AZL-115100 (CVE-2026-99558)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 – Updated: 2026-11-20 05:34 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-99558 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

blk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key()

Sashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the following flow:

dm-inlinecrypt ctor # first use of the fallback ├─ blk_crypto_init_key() # succeeds, ctx->key.size != 0 ├─ blk_crypto_start_using_key() │ ├─ hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP │ │ # profile never allocated (NULL) │ └─ raw key: fallback_start_using_mode() │ └─ blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails │ └─ kfree(profile) # not NULLed ├─ goto bad └─ inlinecrypt_dtr() # evicts whenever key.size is set └─ blk_crypto_evict_key() └─ blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false └─ blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() └─ __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile) └─ profile->num_slots # BOOM!!!

This issue can be reproduced using the following commands:

dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64 LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing) SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP) KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n') dmsetup create ic --table "0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \ $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped"

And the following oops is triggered:

================================================================== blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0 Call Trace: blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320 inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160 inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0 dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40 table_load+0x1c4/0x490 ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0 dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20 ==================================================================

dm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never started, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it.

Fix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when tfms_inited[] is not set for the key's mode. tfms_inited[] is only set after blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the profile, so the crash above is no longer reachable.

The bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae ("blk-crypto: dynamically allocate fallback profile") was merged in v6.5, and only became actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 ("dm-inlinecrypt: add target for inline block device encryption") was merged in v7.2.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nblk-crypto: fix NULL deref and UAF in __blk_crypto_evict_key()\n\nSashiko reported a possible NULL pointer dereference, triggered by the\nfollowing flow:\n\n  dm-inlinecrypt ctor            # first use of the fallback\n   \u251c\u2500 blk_crypto_init_key()      # succeeds, ctx-\u003ekey.size != 0\n   \u251c\u2500 blk_crypto_start_using_key()\n   \u2502   \u251c\u2500 hw-wrapped key: -EOPNOTSUPP\n   \u2502   \u2502    # profile never allocated (NULL)\n   \u2502   \u2514\u2500 raw key: fallback_start_using_mode()\n   \u2502      \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_fallback_init() fails\n   \u2502         \u2514\u2500 kfree(profile)   # not NULLed\n   \u251c\u2500 goto bad\n   \u2514\u2500 inlinecrypt_dtr()          # evicts whenever key.size is set\n      \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_evict_key()\n         \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_config_supported_natively() = false\n            \u2514\u2500 blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key()\n               \u2514\u2500 __blk_crypto_evict_key(blk_crypto_fallback_profile)\n                  \u2514\u2500 profile-\u003enum_slots # BOOM!!!\n\nThis issue can be reproduced using the following commands:\n\n  dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/backing bs=1M count=64\n  LOOP=$(losetup -f --show /tmp/backing)\n  SZ=$(blockdev --getsz $LOOP)\n  KEY=$(head -c 64 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d \u0027 \\n\u0027)\n  dmsetup create ic --table \"0 $SZ inlinecrypt aes-xts-plain64 \\\n    $KEY 0 $LOOP 0 1 keytype:hw-wrapped\"\n\nAnd the following oops is triggered:\n\n  ==================================================================\n  blk-crypto: loop0: no support for wrapped keys\n  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n        0xdffffc000000000b: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI\n  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000058-0x000000000000005f]\n  CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 901 Comm: dmsetup 7.3.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\n  RIP: 0010:__blk_crypto_evict_key+0x2e/0x3b0\n  Call Trace:\n   blk_crypto_evict_key+0x24c/0x320\n   inlinecrypt_dtr+0xf6/0x160\n   inlinecrypt_ctr+0x2d3/0xbd0\n   dm_table_add_target+0x661/0xf40\n   table_load+0x1c4/0x490\n   ctl_ioctl+0x32f/0x5f0\n   dm_ctl_ioctl+0xe/0x20\n  ==================================================================\n\ndm-inlinecrypt is the only caller that can evict a key that was never\nstarted, as fscrypt frees such a key without evicting it.\n\nFix this by returning early from blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key() when\ntfms_inited[] is not set for the key\u0027s mode.  tfms_inited[] is only set\nafter blk_crypto_fallback_init() has successfully initialized the\nprofile, so the crash above is no longer reachable.\n\nThe bug has been latent since commit c984ff1423ae (\"blk-crypto:\ndynamically allocate fallback profile\") was merged in v6.5, and only\nbecame actually triggerable when commit e7f57d2c47e2 (\"dm-inlinecrypt:\nadd target for inline block device encryption\") was merged in v7.2.",
  "id": "AZL-115100",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T05:34:08Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99558"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-99558 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-99558"
  ]
}



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