CVE-2026-82761 (GCVE-0-2026-82761)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-17 13:09 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:26
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication
Summary
Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with single_use_token?, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token's validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.
Sign-in verifies the JWT with Jwt.verify/4 and revokes it only afterwards: AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation revokes in a Query.after_action callback, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange in an after_transaction hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3 writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.
This issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-17 18:25 UTC
CWE
- CWE-367 - Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
3.9.0 , < 4.15.0
(semver)
Affected: 5.0.0-rc.0 , < 5.0.0-rc.14 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
||
| team-alembic | ash_authentication |
Affected:
cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102 , < *
(git)
cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
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"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-82761",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-17T18:25:13.930894Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:26:00.636Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions\u0027"
],
"packageName": "ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_preparation.ex",
"lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_change.ex",
"lib/ash_authentication/token_resource/actions.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation\u0027:prepare/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange\u0027:change/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions\u0027:revoke/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.15.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.9.0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.0.0-rc.14",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions\u0027"
],
"packageName": "team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"product": "ash_authentication",
"programFiles": [
"lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_preparation.ex",
"lib/ash_authentication/strategies/magic_link/sign_in_change.ex",
"lib/ash_authentication/token_resource/actions.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation\u0027:prepare/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange\u0027:change/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions\u0027:revoke/3"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"vendor": "team-alembic",
"versions": [
{
"changes": [
{
"at": "18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840",
"status": "unaffected"
},
{
"at": "9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab",
"status": "unaffected"
}
],
"lessThan": "*",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "4.15.0",
"versionStartIncluding": "3.9.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "5.0.0-rc.14",
"versionStartIncluding": "5.0.0-rc.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "James Harton"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Peter Ullrich"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "analyst",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-09-11T18:05:13.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eTime-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with \u003ccode\u003esingle_use_token?\u003c/code\u003e, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token\u0027s validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSign-in verifies the JWT with \u003ccode\u003eJwt.verify/4\u003c/code\u003e and revokes it only afterwards: \u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation\u003c/code\u003e revokes in a \u003ccode\u003eQuery.after_action\u003c/code\u003e callback, and \u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange\u003c/code\u003e in an \u003ccode\u003eafter_transaction\u003c/code\u003e hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. \u003ccode\u003eAshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3\u003c/code\u003e writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with `single_use_token?`, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token\u0027s validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.\n\nSign-in verifies the JWT with `Jwt.verify/4` and revokes it only afterwards: `AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation` revokes in a `Query.after_action` callback, and `AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange` in an `after_transaction` hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. `AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3` writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
}
],
"value": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an attacker holding a leaked magic link to replay its single-use token and authenticate as the target subject. A magic link configured with single_use_token?, which is the default, is meant to be redeemable exactly once, but nothing serialises the token\u0027s validity check against its consumption, so concurrent redemptions of one token all succeed and each yields a full user token.\n\nSign-in verifies the JWT with Jwt.verify/4 and revokes it only afterwards: AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInPreparation revokes in a Query.after_action callback, and AshAuthentication.Strategy.MagicLink.SignInChange in an after_transaction hook that runs once the sign-in has already committed. AshAuthentication.TokenResource.Actions.revoke/3 writes the revocation as an upsert, so a concurrent duplicate revocation silently succeeds instead of conflicting and no request ever loses the race.\n\nThis issue affects ash_authentication: from 3.9.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-29",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-29 Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 9.1,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-367",
"description": "CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T13:09:01.534Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"related",
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-23gr-vcp4-r27q"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-82761",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-82761.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-82761",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-82761"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit cf3d227 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/cf3d227ef25912cf1b0c5fa80f20001f5c46a102"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 18dfdb3 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/18dfdb36c14aa6a61df8572bce2d5ec36b1d9840"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 9ef6864 in team-alembic/ash_authentication",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9ef6864b8833d3b795427a7b8dc518a4997d41ab"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "Magic link single-use tokens replayable via TOCTOU race in AshAuthentication"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-82761",
"datePublished": "2026-09-17T13:09:01.534Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-31T01:00:10.817Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-17T18:26:08.563Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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