CVE-2023-25194
Vulnerability from cvelistv5
Published
2023-02-07 19:11
Modified
2024-08-02 11:18
Severity ?
Summary
Apache Kafka Connect API: Possible RCE/Denial of service attack via SASL JAAS JndiLoginModule configuration using Kafka Connect
References
security@apache.orghttp://packetstormsecurity.com/files/173151/Apache-Druid-JNDI-Injection-Remote-Code-Execution.htmlThird Party Advisory, VDB Entry
security@apache.orghttps://kafka.apache.org/cve-listMitigation, Vendor Advisory
security@apache.orghttps://lists.apache.org/thread/vy1c7fqcdqvq5grcqp6q5jyyb302khyzMailing List, Mitigation
Impacted products
Apache Software FoundationApache Kafka Connect API
Show details on NVD website

To clipboard 

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          "value": "Apache Kafka would like to thank to Jari J\u00e4\u00e4skel\u00e4 (https://hackerone.com/reports/1529790) and 4ra1n and Y4tacker (they found vulnerabilities in other Apache projects. After discussion between PMC of the two projects, it was finally confirmed that it was the vulnerability of Kafka then they reported it to us)"
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              "value": "A possible security vulnerability has been identified in Apache Kafka Connect API.\u003cbr\u003eThis requires access to a Kafka Connect worker, and the ability to create/modify connectors on it with an arbitrary Kafka client SASL JAAS config\u003cbr\u003eand a SASL-based security protocol, which has been possible on Kafka Connect clusters since Apache Kafka Connect 2.3.0.\u003cbr\u003eWhen configuring the connector via the Kafka Connect REST API, an\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003eauthenticated operator\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;can set the \u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003e`sasl.jaas.config`\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/span\u003eproperty for any of the connector\u0027s Kafka clients\u0026nbsp;to \"com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule\", which can be done via the\u003cbr\u003e`producer.override.sasl.jaas.config`, `consumer.override.sasl.jaas.config`, or `admin.override.sasl.jaas.config` properties.\u003cbr\u003eThis will allow the server to connect to the attacker\u0027s LDAP server\u003cbr\u003eand deserialize the LDAP response, which the attacker can use to execute java deserialization gadget chains on the Kafka connect server.\u003cbr\u003eAttacker can cause \u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003eunrestricted deserialization of untrusted data (or)\u0026nbsp;\u003c/span\u003eRCE vulnerability when there are gadgets in the classpath.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSince Apache Kafka 3.0.0, users are allowed to specify these properties in connector configurations for Kafka Connect clusters running with out-of-the-box\u003cbr\u003econfigurations. Before Apache Kafka 3.0.0, users may not specify these properties unless the Kafka Connect cluster has been reconfigured with a connector\u003cbr\u003eclient override policy that permits them.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eSince Apache Kafka 3.4.0, we have added a system property (\"-Dorg.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules\") to disable the problematic login modules usage\u003cbr\u003ein SASL JAAS configuration. Also by default \"com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule\" is disabled in Apache Kafka Connect 3.4.0. \u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWe advise the Kafka Connect users to validate connector configurations and only allow trusted JNDI configurations. Also examine connector dependencies for \u003cbr\u003evulnerable versions and either upgrade their connectors, upgrading that specific dependency, or removing the connectors as options for remediation. Finally,\u003cbr\u003e\u003cspan style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\"\u003ein addition to leveraging the \"org.apache.kafka.disallowed.login.modules\" system property, Kafka Connect users can also implement their own connector\u003cbr\u003eclient config override policy, which can be used to control which Kafka client properties can be overridden directly in a connector config and which cannot.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr\u003e"
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