CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8265 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W688-W68W-8GV6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 8 of 46).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11150"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-02T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 8 of 46).",
"id": "GHSA-w688-w68w-8gv6",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:49:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11150"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-dr-series-disk-backup-multiple-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/148003/Quest-DR-Series-Disk-Backup-Software-4.0.3-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/71"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6F5-V479-3CRQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:35A vulnerability in the CLI parser of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to gain access to the underlying Linux shell of an affected device and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the device. The vulnerability is due to the affected software improperly sanitizing command arguments to prevent access to internal data structures on a device. An attacker who has privileged EXEC mode (privilege level 15) access to an affected device could exploit this vulnerability on the device by executing CLI commands that contain crafted arguments. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain access to the underlying Linux shell of the affected device and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the device. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCve74432.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-0184"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-03-28T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the CLI parser of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to gain access to the underlying Linux shell of an affected device and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the device. The vulnerability is due to the affected software improperly sanitizing command arguments to prevent access to internal data structures on a device. An attacker who has privileged EXEC mode (privilege level 15) access to an affected device could exploit this vulnerability on the device by executing CLI commands that contain crafted arguments. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain access to the underlying Linux shell of the affected device and execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on the device. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCve74432.",
"id": "GHSA-w6f5-v479-3crq",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:42Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:35:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0184"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-privesc2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103550"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6F8-P44W-P2GP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-11 03:30 – Updated: 2025-03-11 03:30A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the ”zyUtilMailSend” function of the Zyxel AX7501-B1 firmware version V5.17(ABPC.5.3)C0 and earlier could allow an authenticated attacker with administrator privileges to execute operating system (OS) commands on a vulnerable device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12010"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-11T02:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the \u201dzyUtilMailSend\u201d function of the Zyxel\u00a0AX7501-B1 firmware version\u00a0V5.17(ABPC.5.3)C0 and earlier could allow an authenticated attacker with administrator privileges to execute operating system (OS) commands on a vulnerable device.",
"id": "GHSA-w6f8-p44w-p2gp",
"modified": "2025-03-11T03:30:51Z",
"published": "2025-03-11T03:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12010"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-post-authentication-command-injection-vulnerabilities-in-certain-dsl-ethernet-cpe-fiber-ont-and-wifi-extender-devices-03-11-2025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6H2-FR4Q-XVXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:55 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:55Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection
Summary
LocalManagedAgent / SandboxedAgent compute bridging wraps
read_file, list_files, and write_file when a compute provider is
attached. The bridge converts those file operations into shell command strings
using raw path arguments, then sends those strings to shell-backed compute
providers.
An attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument can break out of the
quoted path and execute arbitrary shell commands in the compute environment.
With compute="local", commands execute through the local subprocess compute
provider on the host. With Docker, commands execute in the container.
Affected Product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Package:
praisonai - Component:
src/praisonai/praisonai/integrations/managed_local.py - Confirmed affected:
v4.6.10v4.6.56v4.6.57- current
mainat2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1 - Confirmed not affected:
v4.6.9v4.6.1v4.5.149- Suggested affected range:
>= 4.6.10, <= 4.6.57
Root Cause
Current managed_local.py defines the bridged tool set:
compute_bridged_tools = {"execute_command", "read_file", "write_file", "list_files"}
For file tools, _bridge_file_tool() constructs shell command strings:
command = f'cat "{filepath}"'
command = f'ls -la "{directory}"'
command = f'cat > "{filepath}" << "EOF"\n{content}\nEOF'
The local compute provider executes the string with
asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(...); the Docker compute provider executes it
with ["sh", "-c", command].
The bridge keeps the low-risk read_file / list_files tool names and
signatures while changing their execution primitive into shell interpretation.
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
Compute bridging itself is documented and intentional. The vulnerability is that file path data is interpreted as shell syntax.
The normal read_file and list_files implementations treat the same payload
as a literal path and do not expand shell metacharacters. The approval registry
also marks execute_command as critical, while read_file and list_files
are not dangerous-tool entries.
Impact
An application that exposes a PraisonAI agent using LocalManagedAgent or
SandboxedAgent with a compute provider and a restricted file-tool set can be
tricked into executing shell commands through a path argument to read_file or
list_files.
This can bypass least-privilege tool configuration and tool-approval
expectations. A prompt-injection path, chat endpoint, automation webhook, or
other user-controlled agent task can supply the file path argument without the
operator granting execute_command.
Local PoV
The PoV is local-only and harmless. It uses an environment canary and compares normal file tools against compute-bridged file tools.
Minimal inline reproducer:
import os
from pathlib import Path
from praisonai.integrations.managed_local import LocalManagedAgent, LocalManagedConfig
from praisonaiagents.tools import list_files, read_file
workdir = Path(".prai-cand-006-pov-workdir")
workdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
(workdir / "safe.txt").write_text("SAFE_CONTENT\n", encoding="utf-8")
canary = "PRAISONAI_CAND_006_COMMAND_EXECUTED"
os.environ["PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY"] = canary
payload = 'missing"; printf "$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY"; #'
# Control: normal file tools treat the payload as a literal path.
normal_read = read_file(str(workdir / payload))
normal_list = str(list_files(str(workdir) + '"; printf "$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY"; #'))
cfg = LocalManagedConfig(
name="prai-cand-006-poc",
tools=["read_file", "list_files"],
working_dir=str(workdir),
)
managed = LocalManagedAgent(config=cfg, compute="local")
tools = {tool.__name__: tool for tool in managed._resolve_tools()}
bridged_read = tools["read_file"](payload)
bridged_list = tools["list_files"]('."; printf "$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY"; #')
print("normal_read_contains_canary", canary in normal_read)
print("normal_list_contains_canary", canary in normal_list)
print("bridged_read_contains_canary", canary in bridged_read)
print("bridged_list_contains_canary", canary in bridged_list)
Command:
python3 \
submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-006-compute-file-tool-command-injection/poc/prai_cand_006_compute_file_tool_command_injection.py \
--repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-current
Current-head result:
{
"describe": "v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab",
"vulnerable": true,
"normal_controls": {
"read_file_payload_contains_canary": false,
"list_files_payload_contains_canary": false
},
"bridged_results": {
"read_file_payload_contains_canary": true,
"list_files_payload_contains_canary": true
},
"approval_registry": {
"execute_command_risk": "critical",
"read_file_risk": null,
"list_files_risk": null
}
}
The payload used by the PoV is:
missing"; printf "$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY"; #
Normal read_file treats this as a literal missing filename. The bridged tool
constructs:
cat "missing"; printf "$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY"; #"
and returns the canary from the compute shell.
Suggested Fix
Do not implement file operations by constructing shell command strings from path/content arguments.
Preferred fix:
- Add provider-native file APIs for read, write, and list operations, or pass arguments as structured argv where the provider supports it.
- Preserve the normal file-tool path validation and workspace boundary checks for compute-bridged file tools.
- Treat
write_filecontent as data, not shell source. The current heredoc construction is also unsafe if content can contain the delimiter. - Add regression tests that use paths containing
",;,$(), backticks, newline, and#and assert no shell execution occurs. - Keep
execute_commandas the only bridge path that intentionally accepts a shell command string, with critical approval semantics.
A minimal stopgap is to remove read_file, list_files, and write_file from
compute_bridged_tools until safe provider-native file operations exist.
Suggested Severity
The vector assumes an attacker has low-privilege access to an agent interface
that can request file-tool use. If a deployment exposes such an agent without
authentication, PR:N may be appropriate.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.6.10"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:55:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection\n\n## Summary\n\n`LocalManagedAgent` / `SandboxedAgent` compute bridging wraps\n`read_file`, `list_files`, and `write_file` when a compute provider is\nattached. The bridge converts those file operations into shell command strings\nusing raw path arguments, then sends those strings to shell-backed compute\nproviders.\n\nAn attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument can break out of the\nquoted path and execute arbitrary shell commands in the compute environment.\nWith `compute=\"local\"`, commands execute through the local subprocess compute\nprovider on the host. With Docker, commands execute in the container.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: `src/praisonai/praisonai/integrations/managed_local.py`\n- Confirmed affected:\n - `v4.6.10`\n - `v4.6.56`\n - `v4.6.57`\n - current `main` at `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n- Confirmed not affected:\n - `v4.6.9`\n - `v4.6.1`\n - `v4.5.149`\n- Suggested affected range: `\u003e= 4.6.10, \u003c= 4.6.57`\n\n## Root Cause\n\nCurrent `managed_local.py` defines the bridged tool set:\n\n```python\ncompute_bridged_tools = {\"execute_command\", \"read_file\", \"write_file\", \"list_files\"}\n```\n\nFor file tools, `_bridge_file_tool()` constructs shell command strings:\n\n```python\ncommand = f\u0027cat \"{filepath}\"\u0027\ncommand = f\u0027ls -la \"{directory}\"\u0027\ncommand = f\u0027cat \u003e \"{filepath}\" \u003c\u003c \"EOF\"\\n{content}\\nEOF\u0027\n```\n\nThe local compute provider executes the string with\n`asyncio.create_subprocess_shell(...)`; the Docker compute provider executes it\nwith `[\"sh\", \"-c\", command]`.\n\nThe bridge keeps the low-risk `read_file` / `list_files` tool names and\nsignatures while changing their execution primitive into shell interpretation.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nCompute bridging itself is documented and intentional. The vulnerability is\nthat file path data is interpreted as shell syntax.\n\nThe normal `read_file` and `list_files` implementations treat the same payload\nas a literal path and do not expand shell metacharacters. The approval registry\nalso marks `execute_command` as `critical`, while `read_file` and `list_files`\nare not dangerous-tool entries.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn application that exposes a PraisonAI agent using `LocalManagedAgent` or\n`SandboxedAgent` with a compute provider and a restricted file-tool set can be\ntricked into executing shell commands through a path argument to `read_file` or\n`list_files`.\n\nThis can bypass least-privilege tool configuration and tool-approval\nexpectations. A prompt-injection path, chat endpoint, automation webhook, or\nother user-controlled agent task can supply the file path argument without the\noperator granting `execute_command`.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nThe PoV is local-only and harmless. It uses an environment canary and compares\nnormal file tools against compute-bridged file tools.\n\nMinimal inline reproducer:\n\n```python\nimport os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom praisonai.integrations.managed_local import LocalManagedAgent, LocalManagedConfig\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools import list_files, read_file\n\nworkdir = Path(\".prai-cand-006-pov-workdir\")\nworkdir.mkdir(exist_ok=True)\n(workdir / \"safe.txt\").write_text(\"SAFE_CONTENT\\n\", encoding=\"utf-8\")\n\ncanary = \"PRAISONAI_CAND_006_COMMAND_EXECUTED\"\nos.environ[\"PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"] = canary\npayload = \u0027missing\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #\u0027\n\n# Control: normal file tools treat the payload as a literal path.\nnormal_read = read_file(str(workdir / payload))\nnormal_list = str(list_files(str(workdir) + \u0027\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #\u0027))\n\ncfg = LocalManagedConfig(\n name=\"prai-cand-006-poc\",\n tools=[\"read_file\", \"list_files\"],\n working_dir=str(workdir),\n)\nmanaged = LocalManagedAgent(config=cfg, compute=\"local\")\ntools = {tool.__name__: tool for tool in managed._resolve_tools()}\n\nbridged_read = tools[\"read_file\"](payload)\nbridged_list = tools[\"list_files\"](\u0027.\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #\u0027)\n\nprint(\"normal_read_contains_canary\", canary in normal_read)\nprint(\"normal_list_contains_canary\", canary in normal_list)\nprint(\"bridged_read_contains_canary\", canary in bridged_read)\nprint(\"bridged_list_contains_canary\", canary in bridged_list)\n```\n\nCommand:\n\n```bash\npython3 \\\n submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-006-compute-file-tool-command-injection/poc/prai_cand_006_compute_file_tool_command_injection.py \\\n --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-current\n```\n\nCurrent-head result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"describe\": \"v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab\",\n \"vulnerable\": true,\n \"normal_controls\": {\n \"read_file_payload_contains_canary\": false,\n \"list_files_payload_contains_canary\": false\n },\n \"bridged_results\": {\n \"read_file_payload_contains_canary\": true,\n \"list_files_payload_contains_canary\": true\n },\n \"approval_registry\": {\n \"execute_command_risk\": \"critical\",\n \"read_file_risk\": null,\n \"list_files_risk\": null\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe payload used by the PoV is:\n\n```text\nmissing\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #\n```\n\nNormal `read_file` treats this as a literal missing filename. The bridged tool\nconstructs:\n\n```sh\ncat \"missing\"; printf \"$PRAI_CAND_006_CANARY\"; #\"\n```\n\nand returns the canary from the compute shell.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDo not implement file operations by constructing shell command strings from\npath/content arguments.\n\nPreferred fix:\n\n1. Add provider-native file APIs for read, write, and list operations, or pass\n arguments as structured argv where the provider supports it.\n2. Preserve the normal file-tool path validation and workspace boundary checks\n for compute-bridged file tools.\n3. Treat `write_file` content as data, not shell source. The current heredoc\n construction is also unsafe if content can contain the delimiter.\n4. Add regression tests that use paths containing `\"`, `;`, `$()`, backticks,\n newline, and `#` and assert no shell execution occurs.\n5. Keep `execute_command` as the only bridge path that intentionally accepts a\n shell command string, with critical approval semantics.\n\nA minimal stopgap is to remove `read_file`, `list_files`, and `write_file` from\n`compute_bridged_tools` until safe provider-native file operations exist.\n\n## Suggested Severity\n\nThe vector assumes an attacker has low-privilege access to an agent interface\nthat can request file-tool use. If a deployment exposes such an agent without\nauthentication, `PR:N` may be appropriate.",
"id": "GHSA-w6h2-fr4q-xvxv",
"modified": "2026-06-18T13:55:08Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:55:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-w6h2-fr4q-xvxv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI: Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection"
}
GHSA-W6H5-RJP3-HXVC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:10 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31Multiple ZyXEL network-attached storage (NAS) devices running firmware version 5.21 contain a pre-authentication command injection vulnerability, which may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable device. ZyXEL NAS devices achieve authentication by using the weblogin.cgi CGI executable. This program fails to properly sanitize the username parameter that is passed to it. If the username parameter contains certain characters, it can allow command injection with the privileges of the web server that runs on the ZyXEL device. Although the web server does not run as the root user, ZyXEL devices include a setuid utility that can be leveraged to run any command with root privileges. As such, it should be assumed that exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to remote code execution with root privileges. By sending a specially-crafted HTTP POST or GET request to a vulnerable ZyXEL device, a remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code on the device. This may happen by directly connecting to a device if it is directly exposed to an attacker. However, there are ways to trigger such crafted requests even if an attacker does not have direct connectivity to a vulnerable devices. For example, simply visiting a website can result in the compromise of any ZyXEL device that is reachable from the client system. Affected products include: NAS326 before firmware V5.21(AAZF.7)C0 NAS520 before firmware V5.21(AASZ.3)C0 NAS540 before firmware V5.21(AATB.4)C0 NAS542 before firmware V5.21(ABAG.4)C0 ZyXEL has made firmware updates available for NAS326, NAS520, NAS540, and NAS542 devices. Affected models that are end-of-support: NSA210, NSA220, NSA220+, NSA221, NSA310, NSA310S, NSA320, NSA320S, NSA325 and NSA325v2
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9054"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-04T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple ZyXEL network-attached storage (NAS) devices running firmware version 5.21 contain a pre-authentication command injection vulnerability, which may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable device. ZyXEL NAS devices achieve authentication by using the weblogin.cgi CGI executable. This program fails to properly sanitize the username parameter that is passed to it. If the username parameter contains certain characters, it can allow command injection with the privileges of the web server that runs on the ZyXEL device. Although the web server does not run as the root user, ZyXEL devices include a setuid utility that can be leveraged to run any command with root privileges. As such, it should be assumed that exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to remote code execution with root privileges. By sending a specially-crafted HTTP POST or GET request to a vulnerable ZyXEL device, a remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code on the device. This may happen by directly connecting to a device if it is directly exposed to an attacker. However, there are ways to trigger such crafted requests even if an attacker does not have direct connectivity to a vulnerable devices. For example, simply visiting a website can result in the compromise of any ZyXEL device that is reachable from the client system. Affected products include: NAS326 before firmware V5.21(AAZF.7)C0 NAS520 before firmware V5.21(AASZ.3)C0 NAS540 before firmware V5.21(AATB.4)C0 NAS542 before firmware V5.21(ABAG.4)C0 ZyXEL has made firmware updates available for NAS326, NAS520, NAS540, and NAS542 devices. Affected models that are end-of-support: NSA210, NSA220, NSA220+, NSA221, NSA310, NSA310S, NSA320, NSA320S, NSA325 and NSA325v2",
"id": "GHSA-w6h5-rjp3-hxvc",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:10:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9054"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.cert.org/artifacts/cve-2020-9054.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/498544"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/02/zyxel-fixes-0day-in-network-storage-devices"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-9054"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zyxel.com/support/remote-code-execution-vulnerability-of-NAS-products.shtml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6P4-84VC-QC2W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-21 18:33 – Updated: 2025-06-20 22:14A vulnerability was found in Ackites KillWxapkg up to 2.4.1. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects the function processFile of the file internal/unpack/unpack.go of the component wxapkg File Parser. The manipulation leads to os command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/Ackites/KillWxapkg"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-5030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-20T22:14:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-21T17:15:59Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Ackites KillWxapkg up to 2.4.1. It has been declared as critical. This vulnerability affects the function processFile of the file internal/unpack/unpack.go of the component wxapkg File Parser. The manipulation leads to os command injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitation appears to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-w6p4-84vc-qc2w",
"modified": "2025-06-20T22:14:37Z",
"published": "2025-05-21T18:33:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Ackites/KillWxapkg/issues/85"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Ackites/KillWxapkg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.309850"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.309850"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.580526"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Ackites KillWxapkg vulnerable to OS Command Injection"
}
GHSA-W6P9-F6MP-42PG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:49 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:49Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 34 of 46).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-02T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Quest DR Series Disk Backup software version before 4.0.3.1 allows command injection (issue 34 of 46).",
"id": "GHSA-w6p9-f6mp-42pg",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:49:06Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:49:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11176"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/quest-dr-series-disk-backup-multiple-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/148003/Quest-DR-Series-Disk-Backup-Software-4.0.3-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/May/71"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6PX-PRVJ-7885
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:31 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:31D-Link G416 nodered gz File Handling Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of D-Link G416 routers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the HTTP service listening on TCP port 80. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-21809.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-50215"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T03:16:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "D-Link G416 nodered gz File Handling Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of D-Link G416 routers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the HTTP service listening on TCP port 80. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-21809.",
"id": "GHSA-w6px-prvj-7885",
"modified": "2024-05-03T03:31:06Z",
"published": "2024-05-03T03:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50215"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10367"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1831"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W6Q9-779P-7MP7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:29 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:29McAfee Email Gateway 7.6 allows remote authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the value attribute in a (1) TestFile XML element or the (2) hostname. NOTE: this issue can be combined with CVE-2013-7092 to allow remote attackers to execute commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-7103"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-12-14T17:21:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "McAfee Email Gateway 7.6 allows remote authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the value attribute in a (1) TestFile XML element or the (2) hostname. NOTE: this issue can be combined with CVE-2013-7092 to allow remote attackers to execute commands.",
"id": "GHSA-w6q9-779p-7mp7",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:29:43Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:29:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7103"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/90162"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/100581"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/124277/McAfee-Email-Gateway-7.6-Command-Execution-SQL-Injection.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2013/Dec/18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64150"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W6RH-FP3W-8JJ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-08 21:30 – Updated: 2025-08-08 21:30WAN Emulator v2.3 contains two unauthenticated command execution vulnerabilities. The result.php script calls shell_exec() with unsanitized input from the pc POST parameter, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands as the www-data user. The system also includes a SUID-root binary named dosu, which is vulnerable to command injection via its first argument. An attacker can exploit both flaws in sequence to achieve full remote code execution and escalate privileges to root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-10041"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-08T19:15:33Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "WAN Emulator v2.3 contains two unauthenticated command execution vulnerabilities. The result.php script calls shell_exec() with unsanitized input from the pc POST parameter, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands as the www-data user. The system also includes a SUID-root binary named dosu, which is vulnerable to command injection via its first argument. An attacker can exploit both flaws in sequence to achieve full remote code execution and escalate privileges to root.",
"id": "GHSA-w6rh-fp3w-8jj5",
"modified": "2025-08-08T21:30:38Z",
"published": "2025-08-08T21:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-10041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/linux/http/wanem_exec.rb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sourceforge.net/projects/wanem"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/21190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/wan-emulator-command-execution"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.