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14 vulnerabilities by elixir-plug
CVE-2026-120287 (GCVE-0-2026-120287)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-11-17 16:53 – Updated: 2026-11-17 17:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multipart `:length` limit not charged for part and header framing in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART in elixir-plug plug allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust memory via a multipart request body built from parts without headers, or from header lines without a name and a value. The parser charges the :length limit only with the name and value bytes of each part header and the bytes of each part body. The part delimiter, the header separator, and the line endings cost nothing.
In lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 keeps an entry for every part without a content-disposition header, together with its header list, until the whole body is read. A request made of such parts does not reach the limit at any size, and the parser process holds a multiple of the request size in memory until parsing completes. Any endpoint that uses Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is reachable.
This issue affects plug: from 1.13.0 before 1.20.4.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-17 17:57 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.13.0 , < 1.20.4
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
e06acbd3d381931f23cbde7d763136c9ccb091ac , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"title": "Multipart `:length` limit not charged for part and header framing in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eLimit the request body size in a reverse proxy in front of the application, for example with \u003ccode\u003eclient_max_body_size\u003c/code\u003e in nginx. The proxy rejects a larger body before it reaches the parser. This limits the memory that one request can hold but does not remove the multiplication: a body below the proxy limit still passes the \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e limit.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBuild a multipart body with the boundary \u003ccode\u003eb\u003c/code\u003e that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening \u003ccode\u003e--b\\r\\n\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e, then \u003ccode\u003e\\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e repeated 500,000 times, then \u003ccode\u003e\\r\\n--b--\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e. The body is 4.5 MB.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCreate a connection with \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body)\u003c/code\u003e and the request header \u003ccode\u003econtent-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCall \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5\u003c/code\u003e with the options from \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eObserve that the call returns \u003ccode\u003e{:ok, %{}, conn}\u003c/code\u003e and not \u003ccode\u003e{:error, :too_large, conn}\u003c/code\u003e, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRepeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of \u003ccode\u003e:\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
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"value": "1. Build a multipart body with the boundary `b` that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening `--b\\r\\n\\r\\n`, then `\\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n` repeated 500,000 times, then `\\r\\n--b--\\r\\n`. The body is 4.5 MB.\n2. Create a connection with `Plug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body)` and the request header `content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b`.\n3. Call `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5` with the options from `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000)`.\n4. Observe that the call returns `{:ok, %{}, conn}` and not `{:error, :too_large, conn}`, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\n5. Repeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of `:\\r\\n`. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size."
}
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"value": "* Build a multipart body with the boundary b that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening --b\\r\\n\\r\\n, then \\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n repeated 500,000 times, then \\r\\n--b--\\r\\n. The body is 4.5 MB.\n* Create a connection with Plug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body) and the request header content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b.\n* Call Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5 with the options from Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000).\n* Observe that the call returns {:ok, %{}, conn} and not {:error, :too_large, conn}, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\n* Repeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of :\\r\\n. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size."
}
],
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. What the limit counts.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5\u003c/code\u003e subtracts the result of \u003ccode\u003eheaders_size/1\u003c/code\u003e from the remaining \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e limit. \u003ccode\u003eheaders_size/1\u003c/code\u003e sums \u003ccode\u003ebyte_size(key) + byte_size(value)\u003c/code\u003e for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Inputs that cost zero.\u003c/strong\u003e A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only \u003ccode\u003e:\u003c/code\u003e followed by CRLF also costs 0, because \u003ccode\u003e:plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3\u003c/code\u003e accepts the empty name and returns the header \u003ccode\u003e{\"\", \"\"}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Retention.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003emultipart_type/1\u003c/code\u003e returns \u003ccode\u003e{:binary, nil}\u003c/code\u003e for a part without a \u003ccode\u003econtent-disposition\u003c/code\u003e header. The parser then prepends \u003ccode\u003e{nil, headers, body}\u003c/code\u003e to its accumulator for that part. \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3\u003c/code\u003e drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4. Limits that stay in effect.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Conn.read_part_headers/2\u003c/code\u003e limits one header block to the smaller of \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e:read_length\u003c/code\u003e. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn plug 1.20.3 with \u003ccode\u003elength: 100_000\u003c/code\u003e, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 \u003ccode\u003e:\u003c/code\u003e header lines each peaked at 283 MiB.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
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"value": "**1. What the limit counts.** `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5` subtracts the result of `headers_size/1` from the remaining `:length` limit. `headers_size/1` sums `byte_size(key) + byte_size(value)` for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\n\n**2. Inputs that cost zero.** A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only `:` followed by CRLF also costs 0, because `:plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3` accepts the empty name and returns the header `{\"\", \"\"}`.\n\n**3. Retention.** `multipart_type/1` returns `{:binary, nil}` for a part without a `content-disposition` header. The parser then prepends `{nil, headers, body}` to its accumulator for that part. `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3` drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\n\n**4. Limits that stay in effect.** `Plug.Conn.read_part_headers/2` limits one header block to the smaller of `:length` and `:read_length`. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\n\nOn plug 1.20.3 with `length: 100_000`, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 `:` header lines each peaked at 283 MiB."
}
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"value": "1. What the limit counts. Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 subtracts the result of headers_size/1 from the remaining :length limit. headers_size/1 sums byte_size(key) + byte_size(value) for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\n\n2. Inputs that cost zero. A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only : followed by CRLF also costs 0, because :plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3 accepts the empty name and returns the header {\"\", \"\"}.\n\n3. Retention. multipart_type/1 returns {:binary, nil} for a part without a content-disposition header. The parser then prepends {nil, headers, body} to its accumulator for that part. Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3 drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\n\n4. Limits that stay in effect. Plug.Conn.read_part_headers/2 limits one header block to the smaller of :length and :read_length. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\n\nOn plug 1.20.3 with length: 100_000, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 : header lines each peaked at 283 MiB."
}
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}
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"cveMetadata": {
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-120287",
"datePublished": "2026-11-17T16:53:38.533Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-17T03:12:34.331Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T17:58:14.260Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-105963 (GCVE-0-2026-105963)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-10-23 09:56 – Updated: 2026-10-23 13:39
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Secret key base exposed in stack trace arguments on wrong-typed Plug.Crypto arguments
Summary
Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in plug_crypto in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in Plug.Crypto validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise FunctionClauseError with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library's rescue blocks and Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as crash_reason Logger metadata, which error trackers forward.
Two entry points take request data. Plug.Crypto.verify/4 exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which Phoenix.Token.verify/4 reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker.
This issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-23 10:53 UTC
CWE
- CWE-532 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
4 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.6.3 , < 1.7.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
56000c33d8a0a2fbac491f8be06b9c5112bc2276 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug_crypto |
Affected:
1.0.0 , < 2.2.1
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_crypto:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug_crypto |
Affected:
2d078b7b8264c565f0ff71235c515f4f46882dcf , < 981887493dada0fce7003c61861c00dfbb0fc8c5
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_crypto:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"value": "Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in `plug_crypto` in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in `Plug.Crypto` validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise `FunctionClauseError` with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library\u0027s `rescue` blocks and `Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1` only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as `crash_reason` Logger metadata, which error trackers forward.\n\nTwo entry points take request data. `Plug.Crypto.verify/4` exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which `Phoenix.Token.verify/4` reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2` exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker.\n\nThis issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1."
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"value": "Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in plug_crypto in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in Plug.Crypto validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise FunctionClauseError with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library\u0027s rescue blocks and Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as crash_reason Logger metadata, which error trackers forward.\n\nTwo entry points take request data. Plug.Crypto.verify/4 exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which Phoenix.Token.verify/4 reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker.\n\nThis issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1."
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"title": "Secret key base exposed in stack trace arguments on wrong-typed Plug.Crypto arguments",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eCheck argument types in the calling code before entering \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto\u003c/code\u003e, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e only when \u003ccode\u003eis_binary(token)\u003c/code\u003e holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending \u003ccode\u003evars\u003c/code\u003e with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "Check argument types in the calling code before entering `Plug.Crypto`, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to `Phoenix.Token.verify/4`, `Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4`, `Plug.Crypto.verify/4` or `Plug.Crypto.decrypt/4` only when `is_binary(token)` holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2` only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil.\n\nWhere the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending `vars` with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log."
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"value": "Check argument types in the calling code before entering Plug.Crypto, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to Phoenix.Token.verify/4, Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4, Plug.Crypto.verify/4 or Plug.Crypto.decrypt/4 only when is_binary(token) holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil.\n\nWhere the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending vars with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log."
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"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRun an application that depends on \u003ccode\u003eplug_crypto\u003c/code\u003e and exposes a route calling \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.verify(secret_key_base, \"user auth\", conn.params[\"token\"])\u003c/code\u003e, plus a route calling \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare(List.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\")), api_key)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend \u003ccode\u003eGET /verify?token[]=x\u003c/code\u003e. \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers\u003c/code\u003e yields a list for the bracket syntax, so the token argument is a list.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eObserve the 500 response and read the error log. The top frame prints \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.verify(\"SECRET_KEY_BASE_...\", \"user auth\", [\"x\"], [])\u003c/code\u003e with the secret key base in full, and the same frame is attached as \u003ccode\u003ecrash_reason\u003c/code\u003e Logger metadata.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend \u003ccode\u003eGET /api\u003c/code\u003e with no \u003ccode\u003ex-api-key\u003c/code\u003e header. The header lookup yields nil, and the frame prints \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare(nil, \"\u0026lt;configured API key\u0026gt;\")\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA JSON body of \u003ccode\u003e{\"token\": 123}\u003c/code\u003e to the first route gives the same result with an integer argument.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
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"value": "1. Run an application that depends on `plug_crypto` and exposes a route calling `Phoenix.Token.verify(secret_key_base, \"user auth\", conn.params[\"token\"])`, plus a route calling `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare(List.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\")), api_key)`.\n2. Send `GET /verify?token[]=x`. `Plug.Parsers` yields a list for the bracket syntax, so the token argument is a list.\n3. Observe the 500 response and read the error log. The top frame prints `Plug.Crypto.verify(\"SECRET_KEY_BASE_...\", \"user auth\", [\"x\"], [])` with the secret key base in full, and the same frame is attached as `crash_reason` Logger metadata.\n4. Send `GET /api` with no `x-api-key` header. The header lookup yields nil, and the frame prints `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare(nil, \"\u003cconfigured API key\u003e\")`.\n5. A JSON body of `{\"token\": 123}` to the first route gives the same result with an integer argument."
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Type checks in function-head guards.\u003c/strong\u003e Every public function in \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto\u003c/code\u003e validates its arguments in a head guard, for example \u003ccode\u003esecure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003ewhen is_binary(left) and is_binary(right)\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003everify/4\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003ewhen is_binary(key_base) and is_binary(salt) and is_binary(token)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. The VM builds the error, not the library.\u003c/strong\u003e When no clause matches, the Erlang VM raises \u003ccode\u003eFunctionClauseError\u003c/code\u003e and the top stack frame holds the actual argument values. The library\u0027s \u003ccode\u003erescue ... reraise\u003c/code\u003e blocks and \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1\u003c/code\u003e only apply to exceptions raised inside a function body, so a guard failure never reaches them. In \u003ccode\u003eplug_crypto\u003c/code\u003e the same commit that added \u003ccode\u003eprune_args_from_stacktrace/1\u003c/code\u003e also added these guards.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Which value leaks.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003everify/4\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003esign/4\u003c/code\u003e put the secret key base in the frame. \u003ccode\u003edecrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e has no \u003ccode\u003eis_binary(token)\u003c/code\u003e guard on its main clause, so the key is derived first and the failing guard belongs to \u003ccode\u003eMessageEncryptor.decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e, placing the derived 32-byte key in the frame. \u003ccode\u003esecure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e places the other operand in the frame, which is the server-side secret when a request value is nil.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4. The frame reaches logs and error trackers.\u003c/strong\u003e Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the formatted frame, arguments included, to the error log and attach it as \u003ccode\u003ecrash_reason\u003c/code\u003e Logger metadata. Error trackers forward it; Sentry\u0027s handler sends crash reports by default and serializes frame arguments as \u003ccode\u003evars\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e"
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"value": "**1. Type checks in function-head guards.** Every public function in `Plug.Crypto` validates its arguments in a head guard, for example `secure_compare/2` with `when is_binary(left) and is_binary(right)` and `verify/4` with `when is_binary(key_base) and is_binary(salt) and is_binary(token)`.\n\n**2. The VM builds the error, not the library.** When no clause matches, the Erlang VM raises `FunctionClauseError` and the top stack frame holds the actual argument values. The library\u0027s `rescue ... reraise` blocks and `Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1` only apply to exceptions raised inside a function body, so a guard failure never reaches them. In `plug_crypto` the same commit that added `prune_args_from_stacktrace/1` also added these guards.\n\n**3. Which value leaks.** `verify/4` and `sign/4` put the secret key base in the frame. `decrypt/4` has no `is_binary(token)` guard on its main clause, so the key is derived first and the failing guard belongs to `MessageEncryptor.decrypt/4`, placing the derived 32-byte key in the frame. `secure_compare/2` places the other operand in the frame, which is the server-side secret when a request value is nil.\n\n**4. The frame reaches logs and error trackers.** Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the formatted frame, arguments included, to the error log and attach it as `crash_reason` Logger metadata. Error trackers forward it; Sentry\u0027s handler sends crash reports by default and serializes frame arguments as `vars`."
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"datePublished": "2026-10-23T09:56:58.885Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-10-06T10:30:01.805Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T13:39:29.887Z",
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CVE-2026-56813 (GCVE-0-2026-56813)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-07-10 12:51 – Updated: 2026-09-24 21:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Cookie attribute injection in Plug.Conn.Cookies.encode/2
Summary
Improper Neutralization of Parameter/Argument Delimiters vulnerability in elixir-plug plug allows an attacker to inject or override HTTP cookie attributes.
The Plug.Conn.Cookies.encode/2 function in lib/plug/conn/cookies.ex builds the Set-Cookie response header by interpolating the cookie value and its path, domain, same_site, and extra attributes directly into the header without neutralizing the ; delimiter that separates cookie attributes.
An application that places attacker-controlled data into a cookie value or attribute (for example via Plug.Conn.put_resp_cookie/4 when reflecting a username or preference) lets an attacker inject a ; to append or override cookie attributes (such as Domain and Path scope, or dropping the Secure and HttpOnly flags), enabling cookie tossing and session fixation. Carriage return, line feed, and null bytes are rejected by Plug.Conn header validation, so HTTP response splitting is not possible, but attribute injection through ; is not prevented.
This issue affects plug: from 0.1.0 before 1.16.6, from 1.17.0 before 1.17.4, from 1.18.0 before 1.18.5, from 1.19.1 before 1.19.5, and from 1.20.0 before 1.20.3.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-10 14:43 UTC
CWE
- CWE-141 - Improper Neutralization of Parameter/Argument Delimiters
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
0.1.0 , < 1.16.6
(semver)
Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.4 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.5 (semver) Affected: 1.19.1 , < 1.19.5 (semver) Affected: 1.20.0 , < 1.20.3 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
f26876aa67aaeb38e616638aa3efbcc2fe2906a5 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-07-10 12:51
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CVE-2026-56814 (GCVE-0-2026-56814)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-07-10 11:14 – Updated: 2026-09-24 21:31
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Plug: multipart :length limit is not charged for part headers, enabling unbounded temp-file creation (denial of service)
Summary
Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART, the multipart request-body parser used to handle file uploads and multipart forms, does not enforce its :length budget against all consumed resources, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. The parser charges the :length limit only for part body bytes; part header bytes are never counted, and a part with an empty body costs zero.
Because every part whose Content-Disposition carries a non-empty filename creates a fresh temporary file (via Plug.Upload) and retains a Plug.Upload struct for the duration of the request, an attacker can send a single request composed of many empty-body file parts. Such a request stays well under the configured :length limit (8,000,000 bytes by default) while creating one temporary file per part, leading to inode and disk exhaustion and unbounded memory growth. Any application using Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is affected, and no authentication is required, only reachability of a multipart endpoint over HTTP.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex and program routines Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart/2, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_body/4, and Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_file/4.
This issue affects plug: from 1.4.0-rc.0 before 1.16.6, from 1.17.0 before 1.17.4, from 1.18.0 before 1.18.5, from 1.19.1 before 1.19.5, and from 1.20.0 before 1.20.3.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-10 14:03 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
10 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.4.0-rc.0 , < 1.16.6
(semver)
Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.4 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.5 (semver) Affected: 1.19.1 , < 1.19.5 (semver) Affected: 1.20.0 , < 1.20.3 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
c52b2f32c90bccd718202bafccb5f95594e30183 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-07-10 11:14
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CVE-2026-54892 (GCVE-0-2026-54892)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-06-23 12:31 – Updated: 2026-06-23 18:21
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Plug: quadratic-time decoding of nested query/body parameters enables denial of service
Summary
Inefficient algorithmic complexity in Plug's nested-parameter decoder allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4 (and Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2) parse query strings and application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies. When a key contains many bracketed segments such as a[a][a][a]=1, the decoder walks the brackets and, for each of the N levels, performs a map operation keyed on an ever-growing binary prefix of the key, hashing the full byte range at each step. The total decode cost is therefore quadratic in the number of nesting levels.
With the default Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED body limit of 1,000,000 bytes, a single request can carry roughly 333,000 nesting levels and saturate a BEAM scheduler for minutes. A small number of concurrent requests can saturate all schedulers and render a Plug-based server unresponsive. No authentication or knowledge of application routes is required.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/plug/conn/query.ex and program routines Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4, Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2, Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6, Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3, and Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2.
This issue affects plug from 1.15.0 before 1.15.5, 1.16.4, 1.17.2, 1.18.3, and 1.19.3.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-23 13:03 UTC
CWE
- CWE-407 - Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.15.0 , < 1.15.5
(semver)
Affected: 1.16.0 , < 1.16.4 (semver) Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.2 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.3 (semver) Affected: 1.19.0 , < 1.19.3 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
712b875d3442c765d8d37e546ffd5ad9f8afcc55 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-8468 (GCVE-0-2026-8468)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-05-14 10:29 – Updated: 2026-05-27 15:41
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Unbounded buffer accumulation in multipart header parsing causes denial of service in plug
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in plug_project plug allows denial of service via unbounded buffer accumulation in multipart header parsing.
'Elixir.Plug.Conn':read_part_headers/2 in lib/plug/conn.ex does not obey its :length parameter. There is no upper bound on the size of the accumulated buffer. By contrast, the sibling function read_part_body has an explicit byte_size(acc) > length guard that stops accumulation once a limit is reached. No such guard exists in read_part_headers. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust server memory by sending a crafted multipart/form-data request, causing a denial of service.
This issue affects plug from 1.4.0 before 1.15.4, 1.16.3, 1.17.1, 1.18.2, and 1.19.2.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-05-14 17:53 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.4.0 , < 1.15.4
(semver)
Affected: 1.16.0 , < 1.16.3 (semver) Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.1 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.2 (semver) Affected: 1.19.0 , < 1.19.2 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:plug_project:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
c52b2f32c90bccd718202bafccb5f95594e30183 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:plug_project:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-32688 (GCVE-0-2026-32688)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-04-27 13:45 – Updated: 2026-04-29 17:08
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Atom table exhaustion via HTTP/2 :scheme pseudo-header in plug_cowboy
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-plug plug_cowboy allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via atom table exhaustion.
Plug.Cowboy.Conn.conn/1 in lib/plug/cowboy/conn.ex calls String.to_atom/1 on the value returned by :cowboy_req.scheme/1. For HTTP/2 connections, cowlib passes the client-supplied :scheme pseudo-header value through verbatim without validation. Each unique value permanently allocates a new entry in the BEAM atom table. Since atoms are never garbage-collected and the atom table has a fixed limit (default 1,048,576), an unauthenticated attacker can exhaust the table by sending HTTP/2 requests with unique :scheme values, causing the Erlang VM to abort with system_limit and taking down the entire node.
This vulnerability does not affect HTTP/1.1, where cowboy derives the scheme from the listener type rather than from a client-supplied header.
This issue affects plug_cowboy: from 2.0.0 before 2.8.1.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-04-27 19:04 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug_cowboy/securi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-32688.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-32688 | related |
| https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug_cowboy/commit… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug_cowboy |
Affected:
2.0.0 , < 2.8.1
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_cowboy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug_cowboy |
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(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_cowboy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-120287 (GCVE-0-2026-120287)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-17 16:53 – Updated: 2026-11-17 17:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multipart `:length` limit not charged for part and header framing in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART in elixir-plug plug allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust memory via a multipart request body built from parts without headers, or from header lines without a name and a value. The parser charges the :length limit only with the name and value bytes of each part header and the bytes of each part body. The part delimiter, the header separator, and the line endings cost nothing.
In lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 keeps an entry for every part without a content-disposition header, together with its header list, until the whole body is read. A request made of such parts does not reach the limit at any size, and the parser process holds a multiple of the request size in memory until parsing completes. Any endpoint that uses Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is reachable.
This issue affects plug: from 1.13.0 before 1.20.4.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-17 17:57 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.13.0 , < 1.20.4
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
e06acbd3d381931f23cbde7d763136c9ccb091ac , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART` in elixir-plug plug allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust memory via a multipart request body built from parts without headers, or from header lines without a name and a value. The parser charges the `:length` limit only with the name and value bytes of each part header and the bytes of each part body. The part delimiter, the header separator, and the line endings cost nothing.\n\nIn `lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex`, `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5` keeps an entry for every part without a `content-disposition` header, together with its header list, until the whole body is read. A request made of such parts does not reach the limit at any size, and the parser process holds a multiple of the request size in memory until parsing completes. Any endpoint that uses `Plug.Parsers` with the `:multipart` parser is reachable.\n\nThis issue affects plug: from 1.13.0 before 1.20.4."
}
],
"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART in elixir-plug plug allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust memory via a multipart request body built from parts without headers, or from header lines without a name and a value. The parser charges the :length limit only with the name and value bytes of each part header and the bytes of each part body. The part delimiter, the header separator, and the line endings cost nothing.\n\nIn lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 keeps an entry for every part without a content-disposition header, together with its header list, until the whole body is read. A request made of such parts does not reach the limit at any size, and the parser process holds a multiple of the request size in memory until parsing completes. Any endpoint that uses Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is reachable.\n\nThis issue affects plug: from 1.13.0 before 1.20.4."
}
],
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eOne request makes the process that parses it hold many times the request size in memory until parsing completes, and concurrent requests add up. An application that accepts multipart requests from unauthenticated clients can run out of memory.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
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"value": "One request makes the process that parses it hold many times the request size in memory until parsing completes, and concurrent requests add up. An application that accepts multipart requests from unauthenticated clients can run out of memory."
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"value": "One request makes the process that parses it hold many times the request size in memory until parsing completes, and concurrent requests add up. An application that accepts multipart requests from unauthenticated clients can run out of memory."
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"baseScore": 6.9,
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"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
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}
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"description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
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"type": "CWE"
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]
}
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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{
"name": "Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART does not charge all consumed multipart bytes against `:length`, allowing unbounded part accumulation and memory exhaustion",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
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"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/security/advisories/GHSA-qj4r-jh2r-rw3f"
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{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-120287",
"tags": [
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"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-120287.html"
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{
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"tags": [
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},
{
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],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Multipart `:length` limit not charged for part and header framing in Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART",
"workarounds": [
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eLimit the request body size in a reverse proxy in front of the application, for example with \u003ccode\u003eclient_max_body_size\u003c/code\u003e in nginx. The proxy rejects a larger body before it reaches the parser. This limits the memory that one request can hold but does not remove the multiplication: a body below the proxy limit still passes the \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e limit.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Limit the request body size in a reverse proxy in front of the application, for example with `client_max_body_size` in nginx. The proxy rejects a larger body before it reaches the parser. This limits the memory that one request can hold but does not remove the multiplication: a body below the proxy limit still passes the `:length` limit."
}
],
"value": "Limit the request body size in a reverse proxy in front of the application, for example with client_max_body_size in nginx. The proxy rejects a larger body before it reaches the parser. This limits the memory that one request can hold but does not remove the multiplication: a body below the proxy limit still passes the :length limit."
}
],
"x_proofOfConcept": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBuild a multipart body with the boundary \u003ccode\u003eb\u003c/code\u003e that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening \u003ccode\u003e--b\\r\\n\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e, then \u003ccode\u003e\\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e repeated 500,000 times, then \u003ccode\u003e\\r\\n--b--\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e. The body is 4.5 MB.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCreate a connection with \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body)\u003c/code\u003e and the request header \u003ccode\u003econtent-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCall \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5\u003c/code\u003e with the options from \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eObserve that the call returns \u003ccode\u003e{:ok, %{}, conn}\u003c/code\u003e and not \u003ccode\u003e{:error, :too_large, conn}\u003c/code\u003e, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRepeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of \u003ccode\u003e:\\r\\n\u003c/code\u003e. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
},
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"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "1. Build a multipart body with the boundary `b` that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening `--b\\r\\n\\r\\n`, then `\\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n` repeated 500,000 times, then `\\r\\n--b--\\r\\n`. The body is 4.5 MB.\n2. Create a connection with `Plug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body)` and the request header `content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b`.\n3. Call `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5` with the options from `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000)`.\n4. Observe that the call returns `{:ok, %{}, conn}` and not `{:error, :too_large, conn}`, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\n5. Repeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of `:\\r\\n`. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size."
}
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"value": "* Build a multipart body with the boundary b that holds 500,001 parts without headers: the opening --b\\r\\n\\r\\n, then \\r\\n--b\\r\\n\\r\\n repeated 500,000 times, then \\r\\n--b--\\r\\n. The body is 4.5 MB.\n* Create a connection with Plug.Test.conn(:post, \"/\", body) and the request header content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b.\n* Call Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse/5 with the options from Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.init(length: 100_000).\n* Observe that the call returns {:ok, %{}, conn} and not {:error, :too_large, conn}, and that the memory of the calling process rises to about 20 times the body size during the call.\n* Repeat with 50 parts that each hold 30,000 header lines of :\\r\\n. The result is the same, with about 65 times the body size."
}
],
"x_technicalAnalysis": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. What the limit counts.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5\u003c/code\u003e subtracts the result of \u003ccode\u003eheaders_size/1\u003c/code\u003e from the remaining \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e limit. \u003ccode\u003eheaders_size/1\u003c/code\u003e sums \u003ccode\u003ebyte_size(key) + byte_size(value)\u003c/code\u003e for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. Inputs that cost zero.\u003c/strong\u003e A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only \u003ccode\u003e:\u003c/code\u003e followed by CRLF also costs 0, because \u003ccode\u003e:plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3\u003c/code\u003e accepts the empty name and returns the header \u003ccode\u003e{\"\", \"\"}\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Retention.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003emultipart_type/1\u003c/code\u003e returns \u003ccode\u003e{:binary, nil}\u003c/code\u003e for a part without a \u003ccode\u003econtent-disposition\u003c/code\u003e header. The parser then prepends \u003ccode\u003e{nil, headers, body}\u003c/code\u003e to its accumulator for that part. \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3\u003c/code\u003e drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4. Limits that stay in effect.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Conn.read_part_headers/2\u003c/code\u003e limits one header block to the smaller of \u003ccode\u003e:length\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003e:read_length\u003c/code\u003e. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOn plug 1.20.3 with \u003ccode\u003elength: 100_000\u003c/code\u003e, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 \u003ccode\u003e:\u003c/code\u003e header lines each peaked at 283 MiB.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
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"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "**1. What the limit counts.** `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5` subtracts the result of `headers_size/1` from the remaining `:length` limit. `headers_size/1` sums `byte_size(key) + byte_size(value)` for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\n\n**2. Inputs that cost zero.** A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only `:` followed by CRLF also costs 0, because `:plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3` accepts the empty name and returns the header `{\"\", \"\"}`.\n\n**3. Retention.** `multipart_type/1` returns `{:binary, nil}` for a part without a `content-disposition` header. The parser then prepends `{nil, headers, body}` to its accumulator for that part. `Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3` drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\n\n**4. Limits that stay in effect.** `Plug.Conn.read_part_headers/2` limits one header block to the smaller of `:length` and `:read_length`. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\n\nOn plug 1.20.3 with `length: 100_000`, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 `:` header lines each peaked at 283 MiB."
}
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"value": "1. What the limit counts. Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5 subtracts the result of headers_size/1 from the remaining :length limit. headers_size/1 sums byte_size(key) + byte_size(value) for each header. The part delimiter, the colon and CRLF of each header line, and the blank line that ends the header block are not counted.\n\n2. Inputs that cost zero. A part without headers has an empty header list, so its charge is 0. A header line that holds only : followed by CRLF also costs 0, because :plug_multipart.parse_hd_name/3 accepts the empty name and returns the header {\"\", \"\"}.\n\n3. Retention. multipart_type/1 returns {:binary, nil} for a part without a content-disposition header. The parser then prepends {nil, headers, body} to its accumulator for that part. Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.multipart_to_params/3 drops these entries, but only after the whole request body is read.\n\n4. Limits that stay in effect. Plug.Conn.read_part_headers/2 limits one header block to the smaller of :length and :read_length. No limit applies to the sum over all parts.\n\nOn plug 1.20.3 with length: 100_000, a 4.5 MB body of 500,001 parts without headers parsed successfully with a peak of 92 MiB in the parser process. A 4.5 MB body of 50 parts with 30,000 : header lines each peaked at 283 MiB."
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-120287",
"datePublished": "2026-11-17T16:53:38.533Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-17T03:12:34.331Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T17:58:14.260Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-105963 (GCVE-0-2026-105963)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-23 09:56 – Updated: 2026-10-23 13:39
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Secret key base exposed in stack trace arguments on wrong-typed Plug.Crypto arguments
Summary
Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in plug_crypto in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in Plug.Crypto validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise FunctionClauseError with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library's rescue blocks and Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as crash_reason Logger metadata, which error trackers forward.
Two entry points take request data. Plug.Crypto.verify/4 exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which Phoenix.Token.verify/4 reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker.
This issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-23 10:53 UTC
CWE
- CWE-532 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
4 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.6.3 , < 1.7.0
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
56000c33d8a0a2fbac491f8be06b9c5112bc2276 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug_crypto |
Affected:
1.0.0 , < 2.2.1
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_crypto:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug_crypto |
Affected:
2d078b7b8264c565f0ff71235c515f4f46882dcf , < 981887493dada0fce7003c61861c00dfbb0fc8c5
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_crypto:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
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{
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},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto\u0027:masked_compare/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto\u0027:mask/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto\u0027:sign/4"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto\u0027:encrypt/4"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto.MessageVerifier\u0027:sign/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto.MessageVerifier\u0027:verify/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto.MessageEncryptor\u0027:encrypt/4"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.Plug.Crypto.MessageEncryptor\u0027:decrypt/4"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug_crypto",
"vendor": "elixir-plug",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "981887493dada0fce7003c61861c00dfbb0fc8c5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2d078b7b8264c565f0ff71235c515f4f46882dcf",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eRequest-data reachability needs an application that passes unvalidated request data into \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto\u003c/code\u003e. Either a controller or plug that hands \u003ccode\u003eparams[\"token\"]\u003c/code\u003e to \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e, where \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers\u003c/code\u003e yields a list for \u003ccode\u003etoken[]=x\u003c/code\u003e in a query string and an integer or a map for a JSON body, or a call to \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e on a value that can be nil, such as \u003ccode\u003eList.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\"))\u003c/code\u003e compared against a configured secret. Disclosure of the leaked value additionally needs read access to the application logs or to an error tracker that receives \u003ccode\u003ecrash_reason\u003c/code\u003e metadata. The remaining affected functions require direct misuse by application code and have no request-data trigger.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
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"value": "Request-data reachability needs an application that passes unvalidated request data into `Plug.Crypto`. Either a controller or plug that hands `params[\"token\"]` to `Phoenix.Token.verify/4` or `Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4`, where `Plug.Parsers` yields a list for `token[]=x` in a query string and an integer or a map for a JSON body, or a call to `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2` on a value that can be nil, such as `List.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\"))` compared against a configured secret. Disclosure of the leaked value additionally needs read access to the application logs or to an error tracker that receives `crash_reason` metadata. The remaining affected functions require direct misuse by application code and have no request-data trigger."
}
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"value": "Request-data reachability needs an application that passes unvalidated request data into Plug.Crypto. Either a controller or plug that hands params[\"token\"] to Phoenix.Token.verify/4 or Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4, where Plug.Parsers yields a list for token[]=x in a query string and an integer or a map for a JSON body, or a call to Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 on a value that can be nil, such as List.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\")) compared against a configured secret. Disclosure of the leaked value additionally needs read access to the application logs or to an error tracker that receives crash_reason metadata. The remaining affected functions require direct misuse by application code and have no request-data trigger."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "1.7.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "1.6.3",
"vulnerable": true
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{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_crypto:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
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"vulnerable": true
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"operator": "OR"
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],
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}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Neil Berkman"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Neil Berkman"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Neil Berkman"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation verifier",
"value": "Jos\u00e9 Valim"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-10-22T09:25:19.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eExternally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in \u003ccode\u003eplug_crypto\u003c/code\u003e in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto\u003c/code\u003e validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise \u003ccode\u003eFunctionClauseError\u003c/code\u003e with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library\u0027s \u003ccode\u003erescue\u003c/code\u003e blocks and \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1\u003c/code\u003e only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as \u003ccode\u003ecrash_reason\u003c/code\u003e Logger metadata, which error trackers forward.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTwo entry points take request data. \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in `plug_crypto` in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in `Plug.Crypto` validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise `FunctionClauseError` with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library\u0027s `rescue` blocks and `Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1` only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as `crash_reason` Logger metadata, which error trackers forward.\n\nTwo entry points take request data. `Plug.Crypto.verify/4` exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which `Phoenix.Token.verify/4` reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2` exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker.\n\nThis issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1."
}
],
"value": "Externally-Generated Error Message Containing Sensitive Information vulnerability in plug_crypto in elixir-plug plug_crypto allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to expose the secret key base through application logs via a wrong-typed argument. Every public function in Plug.Crypto validates argument types in a function-head guard. A failed guard makes the Erlang VM raise FunctionClauseError with the actual argument values in the top stack frame, so the secret key base, a derived key, or the value an API key is compared against lands in that frame. The library\u0027s rescue blocks and Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 only reach exceptions raised inside a function body, so they never see a guard failure. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the frame to the error log and attach it as crash_reason Logger metadata, which error trackers forward.\n\nTwo entry points take request data. Plug.Crypto.verify/4 exposes the secret key base when the token is neither a binary nor nil, which Phoenix.Token.verify/4 reaches because it forwards the token unguarded. Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 exposes the other operand when one side is not a binary, as happens when a missing request header yields nil. Reading the leaked value needs separate access to the logs or the error tracker, so the request alone does not disclose the secret to the attacker.\n\nThis issue affects plug: from 1.6.3 before 1.7.0; plug_crypto: from 1.0.0 before 2.2.1."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-54",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eAn unauthenticated attacker sends one request with a wrong-typed parameter, or omits a header, and the secret key base or the compared secret is written into the application log and into \u003ccode\u003ecrash_reason\u003c/code\u003e metadata forwarded to error trackers. Anyone who can read those logs then holds a key sufficient to mint session cookies and tokens under any salt.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "An unauthenticated attacker sends one request with a wrong-typed parameter, or omits a header, and the secret key base or the compared secret is written into the application log and into `crash_reason` metadata forwarded to error trackers. Anyone who can read those logs then holds a key sufficient to mint session cookies and tokens under any salt."
}
],
"value": "An unauthenticated attacker sends one request with a wrong-typed parameter, or omits a header, and the secret key base or the compared secret is written into the application log and into crash_reason metadata forwarded to error trackers. Anyone who can read those logs then holds a key sufficient to mint session cookies and tokens under any salt."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 5.1,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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"value": "GENERAL"
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{
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{
"cweId": "CWE-532",
"description": "CWE-532 Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-23T09:56:58.885Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Secret key base exposed in stack trace arguments on wrong-typed Plug.Crypto arguments",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory",
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/security/advisories/GHSA-ffw9-w85g-f2vh"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-105963",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-105963.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-105963",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-105963"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 56000c3 in elixir-plug/plug",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/56000c33d8a0a2fbac491f8be06b9c5112bc2276"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit aeaa90e in elixir-plug/plug",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug/commit/aeaa90e76b73ea90c3ecca9aae16fce71bd2a8d4"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit 2d078b7 in elixir-plug/plug_crypto",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug_crypto/commit/2d078b7b8264c565f0ff71235c515f4f46882dcf"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 9818874 in elixir-plug/plug_crypto",
"tags": [
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],
"url": "https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug_crypto/commit/981887493dada0fce7003c61861c00dfbb0fc8c5"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Secret key base exposed in stack trace arguments on wrong-typed Plug.Crypto arguments",
"workarounds": [
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eCheck argument types in the calling code before entering \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto\u003c/code\u003e, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e or \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e only when \u003ccode\u003eis_binary(token)\u003c/code\u003e holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhere the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending \u003ccode\u003evars\u003c/code\u003e with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Check argument types in the calling code before entering `Plug.Crypto`, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to `Phoenix.Token.verify/4`, `Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4`, `Plug.Crypto.verify/4` or `Plug.Crypto.decrypt/4` only when `is_binary(token)` holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2` only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil.\n\nWhere the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending `vars` with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log."
}
],
"value": "Check argument types in the calling code before entering Plug.Crypto, so no head guard ever fails. Pass a token to Phoenix.Token.verify/4, Phoenix.Token.decrypt/4, Plug.Crypto.verify/4 or Plug.Crypto.decrypt/4 only when is_binary(token) holds, and treat anything else as an invalid token. Call Plug.Crypto.secure_compare/2 only when both operands are binaries, treating a missing header or parameter as a failed comparison rather than passing nil.\n\nWhere the leaked value matters more than the crash, configuring the error tracker to drop stack-frame arguments also keeps the secret out of the forwarded report. For Sentry this means not sending vars with the crash report. This narrows exposure but leaves the value in the local error log."
}
],
"x_proofOfConcept": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eRun an application that depends on \u003ccode\u003eplug_crypto\u003c/code\u003e and exposes a route calling \u003ccode\u003ePhoenix.Token.verify(secret_key_base, \"user auth\", conn.params[\"token\"])\u003c/code\u003e, plus a route calling \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare(List.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\")), api_key)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend \u003ccode\u003eGET /verify?token[]=x\u003c/code\u003e. \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Parsers\u003c/code\u003e yields a list for the bracket syntax, so the token argument is a list.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eObserve the 500 response and read the error log. The top frame prints \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.verify(\"SECRET_KEY_BASE_...\", \"user auth\", [\"x\"], [])\u003c/code\u003e with the secret key base in full, and the same frame is attached as \u003ccode\u003ecrash_reason\u003c/code\u003e Logger metadata.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eSend \u003ccode\u003eGET /api\u003c/code\u003e with no \u003ccode\u003ex-api-key\u003c/code\u003e header. The header lookup yields nil, and the frame prints \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.secure_compare(nil, \"\u0026lt;configured API key\u0026gt;\")\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA JSON body of \u003ccode\u003e{\"token\": 123}\u003c/code\u003e to the first route gives the same result with an integer argument.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"
},
{
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"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "1. Run an application that depends on `plug_crypto` and exposes a route calling `Phoenix.Token.verify(secret_key_base, \"user auth\", conn.params[\"token\"])`, plus a route calling `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare(List.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\")), api_key)`.\n2. Send `GET /verify?token[]=x`. `Plug.Parsers` yields a list for the bracket syntax, so the token argument is a list.\n3. Observe the 500 response and read the error log. The top frame prints `Plug.Crypto.verify(\"SECRET_KEY_BASE_...\", \"user auth\", [\"x\"], [])` with the secret key base in full, and the same frame is attached as `crash_reason` Logger metadata.\n4. Send `GET /api` with no `x-api-key` header. The header lookup yields nil, and the frame prints `Plug.Crypto.secure_compare(nil, \"\u003cconfigured API key\u003e\")`.\n5. A JSON body of `{\"token\": 123}` to the first route gives the same result with an integer argument."
}
],
"value": "* Run an application that depends on plug_crypto and exposes a route calling Phoenix.Token.verify(secret_key_base, \"user auth\", conn.params[\"token\"]), plus a route calling Plug.Crypto.secure_compare(List.first(get_req_header(conn, \"x-api-key\")), api_key).\n* Send GET /verify?token[]=x. Plug.Parsers yields a list for the bracket syntax, so the token argument is a list.\n* Observe the 500 response and read the error log. The top frame prints Plug.Crypto.verify(\"SECRET_KEY_BASE_...\", \"user auth\", [\"x\"], []) with the secret key base in full, and the same frame is attached as crash_reason Logger metadata.\n* Send GET /api with no x-api-key header. The header lookup yields nil, and the frame prints Plug.Crypto.secure_compare(nil, \"\u003cconfigured API key\u003e\").\n* A JSON body of {\"token\": 123} to the first route gives the same result with an integer argument."
}
],
"x_technicalAnalysis": [
{
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"value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e1. Type checks in function-head guards.\u003c/strong\u003e Every public function in \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto\u003c/code\u003e validates its arguments in a head guard, for example \u003ccode\u003esecure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003ewhen is_binary(left) and is_binary(right)\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003everify/4\u003c/code\u003e with \u003ccode\u003ewhen is_binary(key_base) and is_binary(salt) and is_binary(token)\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2. The VM builds the error, not the library.\u003c/strong\u003e When no clause matches, the Erlang VM raises \u003ccode\u003eFunctionClauseError\u003c/code\u003e and the top stack frame holds the actual argument values. The library\u0027s \u003ccode\u003erescue ... reraise\u003c/code\u003e blocks and \u003ccode\u003ePlug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1\u003c/code\u003e only apply to exceptions raised inside a function body, so a guard failure never reaches them. In \u003ccode\u003eplug_crypto\u003c/code\u003e the same commit that added \u003ccode\u003eprune_args_from_stacktrace/1\u003c/code\u003e also added these guards.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e3. Which value leaks.\u003c/strong\u003e \u003ccode\u003everify/4\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003esign/4\u003c/code\u003e put the secret key base in the frame. \u003ccode\u003edecrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e has no \u003ccode\u003eis_binary(token)\u003c/code\u003e guard on its main clause, so the key is derived first and the failing guard belongs to \u003ccode\u003eMessageEncryptor.decrypt/4\u003c/code\u003e, placing the derived 32-byte key in the frame. \u003ccode\u003esecure_compare/2\u003c/code\u003e places the other operand in the frame, which is the server-side secret when a request value is nil.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e4. The frame reaches logs and error trackers.\u003c/strong\u003e Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the formatted frame, arguments included, to the error log and attach it as \u003ccode\u003ecrash_reason\u003c/code\u003e Logger metadata. Error trackers forward it; Sentry\u0027s handler sends crash reports by default and serializes frame arguments as \u003ccode\u003evars\u003c/code\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
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"value": "**1. Type checks in function-head guards.** Every public function in `Plug.Crypto` validates its arguments in a head guard, for example `secure_compare/2` with `when is_binary(left) and is_binary(right)` and `verify/4` with `when is_binary(key_base) and is_binary(salt) and is_binary(token)`.\n\n**2. The VM builds the error, not the library.** When no clause matches, the Erlang VM raises `FunctionClauseError` and the top stack frame holds the actual argument values. The library\u0027s `rescue ... reraise` blocks and `Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1` only apply to exceptions raised inside a function body, so a guard failure never reaches them. In `plug_crypto` the same commit that added `prune_args_from_stacktrace/1` also added these guards.\n\n**3. Which value leaks.** `verify/4` and `sign/4` put the secret key base in the frame. `decrypt/4` has no `is_binary(token)` guard on its main clause, so the key is derived first and the failing guard belongs to `MessageEncryptor.decrypt/4`, placing the derived 32-byte key in the frame. `secure_compare/2` places the other operand in the frame, which is the server-side secret when a request value is nil.\n\n**4. The frame reaches logs and error trackers.** Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the formatted frame, arguments included, to the error log and attach it as `crash_reason` Logger metadata. Error trackers forward it; Sentry\u0027s handler sends crash reports by default and serializes frame arguments as `vars`."
}
],
"value": "1. Type checks in function-head guards. Every public function in Plug.Crypto validates its arguments in a head guard, for example secure_compare/2 with when is_binary(left) and is_binary(right) and verify/4 with when is_binary(key_base) and is_binary(salt) and is_binary(token).\n\n2. The VM builds the error, not the library. When no clause matches, the Erlang VM raises FunctionClauseError and the top stack frame holds the actual argument values. The library\u0027s rescue ... reraise blocks and Plug.Crypto.prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 only apply to exceptions raised inside a function body, so a guard failure never reaches them. In plug_crypto the same commit that added prune_args_from_stacktrace/1 also added these guards.\n\n3. Which value leaks. verify/4 and sign/4 put the secret key base in the frame. decrypt/4 has no is_binary(token) guard on its main clause, so the key is derived first and the failing guard belongs to MessageEncryptor.decrypt/4, placing the derived 32-byte key in the frame. secure_compare/2 places the other operand in the frame, which is the server-side secret when a request value is nil.\n\n4. The frame reaches logs and error trackers. Plug.Cowboy and Bandit write the formatted frame, arguments included, to the error log and attach it as crash_reason Logger metadata. Error trackers forward it; Sentry\u0027s handler sends crash reports by default and serializes frame arguments as vars."
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CVE-2026-56813 (GCVE-0-2026-56813)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-10 12:51 – Updated: 2026-09-24 21:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Cookie attribute injection in Plug.Conn.Cookies.encode/2
Summary
Improper Neutralization of Parameter/Argument Delimiters vulnerability in elixir-plug plug allows an attacker to inject or override HTTP cookie attributes.
The Plug.Conn.Cookies.encode/2 function in lib/plug/conn/cookies.ex builds the Set-Cookie response header by interpolating the cookie value and its path, domain, same_site, and extra attributes directly into the header without neutralizing the ; delimiter that separates cookie attributes.
An application that places attacker-controlled data into a cookie value or attribute (for example via Plug.Conn.put_resp_cookie/4 when reflecting a username or preference) lets an attacker inject a ; to append or override cookie attributes (such as Domain and Path scope, or dropping the Secure and HttpOnly flags), enabling cookie tossing and session fixation. Carriage return, line feed, and null bytes are rejected by Plug.Conn header validation, so HTTP response splitting is not possible, but attribute injection through ; is not prevented.
This issue affects plug: from 0.1.0 before 1.16.6, from 1.17.0 before 1.17.4, from 1.18.0 before 1.18.5, from 1.19.1 before 1.19.5, and from 1.20.0 before 1.20.3.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-10 14:43 UTC
CWE
- CWE-141 - Improper Neutralization of Parameter/Argument Delimiters
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
0.1.0 , < 1.16.6
(semver)
Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.4 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.5 (semver) Affected: 1.19.1 , < 1.19.5 (semver) Affected: 1.20.0 , < 1.20.3 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
f26876aa67aaeb38e616638aa3efbcc2fe2906a5 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-07-10 12:51
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CVE-2026-56814 (GCVE-0-2026-56814)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-10 11:14 – Updated: 2026-09-24 21:31
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Plug: multipart :length limit is not charged for part headers, enabling unbounded temp-file creation (denial of service)
Summary
Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART, the multipart request-body parser used to handle file uploads and multipart forms, does not enforce its :length budget against all consumed resources, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. The parser charges the :length limit only for part body bytes; part header bytes are never counted, and a part with an empty body costs zero.
Because every part whose Content-Disposition carries a non-empty filename creates a fresh temporary file (via Plug.Upload) and retains a Plug.Upload struct for the duration of the request, an attacker can send a single request composed of many empty-body file parts. Such a request stays well under the configured :length limit (8,000,000 bytes by default) while creating one temporary file per part, leading to inode and disk exhaustion and unbounded memory growth. Any application using Plug.Parsers with the :multipart parser is affected, and no authentication is required, only reachability of a multipart endpoint over HTTP.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/plug/parsers/multipart.ex and program routines Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart/2, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_headers/5, Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_body/4, and Plug.Parsers.MULTIPART.parse_multipart_file/4.
This issue affects plug: from 1.4.0-rc.0 before 1.16.6, from 1.17.0 before 1.17.4, from 1.18.0 before 1.18.5, from 1.19.1 before 1.19.5, and from 1.20.0 before 1.20.3.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-10 14:03 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
10 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.4.0-rc.0 , < 1.16.6
(semver)
Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.4 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.5 (semver) Affected: 1.19.1 , < 1.19.5 (semver) Affected: 1.20.0 , < 1.20.3 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
c52b2f32c90bccd718202bafccb5f95594e30183 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-07-10 11:14
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CVE-2026-54892 (GCVE-0-2026-54892)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-23 12:31 – Updated: 2026-06-23 18:21
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Plug: quadratic-time decoding of nested query/body parameters enables denial of service
Summary
Inefficient algorithmic complexity in Plug's nested-parameter decoder allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause denial of service. Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4 (and Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2) parse query strings and application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies. When a key contains many bracketed segments such as a[a][a][a]=1, the decoder walks the brackets and, for each of the N levels, performs a map operation keyed on an ever-growing binary prefix of the key, hashing the full byte range at each step. The total decode cost is therefore quadratic in the number of nesting levels.
With the default Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED body limit of 1,000,000 bytes, a single request can carry roughly 333,000 nesting levels and saturate a BEAM scheduler for minutes. A small number of concurrent requests can saturate all schedulers and render a Plug-based server unresponsive. No authentication or knowledge of application routes is required.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/plug/conn/query.ex and program routines Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4, Plug.Conn.Query.decode_each/2, Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6, Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3, and Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2.
This issue affects plug from 1.15.0 before 1.15.5, 1.16.4, 1.17.2, 1.18.3, and 1.19.3.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-23 13:03 UTC
CWE
- CWE-407 - Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.15.0 , < 1.15.5
(semver)
Affected: 1.16.0 , < 1.16.4 (semver) Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.2 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.3 (semver) Affected: 1.19.0 , < 1.19.3 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
712b875d3442c765d8d37e546ffd5ad9f8afcc55 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-8468 (GCVE-0-2026-8468)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-14 10:29 – Updated: 2026-05-27 15:41
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Unbounded buffer accumulation in multipart header parsing causes denial of service in plug
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in plug_project plug allows denial of service via unbounded buffer accumulation in multipart header parsing.
'Elixir.Plug.Conn':read_part_headers/2 in lib/plug/conn.ex does not obey its :length parameter. There is no upper bound on the size of the accumulated buffer. By contrast, the sibling function read_part_body has an explicit byte_size(acc) > length guard that stops accumulation once a limit is reached. No such guard exists in read_part_headers. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exhaust server memory by sending a crafted multipart/form-data request, causing a denial of service.
This issue affects plug from 1.4.0 before 1.15.4, 1.16.3, 1.17.1, 1.18.2, and 1.19.2.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-05-14 17:53 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
1.4.0 , < 1.15.4
(semver)
Affected: 1.16.0 , < 1.16.3 (semver) Affected: 1.17.0 , < 1.17.1 (semver) Affected: 1.18.0 , < 1.18.2 (semver) Affected: 1.19.0 , < 1.19.2 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:plug_project:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug |
Affected:
c52b2f32c90bccd718202bafccb5f95594e30183 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:plug_project:plug:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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CVE-2026-32688 (GCVE-0-2026-32688)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-27 13:45 – Updated: 2026-04-29 17:08
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Atom table exhaustion via HTTP/2 :scheme pseudo-header in plug_cowboy
Summary
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-plug plug_cowboy allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via atom table exhaustion.
Plug.Cowboy.Conn.conn/1 in lib/plug/cowboy/conn.ex calls String.to_atom/1 on the value returned by :cowboy_req.scheme/1. For HTTP/2 connections, cowlib passes the client-supplied :scheme pseudo-header value through verbatim without validation. Each unique value permanently allocates a new entry in the BEAM atom table. Since atoms are never garbage-collected and the atom table has a fixed limit (default 1,048,576), an unauthenticated attacker can exhaust the table by sending HTTP/2 requests with unique :scheme values, causing the Erlang VM to abort with system_limit and taking down the entire node.
This vulnerability does not affect HTTP/1.1, where cowboy derives the scheme from the listener type rather than from a client-supplied header.
This issue affects plug_cowboy: from 2.0.0 before 2.8.1.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-04-27 19:04 UTC
CWE
- CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug_cowboy/securi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-32688.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-32688 | related |
| https://github.com/elixir-plug/plug_cowboy/commit… | patch |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| elixir-plug | plug_cowboy |
Affected:
2.0.0 , < 2.8.1
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_cowboy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
|
| elixir-plug | plug_cowboy |
Affected:
12ecfd024bb179d48b018fecf074e43fe6a19c83 , < bfb34cb45eb354e56437f7023fb306de1bf9c19b
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:elixir-plug:plug_cowboy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"credits": [
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"value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-plug plug_cowboy allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via atom table exhaustion.\u003cp\u003e\u003ctt\u003ePlug.Cowboy.Conn.conn/1\u003c/tt\u003e in \u003ctt\u003elib/plug/cowboy/conn.ex\u003c/tt\u003e calls \u003ctt\u003eString.to_atom/1\u003c/tt\u003e on the value returned by \u003ctt\u003e:cowboy_req.scheme/1\u003c/tt\u003e. For HTTP/2 connections, cowlib passes the client-supplied \u003ctt\u003e:scheme\u003c/tt\u003e pseudo-header value through verbatim without validation. Each unique value permanently allocates a new entry in the BEAM atom table. Since atoms are never garbage-collected and the atom table has a fixed limit (default 1,048,576), an unauthenticated attacker can exhaust the table by sending HTTP/2 requests with unique \u003ctt\u003e:scheme\u003c/tt\u003e values, causing the Erlang VM to abort with \u003ctt\u003esystem_limit\u003c/tt\u003e and taking down the entire node.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis vulnerability does not affect HTTP/1.1, where cowboy derives the scheme from the listener type rather than from a client-supplied header.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects plug_cowboy: from 2.0.0 before 2.8.1.\u003c/p\u003e"
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}
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}
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"datePublished": "2026-04-27T13:45:35.160Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-03-13T09:12:14.475Z",
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