CVE-2026-71891 (GCVE-0-2026-71891)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-03 08:56 – Updated: 2026-10-03 08:56
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
BLS12-381 key validation accepts a public key built on a foreign curve
Summary
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381's field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point's own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve's cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC's pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point's curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Assigner
References
2 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%9… | vendor-advisory |
| https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/c16bcfdce… | patch |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. | BC-JAVA |
Affected:
1.85 , < 1.86
(maven)
|
guessed |
{
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{
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"packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.bouncycastle/bcprov-jdk18on",
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"vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.",
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"value": "\u003cp\u003eIn Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, BLS12_381BasicScheme.keyValidate, and so BLSPublicKeyParameters and every BasicScheme, MessageAugmentation and ProofOfPossession verify and aggregateVerify that gate on it, accepted a public key built on a foreign ECCurve that merely shares BLS12-381\u0027s field characteristic. The prime-order subgroup check trusts a point\u0027s own curve to name its cofactor, since ECPoint.satisfiesOrder returns true outright when the curve\u0027s cofactor is one, so a point on a curve with a different equation and a cofactor forged to one passed keyValidate despite not being a G1 point at all. In BC\u0027s pairing implementation such a point contributes the identity in the target group, so an aggregate signature verified against a set of public keys including it is accepted even though it contains no signature for that key and message pair, admitting a phantom signer. keyValidate now first confirms that the point\u0027s curve carries exactly the canonical G1 field, equation, order and cofactor before any subgroup check. The issue is reachable only where an application constructs an ECPoint on an explicit, non-canonical curve and accepts it as an authority-bearing key; the standard 48-byte compressed-point decoder always supplies the canonical curve and was never affected.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
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}
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"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-10-03T08:56:01.050Z",
"orgId": "91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630",
"shortName": "bcorg"
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],
"source": {
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},
"title": "BLS12-381 key validation accepts a public key built on a foreign curve",
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}
}
},
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"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
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"date": "2026-10-03",
"epss": "0.00174",
"percentile": "0.06222"
},
"nvd": {
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"affected": [
{
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{
"collectionURL": "https://www.bouncycastle.org/download/bouncy-castle-java/",
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
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],
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"packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.bouncycastle/bcprov-jdk18on",
"platforms": [
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],
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"programFiles": [
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],
"repo": "https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java",
"vendor": "Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc.",
"versions": [
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}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-71891",
"lastModified": "2026-10-03T09:17:05.763",
"metrics": {
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"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "AMBER",
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}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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