CVE-2026-14535 (GCVE-0-2026-14535)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-04 13:31 – Updated: 2026-07-06 14:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()
Summary
In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports — it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling's check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes — UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist's deduplication logic.
Severity
8.8 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: poc
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-07-06 14:58 UTC
CWE
- CWE-693 - Protection Mechanism Failure
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| trailofbits | fickling |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 0.1.11
(custom)
Unaffected: 0.1.12 (custom) |
guessed |
Date Public
2026-06-28 00:08
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-14535",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-06T14:58:30.612222Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:34.718Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org/project/fickling/",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "fickling",
"product": "fickling",
"vendor": "trailofbits",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "0.1.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0.1.12",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Christopher Aziz (Bombadil Systems LLC)"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-06-28T00:08:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eIn Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling\u0027s check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist\u0027s deduplication logic.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling\u0027s check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist\u0027s deduplication logic."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "An attacker can craft a malicious pickle file that imports any standard library module not in fickling\u0027s UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist. Because the MLAllowlist check is silently skipped due to shared state pollution from UnsafeImportsML, fickling\u0027s check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. When used with fickling.load(), the payload is deserialized and arbitrary code executes in the victim\u0027s environment. This is distinct from denylist incompleteness (CWE-184) because the allowlist mechanism was specifically designed to catch imports that the denylist misses, and a code defect renders it entirely inoperative."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-693",
"description": "CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z",
"orgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"shortName": "BombadilSystems"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"
},
{
"name": "Fix PR #278 \u2014 Split shorten_code() formatting from dedup tracking, make MLAllowlist opt-in",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 41ce7cb (squash merge of PR #278)",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d"
},
{
"name": "Fickling v0.1.12 release",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.2"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"assignerShortName": "BombadilSystems",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-14535",
"datePublished": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-03T00:02:55.918Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:34.718Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-14535",
"date": "2026-11-04",
"epss": "0.00564",
"percentile": "0.47015"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org/project/fickling/",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "fickling",
"product": "fickling",
"vendor": "trailofbits",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "0.1.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0.1.12",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082"
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:trailofbits:fickling:*:*:*:*:*:python:*:*",
"matchCriteriaId": "A3AF23ED-3F44-48AF-A1AC-CFCDC22A55D3",
"versionEndIncluding": "0.1.11",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling\u0027s check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist\u0027s deduplication logic."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En las versiones de fickling de Trail of Bits hasta la 0.1.11 inclusive, la pasada de an\u00e1lisis UnsafeImportsML llama incondicionalmente a AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) en cada nodo de importaci\u00f3n que inspecciona, independientemente de si la importaci\u00f3n est\u00e1 marcada como insegura. Esta llamada registra la representaci\u00f3n de c\u00f3digo acortada en el conjunto compartido AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code. Cuando la pasada de an\u00e1lisis MLAllowlist se ejecuta posteriormente, llama al mismo m\u00e9todo shorten_code(), recibe already_reported=True para cada importaci\u00f3n y ejecuta una sentencia continue que omite completamente su verificaci\u00f3n de lista de permitidos. Esto convierte a MLAllowlist en c\u00f3digo muerto para todas las importaciones - nunca eval\u00faa si una importaci\u00f3n est\u00e1 en la lista de permitidos de ML o no. La pasada MLAllowlist fue dise\u00f1ada para detectar importaciones de m\u00f3dulos fuera del ecosistema de ML conocido como seguro (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) que escapan a la lista de denegados de UnsafeImports. Con MLAllowlist inoperativa, cualquier m\u00f3dulo de la biblioteca est\u00e1ndar que no est\u00e9 en la lista de denegados UNSAFE_IMPORTS puede ser invocado a trav\u00e9s de la deserializaci\u00f3n de pickle mientras que check_safety() de fickling devuelve LIKELY_SAFE. La API fickling.load() encadena check_safety() en pickle.loads() como una puerta de seguridad expl\u00edcita, lo que significa que un veredicto LIKELY_SAFE hace que la carga \u00fatil sea deserializada y ejecutada. La causa ra\u00edz es el estado mutable compartido entre pasadas de an\u00e1lisis independientemente correctas - UnsafeImportsML funciona seg\u00fan lo dise\u00f1ado de forma aislada, MLAllowlist funciona seg\u00fan lo dise\u00f1ado de forma aislada, pero el conjunto compartido reported_shortened_code hace que UnsafeImportsML envenene la l\u00f3gica de deduplicaci\u00f3n de MLAllowlist."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-14535",
"lastModified": "2026-10-25T15:10:00.147",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"type": "Secondary"
},
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "nvd@nist.gov",
"type": "Primary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-14535",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-06T14:58:30.612222Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-07-04T14:16:29.063",
"references": [
{
"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"tags": [
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d"
},
{
"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"tags": [
"Issue Tracking",
"Patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278"
},
{
"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"tags": [
"Release Notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12"
},
{
"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"tags": [
"Exploit",
"Third Party Advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-693"
}
],
"source": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Important",
"current_release_date": "2026-07-10T15:20:09+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-14535",
"id": "CVE-2026-14535",
"initial_release_date": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937000+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "1",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "fickling: Fickling: Arbitrary code execution via pickle deserialization bypass",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-14535.json",
"version": "3"
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-14535",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-07-06T14:58:30.612222Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:02.632Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"
}
],
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org/project/fickling/",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageName": "fickling",
"product": "fickling",
"vendor": "trailofbits",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "0.1.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "custom"
},
{
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0.1.12",
"versionType": "custom"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Christopher Aziz (Bombadil Systems LLC)"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-06-28T00:08:00.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eIn Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling\u0027s check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist\u0027s deduplication logic.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "In Trail of Bits fickling versions up to and including 0.1.11, the UnsafeImportsML analysis pass unconditionally calls AnalysisContext.shorten_code(node) on every import node it inspects, regardless of whether the import is flagged as unsafe. This call registers the shortened code representation in the shared AnalysisContext.reported_shortened_code set. When the MLAllowlist analysis pass subsequently runs, it calls the same shorten_code() method, receives already_reported=True for every import, and executes a continue statement that skips its allowlist check entirely. This renders MLAllowlist dead code for all imports \u2014 it never evaluates whether an import is in the ML allowlist or not. The MLAllowlist pass was designed to catch imports of modules outside the known-safe ML ecosystem (torch, numpy, transformers, etc.) that slip past the UnsafeImports denylist. With MLAllowlist inoperative, any standard library module not in the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist can be invoked via pickle deserialization while fickling\u0027s check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. The fickling.load() API chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, meaning a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed. The root cause is shared mutable state between independently-correct analysis passes \u2014 UnsafeImportsML works as designed in isolation, MLAllowlist works as designed in isolation, but the shared reported_shortened_code set causes UnsafeImportsML to poison MLAllowlist\u0027s deduplication logic."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "An attacker can craft a malicious pickle file that imports any standard library module not in fickling\u0027s UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist. Because the MLAllowlist check is silently skipped due to shared state pollution from UnsafeImportsML, fickling\u0027s check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE. When used with fickling.load(), the payload is deserialized and arbitrary code executes in the victim\u0027s environment. This is distinct from denylist incompleteness (CWE-184) because the allowlist mechanism was specifically designed to catch imports that the denylist misses, and a code defect renders it entirely inoperative."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-693",
"description": "CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z",
"orgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"shortName": "BombadilSystems"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-cffv-grgg-g429"
},
{
"name": "Fix PR #278 \u2014 Split shorten_code() formatting from dedup tracking, make MLAllowlist opt-in",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/278"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 41ce7cb (squash merge of PR #278)",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/41ce7cb01edd97072994039574a2301ebb3f463d"
},
{
"name": "Fickling v0.1.12 release",
"url": "https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.12"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Fickling MLAllowlist analysis pass rendered inoperative by shared mutable state in AnalysisContext.shorten_code()",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.2"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "aa17e1a1-c329-4d6e-a1ed-8d0188aea082",
"assignerShortName": "BombadilSystems",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-14535",
"datePublished": "2026-07-04T13:31:14.937Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-03T00:02:55.918Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-07-06T14:58:34.718Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.