Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-90979 (GCVE-0-2026-90979)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-28 09:34 – Updated: 2026-09-28 13:10

Title

Apache Karaf: LDAP filter injection in JAAS LDAP login modules

Summary

LDAPCache and LDAPBackingEngine build LDAP search filters for user lookup and role lookup by textually substituting the placeholders %u, %dn, and %fqdn (drawn from the login name, the resolved user DN, and its fully qualified namespace form) into administrator-configured filter templates (userFilter, roleFilter). Before the fix, the only sanitization applied to the substituted value was double backslashed: filter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote("%u"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user)); filter = filter.replace("\\", "\\\\"); This does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter: *, (, ), and NUL. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to. It's not exploitable through every entry points: LDAPLoginModule and LDAPPubkeyLoginModule both called Util.doRFC2254Encoding() (correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to LDAPCache, which masked the missing escaping in LDAPCache for those two call paths. Using LDAPCache directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal LDAPLoginModule/LDAPPubkeyLoginModule authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach LDAPCache/LDAPBackingEngine without any prior escaping: * GSSAPILdapLoginModule passes the NameCallback name straight through, unescaped. * LDAPBackingEngine (listRoles) passes principal.getName() straight through, unescaped.

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

CWE-90 - Improper neutralization of special elements used in an LDAP query ('LDAP injection')

Assigner

apache mitre root

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-90979.txt	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/2

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Karaf	Affected: 0 , < 4.4.12 (semver)	guessed

Credits

Gjoko Krstic <gjoko@zeroscience.mk>

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T13:10:12.005Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
          "shortName": "CVE"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/2"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.karaf.jaas.modules.ldap",
          "product": "Apache Karaf",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "Gjoko Krstic \u003cgjoko@zeroscience.mk\u003e"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eLDAPCache\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPBackingEngine\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;build LDAP search filters for user lookup and role lookup by textually substituting the placeholders\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e%u\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e%dn\u003c/code\u003e, and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e%fqdn\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(drawn from the login name, the resolved user DN, and its fully qualified namespace form) into administrator-configured filter templates (\u003ccode\u003euserFilter\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eroleFilter\u003c/code\u003e). Before the fix, the only sanitization applied to the substituted value was double backslashed:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ccode\u003efilter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote(\"%u\"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user));\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003ccode\u003efilter = filter.replace(\"\\\\\", \"\\\\\\\\\");\u003c/code\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eThis does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter:\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e*\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e(\u003c/code\u003e,\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003e)\u003c/code\u003e, and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eNUL\u003c/code\u003e. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to.\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003eIt\u0027s not exploitable through every entry points:\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPLoginModule\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;and\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;both called\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eUtil.doRFC2254Encoding()\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPCache\u003c/code\u003e, which masked the missing escaping in\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPCache\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;for those two call paths. Using\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPCache\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPLoginModule\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003eLDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eLDAPCache\u003c/code\u003e/\u003ccode\u003eLDAPBackingEngine\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;without any prior escaping:\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003eGSSAPILdapLoginModule\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;passes the\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eNameCallback\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;name straight through, unescaped.\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ccode\u003eLDAPBackingEngine\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;(\u003ccode\u003elistRoles\u003c/code\u003e) passes\u0026nbsp;\u003ccode\u003eprincipal.getName()\u003c/code\u003e\u0026nbsp;straight through, unescaped.\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "LDAPCache\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0build LDAP search filters for user lookup and role lookup by textually substituting the placeholders\u00a0%u,\u00a0%dn, and\u00a0%fqdn\u00a0(drawn from the login name, the resolved user DN, and its fully qualified namespace form) into administrator-configured filter templates (userFilter,\u00a0roleFilter). Before the fix, the only sanitization applied to the substituted value was double backslashed:\n\nfilter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote(\"%u\"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user));\n\nfilter = filter.replace(\"\\\\\", \"\\\\\\\\\");\n\n\n\n\nThis does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter:\u00a0*,\u00a0(,\u00a0), and\u00a0NUL. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to.\n\n\n\n\nIt\u0027s not exploitable through every entry points:\u00a0LDAPLoginModule\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0both called\u00a0Util.doRFC2254Encoding()\u00a0(correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to\u00a0LDAPCache, which masked the missing escaping in\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0for those two call paths. Using\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal\u00a0LDAPLoginModule/LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach\u00a0LDAPCache/LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0without any prior escaping:\n\n  *  GSSAPILdapLoginModule\u00a0passes the\u00a0NameCallback\u00a0name straight through, unescaped.\n  *  LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0(listRoles) passes\u00a0principal.getName()\u00a0straight through, unescaped."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "other": {
            "content": {
              "text": "moderate"
            },
            "type": "Textual description of severity"
          },
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-90",
              "description": "CWE-90 Improper neutralization of special elements used in an LDAP query (\u0027LDAP injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T09:34:33.253Z",
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
        "shortName": "apache"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-90979.txt"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-90979.txt",
        "defect": [
          "https://github.com/apache/karaf/pull/2880"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Apache Karaf: LDAP filter injection in JAAS LDAP login modules",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.3"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
    "assignerShortName": "apache",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-90979",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-28T09:34:33.253Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-14T13:42:44.229Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-28T13:10:12.005Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-90979",
      "date": "2026-09-28",
      "epss": "0.00265",
      "percentile": "0.165"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
                "packageName": "org.apache.karaf.jaas.modules.ldap",
                "product": "Apache Karaf",
                "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "lessThan": "4.4.12",
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "0",
                    "versionType": "semver"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "security@apache.org"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "LDAPCache\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0build LDAP search filters for user lookup and role lookup by textually substituting the placeholders\u00a0%u,\u00a0%dn, and\u00a0%fqdn\u00a0(drawn from the login name, the resolved user DN, and its fully qualified namespace form) into administrator-configured filter templates (userFilter,\u00a0roleFilter). Before the fix, the only sanitization applied to the substituted value was double backslashed:\n\nfilter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote(\"%u\"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user));\n\nfilter = filter.replace(\"\\\\\", \"\\\\\\\\\");\n\n\n\n\nThis does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter:\u00a0*,\u00a0(,\u00a0), and\u00a0NUL. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to.\n\n\n\n\nIt\u0027s not exploitable through every entry points:\u00a0LDAPLoginModule\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0both called\u00a0Util.doRFC2254Encoding()\u00a0(correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to\u00a0LDAPCache, which masked the missing escaping in\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0for those two call paths. Using\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal\u00a0LDAPLoginModule/LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach\u00a0LDAPCache/LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0without any prior escaping:\n\n  *  GSSAPILdapLoginModule\u00a0passes the\u00a0NameCallback\u00a0name straight through, unescaped.\n  *  LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0(listRoles) passes\u00a0principal.getName()\u00a0straight through, unescaped."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-90979",
        "lastModified": "2026-09-28T14:17:22.140",
        "metrics": {},
        "published": "2026-09-28T10:16:45.990",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "security@apache.org",
            "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-90979.txt"
          },
          {
            "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/2"
          }
        ],
        "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
        "vulnStatus": "Received",
        "weaknesses": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-90"
              }
            ],
            "source": "security@apache.org",
            "type": "Secondary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-90979

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-28 10:16 - Updated: 2026-09-28 14:17

Severity

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-90979.txt
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/2

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.karaf.jaas.modules.ldap",
          "product": "Apache Karaf",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.4.12",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "LDAPCache\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0build LDAP search filters for user lookup and role lookup by textually substituting the placeholders\u00a0%u,\u00a0%dn, and\u00a0%fqdn\u00a0(drawn from the login name, the resolved user DN, and its fully qualified namespace form) into administrator-configured filter templates (userFilter,\u00a0roleFilter). Before the fix, the only sanitization applied to the substituted value was double backslashed:\n\nfilter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote(\"%u\"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user));\n\nfilter = filter.replace(\"\\\\\", \"\\\\\\\\\");\n\n\n\n\nThis does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter:\u00a0*,\u00a0(,\u00a0), and\u00a0NUL. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to.\n\n\n\n\nIt\u0027s not exploitable through every entry points:\u00a0LDAPLoginModule\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0both called\u00a0Util.doRFC2254Encoding()\u00a0(correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to\u00a0LDAPCache, which masked the missing escaping in\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0for those two call paths. Using\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal\u00a0LDAPLoginModule/LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach\u00a0LDAPCache/LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0without any prior escaping:\n\n  *  GSSAPILdapLoginModule\u00a0passes the\u00a0NameCallback\u00a0name straight through, unescaped.\n  *  LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0(listRoles) passes\u00a0principal.getName()\u00a0straight through, unescaped."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-90979",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-28T14:17:22.140",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-28T10:16:45.990",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-90979.txt"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/2"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-90"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-932C-QW9F-CPCQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-28 15:31

Details

filter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote("%u"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user));

filter = filter.replace("\", "\\");

This does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter: *, (, ), and NUL. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to.

It's not exploitable through every entry points: LDAPLoginModule and LDAPPubkeyLoginModule both called Util.doRFC2254Encoding() (correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to LDAPCache, which masked the missing escaping in LDAPCache for those two call paths. Using LDAPCache directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal LDAPLoginModule/LDAPPubkeyLoginModule authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach LDAPCache/LDAPBackingEngine without any prior escaping:

GSSAPILdapLoginModule passes the NameCallback name straight through, unescaped.
LDAPBackingEngine (listRoles) passes principal.getName() straight through, unescaped.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-90979"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-90"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T10:16:45Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "LDAPCache\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0build LDAP search filters for user lookup and role lookup by textually substituting the placeholders\u00a0%u,\u00a0%dn, and\u00a0%fqdn\u00a0(drawn from the login name, the resolved user DN, and its fully qualified namespace form) into administrator-configured filter templates (userFilter,\u00a0roleFilter). Before the fix, the only sanitization applied to the substituted value was double backslashed:\n\nfilter = filter.replaceAll(Pattern.quote(\"%u\"), Matcher.quoteReplacement(user));\n\nfilter = filter.replace(\"\\\\\", \"\\\\\\\\\");\n\n\n\n\nThis does not escape the other characters RFC 4515 requires escaping in an LDAP search filter:\u00a0*,\u00a0(,\u00a0), and\u00a0NUL. A login name containing any of these can change the structure of the resulting filter rather than being matched as a literal value (e.g. a crafted username can turn an equality match into a wildcard match, or close/reopen filter clauses), widening what the search returns and potentially causing a login or role lookup to match an LDAP entry other than the intended one, over-granting roles, and depending on deployment-specific filter templates, potentially affecting which account a login resolved to.\n\n\n\n\nIt\u0027s not exploitable through every entry points:\u00a0LDAPLoginModule\u00a0and\u00a0LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0both called\u00a0Util.doRFC2254Encoding()\u00a0(correct RFC 4515 escaping) on the login name before handing it to\u00a0LDAPCache, which masked the missing escaping in\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0for those two call paths. Using\u00a0LDAPCache\u00a0directly (bypassing the login modules) does not reproduce through the normal\u00a0LDAPLoginModule/LDAPPubkeyLoginModule\u00a0authentication flow for this reason. It does reproduce through two other call paths that reach\u00a0LDAPCache/LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0without any prior escaping:\n\n  *  GSSAPILdapLoginModule\u00a0passes the\u00a0NameCallback\u00a0name straight through, unescaped.\n  *  LDAPBackingEngine\u00a0(listRoles) passes\u00a0principal.getName()\u00a0straight through, unescaped.",
  "id": "GHSA-932c-qw9f-cpcq",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T15:31:49Z",
  "published": "2026-09-28T12:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90979"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-90979.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

CVE-2026-90979 (GCVE-0-2026-90979)

FKIE_CVE-2026-90979

GHSA-932C-QW9F-CPCQ

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour