CVE-2026-101062 (GCVE-0-2026-101062)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-27 20:49 – Updated: 2026-09-30 22:11- CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/obot-platform/obot/security/ad… | vendor-advisory |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/obot-before-… | third-party-advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| obot-platform | obot |
Affected:
0 , < 0.23.0
(semver)
Unaffected: 0.23.0 (semver) |
guessed |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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