Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-48035 (GCVE-0-2026-48035)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-24 18:43 – Updated: 2026-07-27 20:23

Title

Hulumi: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened

Summary

Hulumi is an open-source toolkit that ships secure-by-default cloud and platform infrastructure components for Pulumi. Prior to version 1.4.0, consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). This issue has been patched in version 1.4.0.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-27 17:26 UTC

CWE

CWE-1059 - Insufficient Technical Documentation

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7993 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/securit…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/release…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
kerberosmansour	hulumi	Affected: < 1.4.0	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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}

FKIE_CVE-2026-48035

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-07-24 19:16 - Updated: 2026-10-24 13:10

Severity

7.1 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/releases/tag/v1.4.0
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/security/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
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      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "hulumi",
          "vendor": "kerberosmansour",
          "versions": [
            {
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              "version": "\u003c 1.4.0"
            }
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    },
    {
      "lang": "es",
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          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
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}

GHSA-2MXR-P26X-MJ73

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 13:38 – Updated: 2026-06-10 13:38

Summary

@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened

Details

Affected: @hulumi/baseline < 1.4.0 — Fixed in: 1.4.0 — Severity: High — CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)

Summary

The S3 bucket that AccountFoundation creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:

No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket. The startup-hardened tier hard-coded objectLock: false on the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)
forceDestroy was forwarded to the audit bucket. Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting logBucketForceDestroy: true, which made pulumi destroy purge every audit-log object on teardown.
Sandbox tier dropped everything. Sandbox-tier AccountFoundation created its audit bucket with tier: "sandbox", which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake EventDataStore (the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.

Impact

Consumers using AccountFoundation could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).

Patches

Upgrade to @hulumi/baseline@1.4.0. A single invariant in SecureBucket now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true):

refuses forceDestroy: true on the startup-hardened tier;
emits the CloudTrail-Lake EventDataStore regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture);
adds a deny-s3:DeleteObject* bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config ConfigWritabilityCheckFile probe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.

Workarounds

Replicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.

Resources

PR #178 (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG ### Migration for the forceDestroy behaviour change.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@hulumi/baseline"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48035"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1059"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-10T13:38:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `\u003c 1.4.0` \u2014 **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` \u2014 **Severity:** High \u2014 **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)**\n\n#### Summary\n\nThe S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant \u2014 if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened:\n\n1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the audit bucket. (The reason was real \u2014 bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe \u2014 but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.)\n2. **`forceDestroy` was forwarded to the audit bucket.** Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting `logBucketForceDestroy: true`, which made `pulumi destroy` purge every audit-log object on teardown.\n3. **Sandbox tier dropped everything.** Sandbox-tier `AccountFoundation` created its audit bucket with `tier: \"sandbox\"`, which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` (the independent immutable mirror) \u2014 leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all.\n\n#### Impact\n\nConsumers using `AccountFoundation` could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal \u2014 while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded).\n\n#### Patches\n\nUpgrade to `@hulumi/baseline@1.4.0`. A single invariant in `SecureBucket` now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. `awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true`):\n\n- refuses `forceDestroy: true` on the startup-hardened tier;\n- emits the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture);\n- adds a deny-`s3:DeleteObject*` bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config `ConfigWritabilityCheckFile` probe key so Config\u0027s write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled.\n\n#### Workarounds\n\nReplicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade.\n\n#### Resources\n\n- [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG `### Migration` for the `forceDestroy` behaviour change.",
  "id": "GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73",
  "modified": "2026-06-10T13:38:37Z",
  "published": "2026-06-10T13:38:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/security/advisories/GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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Action not permitted

CVE-2026-48035 (GCVE-0-2026-48035)

FKIE_CVE-2026-48035

GHSA-2MXR-P26X-MJ73

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