7PAA022088
Vulnerability from csaf_abb - Published: 2025-11-20 00:30 - Updated: 2025-11-20 00:30Summary
Edgenius Management Portal Authentication Bypass
Notes
Summary
ABB identified a critical vulnerability present in ABB Ability Edgenius starting from version 3.2.0.0. We have not received any reports of this vulnerability being exploited.
An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to:
→ install and run arbitrary code,
→ uninstall installed applications,
→ modify the configuration of installed applications,
on systems running the vulnerable versions of ABB Ability Edgenius, including 3.2.0.0 through 3.2.1.1.
General security recommendations
Control systems and the control network are exposed to cyber threats. To minimize these risks, the protective measures and best practices listed below are available in addition to other measures. ABB strongly recommends system integrators and asset owners to implement the measures they consider appropriate for their control system environment:
– Place control systems in a dedicated control network containing control systems only.
– Locate control networks and systems behind firewalls and separate them from any other networks like business networks and the Internet.
– Block any inbound Internet traffic destined for the control networks/systems. Place remote access systems used for remote control system access outside the control network.
– Limit outbound Internet traffic originating from control systems/networks as much as possible. If control systems must talk to the Internet, tailor firewall rules to required resources - allow only source IPs, destination IPs and services/destination ports which control systems need to use for normal control operation.
– If Internet access is required on occasion only, disable relevant firewall rules and enable them during the time window of required Internet access only. If supported by your firewall, define an expiry date and time for such rules – after the expiry date and time, the firewall will disable the rule automatically.
– Limit exposure of control networks/systems to internal systems. Tailor firewall rules allowing traffic from internal systems to control networks/systems to allow only source IPs, destination IPs and services/destination ports which are definitely required for normal control operation.
– Create strict firewall rules to filter malicious network traffic targeting control system vulnerabilities ("exploit traffic"). Exploit traffic may use network communication features like source routing, IP fragmentation and/or IP tunneling. If such features are not required for normal control operation, block them on your firewall.
– If supported by your firewall, apply additional filters to allowed traffic which provide protection for control networks/systems. Such filters are provided by advanced firewall features like Application Control and Anti-Virus.
– Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or Intrusion Preventions Systems (IPS) to detect/block control system-specific exploit traffic. Consider using IPS rules protecting against control system exploits.
– When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Please ensure that VPN solutions are updated to the most current version available.
– In case you want to filter internal control network traffic, consider using solutions supporting Intra-LAN traffic control like VLAN access control lists.
– Harden your control systems by enabling only the ports, services and software required for normal control operation. Disable all other ports and disable/uninstall all other services and software.
– If possible, limit the permissions of user accounts, software processes and devices to the permissions required for normal control operation.
– Use trusted, patched software and malware protection solutions. Interact with trusted web sites and trusted email attachments only.
– Ensure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system and firm-ware patches as well as anti-virus and firewall.
– Protect control systems from physical access by unauthorized personnel e.g. by placing them in locked switch cabinets.
Support
For additional instructions and support please contact your local ABB service organization. For contact information, see www.abb.com/contactcenters.
Information about ABB’s cyber security program and capabilities can be found at www.abb.com/cybersecurity.
Notice
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB.
ABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose.
All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
Purpose
ABB has a rigorous internal cyber security continuous improvement process which involves regular testing with industry leading tools and periodic assessments to identify potential product issues. Occasionally an issue is determined to be a design or coding flaw with implications that may impact product cyber security.
When a potential product vulnerability is identified or reported, ABB immediately initiates our vulnerability handling process. This entails validating if the issue is in fact a product issue, identifying root causes, determining what related products may be impacted, developing a remediation, and notifying end users and governmental organizations (e.g. ICS-CERT).
The resulting Cyber Security Advisory intends to notify customers of the vulnerability and provide details on which products are impacted, how to mitigate the vulnerability or explain workarounds that minimize the potential risk as much as possible. The release of a Cyber Security Advisory should not be misconstrued as an affirmation or indication of an active threat or ongoing campaign targeting the products mentioned here. If ABB is aware of any specific threats, it will be clearly mentioned in the communication.
The publication of this Cyber Security Advisory is an example of ABB’s commitment to the user com-munity in support of this critical topic. Responsible disclosure is an important element in the chain of trust we work to maintain with our many customers. The release of an Advisory provides timely in-formation which is essential to help ensure our customers are fully informed.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the scope of the vulnerability?
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could install and run arbitrary code, uninstall installed applications and modify the configuration of installed applications.
What causes the vulnerability?
The vulnerability is caused by an underlying API (Application Programming Interface) not adequately verifying authentication.
What is ABB Ability Edgenius Management Portal?
ABB Ability Edgenius Management Portal allows administrators to configure their edge and manage applications.
What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could be able to run arbitrary code on the edge and modify the configuration of installed applications.
How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?
An attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted message and sending the message to an affected system node. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the net-work with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Miti-gating Factors above.
Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely?
Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed.
What does the update do?
The update removes the vulnerability, ensuring that the vulnerable parts of the Edgenius Management Portal validate authorization for requests.
Meanwhile please refer to the defined mitigations and workaround.
When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?
No, ABB discovered this vulnerability through internal testing.
When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?
No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued
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"notes": [
{
"category": "summary",
"text": "ABB identified a critical vulnerability present in ABB Ability Edgenius starting from version 3.2.0.0. We have not received any reports of this vulnerability being exploited. \n\nAn unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to: \n\n\u2192\tinstall and run arbitrary code,\n\n\u2192\tuninstall installed applications,\n\n\u2192\tmodify the configuration of installed applications,\n\non systems running the vulnerable versions of ABB Ability Edgenius, including 3.2.0.0 through 3.2.1.1.",
"title": "Summary"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "Control systems and the control network are exposed to cyber threats. To minimize these risks, the protective measures and best practices listed below are available in addition to other measures. ABB strongly recommends system integrators and asset owners to implement the measures they consider appropriate for their control system environment:\n\n\u2013\tPlace control systems in a dedicated control network containing control systems only.\n\n\u2013\tLocate control networks and systems behind firewalls and separate them from any other networks like business networks and the Internet.\n\n\u2013\tBlock any inbound Internet traffic destined for the control networks/systems. Place remote access systems used for remote control system access outside the control network.\n\n\u2013\tLimit outbound Internet traffic originating from control systems/networks as much as possible. If control systems must talk to the Internet, tailor firewall rules to required resources - allow only source IPs, destination IPs and services/destination ports which control systems need to use for normal control operation.\n\n\u2013\tIf Internet access is required on occasion only, disable relevant firewall rules and enable them during the time window of required Internet access only. If supported by your firewall, define an expiry date and time for such rules \u2013 after the expiry date and time, the firewall will disable the rule automatically.\n\n\u2013\tLimit exposure of control networks/systems to internal systems. Tailor firewall rules allowing traffic from internal systems to control networks/systems to allow only source IPs, destination IPs and services/destination ports which are definitely required for normal control operation.\n\n\u2013\tCreate strict firewall rules to filter malicious network traffic targeting control system vulnerabilities (\"exploit traffic\"). Exploit traffic may use network communication features like source routing, IP fragmentation and/or IP tunneling. If such features are not required for normal control operation, block them on your firewall.\n\n\u2013\tIf supported by your firewall, apply additional filters to allowed traffic which provide protection for control networks/systems. Such filters are provided by advanced firewall features like Application Control and Anti-Virus.\n\n\u2013\tUse Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) or Intrusion Preventions Systems (IPS) to detect/block control system-specific exploit traffic. Consider using IPS rules protecting against control system exploits.\n\n\u2013\tWhen remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Please ensure that VPN solutions are updated to the most current version available.\n\n\u2013\tIn case you want to filter internal control network traffic, consider using solutions supporting Intra-LAN traffic control like VLAN access control lists.\n\n\u2013\tHarden your control systems by enabling only the ports, services and software required for normal control operation. Disable all other ports and disable/uninstall all other services and software.\n\n\u2013\tIf possible, limit the permissions of user accounts, software processes and devices to the permissions required for normal control operation.\n\n\u2013\tUse trusted, patched software and malware protection solutions. Interact with trusted web sites and trusted email attachments only.\n\n\u2013\tEnsure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system and firm-ware patches as well as anti-virus and firewall.\n\n\u2013\tProtect control systems from physical access by unauthorized personnel e.g. by placing them in locked switch cabinets.",
"title": "General security recommendations"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "For additional instructions and support please contact your local ABB service organization. For contact information, see www.abb.com/contactcenters.\n\nInformation about ABB\u2019s cyber security program and capabilities can be found at www.abb.com/cybersecurity.\n",
"title": "Support"
},
{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB.\n\nABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.\n\nThis document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose.\n\nAll rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.\n",
"title": "Notice"
},
{
"category": "other",
"text": "ABB has a rigorous internal cyber security continuous improvement process which involves regular testing with industry leading tools and periodic assessments to identify potential product issues. Occasionally an issue is determined to be a design or coding flaw with implications that may impact product cyber security.\n\nWhen a potential product vulnerability is identified or reported, ABB immediately initiates our vulnerability handling process. This entails validating if the issue is in fact a product issue, identifying root causes, determining what related products may be impacted, developing a remediation, and notifying end users and governmental organizations (e.g. ICS-CERT).\n\nThe resulting Cyber Security Advisory intends to notify customers of the vulnerability and provide details on which products are impacted, how to mitigate the vulnerability or explain workarounds that minimize the potential risk as much as possible. The release of a Cyber Security Advisory should not be misconstrued as an affirmation or indication of an active threat or ongoing campaign targeting the products mentioned here. If ABB is aware of any specific threats, it will be clearly mentioned in the communication.\n\nThe publication of this Cyber Security Advisory is an example of ABB\u2019s commitment to the user com-munity in support of this critical topic. Responsible disclosure is an important element in the chain of trust we work to maintain with our many customers. The release of an Advisory provides timely in-formation which is essential to help ensure our customers are fully informed.\n",
"title": "Purpose"
},
{
"category": "faq",
"text": "What is the scope of the vulnerability?\n\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could install and run arbitrary code, uninstall installed applications and modify the configuration of installed applications. \n\nWhat causes the vulnerability?\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by an underlying API (Application Programming Interface) not adequately verifying authentication. \n\nWhat is ABB Ability Edgenius Management Portal?\n\nABB Ability Edgenius Management Portal allows administrators to configure their edge and manage applications. \n\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?\n\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could be able to run arbitrary code on the edge and modify the configuration of installed applications.\n\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?\n\nAn attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by creating a specially crafted message and sending the message to an affected system node. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network, by connecting to the network either directly or through a wrongly configured or penetrated firewall, or that he installs malicious software on a system node or otherwise infects the net-work with malicious software. Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Miti-gating Factors above.\n\nCould the vulnerability be exploited remotely? \n\nYes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. Recommended practices include that process control systems are physically protected, have no direct connections to the Internet, and are separated from other networks by means of a firewall system that has a minimal number of ports exposed.\n\nWhat does the update do?\n\nThe update removes the vulnerability, ensuring that the vulnerable parts of the Edgenius Management Portal validate authorization for requests. \nMeanwhile please refer to the defined mitigations and workaround.\n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?\n\nNo, ABB discovered this vulnerability through internal testing. \n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?\n\nNo, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued \n",
"title": "Frequently Asked Questions"
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"summary": "ABB CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY - PDF version ",
"url": "https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=7PAA022088\u0026LanguageCode=en\u0026DocumentPartId=\u0026Action=Launch"
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{
"category": "self",
"summary": "ABB CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY - CSAF version ",
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{
"summary": "7PAA022086_en\tCVE-2025-10571 Workaround Instructions\n",
"url": "https://library.abb.com/d/7PAA022086"
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],
"title": "Edgenius Management Portal Authentication Bypass",
"tracking": {
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"name": "Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel"
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"notes": [
{
"category": "description",
"text": "The Edgenius Management Portal in the affected product versions contains a vulnerability that allows authentication to be bypassed. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially craft-ed message to the system node allowing the attacker to install and run arbitrary code, uninstall in-stalled applications and modify the configuration of installed applications.",
"title": "CVE description"
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],
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{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"details": "ABB has prepared an update to fix this vulnerability included in the latest Roll-Up, ABB Ability Edgenius version 3.2.2.0.\n\nABB advises customers to upgrade as soon as possible. Until the upgrade is applied, ABB advises customers to disable the Edgenius Management Portal to mitigate the vulnerability.",
"product_ids": [
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"AV2"
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},
{
"category": "mitigation",
"details": "Exploitation requires an attacker to have gained access to the network where Edgenius has been deployed, and while the Edgenius Management Portal is running. \n\nRefer to section \u201cGeneral security recommendations\u201d for further advise on how to keep your system secure.",
"product_ids": [
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"scores": [
{
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"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.6,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"environmentalScore": 9.1,
"environmentalSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"exploitCodeMaturity": "FUNCTIONAL",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"remediationLevel": "TEMPORARY_FIX",
"reportConfidence": "CONFIRMED",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"temporalScore": 9,
"temporalSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:F/RL:T/RC:C",
"version": "3.1"
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"products": [
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}
],
"title": "CVE-2025-10571"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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