CVE-2026-65627 (GCVE-0-2026-65627)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-26 19:53 – Updated: 2026-10-26 19:53- CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/securi… | vendor-advisoryrelated |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65627.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65627 | related |
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit… | related |
| https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| potatosalad | jose |
Affected:
1.0.0 , < 1.11.13
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| potatosalad | jose |
Affected:
a7746ecd4950f85a393136e449a91dac62b5c429 , < 857eb8e7f2d33e2c9ca2189e77226561cacaf2ad
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"value": "Andrew Bennett"
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"value": "Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node\u0027s memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe `jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2` function in `src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl` decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional `zip: DEF` header by calling `zlib:inflate/2` on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through `jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2` (`JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2` in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient\u0027s public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node\u0027s memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13."
}
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}
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"version": "4.0",
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"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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"description": "CWE-409 Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification)",
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}
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"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
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{
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"source": {
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},
"title": "Decompression bomb via unbounded zlib:inflate in jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2",
"workarounds": [
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}
]
}
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"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-65627",
"datePublished": "2026-10-26T19:53:16.336Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-07-22T13:58:26.233Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T19:53:16.336Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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{
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}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose",
"vendor": "potatosalad",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node\u0027s memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient\u0027s public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node\u0027s memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13."
}
],
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"published": "2026-10-26T20:17:58.290",
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}
},
"redhat_vex": {
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"current_release_date": "2026-10-29T19:56:04+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-65627",
"id": "CVE-2026-65627",
"initial_release_date": "2026-10-26T19:53:16.336000+00:00",
"product_status:fixed": "19",
"product_status:known_affected": "4",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "jose: jose: Denial of Service via unbounded decompression of crafted JWE tokens",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-65627.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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