AZL-115103 (CVE-2026-99561)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-11-19 15:18 – Updated: 2026-11-20 05:34 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-99561 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fork: don't create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set

zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set. Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can't catch it anymore. It isn't counted in core_state->threads_remaining and it isn't sent SIGKILL.

do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it exits it sees signal->core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and decrements threads_remaining like any other thread.

So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running.

The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately didn't send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn't have PF_SIGNALED either.

Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP. That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn't retry -EINTR.

Clearing PF_POSTCOREDUMP for the new thread in copy_process() was the other option. It makes the worker a thread like any other, but it only helps while the dump hasn't started. A worker born after zap_process() has run is invisible to it whatever its flags say and still decrements threads_remaining on the way out. Refusing to create it covers both, and then no task is ever born with the flag, so there is nothing to clear.

Moving io_uring_files_cancel() ahead of synchronize_group_exit() closes the same window. It runs the cancellation, and whatever that can block on, before the thread announces itself to the dumper. A thread that blocks there never reaches coredump_task_exit() at all, so the dumper ends up waiting for a thread that never parks. Refusing the creation leaves the cancellation where it is. But it's very ugly to run io_uring work even before we did all the generic exit work.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfork: don\u0027t create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set\n\nzap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set.\nSuch a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can\u0027t\ncatch it anymore. It isn\u0027t counted in core_state-\u003ethreads_remaining and\nit isn\u0027t sent SIGKILL.\n\ndo_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls\nio_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task\nwork and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates\na new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in\nthe meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being\ndumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it\nexits it sees signal-\u003ecore_state in synchronize_group_exit() and\ndecrements threads_remaining like any other thread.\n\nSo the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves\ncoredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running.\n\nThe task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately\ndidn\u0027t send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn\u0027t\nhave PF_SIGNALED either.\n\nRefuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP.\nThat costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT\nbefore it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever\ngets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn\u0027t retry -EINTR.\n\nClearing PF_POSTCOREDUMP for the new thread in copy_process() was the\nother option. It makes the worker a thread like any other, but it only\nhelps while the dump hasn\u0027t started. A worker born after zap_process()\nhas run is invisible to it whatever its flags say and still decrements\nthreads_remaining on the way out. Refusing to create it covers both, and\nthen no task is ever born with the flag, so there is nothing to clear.\n\nMoving io_uring_files_cancel() ahead of synchronize_group_exit() closes\nthe same window. It runs the cancellation, and whatever that can block\non, before the thread announces itself to the dumper. A thread that\nblocks there never reaches coredump_task_exit() at all, so the dumper\nends up waiting for a thread that never parks. Refusing the creation\nleaves the cancellation where it is. But it\u0027s very ugly to run io_uring\nwork even before we did all the generic exit work.",
  "id": "AZL-115103",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T05:34:08Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:18:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99561"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-99561 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-99561"
  ]
}



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