9AKK108471A8948
Vulnerability from csaf_abb - Published: 2025-10-20 00:30 - Updated: 2025-10-21 00:30Summary
Terra AC wallbox Heap Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Notes
Summary
ABB is aware of vulnerabilities in the product versions listed as affected in the advisory.
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the pollution of heap memory which potentially takes remote control of the product and performs a write operation to the flash memory to alter the firmware behavior.
Support
For additional instructions and support please contact your local ABB Digital Service Support ch.ups.digital@abb.com. For contact information, see ww.abb.com/contactcenters.
Information about ABB’s cyber security program and capabilities can be found at https://go.abb/cybersecurity.
Notice
The information in this document is subject to change without notice, and should not be construed as a commitment by ABB.
ABB provides no warranty, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, for the information contained in this document, and assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this document. In no event shall ABB or any of its suppliers be liable for direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages of any nature or kind arising from the use of this document, or from the use of any hardware or software described in this document, even if ABB or its suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages.
This document and parts hereof must not be reproduced or copied without written permission from ABB, and the contents hereof must not be imparted to a third party nor used for any unauthorized purpose.
All rights to registrations and trademarks reside with their respective owners.
Mitigating factors
To attack with this kind of message, hackers must hijack CSMS (OCPP backends) first and then can send messages, OR the way to OCPP backend is unsafe itself (http) which can cause any kind of attack behavior and known as a common knowledge.
Refer to section “General security recommendations” for further advise on how to keep your system secure.
Workarounds
Make sure OCPP backend that chargers are connected is strictly secured to avoid any kind of at-tack especially the communication relevant components.
Use https(TLS) as basic communication foundation between charger and OCPP backend instead of http.
General security recommendations
For any installation of software-related ABB products we strongly recommend the following (non-exhaustive) list of cyber security practices:
– Isolate special purpose networks (e.g. for automation systems) and remote devices behind fire-walls and separate them from any general-purpose network (e.g. office or home networks).
– Install physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your devices, components, peripheral equipment, and networks.
– Never connect programming software or computers containing programing software to any net-work other than the network for the devices that it is intended for.
– Scan all data imported into your environment before use to detect potential malware infections.
– Minimize network exposure for all applications and endpoints to ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet unless they are designed for such exposure and the intended use requires such.
– Ensure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system, and firm-ware patches as well as anti-virus and firewall.
– When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices.
Purpose
ABB has a rigorous internal cyber security continuous improvement process which involves regular testing with industry leading tools and periodic assessments to identify potential product issues. Occasionally an issue is determined to be a design or coding flaw with implications that may impact product cyber security.
When a potential product vulnerability is identified or reported, ABB immediately initiates our vulnerability handling process. This entails validating if the issue is in fact a product issue, identifying root causes, determining what related products may be impacted, developing a remediation, and notifying end users and governmental organizations.
The resulting Cyber Security Advisory intends to notify customers of the vulnerability and provide details on which products are impacted, how to mitigate the vulnerability or explain workarounds that minimize the potential risk as much as possible. The release of a Cyber Security Advisory should not be misconstrued as an affirmation or indication of an active threat or ongoing campaign targeting the products mentioned here. If ABB is aware of any specific threats, it will be clearly mentioned in the communication.
The publication of this Cyber Security Advisory is an example of ABB’s commitment to the user com-munity in support of this critical topic. Responsible disclosure is an important element in the chain of trust we work to maintain with our many customers. The release of an Advisory provides timely in-formation which is essential to help ensure our customers are fully informed.
Frequently asked questions
What causes the vulnerability?
The vulnerability is caused by firmware which it didn’t limit the length of OCPP field in certain case.
What is Terra AC wallbox?
Terra AC wallbox is a Level 2 Electric Vehicle charger.
What might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?
An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the affected system node to take control of the charger to response wrong messages, Denial-of-Service, compromised internal state, and possibly remote code execution.
How could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?
An attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted OCPP message to chargers via OCPP backend(CSMS), which could be done remotely. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network and hijack the API of sending message OR hijack the network data directly if the charger is connected with unsafe http mode.
Recommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above.
Could the vulnerability be exploited remotely?
Yes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability.
Can functional safety be affected by an exploit of this vulnerability?
The charger potentially is running with unpredictable mode, including Denial-of-Service, compromised internal state, and possibly remote code execution.
What does the update do?
The update removes the vulnerability by modifying the validation rules of receiving data from OCPP backend.
When this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?
No, ABB received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.
When this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?
No, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued
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"title": "Workarounds"
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{
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"text": "For any installation of software-related ABB products we strongly recommend the following (non-exhaustive) list of cyber security practices:\n\n\u2013\tIsolate special purpose networks (e.g. for automation systems) and remote devices behind fire-walls and separate them from any general-purpose network (e.g. office or home networks).\n\n\u2013\tInstall physical controls so no unauthorized personnel can access your devices, components, peripheral equipment, and networks.\n\n\u2013\tNever connect programming software or computers containing programing software to any net-work other than the network for the devices that it is intended for.\n\n\u2013\tScan all data imported into your environment before use to detect potential malware infections.\n\n\u2013\tMinimize network exposure for all applications and endpoints to ensure that they are not accessible from the Internet unless they are designed for such exposure and the intended use requires such.\n\n\u2013\tEnsure all nodes are always up to date in terms of installed software, operating system, and firm-ware patches as well as anti-virus and firewall.\n\n\u2013\tWhen remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Recognize that VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also, understand that VPNs are only as secure as the connected devices.",
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"title": "Purpose"
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"text": "What causes the vulnerability? \n\nThe vulnerability is caused by firmware which it didn\u2019t limit the length of OCPP field in certain case.\n\nWhat is Terra AC wallbox?\n\nTerra AC wallbox is a Level 2 Electric Vehicle charger.\n\nWhat might an attacker use the vulnerability to do?\n\nAn attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the affected system node to take control of the charger to response wrong messages, Denial-of-Service, compromised internal state, and possibly remote code execution.\n\nHow could an attacker exploit the vulnerability?\n\nAn attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by sending a specially crafted OCPP message to chargers via OCPP backend(CSMS), which could be done remotely. This would require that the attacker has access to the system network and hijack the API of sending message OR hijack the network data directly if the charger is connected with unsafe http mode. \n\nRecommended practices help mitigate such attacks, see section Mitigating Factors above.\n\nCould the vulnerability be exploited remotely? \n\nYes, an attacker who has network access to an affected system node could exploit this vulnerability. \n\nCan functional safety be affected by an exploit of this vulnerability?\n\nThe charger potentially is running with unpredictable mode, including Denial-of-Service, compromised internal state, and possibly remote code execution.\n\nWhat does the update do?\n\nThe update removes the vulnerability by modifying the validation rules of receiving data from OCPP backend.\n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had this vulnerability been publicly disclosed?\n\nNo, ABB received information about this vulnerability through responsible disclosure.\n\nWhen this security advisory was issued, had ABB received any reports that this vulnerability was being exploited?\n\nNo, ABB had not received any information indicating that this vulnerability had been exploited when this security advisory was originally issued\n",
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"url": "https://psirt.abb.com/csaf/2025/9akk108471a8948.json"
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"summary": "ABB E-mobility, \"The home of charging, Terra AC wallbox,\" [Online]. Available: ",
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"summary": "ABB E-mobility, \"Installation Manual, Terra AC (BCM.V3Y01.0-EN),\" [Online]. Available:",
"url": "https://search.abb.com/library/Download.aspx?DocumentID=9AKK107680A4972"
}
],
"title": "Terra AC wallbox Heap Memory Corruption Vulnerability",
"tracking": {
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"name": "\u003c=1.8.32",
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"vulnerabilities": [
{
"cve": "CVE-2025-5517",
"cwe": {
"id": "CWE-122",
"name": "Heap-based Buffer Overflow"
},
"notes": [
{
"category": "description",
"text": "There is potential risk to pollute the memory when a specially crafted OCPP message may be sent to a target vulnerable charger by exploiting unencrypted communication to the Charging Station Management System (CSMS) or fully remotely from its CSMS server.",
"title": "CVE description"
}
],
"product_status": {
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"references": [
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5517"
}
],
"remediations": [
{
"category": "vendor_fix",
"details": "The problem is corrected in the product versions listed as fixed in the advisory. \n\nTerra AC wallbox (UL40/80A) 1.8.33\n\nTerra AC wallbox (UL32A) 1.8.34\n\nTerra AC MID 1.8.34\n\nTerra AC Juno CE 1.8.34\n\nTerra AC PTB 1.8.33\n\nTerra AC wallbox (JP) 1.8.34\n\n\nAdditionally, we strongly recommend not use unsafe mode(http) to connect your charger to your backend even though OCPP is allowed to do in this way, which absolutely could be attacked by malicious man or organization as a common knowledge.\n\nABB recommends that customers apply the update at earliest convenience.\n",
"product_ids": [
"AV1",
"AV2",
"AV3",
"AV4",
"AV5",
"AV6"
]
}
],
"scores": [
{
"cvss_v3": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 6.8,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"environmentalScore": 6.1,
"environmentalSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"exploitCodeMaturity": "PROOF_OF_CONCEPT",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"remediationLevel": "OFFICIAL_FIX",
"reportConfidence": "CONFIRMED",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"temporalScore": 6.1,
"temporalSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H/E:P/RL:O/RC:C",
"version": "3.1"
},
"products": [
"AV1",
"AV2",
"AV3",
"AV4",
"AV5",
"AV6"
]
}
],
"title": "CVE-2025-5517"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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