GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-2JX3-65F3-XR8R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 21:07 – Updated: 2026-06-18 21:07
VLAI
Summary
spomky-labs/otphp: Mass-assignment in Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri lets a hostile provisioning URI corrupt OTP state or leak an uncaught TypeError
Details

Summary

OTPHP\Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri() parses an attacker-supplied otpauth:// URI and forwards every query key to OTP::setParameter($key, $value). setParameter() resolves the name with property_exists($this, $parameter) and performs a dynamic write $this->{$parameter} = $value (src/OTP.php:196-197). Because the query keys are entirely controlled by whoever produced the URI, a URI can target the internal properties of the OTP object that are not meant to be set from a URI: parameters, issuer, label, issuer_included_as_parameter, and (on TOTP) the readonly clock. This is an instance of object property mass-assignment (CWE-915).

Impact

The Factory is documented as the entry point for third-party provisioning URIs (e.g. QR codes from Microsoft 365 / Google Authenticator). An application that loads such a URI is exposed to:

  • State corruption. A URI such as otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&parameters[foo]=bar overwrites the whole internal $parameters array that createFromSecret() primed (period, algorithm, digits, epoch). The resulting object is silently unusable: getProvisioningUri(), getDigits(), at(), verify() then throw ParameterNotFoundException.
  • Uncaught TypeError escaping the documented exception type. A URI such as otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool assigns a string to a typed bool property and raises a TypeError. The try/catch in loadFromProvisioningUri() only wraps Url::fromString(); createOTP() and populateOTP() run outside it, so the TypeError (and Error on the readonly clock) escapes past the documented InvalidProvisioningUriException, breaking callers that catch only the documented type.
  • Label/issuer validation bypass. parameters[label]=hijacked stores a label into the parameters array without running the label validation callback (keyed on label, not parameters). getLabel() and getParameter('label') then disagree — a confused-deputy risk.

Affected component

  • src/OTP.php:187-201setParameter() dynamic property write
  • src/Factory.php:50-55populateParameters() forwarding all query keys

Proof of concept

use OTPHP\Factory;

// State corruption
$otp = Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri(
    'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&parameters[foo]=bar',
    $clock
);
$otp->getProvisioningUri(); // ParameterNotFoundException: Parameter "period" does not exist

// Uncaught TypeError
Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri(
    'otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP&issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool',
    $clock
); // TypeError escapes InvalidProvisioningUriException

Remediation

Restrict the keys accepted from a provisioning URI to a known allow-list of public OTP parameters, and never let a URI key resolve to an internal object property via property_exists. Route all URI-sourced values through the validated parameter map only.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "spomky-labs/otphp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-915"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T21:07:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`OTPHP\\Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri()` parses an attacker-supplied `otpauth://` URI and forwards **every** query key to `OTP::setParameter($key, $value)`. `setParameter()` resolves the name with `property_exists($this, $parameter)` and performs a dynamic write `$this-\u003e{$parameter} = $value` (`src/OTP.php:196-197`). Because the query keys are entirely controlled by whoever produced the URI, a URI can target the internal properties of the OTP object that are not meant to be set from a URI: `parameters`, `issuer`, `label`, `issuer_included_as_parameter`, and (on TOTP) the readonly `clock`. This is an instance of object property mass-assignment (CWE-915).\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `Factory` is documented as the entry point for third-party provisioning URIs (e.g. QR codes from Microsoft 365 / Google Authenticator). An application that loads such a URI is exposed to:\n\n- **State corruption.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026parameters[foo]=bar` overwrites the whole internal `$parameters` array that `createFromSecret()` primed (`period`, `algorithm`, `digits`, `epoch`). The resulting object is silently unusable: `getProvisioningUri()`, `getDigits()`, `at()`, `verify()` then throw `ParameterNotFoundException`.\n- **Uncaught TypeError escaping the documented exception type.** A URI such as `otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool` assigns a string to a typed `bool` property and raises a `TypeError`. The `try/catch` in `loadFromProvisioningUri()` only wraps `Url::fromString()`; `createOTP()` and `populateOTP()` run outside it, so the `TypeError` (and `Error` on the readonly `clock`) escapes past the documented `InvalidProvisioningUriException`, breaking callers that catch only the documented type.\n- **Label/issuer validation bypass.** `parameters[label]=hijacked` stores a label into the parameters array without running the `label` validation callback (keyed on `label`, not `parameters`). `getLabel()` and `getParameter(\u0027label\u0027)` then disagree \u2014 a confused-deputy risk.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `src/OTP.php:187-201` \u2014 `setParameter()` dynamic property write\n- `src/Factory.php:50-55` \u2014 `populateParameters()` forwarding all query keys\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```php\nuse OTPHP\\Factory;\n\n// State corruption\n$otp = Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri(\n    \u0027otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026parameters[foo]=bar\u0027,\n    $clock\n);\n$otp-\u003egetProvisioningUri(); // ParameterNotFoundException: Parameter \"period\" does not exist\n\n// Uncaught TypeError\nFactory::loadFromProvisioningUri(\n    \u0027otpauth://totp/Alice?secret=JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP\u0026issuer_included_as_parameter=notabool\u0027,\n    $clock\n); // TypeError escapes InvalidProvisioningUriException\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nRestrict the keys accepted from a provisioning URI to a known allow-list of public OTP parameters, and never let a URI key resolve to an internal object property via `property_exists`. Route all URI-sourced values through the validated parameter map only.",
  "id": "GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T21:07:41Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T21:07:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Spomky-Labs/otphp/security/advisories/GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/spomky-labs/otphp/GHSA-2jx3-65f3-xr8r.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Spomky-Labs/otphp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "spomky-labs/otphp: Mass-assignment in Factory::loadFromProvisioningUri lets a hostile provisioning URI corrupt OTP state or leak an uncaught TypeError"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…