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4 vulnerabilities by Erlang Ecosystem Foundation
CVE-2026-66884 (GCVE-0-2026-66884)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-08-04 11:45 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:40
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback accepts callbacks with no authorize session or no state parameter, defeating CSRF protection
Summary
Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback module) allows an attacker to make a victim's browser complete an authorization flow the victim never initiated.
This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex and program routine Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2.
A callback request that carries no Oidcc.Plug.Authorize session is processed with every security check disabled rather than being rejected. call/2 substitutes permissive defaults for the absent session, and each downstream check treats its value as nothing to compare and returns :ok, so the nonce, state, PKCE, peer IP and user agent checks are all skipped. A separate clause of check_state/2 also accepts a state-less request when a verifier is present.
An attacker obtains an authorization code for their own provider account, then induces the victim to visit the callback endpoint with that code and no state parameter. The application signs the victim in as the attacker, so the victim's subsequent actions occur in the attacker's account where the attacker can read them. Applications reusing one callback for both signing in and linking a provider account are further exposed to account takeover, the attacker's account becoming linked to the victim's.
The permissive fallback serves no conforming flow. Third-party-initiated login reaches a relying party at a separate login initiation endpoint and causes it to send a fresh authentication request, and this library implements no such endpoint. Oidcc.Plug.Authorize always sends a state parameter, which an authorization server must echo, so no legitimate callback lacks one.
This issue affects oidcc_plug: from 0.2.0-beta.1 before 0.5.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/security/advi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66884.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66884 | related |
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/commit/97d75a… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
0.2.0-beta.1 , < 0.5.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
e577ae73b9080693442916043a22d8f05491dd93 , < 97d75afc57826dca31989b47d6e2a3c136039917
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
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CVE-2026-66883 (GCVE-0-2026-66883)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-08-04 11:46 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Oidcc.Plug.Authorize user agent session binding inert due to case-sensitive header lookup
Summary
Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.Authorize module) renders the user agent session binding inert, removing a defense in depth control against replay of a stolen session.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/oidcc/plug/authorize.ex and lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex, and program routines Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 and Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2.
Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 reads the initiating client's user agent with get_req_header(conn, "User-Agent"). Plug lowercases incoming header names, but get_req_header/2 matches the supplied key exactly and performs no normalization of its own, so the mixed-case lookup always returns an empty list and nil is written into the session. On the callback side, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback treats a stored nil user agent as nothing to compare and returns :ok without inspecting the request. The two behaviours combine so that the check passes unconditionally on every request, including for deployments that explicitly opted in with check_useragent: true, and an authorization callback can be completed from a different user agent than the one that initiated the flow without detection. The check fails open silently, with no error and no log entry, so a deployment cannot tell the binding is absent.
The impact is limited to defense in depth. The inert check does not by itself allow an attacker to complete an authorization flow; it removes one layer that would otherwise hinder use of a stolen or leaked session, such as an exfiltrated session cookie replayed from a different client. The CSRF/state, nonce, and PKCE checks are unaffected and continue to function. Deployments that never enabled check_useragent are not affected in practice, since they never expected the binding. The corresponding lookup in Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback correctly uses the lowercase key and is not affected.
This issue affects oidcc_plug: from 0.1.0-alpha.3 before 0.5.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-178 - Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/security/advi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66883.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66883 | related |
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/commit/f15e52… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
0.1.0-alpha.3 , < 0.5.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
0a75fb139d8e2686d1b75e0d48962323d2181673 , < f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
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CVE-2026-66883 (GCVE-0-2026-66883)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-04 11:46 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:27
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Oidcc.Plug.Authorize user agent session binding inert due to case-sensitive header lookup
Summary
Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.Authorize module) renders the user agent session binding inert, removing a defense in depth control against replay of a stolen session.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/oidcc/plug/authorize.ex and lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex, and program routines Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 and Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2.
Oidcc.Plug.Authorize.call/2 reads the initiating client's user agent with get_req_header(conn, "User-Agent"). Plug lowercases incoming header names, but get_req_header/2 matches the supplied key exactly and performs no normalization of its own, so the mixed-case lookup always returns an empty list and nil is written into the session. On the callback side, Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback treats a stored nil user agent as nothing to compare and returns :ok without inspecting the request. The two behaviours combine so that the check passes unconditionally on every request, including for deployments that explicitly opted in with check_useragent: true, and an authorization callback can be completed from a different user agent than the one that initiated the flow without detection. The check fails open silently, with no error and no log entry, so a deployment cannot tell the binding is absent.
The impact is limited to defense in depth. The inert check does not by itself allow an attacker to complete an authorization flow; it removes one layer that would otherwise hinder use of a stolen or leaked session, such as an exfiltrated session cookie replayed from a different client. The CSRF/state, nonce, and PKCE checks are unaffected and continue to function. Deployments that never enabled check_useragent are not affected in practice, since they never expected the binding. The corresponding lookup in Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback correctly uses the lowercase key and is not affected.
This issue affects oidcc_plug: from 0.1.0-alpha.3 before 0.5.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-178 - Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/security/advi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66883.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66883 | related |
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/commit/f15e52… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
0.1.0-alpha.3 , < 0.5.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
0a75fb139d8e2686d1b75e0d48962323d2181673 , < f15e52c5750aaba701104b10ed96cfac063bd557
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
Credits
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CVE-2026-66884 (GCVE-0-2026-66884)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-04 11:45 – Updated: 2026-08-04 12:40
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback accepts callbacks with no authorize session or no state parameter, defeating CSRF protection
Summary
Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerability in Erlang Ecosystem Foundation oidcc_plug (Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback module) allows an attacker to make a victim's browser complete an authorization flow the victim never initiated.
This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/oidcc/plug/authorization_callback.ex and program routine Oidcc.Plug.AuthorizationCallback.call/2.
A callback request that carries no Oidcc.Plug.Authorize session is processed with every security check disabled rather than being rejected. call/2 substitutes permissive defaults for the absent session, and each downstream check treats its value as nothing to compare and returns :ok, so the nonce, state, PKCE, peer IP and user agent checks are all skipped. A separate clause of check_state/2 also accepts a state-less request when a verifier is present.
An attacker obtains an authorization code for their own provider account, then induces the victim to visit the callback endpoint with that code and no state parameter. The application signs the victim in as the attacker, so the victim's subsequent actions occur in the attacker's account where the attacker can read them. Applications reusing one callback for both signing in and linking a provider account are further exposed to account takeover, the attacker's account becoming linked to the victim's.
The permissive fallback serves no conforming flow. Third-party-initiated login reaches a relying party at a separate login initiation endpoint and causes it to send a fresh authentication request, and this library implements no such endpoint. Oidcc.Plug.Authorize always sends a state parameter, which an authorization server must echo, so no legitimate callback lacks one.
This issue affects oidcc_plug: from 0.2.0-beta.1 before 0.5.0.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
CWE
- CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/security/advi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66884.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66884 | related |
| https://github.com/erlef/oidcc_plug/commit/97d75a… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
0.2.0-beta.1 , < 0.5.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
|
| Erlang Ecosystem Foundation | oidcc_plug |
Affected:
e577ae73b9080693442916043a22d8f05491dd93 , < 97d75afc57826dca31989b47d6e2a3c136039917
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:erlef:oidcc_plug:*:*:*:*:*:erlang:*:* |
Credits
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