CVE-2025-12999 (GCVE-0-2025-12999)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-21 08:59 – Updated: 2026-09-21 13:52
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Summary
UrlUtil.getBaseUrl builds the absolute URLs in a response — download links, icons, asset and API URLs — from the X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Prefix request headers, with no check on whether the sender was a trusted proxy, falling back to the client-supplied Host header.
Those responses are cached under keys that do not include the host (extension.json since 0.6.0, namespace.details.json since 0.9.0, sitemap since 0.14.5, latest.extension.version.vscode since 0.34.2). A single request carrying a forged header therefore places attacker-chosen URLs into an entry served to every other client for the lifetime of that entry — one hour by default, and cluster-wide where ovsx.redis.enabled is set.
The VSIX download URL, its signature URL and the public key URL are all derived from the same base URL, so extension signing does not limit the impact: an attacker who poisons an entry supplies the package, the signature over it, and the key used to verify it.
Exploitability depends on deployment topology. A server reachable directly by clients, or fronted by a proxy that relays the client's X-Forwarded-Host rather than overwriting it, is exploitable by an unauthenticated remote attacker. A proxy that overwrites the header is not.
An unauthenticated attacker can poison Open VSX's per-extension metadata cache with attacker-controlled download, signature, and public-key URLs by supplying a crafted X-Forwarded-Host header, causing downstream VS Code-compatible editors to fetch and install a malicious VSIX.
Workarounds (unpatched versions)
1. Configure the reverse proxy to set rather than relay X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Prefix — note that nginx's $host is the client's Host header and is not a safe value.
2. Ensure the server is not reachable except through that proxy.
3. Flush the caches afterwards; poisoned entries survive the configuration change.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-21 13:52 UTC
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation | Eclipse Open VSX |
Affected:
0.6.0 , ≤ 1.1.2
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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