Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8272 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-V6G6-86J5-M57G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:38 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:38
VLAI
Details

This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Foxit Reader 8.3.0.14878. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within app.launchURL method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-4724.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-10951"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-08-29T13:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable installations of Foxit Reader 8.3.0.14878. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file. The specific flaw exists within app.launchURL method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-4724.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6g6-86j5-m57g",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:38:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:38:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-17-691"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100409"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039213"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V6QH-23JX-X3GW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-18 03:30 – Updated: 2023-05-18 03:30
VLAI
Details

Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) could allow an authenticated attacker to perform command injection attacks on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker must have valid credentials on an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-20164"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-18T03:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in Cisco Identity Services Engine (ISE) could allow an authenticated attacker to perform command injection attacks on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker must have valid credentials on an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Details section of this advisory.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6qh-23jx-x3gw",
  "modified": "2023-05-18T03:30:21Z",
  "published": "2023-05-18T03:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20164"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ise-injection-sRQnsEU9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V6R2-JH58-XX6W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 16:00 – Updated: 2026-07-02 16:00
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw's marketplace runtime extension metadata could point at unscanned payloads
Details

Summary

Marketplace runtime extension metadata could point at unscanned payloads. In affected versions, a package selected for installation by a trusted operator could redirect runtime loading toward hidden package content that was not scanned as expected.

This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.

Impact

When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could load plugin code outside the reviewed package entry points. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.

Patched Versions

The first stable patched version is 2026.5.18.

Mitigations

Install only trusted plugins and keep plugin allowlists explicit until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.5.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53810"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-829",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T16:00:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T21:16:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nMarketplace runtime extension metadata could point at unscanned payloads. In affected versions, a package selected for installation by a trusted operator could redirect runtime loading toward hidden package content that was not scanned as expected.\n\nThis advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw\u0027s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could load plugin code outside the reviewed package entry points. Practical impact depends on the operator\u0027s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.\n\n### Patched Versions\n\nThe first stable patched version is `2026.5.18`.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nInstall only trusted plugins and keep plugin allowlists explicit until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6r2-jh58-xx6w",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T16:00:42Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T16:00:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-v6r2-jh58-xx6w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53810"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-arbitrary-code-execution-via-unscanned-marketplace-runtime-extension-metadata"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s marketplace runtime extension metadata could point at unscanned payloads"
}

GHSA-V6WJ-C83F-V46X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-09 00:42 – Updated: 2026-05-09 00:42
VLAI
Summary
@profullstack/mcp-server vulnerable to OS Command Injection in domain_lookup Module
Details

Security Advisory: OS Command Injection in profullstack/mcp-server domain_lookup Module

Field | Value -- | -- Project | profullstack/mcp-server Repository | https://github.com/profullstack/mcp-server Affected Commit | 2e8ea913573610667ad54e31dba2e8198ebf7cf9 Affected Module | mcp_modules/domain_lookup Affected Endpoints | POST /domain-lookup/check, POST /domain-lookup/bulk Vulnerability Type | CWE-78: OS Command Injection CVSS 3.1 Score | 9.8 (Critical) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Authentication Required | None Default Network Exposure | Bind address 0.0.0.0, no global authentication middleware Validated | 2026-04-21 (initial), 2026-04-28 (re-confirmed)

Summary

The domain_lookup module assembles a shell command string by concatenating user-controlled input (domains / keywords) and passes it to execAsync(). Both HTTP endpoints reach the same sink. Because there is no argument quoting, escaping, or allowlist — and no authentication on the server — an unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands as the server process.

Affected Code

  • index.js:27 — server binds to 0.0.0.0, no global auth middleware.
  • mcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:52 — registers POST /domain-lookup/check.
  • mcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:55 — registers POST /domain-lookup/bulk.
  • mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:19, :20 — buildTldxCommand() concatenates user input into the shell string.
  • mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:114, :115, :142 — execAsync(command) sink reached from both routes.

Vulnerable Code

File: mcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js

Step 1 — User input concatenated directly into a shell string:

buildTldxCommand(keywords, options = {}) {
  let command = `tldx ${keywords.join(' ')}`;

  if (options.prefixes?.length) {
    command += ` --prefixes ${options.prefixes.join(',')}`;
  }
}

Step 2 — That shell string is executed as-is:

async checkDomainAvailability(domains, options = {}) {
  try {
    const command = this.buildTldxCommand(domains, options);
    const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command);

There is no sanitization between Step 1 and Step 2. Shell metacharacters (;, |, $(), etc.) in user input are interpreted by /bin/sh at execution time.

Proof of Concept

Tested against a local Docker build of the affected commit (0.0.0.0:13000->3000/tcp).

PoC A — POST /domain-lookup/check

Request:

curl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/check \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"domains":["example.com; echo final_check_poc > /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt; #"]}'

Response:

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
access-control-allow-origin: *
content-type: application/json
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:39 GMT

{"error":"tldx command failed: tldx command failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\n"}

Side effect confirmed inside container:

$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt
final_check_poc

PoC B — POST /domain-lookup/bulk

Request:

curl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/bulk \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"keywords":["safe","x; echo final_bulk_poc > /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt; #"]}'

Response:

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
access-control-allow-origin: *
content-type: application/json
Date: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:40 GMT

{"error":"Bulk domain check failed: Bulk domain check failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\n"}

Side effect confirmed inside container:

$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt
final_bulk_poc

Note on HTTP 500

Both requests return HTTP 500 because tldx is not installed in the test container. The injected commands are interpreted by the shell before tldx is invoked. The marker files confirm that attacker-controlled commands executed successfully despite the 500 response. In a production environment where tldx is installed, both the intended function and the injected commands execute.

Impact

  • Unauthenticated remote code execution as the server process UID.
  • Full read/write access to any file the server process can access.
  • Potential for outbound connections, credential theft, persistence, and lateral movement.
  • Reproducible with a single unauthenticated HTTP POST to either of two documented endpoints.

Suggested Remediation

  1. Replace execAsync(command) with child_process.execFile or spawn('tldx', [keyword1, keyword2, ...]) — pass arguments as an array, never as a concatenated shell string.
  2. Validate all domain/keyword input against a strict allowlist (RFC 1035 hostname syntax) before invoking the external binary; reject any input containing shell metacharacters.
  3. Add a global authentication middleware so all HTTP-exposed modules are not callable anonymously.
  4. Default the server bind address to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for non-loopback bindings.

Verification Environment

  • Local Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested.
  • The container does not include the tldx binary; this is intentional for safe local PoC and does not affect exploitability.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@profullstack/mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.4.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-09T00:42:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003c!--StartFragment--\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u003ch1\u003eSecurity Advisory: OS Command Injection in \u003ccode\u003eprofullstack/mcp-server\u003c/code\u003e \u003ccode\u003edomain_lookup\u003c/code\u003e Module\u003c/h1\u003e\n\nField | Value\n-- | --\nProject | profullstack/mcp-server\nRepository | https://github.com/profullstack/mcp-server\nAffected Commit | 2e8ea913573610667ad54e31dba2e8198ebf7cf9\nAffected Module | mcp_modules/domain_lookup\nAffected Endpoints | POST /domain-lookup/check, POST /domain-lookup/bulk\nVulnerability Type | CWE-78: OS Command Injection\nCVSS 3.1 Score | 9.8 (Critical) \u2014 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\nAuthentication Required | None\nDefault Network Exposure | Bind address 0.0.0.0, no global authentication middleware\nValidated | 2026-04-21 (initial), 2026-04-28 (re-confirmed)\n\n\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eSummary\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003edomain_lookup\u003c/code\u003e module assembles a shell command string by concatenating user-controlled input (\u003ccode\u003edomains\u003c/code\u003e / \u003ccode\u003ekeywords\u003c/code\u003e) and passes it to \u003ccode\u003eexecAsync()\u003c/code\u003e. Both HTTP endpoints reach the same sink. Because there is no argument quoting, escaping, or allowlist \u2014 and no authentication on the server \u2014 an unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands as the server process.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eAffected Code\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003eindex.js:27\u003c/code\u003e \u2014 server binds to \u003ccode\u003e0.0.0.0\u003c/code\u003e, no global auth middleware.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:52\u003c/code\u003e \u2014 registers \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/check\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/index.js:55\u003c/code\u003e \u2014 registers \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/bulk\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:19, :20\u003c/code\u003e \u2014 \u003ccode\u003ebuildTldxCommand()\u003c/code\u003e concatenates user input into the shell string.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js:114, :115, :142\u003c/code\u003e \u2014 \u003ccode\u003eexecAsync(command)\u003c/code\u003e sink reached from both routes.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eVulnerable Code\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFile:\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003emcp_modules/domain_lookup/src/service.js\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eStep 1 \u2014 User input concatenated directly into a shell string:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-js\"\u003ebuildTldxCommand(keywords, options = {}) {\n  let command = `tldx ${keywords.join(\u0027 \u0027)}`;\n\n  if (options.prefixes?.length) {\n    command += ` --prefixes ${options.prefixes.join(\u0027,\u0027)}`;\n  }\n}\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eStep 2 \u2014 That shell string is executed as-is:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-js\"\u003easync checkDomainAvailability(domains, options = {}) {\n  try {\n    const command = this.buildTldxCommand(domains, options);\n    const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command);\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no sanitization between Step 1 and Step 2. Shell metacharacters (\u003ccode\u003e;\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e|\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003e$()\u003c/code\u003e, etc.) in user input are interpreted by \u003ccode\u003e/bin/sh\u003c/code\u003e at execution time.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eProof of Concept\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTested against a local Docker build of the affected commit (\u003ccode\u003e0.0.0.0:13000-\u0026gt;3000/tcp\u003c/code\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePoC A \u2014 \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/check\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRequest:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003ecurl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/check \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"domains\":[\"example.com; echo final_check_poc \u0026gt; /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt; #\"]}\u0027\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResponse:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eHTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\ncontent-type: application/json\nDate: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:39 GMT\n\n{\"error\":\"tldx command failed: tldx command failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\\n\"}\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSide effect confirmed inside container:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_check.txt\nfinal_check_poc\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePoC B \u2014 \u003ccode\u003ePOST /domain-lookup/bulk\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eRequest:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode class=\"language-bash\"\u003ecurl -X POST http://localhost:13000/domain-lookup/bulk \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"keywords\":[\"safe\",\"x; echo final_bulk_poc \u0026gt; /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt; #\"]}\u0027\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResponse:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003eHTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\naccess-control-allow-origin: *\ncontent-type: application/json\nDate: Tue, 21 Apr 2026 04:32:40 GMT\n\n{\"error\":\"Bulk domain check failed: Bulk domain check failed: /bin/sh: tldx: not found\\n\"}\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSide effect confirmed inside container:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cpre\u003e\u003ccode\u003e$ cat /tmp/verify-exports/final_bulk.txt\nfinal_bulk_poc\n\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eNote on HTTP 500\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBoth requests return HTTP 500 because \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e is not installed in the test container. The injected commands are interpreted by the shell \u003cstrong\u003ebefore\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e is invoked. The marker files confirm that attacker-controlled commands executed successfully despite the 500 response. In a production environment where \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e is installed, both the intended function and the injected commands execute.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eImpact\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eUnauthenticated remote code execution as the server process UID.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eFull read/write access to any file the server process can access.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePotential for outbound connections, credential theft, persistence, and lateral movement.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReproducible with a single unauthenticated HTTP POST to either of two documented endpoints.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eSuggested Remediation\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eReplace \u003ccode\u003eexecAsync(command)\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003echild_process.execFile\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003espawn(\u0027tldx\u0027, [keyword1, keyword2, ...])\u003c/code\u003e \u2014 pass arguments as an array, never as a concatenated shell string.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eValidate all domain/keyword input against a strict allowlist (RFC 1035 hostname syntax) before invoking the external binary; reject any input containing shell metacharacters.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAdd a global authentication middleware so all HTTP-exposed modules are not callable anonymously.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eDefault the server bind address to \u003ccode\u003e127.0.0.1\u003c/code\u003e and require explicit opt-in for non-loopback bindings.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e\n\u003chr\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eVerification Environment\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eLocal Docker container only; no third-party deployment was tested.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eThe container does not include the \u003ccode\u003etldx\u003c/code\u003e binary; this is intentional for safe local PoC and does not affect exploitability.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u003c!--EndFragment--\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x",
  "modified": "2026-05-09T00:42:12Z",
  "published": "2026-05-09T00:42:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/profullstack/mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-v6wj-c83f-v46x"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/profullstack/mcp-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@profullstack/mcp-server vulnerable to OS Command Injection in domain_lookup Module"
}

GHSA-V6WV-QMHQ-J5MP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-13 12:31 – Updated: 2025-10-02 15:31
VLAI
Details

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in RTI Connext Professional (System Designer) allows OS Command Injection.This issue affects Connext Professional: from 7.0.0 before 7.3.0.2, from 6.1.0 before 6.1.2.19.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-52058"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-13T11:15:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability in RTI Connext Professional (System Designer) allows OS Command Injection.This issue affects Connext Professional: from 7.0.0 before 7.3.0.2, from 6.1.0 before 6.1.2.19.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6wv-qmhq-j5mp",
  "modified": "2025-10-02T15:31:12Z",
  "published": "2024-12-13T12:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52058"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rti.com/vulnerabilities/#cve-2024-52058"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V6X4-XFCG-2VXH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-15 00:30 – Updated: 2024-05-15 00:30
VLAI
Details

Multiple authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the command line interface. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities result in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-31477"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T23:15:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the command line interface. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities result in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-v6x4-xfcg-2vxh",
  "modified": "2024-05-15T00:30:37Z",
  "published": "2024-05-15T00:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31477"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2024-006.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V6XM-GCVX-99RX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:29 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:40
VLAI
Details

HOME SPOT CUBE2 firmware V101 and earlier allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via Clock Settings.

Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-2183"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-07-07T13:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "HOME SPOT CUBE2 firmware V101 and earlier allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via Clock Settings.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6xm-gcvx-99rx",
  "modified": "2025-04-20T03:40:25Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:29:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2183"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.au.com/information/notice_mobile/update/update-20170612-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN24348065/index.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99282"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V6XW-2VGR-375P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-25 18:30 – Updated: 2025-07-25 18:30
VLAI
Details

A command injection vulnerability exists in the eScan Web Management Console version 5.5-2. The application fails to properly sanitize the 'pass' parameter when processing login requests to login.php, allowing an authenticated attacker with a valid username to inject arbitrary commands via a specially crafted password value. Successful exploitation results in remote code execution. Privilege escalation to root is possible by abusing the runasroot utility with mwconf-level privileges.

Severity
9.4 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-125118"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-25T16:15:26Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A command injection vulnerability exists in the eScan Web Management Console version 5.5-2. The application fails to properly sanitize the \u0027pass\u0027 parameter when processing login requests to login.php, allowing an authenticated attacker with a valid username to inject arbitrary commands via a specially crafted password value. Successful exploitation results in remote code execution. Privilege escalation to root is possible by abusing the runasroot utility with mwconf-level privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-v6xw-2vgr-375p",
  "modified": "2025-07-25T18:30:38Z",
  "published": "2025-07-25T18:30:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-125118"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/linux/antivirus/escan_password_exec.rb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/32869"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/escan-web-management-console-command-injection"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V73W-8QPR-XW6P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49
VLAI
Details

Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 21 of 46).

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-11163"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-06-02T01:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 21 of 46).",
  "id": "GHSA-v73w-8qpr-xw6p",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:05Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:49:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11163"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-dr-series-disk-backup-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/148003/Quest-DR-Series-Disk-Backup-Software-4.0.3-Code-Execution.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/71"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V75R-VX73-82PJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 20:47 – Updated: 2026-06-19 20:47
VLAI
Summary
@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm: Shell Injection via Unsanitized --workspace Argument
Details

Summary

A command injection vulnerability exists in @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm when the CLI is invoked with the --workspace <value> option while the environment variable npm_execpath is unset or empty.
User‑supplied --workspace values are passed to a subshell without proper sanitization, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands.
This issue corresponds to CWE‑78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.

The vulnerability was fixed in version 5.0.0.

Vulnerability Details

When cyclonedx-npm is executed with the --workspace option, the provided argument is incorporated into an internal shell command.
If the environment variable npm_execpath is set, the tool uses the npm executable directly and no injection occurs.
However, when npm_execpath is unset or empty, the tool falls back to spawning a subshell and interpolating the --workspace value directly into the command string without proper escaping or neutralization.

As a result, specially crafted workspace names can break out of the intended command context and execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the invoking user.

Impact

An attacker who can influence the value passed to --workspace can execute arbitrary OS commands.
This may lead to:

  • Arbitrary command execution
  • Data exfiltration
  • Local privilege escalation (depending on how the tool is used)
  • Modification or destruction of files accessible to the user running the CLI

The vulnerability affects only scenarios where: * The user invokes cyclonedx-npm with --workspace <value>, and * The environment variable npm_execpath is unset or empty

Exploitation Conditions (High‑Level)

Exploitation requires the attacker to supply or influence the --workspace value passed to the CLI.
If the tool falls back to its subshell execution path, specially crafted workspace identifiers can cause unintended command execution.
No exploit code is included here to avoid providing weaponizable examples.

Root Cause

The CLI constructs a shell command using untrusted input from the --workspace option.
Because the fallback code path does not sanitize or escape the workspace value, special shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |) are interpreted by the shell, enabling command injection.

This behavior matches CWE‑78.

Fix

The vulnerability was resolved in PR #1476, which ensures that workspace values are handled safely and are no longer passed to a subshell in an unsafe manner.

The fix is included in @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm version 5.0.0.

Remediation

  • Upgrade to version 5.0.0 or later, which contains the complete fix.
  • As a temporary mitigation for older versions, ensure that the environment variable npm_execpath is set before invoking the tool.
  • Avoid passing untrusted or user‑controlled values to the --workspace option.
Severity
8.5 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55849"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T20:47:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nA command injection vulnerability exists in `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` when the CLI is invoked with the `--workspace \u003cvalue\u003e` option while the environment variable `npm_execpath` is unset or empty.  \nUser\u2011supplied `--workspace` values are passed to a subshell without proper sanitization, enabling attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands.  \nThis issue corresponds to **CWE\u201178**: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.\n\nThe vulnerability was fixed in version [5.0.0][v5.0.0].\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\nWhen `cyclonedx-npm` is executed with the `--workspace` option, the provided argument is incorporated into an internal shell command.  \nIf the environment variable `npm_execpath` is set, the tool uses the npm executable directly and no injection occurs.  \nHowever, when `npm_execpath` is unset or empty, the tool falls back to spawning a subshell and interpolating the `--workspace` value directly into the command string without proper escaping or neutralization.\n\nAs a result, specially crafted workspace names can break out of the intended command context and execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the invoking user.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence the value passed to `--workspace` can execute arbitrary OS commands.  \nThis may lead to:\n\n* Arbitrary command execution\n* Data exfiltration\n* Local privilege escalation (depending on how the tool is used)\n* Modification or destruction of files accessible to the user running the CLI\n\nThe vulnerability affects only scenarios where:\n* The user invokes `cyclonedx-npm` with `--workspace \u003cvalue\u003e`, and\n* The environment variable `npm_execpath` is unset or empty\n\n## Exploitation Conditions (High\u2011Level)\n\nExploitation requires the attacker to supply or influence the `--workspace` value passed to the CLI.  \nIf the tool falls back to its subshell execution path, specially crafted workspace identifiers can cause unintended command execution.  \nNo exploit code is included here to avoid providing weaponizable examples.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe CLI constructs a shell command using untrusted input from the `--workspace` option.  \nBecause the fallback code path does not sanitize or escape the workspace value, special shell metacharacters (e.g., `;`, `\u0026\u0026`, `|`) are interpreted by the shell, enabling command injection.\n\nThis behavior matches **CWE\u201178**.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe vulnerability was resolved in [PR #1476], which ensures that workspace values are handled safely and are no longer passed to a subshell in an unsafe manner.\n\nThe fix is included in `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` version [5.0.0][v5.0.0].\n\n## Remediation\n\n* Upgrade to version [5.0.0][v5.0.0] or later, which contains the complete fix.\n* As a temporary mitigation for older versions, ensure that the environment variable `npm_execpath` is set before invoking the tool.\n* Avoid passing untrusted or user\u2011controlled values to the `--workspace` option.\n\n[v5.0.0]: https://github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-node-npm/releases/tag/v5.0.0\n[PR #1476]: https://github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-node-npm/pull/1476",
  "id": "GHSA-v75r-vx73-82pj",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T20:47:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T20:47:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-node-npm/security/advisories/GHSA-v75r-vx73-82pj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-node-npm/pull/1476"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-node-npm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/CycloneDX/cyclonedx-node-npm/releases/tag/v5.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm: Shell Injection via Unsanitized --workspace Argument"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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