CVE-2026-43472 (GCVE-0-2026-43472)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-08 14:22 – Updated: 2026-05-08 14:22
VLAI?
Title
unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling
There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a
CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that
case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy,
which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]
> I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true.
Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness.
Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS
(and current->fs->users == 1).
We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and
flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace.
Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM).
We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's
destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and
current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.
They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling
process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with
pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug.
There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including
the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one
is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new
fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could
go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might
end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set,
force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost
of copy_fs_struct() is trivial.
Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets
a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That
seriously simplifies the analysis...
FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 845bf3c6963a52096d0d3866e4a92db77a0c03d8
(git)
Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < d3ffc8f13034af895531a02c30b1fe3a34b46432 (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < d0d99f60538ddb4a62ccaac2168d8f448965f083 (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < d7963d6997fea86a6def242ac36198b86655f912 (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < aa9ebc084505fb26dd90f4d7a249045aad152043 (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < af8f4be3b68ac8caa41c8e5ead0eeaf5e85e42d0 (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 42e21e74061b0ebbd859839f81acf10efad02a27 (git) Affected: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 , < 6c4b2243cb6c0755159bd567130d5e12e7b10d9f (git) |
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|
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{
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nunshare: fix unshare_fs() handling\n\nThere\u0027s an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a\nCLONE_NEWNS in flags and current-\u003efs hadn\u0027t been shared at all; in that\ncase copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current-\u003efs instead of a private copy,\nwhich causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]\n\n\u003e I guess if private means fs-\u003eusers == 1, the condition could still be true.\n\nUnfortunately, it\u0027s worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness.\nConsider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS\n(and current-\u003efs-\u003eusers == 1).\n\nWe pass current-\u003efs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and\nflips current-\u003efs-\u003e{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace.\nNow we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM).\nWe call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it\u0027s\ndestroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current-\u003efs-\u003eroot and\ncurrent-\u003efs-\u003epwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.\n\nThey are pinning those, so it\u0027s not a UAF, but it leaves the calling\nprocess with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with\npwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug.\n\nThere is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including\nthe one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one\nis easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as \"allocate a new\nfs_struct even if it hadn\u0027t been shared in the first place\". Sure, we could\ngo for something like \"if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might\nend up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set,\nforce allocation of new fs_struct\", but let\u0027s keep it simple - the cost\nof copy_fs_struct() is trivial.\n\nAnother benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets\na freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That\nseriously simplifies the analysis...\n\nFWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-05-08T14:22:31.556Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/845bf3c6963a52096d0d3866e4a92db77a0c03d8"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ffc8f13034af895531a02c30b1fe3a34b46432"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0d99f60538ddb4a62ccaac2168d8f448965f083"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7963d6997fea86a6def242ac36198b86655f912"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa9ebc084505fb26dd90f4d7a249045aad152043"
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"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/af8f4be3b68ac8caa41c8e5ead0eeaf5e85e42d0"
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c4b2243cb6c0755159bd567130d5e12e7b10d9f"
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"title": "unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling",
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-43472",
"datePublished": "2026-05-08T14:22:31.556Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-05-01T14:12:56.011Z",
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}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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