CVE-2026-48079 (GCVE-0-2026-48079)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-06 21:00 – Updated: 2026-08-07 17:11
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry
Summary
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.
Severity
7.4 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-08-07 17:10 UTC
CWE
- CWE-613 - Insufficient Session Expiration
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_CONFIRM |
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_MISC |
| https://github.com/open-reception/appointment-boo… | x_refsource_MISC |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| open-reception | appointment-booking-software |
Affected:
< 1.0.2
|
guessed |
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"value": "El software de reserva de citas de OpenReception proporciona una plataforma de reserva de citas cifrada de extremo a extremo. Antes de la versi\u00f3n 1.0.2, cuando un usuario navega a la p\u00e1gina \u2019/logout\u2019, el gestor de carga del lado del servidor de la p\u00e1gina elimina la \u2019cookie\u2019 \u2019access_token\u2019 antes de llamar a \u2019/api/auth/logout\u2019 a trav\u00e9s de un \u2019event.fetch()\u2019 interno. La \u2019fetch\u2019 interna, en consecuencia, se ejecuta sin la \u2019cookie\u2019 de autenticaci\u00f3n, por lo que \u2019apiAuthHandle\u2019 la rechaza, el gestor de cierre de sesi\u00f3n nunca se ejecuta y \u2019SessionService.revokeSession()\u2019 nunca se llama para la \u2019sesi\u00f3n\u2019 actual. La fila de la \u2019sesi\u00f3n\u2019 de la base de datos permanece v\u00e1lida hasta su caducidad natural (una semana por defecto). El usuario ve un cierre de sesi\u00f3n exitoso (\u2019cookie\u2019 eliminada, la interfaz de usuario vuelve al inicio de \u2019sesi\u00f3n\u2019), pero cualquier parte que a\u00fan conserve una copia del \u2019token\u2019 de acceso ahora eliminado puede seguir realizando llamadas a la API autenticadas hasta que la \u2019sesi\u00f3n\u2019 expire naturalmente. La causa ra\u00edz es un simple error de orden. El mismo subsistema de autenticaci\u00f3n implementa el orden correcto en \u2019/api/auth/logout\u2019: revocar primero la \u2019sesi\u00f3n\u2019 actual de la base de datos, luego eliminar la \u2019cookie\u2019. El envoltorio a nivel de p\u00e1gina hace lo contrario. La versi\u00f3n 1.0.2 inicia el cierre de \u2019sesi\u00f3n\u2019 del lado del servidor antes de eliminar las \u2019cookies\u2019 de autenticaci\u00f3n y aparece por primera vez en la versi\u00f3n 1.0.2. La versi\u00f3n 2.0.0 m\u00e1s tarde reemplaza esto con un flujo de cierre de \u2019sesi\u00f3n\u2019 del lado del \u2019cliente\u2019 sin condiciones de carrera."
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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