CVE-2026-90711 (GCVE-0-2026-90711)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 06:19 – Updated: 2026-09-15 14:48
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
proxy-addr vulnerable to IP spoofing via IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet
Summary
proxy-addr is a Node.js module that determines a request's client address behind trusted reverse proxies, and it backs Express req.ip and req.ips. In versions 1.1.0 through 2.0.7, a trust subnet written in IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation with an IPv4-sized prefix, such as ::ffff:10.0.0.0/8 instead of the correct ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, is accepted without error but trusts every IPv4 address on the internet rather than the block it names. Because the socket peer then becomes trusted at hop 0, any unauthenticated client can supply an arbitrary X-Forwarded-For header and control the address the application reads, which defeats IP-based access control, rate limiting, geolocation, and audit logging. This is a fail-open regression introduced in version 1.1.0. The issue is fixed in proxy-addr 2.0.8, and users should upgrade to 2.0.8 or later. As a workaround, ensure any IPv4-mapped IPv6 trust subnet uses a prefix length of at least 97, or express the range in plain IPv4 notation.
Severity
9.1 (Critical)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-15 14:46 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| proxy-addr | proxy-addr |
Affected:
1.1.0 , < 2.0.8
(semver)
Unaffected: 2.0.8 (semver) |
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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