CVE-2026-128908 (GCVE-0-2026-128908)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 14:29 – Updated: 2026-11-13 14:29 Unsupported When Assigned- CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://cyber-defence-campus.github.io/projects/v… | third-party-advisory |
| https://www.dji.com/aeroscope | product |
| https://github.com/llorencroma/dji-aeroscope-root | technical-description |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DJI | AeroScope Mobile (TP703) |
Affected:
03.00.00.26
(custom)
|
guessed | |
| DJI | AeroScope Mobile (TP703) 1300 communications board firmware |
Affected:
02.00.07.12 , ≤ 02.00.08.40
(custom)
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
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"modules": [
"1300 DM810X communications board (uavmonitor_usbv1)"
],
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"programFiles": [
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"credits": [
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}
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eOS command injection (CWE-78) in the network-configuration handling of the management service (uavmonitor_usbv1) of the 1300 communications board in DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) firmware 03.00.00.26, with 1300 communications board firmware 02.00.07.12 through 02.00.08.40, allows an unauthenticated attacker on the local network to execute arbitrary commands as root. Configuration values that can be written without authentication over the management interface are inserted unquoted into shell commands. Exploitation requires network access to TCP port 16000 on the board and that the unit is not connected to another controlling host. The injected command persists across reboots. Confirmed on a physical device.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. DJI has discontinued AeroScope Mobile and no fixed firmware is available.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "OS command injection (CWE-78) in the network-configuration handling of the management service (uavmonitor_usbv1) of the 1300 communications board in DJI AeroScope Mobile (TP703) firmware 03.00.00.26, with 1300 communications board firmware 02.00.07.12 through 02.00.08.40, allows an unauthenticated attacker on the local network to execute arbitrary commands as root. Configuration values that can be written without authentication over the management interface are inserted unquoted into shell commands. Exploitation requires network access to TCP port 16000 on the board and that the unit is not connected to another controlling host. The injected command persists across reboots. Confirmed on a physical device.\n\n\n\nNOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. DJI has discontinued AeroScope Mobile and no fixed firmware is available."
}
],
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"value": "Primary score assumes Adjacent (AV:A) reach via the L2 multicast arming handshake. If the management interface is IP-routed/bridged, use AV:N -\u003e CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8 CRITICAL."
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"url": "https://www.dji.com/aeroscope"
},
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eDJI AeroScope Mobile has been discontinued and is no longer supported by DJI. No fixed firmware is available. Operators should plan to replace affected units with a supported product and, until then, apply the workarounds.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
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"time": "2026-09-25T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "Reported to DJI"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-11-04T00:00:00.000Z",
"value": "DJI acknowledged the vulnerability and provided its assessment"
}
],
"title": "DJI AeroScope Mobile: OS command injection leads to root code execution",
"workarounds": [
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"lang": "en",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eConnect the unit\u0027s management Ethernet port only to an isolated network segment with no untrusted hosts, and do not route or bridge that segment to other networks, so that TCP port 16000 and the multicast discovery traffic (225.0.0.37, UDP port 16001) cannot be reached.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Connect the unit\u0027s management Ethernet port only to an isolated network segment with no untrusted hosts, and do not route or bridge that segment to other networks, so that TCP port 16000 and the multicast discovery traffic (225.0.0.37, UDP port 16001) cannot be reached."
}
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-128908",
"datePublished": "2026-11-13T14:29:28.584Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-13T12:42:53.330Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-13T14:29:28.584Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-128908",
"lastModified": "2026-11-13T15:17:44.610",
"metrics": {
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}
Solutions
Workarounds
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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