CVE-2023-45814 (GCVE-0-2023-45814)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-10-18 21:22 – Updated: 2024-09-13 15:07
VLAI
Title
Tokens cached in the AuthenticationService are susceptible to reuse in Bunkum
Summary
Bunkum is an open-source protocol-agnostic request server for custom game servers. First, a little bit of background. So, in the beginning, Bunkum's `AuthenticationService` only supported injecting `IUser`s. However, as Refresh and SoundShapesServer implemented permissions systems support for injecting `IToken`s into endpoints was added. All was well until 4.0. Bunkum 4.0 then changed to enforce relations between `IToken`s and `IUser`s. This wasn't implemented in a very good way in the `AuthenticationService`, and ended up breaking caching in such a way that cached tokens would persist after the lifetime of the request - since we tried to cache both tokens and users. From that point until now, from what I understand, Bunkum was attempting to use that cached token at the start of the next request once cached. Naturally, when that token expired, downstream projects like Refresh would remove the object from Realm - and cause the object in the cache to be in a detached state, causing an exception from invalid use of `IToken.User`. So in other words, a use-after-free since Realm can't manage the lifetime of the cached token. Security-wise, the scope is fairly limited, can only be pulled off on a couple endpoints given a few conditions, and you can't guarantee which token you're going to get. Also, the token *would* get invalidated properly if the endpoint had either a `IToken` usage or a `IUser` usage. The fix is to just wipe the token cache after the request was handled, which is now in `4.2.1`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
CWE
  • CWE-772 - Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
LittleBigRefresh Bunkum Affected: >= 4.0.0, < 4.2.1
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-08-02T20:29:32.308Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq",
            "tags": [
              "x_refsource_CONFIRM",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76",
            "tags": [
              "x_refsource_MISC",
              "x_transferred"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      },
      {
        "affected": [
          {
            "cpes": [
              "cpe:2.3:a:littlebigrefresh:bunkum:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
            ],
            "defaultStatus": "unknown",
            "product": "bunkum",
            "vendor": "littlebigrefresh",
            "versions": [
              {
                "lessThan": "4.2.1",
                "status": "affected",
                "version": "4.0.0",
                "versionType": "custom"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2023-45814",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2024-09-13T15:04:08.447847Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2024-09-13T15:07:44.058Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Bunkum",
          "vendor": "LittleBigRefresh",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.2.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Bunkum is an open-source protocol-agnostic request server for custom game servers. First, a little bit of background. So, in the beginning, Bunkum\u0027s `AuthenticationService` only supported injecting `IUser`s. However, as Refresh and SoundShapesServer implemented permissions systems support for injecting `IToken`s into endpoints was added. All was well until 4.0. Bunkum 4.0 then changed to enforce relations between `IToken`s and `IUser`s. This wasn\u0027t implemented in a very good way in the `AuthenticationService`, and ended up breaking caching in such a way that cached tokens would persist after the lifetime of the request - since we tried to cache both tokens and users. From that point until now, from what I understand, Bunkum was attempting to use that cached token at the start of the next request once cached. Naturally, when that token expired, downstream projects like Refresh would remove the object from Realm - and cause the object in the cache to be in a detached state, causing an exception from invalid use of `IToken.User`. So in other words, a use-after-free since Realm can\u0027t manage the lifetime of the cached token. Security-wise, the scope is fairly limited, can only be pulled off on a couple endpoints given a few conditions, and you can\u0027t guarantee which token you\u0027re going to get. Also, the token *would* get invalidated properly if the endpoint had either a `IToken` usage or a `IUser` usage. The fix is to just wipe the token cache after the request was handled, which is now in `4.2.1`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-772",
              "description": "CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2023-10-18T21:22:03.066Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Tokens cached in the AuthenticationService are susceptible to reuse in Bunkum"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2023-45814",
    "datePublished": "2023-10-18T21:22:03.066Z",
    "dateReserved": "2023-10-13T12:00:50.437Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-09-13T15:07:44.058Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2023-45814",
      "date": "2026-06-01",
      "epss": "0.00127",
      "percentile": "0.31637"
    },
    "fkie_nvd": {
      "configurations": "[{\"nodes\": [{\"operator\": \"OR\", \"negate\": false, \"cpeMatch\": [{\"vulnerable\": true, \"criteria\": \"cpe:2.3:a:littlebigfresh:bunkum:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\", \"versionStartIncluding\": \"4.0\", \"versionEndExcluding\": \"4.2.1\", \"matchCriteriaId\": \"F4F0D6F2-C400-42D2-BFC4-908EC8742FDA\"}]}]}]",
      "descriptions": "[{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Bunkum is an open-source protocol-agnostic request server for custom game servers. First, a little bit of background. So, in the beginning, Bunkum\u0027s `AuthenticationService` only supported injecting `IUser`s. However, as Refresh and SoundShapesServer implemented permissions systems support for injecting `IToken`s into endpoints was added. All was well until 4.0. Bunkum 4.0 then changed to enforce relations between `IToken`s and `IUser`s. This wasn\u0027t implemented in a very good way in the `AuthenticationService`, and ended up breaking caching in such a way that cached tokens would persist after the lifetime of the request - since we tried to cache both tokens and users. From that point until now, from what I understand, Bunkum was attempting to use that cached token at the start of the next request once cached. Naturally, when that token expired, downstream projects like Refresh would remove the object from Realm - and cause the object in the cache to be in a detached state, causing an exception from invalid use of `IToken.User`. So in other words, a use-after-free since Realm can\u0027t manage the lifetime of the cached token. Security-wise, the scope is fairly limited, can only be pulled off on a couple endpoints given a few conditions, and you can\u0027t guarantee which token you\u0027re going to get. Also, the token *would* get invalidated properly if the endpoint had either a `IToken` usage or a `IUser` usage. The fix is to just wipe the token cache after the request was handled, which is now in `4.2.1`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\"}, {\"lang\": \"es\", \"value\": \"Bunkum es un servidor de solicitudes independiente del protocolo de c\\u00f3digo abierto para servidores de juegos personalizados. Primero, un poco de historia. Entonces, al principio, el \\\"AuthenticationService\\\" de Bunkum solo admit\\u00eda la inyecci\\u00f3n de \\\"IUser\\\". Sin embargo, a medida que Refresh y SoundShapesServer implementaron sistemas de permisos, se agreg\\u00f3 soporte para inyectar \\\"IToken\\\" en los endpoints. Todo estuvo bien hasta el 4.0. Bunkum 4.0, luego cambi\\u00f3 para imponer relaciones entre `IToken`s e `IUser`s. Esto no se implement\\u00f3 de muy buena manera en `AuthenticationService` y termin\\u00f3 rompiendo el almacenamiento en cach\\u00e9 de tal manera que los tokens almacenados en cach\\u00e9 persistir\\u00edan despu\\u00e9s de la vida \\u00fatil de la solicitud, ya que intentamos almacenar en cach\\u00e9 tanto los tokens como los usuarios. Desde ese momento hasta ahora, seg\\u00fan tengo entendido, Bunkum estaba intentando usar ese token almacenado en cach\\u00e9 al comienzo de la siguiente solicitud una vez almacenado en cach\\u00e9. Naturalmente, cuando ese token expir\\u00f3, los proyectos posteriores como Refresh eliminar\\u00edan el objeto de Realm y provocar\\u00edan que el objeto en el cach\\u00e9 estuviera en un estado separado, lo que provocar\\u00eda una excepci\\u00f3n por el uso no v\\u00e1lido de `IToken.User`. En otras palabras, un use-after-free ya que Realm no puede administrar la vida \\u00fatil del token almacenado en cach\\u00e9. En cuanto a la seguridad, el alcance es bastante limitado, solo se puede implementar en un par de endpoints dadas algunas condiciones y no se puede garantizar qu\\u00e9 token obtendr\\u00e1. Adem\\u00e1s, el token *would* invalidar\\u00eda correctamente si el endpoint tuviera un uso de \\\"IToken\\\" o un uso de \\\"IUser\\\". La soluci\\u00f3n es simplemente borrar el cach\\u00e9 del token despu\\u00e9s de que se manej\\u00f3 la solicitud, que ahora est\\u00e1 en `4.2.1`. Se recomienda a los usuarios que actualicen. No se conocen workarounds para esta vulnerabilidad.\"}]",
      "id": "CVE-2023-45814",
      "lastModified": "2024-11-21T08:27:24.617",
      "metrics": "{\"cvssMetricV31\": [{\"source\": \"security-advisories@github.com\", \"type\": \"Secondary\", \"cvssData\": {\"version\": \"3.1\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N\", \"baseScore\": 5.3, \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"NONE\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 1.4}, {\"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"cvssData\": {\"version\": \"3.1\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N\", \"baseScore\": 5.3, \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"LOW\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"NONE\"}, \"exploitabilityScore\": 3.9, \"impactScore\": 1.4}]}",
      "published": "2023-10-18T22:15:09.497",
      "references": "[{\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\", \"source\": \"security-advisories@github.com\", \"tags\": [\"Patch\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\", \"source\": \"security-advisories@github.com\", \"tags\": [\"Vendor Advisory\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\", \"source\": \"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\", \"tags\": [\"Patch\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\", \"source\": \"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\", \"tags\": [\"Vendor Advisory\"]}]",
      "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "vulnStatus": "Modified",
      "weaknesses": "[{\"source\": \"security-advisories@github.com\", \"type\": \"Secondary\", \"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-772\"}]}, {\"source\": \"nvd@nist.gov\", \"type\": \"Primary\", \"description\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"CWE-772\"}]}]"
    },
    "nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2023-45814\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"published\":\"2023-10-18T22:15:09.497\",\"lastModified\":\"2024-11-21T08:27:24.617\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Modified\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"Bunkum is an open-source protocol-agnostic request server for custom game servers. First, a little bit of background. So, in the beginning, Bunkum\u0027s `AuthenticationService` only supported injecting `IUser`s. However, as Refresh and SoundShapesServer implemented permissions systems support for injecting `IToken`s into endpoints was added. All was well until 4.0. Bunkum 4.0 then changed to enforce relations between `IToken`s and `IUser`s. This wasn\u0027t implemented in a very good way in the `AuthenticationService`, and ended up breaking caching in such a way that cached tokens would persist after the lifetime of the request - since we tried to cache both tokens and users. From that point until now, from what I understand, Bunkum was attempting to use that cached token at the start of the next request once cached. Naturally, when that token expired, downstream projects like Refresh would remove the object from Realm - and cause the object in the cache to be in a detached state, causing an exception from invalid use of `IToken.User`. So in other words, a use-after-free since Realm can\u0027t manage the lifetime of the cached token. Security-wise, the scope is fairly limited, can only be pulled off on a couple endpoints given a few conditions, and you can\u0027t guarantee which token you\u0027re going to get. Also, the token *would* get invalidated properly if the endpoint had either a `IToken` usage or a `IUser` usage. The fix is to just wipe the token cache after the request was handled, which is now in `4.2.1`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"Bunkum es un servidor de solicitudes independiente del protocolo de c\u00f3digo abierto para servidores de juegos personalizados. Primero, un poco de historia. Entonces, al principio, el \\\"AuthenticationService\\\" de Bunkum solo admit\u00eda la inyecci\u00f3n de \\\"IUser\\\". Sin embargo, a medida que Refresh y SoundShapesServer implementaron sistemas de permisos, se agreg\u00f3 soporte para inyectar \\\"IToken\\\" en los endpoints. Todo estuvo bien hasta el 4.0. Bunkum 4.0, luego cambi\u00f3 para imponer relaciones entre `IToken`s e `IUser`s. Esto no se implement\u00f3 de muy buena manera en `AuthenticationService` y termin\u00f3 rompiendo el almacenamiento en cach\u00e9 de tal manera que los tokens almacenados en cach\u00e9 persistir\u00edan despu\u00e9s de la vida \u00fatil de la solicitud, ya que intentamos almacenar en cach\u00e9 tanto los tokens como los usuarios. Desde ese momento hasta ahora, seg\u00fan tengo entendido, Bunkum estaba intentando usar ese token almacenado en cach\u00e9 al comienzo de la siguiente solicitud una vez almacenado en cach\u00e9. Naturalmente, cuando ese token expir\u00f3, los proyectos posteriores como Refresh eliminar\u00edan el objeto de Realm y provocar\u00edan que el objeto en el cach\u00e9 estuviera en un estado separado, lo que provocar\u00eda una excepci\u00f3n por el uso no v\u00e1lido de `IToken.User`. En otras palabras, un use-after-free ya que Realm no puede administrar la vida \u00fatil del token almacenado en cach\u00e9. En cuanto a la seguridad, el alcance es bastante limitado, solo se puede implementar en un par de endpoints dadas algunas condiciones y no se puede garantizar qu\u00e9 token obtendr\u00e1. Adem\u00e1s, el token *would* invalidar\u00eda correctamente si el endpoint tuviera un uso de \\\"IToken\\\" o un uso de \\\"IUser\\\". La soluci\u00f3n es simplemente borrar el cach\u00e9 del token despu\u00e9s de que se manej\u00f3 la solicitud, que ahora est\u00e1 en `4.2.1`. Se recomienda a los usuarios que actualicen. No se conocen workarounds para esta vulnerabilidad.\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N\",\"baseScore\":5.3,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"NONE\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.9,\"impactScore\":1.4},{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N\",\"baseScore\":5.3,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"NETWORK\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"NONE\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"LOW\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"NONE\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":3.9,\"impactScore\":1.4}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"type\":\"Secondary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-772\"}]},{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-772\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:a:littlebigfresh:bunkum:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"4.0\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"4.2.1\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"F4F0D6F2-C400-42D2-BFC4-908EC8742FDA\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\",\"source\":\"security-advisories@github.com\",\"tags\":[\"Vendor Advisory\"]},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\",\"source\":\"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\",\"tags\":[\"Vendor Advisory\"]}]}}",
    "vulnrichment": {
      "containers": "{\"adp\": [{\"title\": \"CVE Program Container\", \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_CONFIRM\", \"x_transferred\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\", \"x_transferred\"]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108\", \"shortName\": \"CVE\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-08-02T20:29:32.308Z\"}}, {\"title\": \"CISA ADP Vulnrichment\", \"metrics\": [{\"other\": {\"type\": \"ssvc\", \"content\": {\"id\": \"CVE-2023-45814\", \"role\": \"CISA Coordinator\", \"options\": [{\"Exploitation\": \"none\"}, {\"Automatable\": \"yes\"}, {\"Technical Impact\": \"partial\"}], \"version\": \"2.0.3\", \"timestamp\": \"2024-09-13T15:04:08.447847Z\"}}}], \"affected\": [{\"cpes\": [\"cpe:2.3:a:littlebigrefresh:bunkum:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\"], \"vendor\": \"littlebigrefresh\", \"product\": \"bunkum\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"4.0.0\", \"lessThan\": \"4.2.1\", \"versionType\": \"custom\"}], \"defaultStatus\": \"unknown\"}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0\", \"shortName\": \"CISA-ADP\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-09-13T15:07:36.283Z\"}}], \"cna\": {\"title\": \"Tokens cached in the AuthenticationService are susceptible to reuse in Bunkum\", \"source\": {\"advisory\": \"GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\", \"discovery\": \"UNKNOWN\"}, \"metrics\": [{\"cvssV3_1\": {\"scope\": \"UNCHANGED\", \"version\": \"3.1\", \"baseScore\": 5.3, \"attackVector\": \"NETWORK\", \"baseSeverity\": \"MEDIUM\", \"vectorString\": \"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N\", \"integrityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"userInteraction\": \"NONE\", \"attackComplexity\": \"LOW\", \"availabilityImpact\": \"NONE\", \"privilegesRequired\": \"NONE\", \"confidentialityImpact\": \"LOW\"}}], \"affected\": [{\"vendor\": \"LittleBigRefresh\", \"product\": \"Bunkum\", \"versions\": [{\"status\": \"affected\", \"version\": \"\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.2.1\"}]}], \"references\": [{\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/security/advisories/GHSA-jrf2-h5j6-3rrq\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_CONFIRM\"]}, {\"url\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\", \"name\": \"https://github.com/LittleBigRefresh/Bunkum/commit/6e109464ed9255f558182f001f475a378405ff76\", \"tags\": [\"x_refsource_MISC\"]}], \"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"value\": \"Bunkum is an open-source protocol-agnostic request server for custom game servers. First, a little bit of background. So, in the beginning, Bunkum\u0027s `AuthenticationService` only supported injecting `IUser`s. However, as Refresh and SoundShapesServer implemented permissions systems support for injecting `IToken`s into endpoints was added. All was well until 4.0. Bunkum 4.0 then changed to enforce relations between `IToken`s and `IUser`s. This wasn\u0027t implemented in a very good way in the `AuthenticationService`, and ended up breaking caching in such a way that cached tokens would persist after the lifetime of the request - since we tried to cache both tokens and users. From that point until now, from what I understand, Bunkum was attempting to use that cached token at the start of the next request once cached. Naturally, when that token expired, downstream projects like Refresh would remove the object from Realm - and cause the object in the cache to be in a detached state, causing an exception from invalid use of `IToken.User`. So in other words, a use-after-free since Realm can\u0027t manage the lifetime of the cached token. Security-wise, the scope is fairly limited, can only be pulled off on a couple endpoints given a few conditions, and you can\u0027t guarantee which token you\u0027re going to get. Also, the token *would* get invalidated properly if the endpoint had either a `IToken` usage or a `IUser` usage. The fix is to just wipe the token cache after the request was handled, which is now in `4.2.1`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.\"}], \"problemTypes\": [{\"descriptions\": [{\"lang\": \"en\", \"type\": \"CWE\", \"cweId\": \"CWE-772\", \"description\": \"CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime\"}]}], \"providerMetadata\": {\"orgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"shortName\": \"GitHub_M\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2023-10-18T21:22:03.066Z\"}}}",
      "cveMetadata": "{\"cveId\": \"CVE-2023-45814\", \"state\": \"PUBLISHED\", \"dateUpdated\": \"2024-09-13T15:07:44.058Z\", \"dateReserved\": \"2023-10-13T12:00:50.437Z\", \"assignerOrgId\": \"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa\", \"datePublished\": \"2023-10-18T21:22:03.066Z\", \"assignerShortName\": \"GitHub_M\"}",
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.1"
    }
  }
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.





Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.