Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8272 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-V7QQ-G7HW-PJ84

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-06 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-04 21:31
VLAI
Details

Advantech WebAccess/VPN versions prior to 1.1.5 contain a command injection vulnerability in AppManagementController.appUpgradeAction() that allows an authenticated system administrator to execute arbitrary commands as the web server user (www-data) by supplying a crafted uploaded filename.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34239"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-06T20:15:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Advantech WebAccess/VPN versions prior to 1.1.5 contain a command injection vulnerability in\u00a0AppManagementController.appUpgradeAction()\u00a0that allows an authenticated system administrator to execute arbitrary commands as the web server user (www-data) by supplying a crafted uploaded filename.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7qq-g7hw-pj84",
  "modified": "2025-12-04T21:31:02Z",
  "published": "2025-11-06T21:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34239"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://icr.advantech.com/download/software"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://icr.advantech.com/support/router-models/download/511/sa-2025-01-vpn-portal-2025-11-06.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/advantech-webaccess-vpn-command-injection-in-appmanagementcontroller"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V7W4-M8G5-3VVF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:10
VLAI
Details

rConfig 3.9.5 allows command injection by sending a crafted GET request to lib/ajaxHandlers/ajaxArchiveFiles.php since the path parameter is passed directly to the exec function without being escaped.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-23151"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-09T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "rConfig 3.9.5 allows command injection by sending a crafted GET request to lib/ajaxHandlers/ajaxArchiveFiles.php since the path parameter is passed directly to the exec function without being escaped.",
  "id": "GHSA-v7w4-m8g5-3vvf",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:10:37Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:10:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-23151"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/blob/7ef8bd8d606bc10835e1b8f6f72a2048094816d3/www/lib/ajaxHandlers/ajaxArchiveFiles.php#L13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V82M-QMR3-V4F8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:54 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:44
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges on an affected device. An attacker would need to have valid administrator credentials on the device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the affected software. An attacker with elevated privileges could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted commands to the administrative web management interface of the affected software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to inject and execute arbitrary, system-level commands with root privileges on an affected device.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-1850"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-08-21T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges on an affected device. An attacker would need to have valid administrator credentials on the device. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the affected software. An attacker with elevated privileges could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted commands to the administrative web management interface of the affected software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to inject and execute arbitrary, system-level commands with root privileges on an affected device.",
  "id": "GHSA-v82m-qmr3-v4f8",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:44:58Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:54:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1850"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190821-imc-cmdinj-1850"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V833-MFJC-7QR5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-24 03:30 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:34
VLAI
Details

OS Command injection vulnerability in sleuthkit fls tool 4.11.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted value to the m parameter.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-45639"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-01-24T02:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "OS Command injection vulnerability in sleuthkit fls tool 4.11.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted value to the m parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-v833-mfjc-7qr5",
  "modified": "2024-03-21T03:34:39Z",
  "published": "2023-01-24T03:30:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45639"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.binaryworld.it/guidepoc.asp#CVE-2022-45639"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/171649/Sleuthkit-4.11.1-Command-Injection.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.binaryworld.it"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V847-HXXW-3PXG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:53 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:53
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI recipe.run_stream skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement
Details

PraisonAI recipe.run_stream() skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement

Summary

PraisonAI recipe execution blocks default-denied dangerous tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. The normal recipe.run() path enforces this with _check_tool_policy(). The streaming path, recipe.run_stream(), loads the same recipe, checks dependencies, and then calls _execute_recipe() without running the dangerous-tool policy check.

As a result, a recipe that honestly declares execute_command in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools is denied by recipe.run(), but reaches the execution engine through recipe.run_stream() with allow_dangerous_tools=False.

The local PoV uses a harmless printf canary, explicitly unsets PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE, and avoids network access.

Affected Product

  • Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI
  • Package: praisonai
  • Components:
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/core.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py
  • src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/yaml_parser.py
  • src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py

Validated affected:

  • current main 2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1 (v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab)
  • v4.6.57
  • v4.6.56
  • v4.6.10
  • v4.6.9
  • v4.5.128
  • v4.5.120
  • v4.5.96
  • v4.5.87

Suggested affected range: >= 4.5.87, <= 4.6.57.

PyPI lists PraisonAI 4.6.57 as the latest release on 2026-06-13.

Earlier tested tags through v4.5.85 failed in this source checkout before the tested workflow path due an unrelated praisonaiagents.output.models import error. They are not claimed fixed or unaffected.

Root Cause

recipe.run() enforces the dangerous-tool gate:

if not options.get("allow_dangerous_tools", False):
    policy_error = _check_tool_policy(recipe_config)
    if policy_error:
        return RecipeResult(..., status=RecipeStatus.POLICY_DENIED, ...)

recipe.run_stream() has a sibling execution path. It loads the recipe and checks dependencies, but then goes directly to execution:

recipe_config = _load_recipe(name, offline=options.get("offline", False))
...
output = _execute_recipe(recipe_config, merged_config, session_id, options)

There is no equivalent _check_tool_policy() call in run_stream() before execution or before the dry-run shortcut.

The CLI exposes this path via praisonai recipe run <recipe> --stream, and the recipe HTTP server exposes it as POST /v1/recipes/stream.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

The normal recipe path clearly treats declared dangerous tools as denied by default. A control recipe with TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools: [execute_command] returns:

Tool 'execute_command' is denied by default. Use allow_dangerous_tools=True to override.

That operator-facing override should not depend on whether the caller requests streaming output. PraisonAI's own docs describe approval as requiring a human or configured channel before risky tools run, describe security environment variables as opt-in access for dangerous operations with secure defaults, and describe policy controls as blocking dangerous operations.

This is distinct from the prior report PRAI-CAND-011:

  • PRAI-CAND-011 covers workflow tool declarations that are omitted from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools.
  • This report covers a sibling entrypoint that skips the policy check even when TEMPLATE.yaml correctly declares the dangerous tool.

It is also distinct from the published Recipe-server authentication fail-open advisory. That advisory covers missing authentication secrets. This report assumes the attacker has whatever access is already needed to invoke recipe streaming and focuses on the missing dangerous-tool policy guard.

Local PoV

Run:

python3 poc/pov_prai_cand_012_stream_policy_bypass.py

Expected output includes:

{
  "ok": true,
  "policy_error": "Tool 'execute_command' is denied by default. Use allow_dangerous_tools=True to override.",
  "control_recipe_status": "policy_denied",
  "execution_reached": [
    {
      "recipe": "declared-dangerous-stream",
      "declared_required_tools": ["execute_command"],
      "allow_dangerous_tools": false
    }
  ],
  "workflow_approve_tools": ["execute_command"],
  "runner_tool_names": ["execute_command"],
  "command_stdout": "PRAI-CAND-012-CANARY",
  "operator_env_auto_approve": null
}

The PoV creates a temporary recipe that declares execute_command in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools.

Control:

  • recipe.run(..., options={"force": True}) returns policy_denied.

Bypass:

  • recipe.run_stream(..., options={"force": True}) emits the executing event and reaches _execute_recipe() while allow_dangerous_tools remains false.
  • The same recipe workflow resolves execute_command and preserves approve: [execute_command].
  • With the workflow approval context installed, the resolved tool runs the harmless local command printf PRAI-CAND-012-CANARY.

The PoV monkey-patches _execute_recipe() only to prove that run_stream() crosses the policy boundary without invoking an LLM. The command canary is executed directly through the same resolved workflow tool and approval context to keep the proof deterministic and local-only.

Impact

If an operator runs an untrusted recipe through streaming mode, or exposes the recipe streaming API to users who can choose recipe names or URIs, the recipe can reach execution with default-denied tools even though the caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True.

If the workflow reaches the approved execute_command tool call, commands run with the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The exact trigger depends on the workflow and model/tool-call path, but the dangerous-tool policy boundary is already bypassed before execution.

The HTTP recipe sidecar is documented as a localhost REST API with SSE streaming and optional API-key/JWT authentication. This report does not claim default unauthenticated network RCE. In authenticated or exposed sidecar deployments where lower-trust users can invoke /v1/recipes/stream, the same policy gap can become a remote recipe-execution issue.

Suggested Fix

Centralize recipe preflight enforcement so every execution mode uses the same guard:

  1. Run _check_tool_policy(recipe_config) in run_stream() unless options["allow_dangerous_tools"] is true.
  2. Perform that check before both dry-run and real execution, matching recipe.run().
  3. Prefer a shared helper for dependency checks, dangerous-tool policy checks, and dry-run handling so future entrypoints cannot drift.
  4. Add regression tests:
  5. declared dangerous tool is denied by recipe.run();
  6. the same declared dangerous tool is denied by recipe.run_stream();
  7. allow_dangerous_tools=True preserves the intended opt-in behavior;
  8. /v1/recipes/stream maps a policy denial to a non-success SSE event or equivalent HTTP failure.
Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.5.87"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:53:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# PraisonAI `recipe.run_stream()` skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI recipe execution blocks default-denied dangerous tools unless the\ncaller explicitly passes `allow_dangerous_tools=True`. The normal `recipe.run()`\npath enforces this with `_check_tool_policy()`. The streaming path,\n`recipe.run_stream()`, loads the same recipe, checks dependencies, and then\ncalls `_execute_recipe()` without running the dangerous-tool policy check.\n\nAs a result, a recipe that honestly declares `execute_command` in\n`TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools` is denied by `recipe.run()`, but reaches the\nexecution engine through `recipe.run_stream()` with\n`allow_dangerous_tools=False`.\n\nThe local PoV uses a harmless `printf` canary, explicitly unsets\n`PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE`, and avoids network access.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Components:\n  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/core.py`\n  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py`\n  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py`\n  - `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/yaml_parser.py`\n  - `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/workflows/workflows.py`\n\nValidated affected:\n\n- current main `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n  (`v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab`)\n- `v4.6.57`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.6.10`\n- `v4.6.9`\n- `v4.5.128`\n- `v4.5.120`\n- `v4.5.96`\n- `v4.5.87`\n\nSuggested affected range: `\u003e= 4.5.87, \u003c= 4.6.57`.\n\nPyPI lists `PraisonAI 4.6.57` as the latest release on 2026-06-13.\n\nEarlier tested tags through `v4.5.85` failed in this source checkout before the\ntested workflow path due an unrelated `praisonaiagents.output.models` import\nerror. They are not claimed fixed or unaffected.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`recipe.run()` enforces the dangerous-tool gate:\n\n```python\nif not options.get(\"allow_dangerous_tools\", False):\n    policy_error = _check_tool_policy(recipe_config)\n    if policy_error:\n        return RecipeResult(..., status=RecipeStatus.POLICY_DENIED, ...)\n```\n\n`recipe.run_stream()` has a sibling execution path. It loads the recipe and\nchecks dependencies, but then goes directly to execution:\n\n```python\nrecipe_config = _load_recipe(name, offline=options.get(\"offline\", False))\n...\noutput = _execute_recipe(recipe_config, merged_config, session_id, options)\n```\n\nThere is no equivalent `_check_tool_policy()` call in `run_stream()` before\nexecution or before the dry-run shortcut.\n\nThe CLI exposes this path via `praisonai recipe run \u003crecipe\u003e --stream`, and the\nrecipe HTTP server exposes it as `POST /v1/recipes/stream`.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nThe normal recipe path clearly treats declared dangerous tools as denied by\ndefault. A control recipe with `TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools:\n[execute_command]` returns:\n\n```text\nTool \u0027execute_command\u0027 is denied by default. Use allow_dangerous_tools=True to override.\n```\n\nThat operator-facing override should not depend on whether the caller requests\nstreaming output. PraisonAI\u0027s own docs describe approval as requiring a human\nor configured channel before risky tools run, describe security environment\nvariables as opt-in access for dangerous operations with secure defaults, and\ndescribe policy controls as blocking dangerous operations.\n\nThis is distinct from the prior report `PRAI-CAND-011`:\n\n- `PRAI-CAND-011` covers workflow tool declarations that are omitted from\n  `TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools`.\n- This report covers a sibling entrypoint that skips the policy check even when\n  `TEMPLATE.yaml` correctly declares the dangerous tool.\n\nIt is also distinct from the published Recipe-server authentication fail-open\nadvisory. That advisory covers missing authentication secrets. This report\nassumes the attacker has whatever access is already needed to invoke recipe\nstreaming and focuses on the missing dangerous-tool policy guard.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\npython3 poc/pov_prai_cand_012_stream_policy_bypass.py\n```\n\nExpected output includes:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"ok\": true,\n  \"policy_error\": \"Tool \u0027execute_command\u0027 is denied by default. Use allow_dangerous_tools=True to override.\",\n  \"control_recipe_status\": \"policy_denied\",\n  \"execution_reached\": [\n    {\n      \"recipe\": \"declared-dangerous-stream\",\n      \"declared_required_tools\": [\"execute_command\"],\n      \"allow_dangerous_tools\": false\n    }\n  ],\n  \"workflow_approve_tools\": [\"execute_command\"],\n  \"runner_tool_names\": [\"execute_command\"],\n  \"command_stdout\": \"PRAI-CAND-012-CANARY\",\n  \"operator_env_auto_approve\": null\n}\n```\n\nThe PoV creates a temporary recipe that declares `execute_command` in\n`TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools`.\n\nControl:\n\n- `recipe.run(..., options={\"force\": True})` returns `policy_denied`.\n\nBypass:\n\n- `recipe.run_stream(..., options={\"force\": True})` emits the `executing`\n  event and reaches `_execute_recipe()` while `allow_dangerous_tools` remains\n  false.\n- The same recipe workflow resolves `execute_command` and preserves\n  `approve: [execute_command]`.\n- With the workflow approval context installed, the resolved tool runs the\n  harmless local command `printf PRAI-CAND-012-CANARY`.\n\nThe PoV monkey-patches `_execute_recipe()` only to prove that\n`run_stream()` crosses the policy boundary without invoking an LLM. The command\ncanary is executed directly through the same resolved workflow tool and\napproval context to keep the proof deterministic and local-only.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator runs an untrusted recipe through streaming mode, or exposes the\nrecipe streaming API to users who can choose recipe names or URIs, the recipe\ncan reach execution with default-denied tools even though the caller did not\nset `allow_dangerous_tools=True`.\n\nIf the workflow reaches the approved `execute_command` tool call, commands run\nwith the privileges of the PraisonAI process. The exact trigger depends on the\nworkflow and model/tool-call path, but the dangerous-tool policy boundary is\nalready bypassed before execution.\n\nThe HTTP recipe sidecar is documented as a localhost REST API with SSE\nstreaming and optional API-key/JWT authentication. This report does not claim\ndefault unauthenticated network RCE. In authenticated or exposed sidecar\ndeployments where lower-trust users can invoke `/v1/recipes/stream`, the same\npolicy gap can become a remote recipe-execution issue.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nCentralize recipe preflight enforcement so every execution mode uses the same\nguard:\n\n1. Run `_check_tool_policy(recipe_config)` in `run_stream()` unless\n   `options[\"allow_dangerous_tools\"]` is true.\n2. Perform that check before both dry-run and real execution, matching\n   `recipe.run()`.\n3. Prefer a shared helper for dependency checks, dangerous-tool policy checks,\n   and dry-run handling so future entrypoints cannot drift.\n4. Add regression tests:\n   - declared dangerous tool is denied by `recipe.run()`;\n   - the same declared dangerous tool is denied by `recipe.run_stream()`;\n   - `allow_dangerous_tools=True` preserves the intended opt-in behavior;\n   - `/v1/recipes/stream` maps a policy denial to a non-success SSE event or\n     equivalent HTTP failure.",
  "id": "GHSA-v847-hxxw-3pxg",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T13:53:05Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:53:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-v847-hxxw-3pxg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI recipe.run_stream skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement"
}

GHSA-V854-296P-97GP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 09:30 – Updated: 2025-09-17 12:30
VLAI
Details

The N-Reporter, N-Cloud, and N-Probe developed by N-Partner has an OS Command Injection vulnerability, allowing authenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands and execute them on the server.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-9972"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-17T07:15:43Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The N-Reporter, N-Cloud, and N-Probe developed by N-Partner has an OS Command Injection vulnerability, allowing authenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary OS commands and execute them on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-v854-296p-97gp",
  "modified": "2025-09-17T12:30:57Z",
  "published": "2025-09-17T09:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9972"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.planet.com.tw/en/support/security-advisory/8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/en/cp-139-10390-7ce12-2.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-10389-265a3-1.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V89W-3C42-RPRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-20 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-31 12:31
VLAI
Details

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in Microchip Time Provider 4100 allows OS Command Injection.This issue affects Time Provider 4100: before 2.5.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.9 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-47900"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-20T18:15:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Microchip Time Provider 4100 allows OS Command Injection.This issue affects Time Provider 4100: before 2.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-v89w-3c42-rprg",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T12:31:33Z",
  "published": "2025-10-20T18:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.gruppotim.it/en/footer/TIM-red-team.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.microchip.com/en-us/solutions/technologies/embedded-security/how-to-report-potential-product-security-vulnerabilities/timeprovider-4100-grandmaster-remote-command-execution"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V8CV-CH4W-445W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-14 00:00 – Updated: 2024-09-17 00:31
VLAI
Details

In Festo Controller CECC-X-M1 product family in multiple versions, the http-endpoint "cecc-x-refresh-request" POST request doesn’t check for port syntax. This can result in unauthorized execution of system commands with root privileges due to improper access control command injection.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-30311"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-13T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In Festo Controller CECC-X-M1 product family in multiple versions, the http-endpoint \"cecc-x-refresh-request\" POST request doesn\u00e2\u20ac\u2122t check for port syntax. This can result in unauthorized execution of system commands with root privileges due to improper access control command injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-v8cv-ch4w-445w",
  "modified": "2024-09-17T00:31:00Z",
  "published": "2022-06-14T00:00:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30311"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2022-020"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V8H2-P73V-3WHX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-11 21:31 – Updated: 2024-11-12 18:30
VLAI
Details

EnGenius EWS356-FIT devices through 1.1.30 allow blind OS command injection. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands via shell metacharacters to the Ping and Speed Test utilities.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-36061"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-11T20:15:17Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "EnGenius EWS356-FIT devices through 1.1.30 allow blind OS command injection. This allows an attacker to execute arbitrary OS commands via shell metacharacters to the Ping and Speed Test utilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-v8h2-p73v-3whx",
  "modified": "2024-11-12T18:30:51Z",
  "published": "2024-11-11T21:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-36061"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/actuator/cve/blob/main/Engenius/CVE-2024-36061"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V8H9-WJ87-Q8VR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-12 15:30 – Updated: 2022-12-15 15:32
VLAI
Details

Authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the ArubaOS command line interface. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities results in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37900"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-12T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authenticated command injection vulnerabilities exist in the ArubaOS command line interface. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities results in the ability to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.",
  "id": "GHSA-v8h9-wj87-q8vr",
  "modified": "2022-12-15T15:32:13Z",
  "published": "2022-12-12T15:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2022-016.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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