Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-82840 (GCVE-0-2026-82840)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-01 22:05 – Updated: 2026-11-01 22:05

Title

Apache Wicket: The session id is renewed only on the first sign in, not on re-authentication

Summary

Session fixation in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket's role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim's browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason. AuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session's signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen. An application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requires an attacker to place a session id of their choosing in the victim's browser. JSESSIONID is set by the servlet container rather than by Wicket, so that needs a position Wicket does not grant, such as control of a host under the same registrable domain or a container configured to carry the session id in the URL, and the planted session has to be one the attacker has already signed in on, because a session that is not yet signed in does have its id renewed by the victim's authentication. An authentication attempt that fails signs the session out and closes the window. Applications that renew the session id in their own code after a successful authentication are not affected. As a workaround, renew the session id from the application's own code on every successful authentication, by calling Session#changeSessionId() at the end of the authenticate(String, String) implementation. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.18.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.23.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.9.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-384 - Session Fixation

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1170 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/q812kjb74x2p…	vendor-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Wicket	Affected: 8.18.0 , ≤ 8.19.0 (semver) Affected: 9.23.0 , ≤ 9.24.0 (semver) Affected: 10.9.0 , ≤ 10.11.0 (semver)	guessed

Credits

Emond Papegaaij

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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              "value": "Session fixation in Apache Wicket.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eorg.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket\u0027s role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim\u0027s browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session\u0027s signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAn application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requires an attacker to place a session id of their choosing in the victim\u0027s browser. JSESSIONID is set by the servlet container rather than by Wicket, so that needs a position Wicket does not grant, such as control of a host under the same registrable domain or a container configured to carry the session id in the URL, and the planted session has to be one the attacker has already signed in on, because a session that is not yet signed in does have its id renewed by the victim\u0027s authentication. An authentication attempt that fails signs the session out and closes the window. Applications that renew the session id in their own code after a successful authentication are not affected.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAs a workaround, renew the session id from the application\u0027s own code on every successful authentication, by calling Session#changeSessionId() at the end of the authenticate(String, String) implementation.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThis issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.18.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.23.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.9.0 through 10.11.0.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.\u003cbr\u003e"
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FKIE_CVE-2026-82840

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-01 22:17 - Updated: 2026-11-02 16:13

Severity

7.2 (High) - CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/q812kjb74x2pt6956w0pcmkc4wwj95l9

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.wicket:wicket-auth-roles",
          "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.wicket/wicket-auth-roles",
          "product": "Apache Wicket",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "8.19.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "8.18.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "9.24.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "9.23.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "10.11.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "10.9.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
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    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-82840",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-02T16:13:27.570",
  "metrics": {
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}

GHSA-QQF3-JQRG-FM5R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-02 00:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 00:30

Details

Session fixation in Apache Wicket.

org.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket's role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim's browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason.

AuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session's signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen.

An application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requires an attacker to place a session id of their choosing in the victim's browser. JSESSIONID is set by the servlet container rather than by Wicket, so that needs a position Wicket does not grant, such as control of a host under the same registrable domain or a container configured to carry the session id in the URL, and the planted session has to be one the attacker has already signed in on, because a session that is not yet signed in does have its id renewed by the victim's authentication. An authentication attempt that fails signs the session out and closes the window. Applications that renew the session id in their own code after a successful authentication are not affected.

As a workaround, renew the session id from the application's own code on every successful authentication, by calling Session#changeSessionId() at the end of the authenticate(String, String) implementation.

This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.18.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.23.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.9.0 through 10.11.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.

Severity

7.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-82840"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-384"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-01T22:17:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Session fixation in Apache Wicket.\n\norg.apache.wicket.authroles.authentication.AuthenticatedWebSession is the authentication base class of Wicket\u0027s role-based security module, and its signIn(String, String) method is the entry point through which an application authenticates a session. Renewing the container session id at that point is the standard defence against an attacker who has fixed a session id in a victim\u0027s browser, and Wicket provides that renewal as org.apache.wicket.Session#changeSessionId(), whose documentation directs callers to invoke it on login for exactly that reason.\n\nAuthenticatedWebSession#signIn(String, String) calls it inside a guard that succeeds only on the first transition of the session\u0027s signed-in flag. The session id is therefore renewed when a session first signs in, and is not renewed when a session that is already signed in authenticates again. signIn(String, String) returns true either way, so neither the caller nor the application can tell that the renewal did not happen.\n\nAn application is affected where it authenticates through AuthenticatedWebSession, which AuthenticatedWebApplication requires and which the shipped UsernamePasswordPanel uses, and where a session that is already signed in can authenticate again: a step-up prompt before a sensitive action, an account switch, or simply a sign-in form that stays reachable once the user is signed in. Nothing in the module hides that form from a signed-in session. Reaching the defect also requires an attacker to place a session id of their choosing in the victim\u0027s browser. JSESSIONID is set by the servlet container rather than by Wicket, so that needs a position Wicket does not grant, such as control of a host under the same registrable domain or a container configured to carry the session id in the URL, and the planted session has to be one the attacker has already signed in on, because a session that is not yet signed in does have its id renewed by the victim\u0027s authentication. An authentication attempt that fails signs the session out and closes the window. Applications that renew the session id in their own code after a successful authentication are not affected.\n\nAs a workaround, renew the session id from the application\u0027s own code on every successful authentication, by calling Session#changeSessionId() at the end of the authenticate(String, String) implementation.\n\nThis issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.18.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.23.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.9.0 through 10.11.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-qqf3-jqrg-fm5r",
  "modified": "2026-11-02T00:30:26Z",
  "published": "2026-11-02T00:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82840"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/q812kjb74x2pt6956w0pcmkc4wwj95l9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

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Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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CVE-2026-82840 (GCVE-0-2026-82840)

FKIE_CVE-2026-82840

GHSA-QQF3-JQRG-FM5R

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