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CVE-2026-47065 (GCVE-0-2026-47065)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-03 09:39 – Updated: 2026-06-04 03:55
VLAI
Title
Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232
Summary
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-03 00:00 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-502 - Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Apache Software Foundation Apache MINA Affected: 2.2.0 , < 2.2.8 (semver)
Affected: 2.1.0 , < 2.1.13 (semver)
Affected: 2.0.0 , < 2.0.29 (semver)
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits
Venkatraman Kumar, SecureIn keda (GitHub: @yuui25)
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.