CVE-2026-82976 (GCVE-0-2026-82976)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-03 18:36 – Updated: 2026-11-03 18:36
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret
Summary
A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.
### Evidence
**pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names**
```go
func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
result := []fs.FileInfo{}
for _, im := range f.images {
result = append(result, im)
}
return result, nil
}
func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {
f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)
if name == "/" {
return f, nil
}
...
```
**cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS**
```go
http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))
go func() {
server := &http.Server{
Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084"
ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
err := server.ListenAndServe()
```
**pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image**
```go
func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {
source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)
return ignition_config_types_32.File{
Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"},
...
```
### Attack Pattern
Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.
Severity
7.1 (High)
CWE
- CWE-548 - Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-82976 | vdb-entryx_refsource_REDHAT |
| https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2526334 | issue-trackingx_refsource_REDHAT |
| https://github.com/openshift/image-customization-… | |
| https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/OCPBUGS-105396 |
Impacted products
2 products
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 |
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4
|
||
| Red Hat | Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 |
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:5
|
Date Public
2026-11-03 12:03
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel8",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:5"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift5/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
}
],
"datePublic": "2026-11-03T12:03:30.152Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift\u0027s bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.\n\n### Evidence\n**pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go \u2014 root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names**\n```go\nfunc (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {\n f.mu.Lock()\n defer f.mu.Unlock()\n result := []fs.FileInfo{}\n for _, im := range f.images {\n result = append(result, im)\n }\n return result, nil\n}\n\nfunc (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {\n f.log.Info(\"Open\", \"path\", name)\n if name == \"/\" {\n return f, nil\n }\n ...\n```\n\n**cmd/controller/main.go \u2014 file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS**\n```go\nhttp.Handle(\"/\", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))\n\ngo func() {\n server := \u0026http.Server{\n Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default \":8084\"\n ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,\n }\n err := server.ListenAndServe()\n```\n\n**pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 \u2014 pull secret is embedded in every served image**\n```go\nfunc (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {\n source := \"data:;base64,\" + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)\n return ignition_config_types_32.File{\n Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: \"/etc/authfile.json\"},\n ...\n```\n\n### Attack Pattern\nAdjacent provisioning-network client \u2192 GET / lists UUID image names \u2192 download ISO/initramfs \u2192 extract embedded Ignition \u2192 recover cluster pull secret and SSH key."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"namespace": "https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/",
"value": "Important"
},
"type": "Red Hat severity rating"
}
},
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-548",
"description": "Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-03T18:36:24.334Z",
"orgId": "53f830b8-0a3f-465b-8143-3b8a9948e749",
"shortName": "redhat"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"vdb-entry",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-82976"
},
{
"name": "RHBZ#2526334",
"tags": [
"issue-tracking",
"x_refsource_REDHAT"
],
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2526334"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/openshift/image-customization-controller"
},
{
"url": "https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/OCPBUGS-105396"
}
],
"timeline": [
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-08-07T10:39:22.000Z",
"value": "Reported to Red Hat."
},
{
"lang": "en",
"time": "2026-11-03T12:03:30.152Z",
"value": "Made public."
}
],
"title": "Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret",
"workarounds": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected."
}
],
"x_generator": {
"engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
},
"x_redhatCweChain": "CWE-548: Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "53f830b8-0a3f-465b-8143-3b8a9948e749",
"assignerShortName": "redhat",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-82976",
"datePublished": "2026-11-03T18:36:24.334Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-08-31T14:59:35.045Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-03T18:36:24.334Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-82976",
"date": "2026-11-04",
"epss": "0.00234",
"percentile": "0.14439"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel8",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift4/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/",
"cpes": [
"cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:5"
],
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "openshift5/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel9",
"product": "Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5",
"vendor": "Red Hat"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift\u0027s bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.\n\n### Evidence\n**pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go \u2014 root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names**\n```go\nfunc (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {\n f.mu.Lock()\n defer f.mu.Unlock()\n result := []fs.FileInfo{}\n for _, im := range f.images {\n result = append(result, im)\n }\n return result, nil\n}\n\nfunc (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {\n f.log.Info(\"Open\", \"path\", name)\n if name == \"/\" {\n return f, nil\n }\n ...\n```\n\n**cmd/controller/main.go \u2014 file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS**\n```go\nhttp.Handle(\"/\", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))\n\ngo func() {\n server := \u0026http.Server{\n Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default \":8084\"\n ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,\n }\n err := server.ListenAndServe()\n```\n\n**pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 \u2014 pull secret is embedded in every served image**\n```go\nfunc (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {\n source := \"data:;base64,\" + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)\n return ignition_config_types_32.File{\n Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: \"/etc/authfile.json\"},\n ...\n```\n\n### Attack Pattern\nAdjacent provisioning-network client \u2192 GET / lists UUID image names \u2192 download ISO/initramfs \u2192 extract embedded Ignition \u2192 recover cluster pull secret and SSH key."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-82976",
"lastModified": "2026-11-03T19:18:10.993",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 4.2,
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-03T19:18:10.850",
"references": [
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-82976"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2526334"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://github.com/openshift/image-customization-controller"
},
{
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"url": "https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/OCPBUGS-105396"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "secalert@redhat.com",
"vulnStatus": "Awaiting Analysis",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-548"
}
],
"source": "secalert@redhat.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Important",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-03T20:27:10+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-82976",
"id": "CVE-2026-82976",
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-03T12:03:30.152000+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "3",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "image-customization-controller: Unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes Ignition images containing cluster pull secret",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-82976.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.