CVE-2026-67231 (GCVE-0-2026-67231)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-23 20:47 – Updated: 2026-09-23 20:47
VLAI
Title
RabbitMQ: Trust-store whitelist by Issuer+Serial only
Summary
RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The trust-store plugin installs a verify_fun that overrides {bad_cert, unknown_ca} / {bad_cert, selfsigned_peer} when the presented cert "matches" a whitelisted one. The match key is extract_issuer_id/1 → public_key:pkix_issuer_id/2 → {IssuerName, SerialNumber} , both fields are taken verbatim from the presented certificate body and contain no public-key, SKI, fingerprint or signature material. is_whitelisted/1 is a pure ets:member lookup; the stored full DER is used only for list/0 display and is never compared against the presented cert. cacerts is [], so the whitelisted cert is never used as a trust anchor for path validation either. TLS client-authentication bypass: an attacker who knows the issuer DN + serial of any whitelisted certificate can connect with a forged self-signed cert. Preconditions include rabbitmq_trust_store plugin enabled and used as the TLS verify_fun Attacker knows or can guess the {Issuer, Serial} of at least one whitelisted cert (non-secret; exposed via CLI/logs/any cert copy). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0.
CWE
  • CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
rabbitmq rabbitmq-server Affected: >= 3.13.0, < 3.13.15
Affected: >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.20
Affected: >= 4.1.0, < 4.1.11
Affected: >= 4.2.0, < 4.2.6
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
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      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "rabbitmq-server",
          "vendor": "rabbitmq",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.13.0, \u003c 3.13.15"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.0.20"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.1.0, \u003c 4.1.11"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 4.2.0, \u003c 4.2.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The trust-store plugin installs a verify_fun that overrides {bad_cert, unknown_ca} / {bad_cert, selfsigned_peer} when the presented cert \"matches\" a whitelisted one. The match key is extract_issuer_id/1 \u2192 public_key:pkix_issuer_id/2 \u2192 {IssuerName, SerialNumber} , both fields are taken verbatim from the presented certificate body and contain no public-key, SKI, fingerprint or signature material. is_whitelisted/1 is a pure ets:member lookup; the stored full DER is used only for list/0 display and is never compared against the presented cert. cacerts is [], so the whitelisted cert is never used as a trust anchor for path validation either. TLS client-authentication bypass: an attacker who knows the issuer DN + serial of any whitelisted certificate can connect with a forged self-signed cert. Preconditions include rabbitmq_trust_store plugin enabled and used as the TLS verify_fun Attacker knows or can guess the {Issuer, Serial} of at least one whitelisted cert (non-secret; exposed via CLI/logs/any cert copy). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 9.1,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
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      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
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              "description": "CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T20:47:36.045Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-cw8c-4m83-9c6w",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-cw8c-4m83-9c6w"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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          "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-cw8c-4m83-9c6w",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "RabbitMQ: Trust-store whitelist by Issuer+Serial only"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-67231",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-23T20:47:36.045Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-28T19:50:39.438Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T20:47:36.045Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "nvd": {
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        "affected": [
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            "affectedData": [
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                "product": "rabbitmq-server",
                "vendor": "rabbitmq",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "\u003e= 3.13.0, \u003c 3.13.15"
                  },
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "\u003e= 4.0.0, \u003c 4.0.20"
                  },
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "\u003e= 4.1.0, \u003c 4.1.11"
                  },
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "\u003e= 4.2.0, \u003c 4.2.6"
                  }
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            "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
          }
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        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. Prior to versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0, The trust-store plugin installs a verify_fun that overrides {bad_cert, unknown_ca} / {bad_cert, selfsigned_peer} when the presented cert \"matches\" a whitelisted one. The match key is extract_issuer_id/1 \u2192 public_key:pkix_issuer_id/2 \u2192 {IssuerName, SerialNumber} , both fields are taken verbatim from the presented certificate body and contain no public-key, SKI, fingerprint or signature material. is_whitelisted/1 is a pure ets:member lookup; the stored full DER is used only for list/0 display and is never compared against the presented cert. cacerts is [], so the whitelisted cert is never used as a trust anchor for path validation either. TLS client-authentication bypass: an attacker who knows the issuer DN + serial of any whitelisted certificate can connect with a forged self-signed cert. Preconditions include rabbitmq_trust_store plugin enabled and used as the TLS verify_fun Attacker knows or can guess the {Issuer, Serial} of at least one whitelisted cert (non-secret; exposed via CLI/logs/any cert copy). This issue is fixed in versions 3.13.15, 4.0.20, 4.1.11, 4.2.6, and 4.3.0."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-67231",
        "lastModified": "2026-09-23T21:17:00.940",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV40": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "baseScore": 9.1,
                "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
              },
              "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-09-23T21:17:00.940",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.2.6"
          },
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
          },
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server/security/advisories/GHSA-cw8c-4m83-9c6w"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "vulnStatus": "Received",
        "weaknesses": [
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            "description": [
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                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-295"
              }
            ],
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "type": "Primary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



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