{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "nginx-ui",
          "vendor": "0xJacky",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c 2.5.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. From 2.0.0 until 2.5.0, internal/backup/restore.go extracts inner archives before applying the restore_nginx and restore_nginx_ui flags and permits symlinks targeting the live Nginx configuration path. An authenticated user who can create and restore backups can craft a valid backup that places a symlink in the staging tree and then writes a regular file through that link, even when both restore flags are false. This can persistently inject configuration or cause denial of service when the modified files are later consumed. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-107810",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-09T16:38:57.820",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-10-09T16:17:25.540",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/a467ed652591fc0cd1b466a1ec751b493faef9f7"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-p8v3-89rh-jxc7"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Undergoing Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-59"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-61"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.10-0.20260728074146-a467ed652591"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107810"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59",
      "CWE-61"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T17:07:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated user who can create and restore a backup can craft a valid backup archive that causes the restore staging process to write attacker-controlled files into the live Nginx configuration path even when both `restore_nginx` and `restore_nginx_ui` are set to `false`.\n\n### Details\nThe restore flow always extracts the outer archive, verifies the manifest, decrypts `nginx-ui.zip` and `nginx.zip`, and extracts both inner archives before it decides whether `RestoreNginx` or `RestoreNginxUI` should be applied. The zip extractor explicitly allows absolute symlinks when the link target is under `nginx.GetConfPath()` or `nginx.GetModulesPath()`. Later regular-file entries are then created with `os.OpenFile()` on the symlinked path, which follows the symlink and writes into the live path.\n\nRelevant code paths:\n- [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:39)\n- [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:79)\n- [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:204)\n- [internal/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/internal/backup/restore.go:286)\n- [api/backup/restore.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/backup/restore.go:31)\n- [api/backup/backup.go](/home/kali/Desktop/bounty/nginx-ui/api/backup/backup.go:15)\n\nThis means the restore trust boundary is broken during extraction. A restore request that explicitly opted out of restoring either Nginx or Nginx UI can still modify the live Nginx configuration tree during staging.\n\n### PoC\nI verified this locally in an isolated environment with a temporary package-level harness that exercised the real `Backup()` and `Restore()` implementations.\n\nWhat the executed test did:\n1. Created a temporary `app.ini`, database file, and a temporary live Nginx config directory.\n2. Called the real `Backup()` implementation to obtain a valid backup archive plus AES key/IV.\n3. Extracted the outer backup, decrypted `nginx.zip`, replaced it with a crafted zip containing:\n   - a symlink entry `link -\u003e \u003clive nginx conf dir\u003e`\n   - a later regular file entry `link/poc.conf`\n4. Recomputed `manifest.json` size/hash values for the modified encrypted `nginx.zip` and re-signed `manifest.sig` with the expected signing key derived from the AES key.\n5. Repacked the outer archive and called the real `Restore()` implementation with:\n   - `RestoreNginx: false`\n   - `RestoreNginxUI: false`\n6. Verified that `\u003clive nginx conf dir\u003e/poc.conf` was created anyway.\n\nObserved result from the actual local verification:\n- The crafted restore completed successfully with both restore flags set to `false`.\n- The asserted sink was the existence and content of the live-path file written during restore staging.\n\n### Impact\nAny deployment that allows an authenticated user to create and restore backups is affected. A crafted restore archive can modify the live Nginx configuration path before either restore toggle is honored. This can lead to persistent configuration injection, denial of service on a later reload, or other follow-on impact depending on what files the deployment later consumes from the modified path.",
  "id": "GHSA-p8v3-89rh-jxc7",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T17:07:05Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T17:07:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-p8v3-89rh-jxc7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/commit/a467ed652591fc0cd1b466a1ec751b493faef9f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.5.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nginx UI: Backup restore follows crafted symlinks into the live Nginx configuration path before restore flags are applied"
}