CVE-2021-33484 (GCVE-0-2021-33484)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2021-09-07 04:59 – Updated: 2024-08-03 23:50
VLAI?
Summary
An issue was discovered in CommentsService.ashx in OnyakTech Comments Pro 3.8. An attacker can download a copy of the installer, decompile it, and discover a hardcoded IV used to encrypt the username and userid in the comment POST request. Additionally, the attacker can decrypt the encrypted encryption key (sent as a parameter in the comment form request) by setting this encrypted value as the username, which will appear on the comment page in its decrypted form. Using these two values (combined with the encryption functionality discovered in the decompiled installer), the attacker can encrypt another user's ID and username. These values can be used as part of the comment posting request in order to spoof the user.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
  • n/a
Assigner
References
Show details on NVD website
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.