CVE-2026-92597 (GCVE-0-2026-92597)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-16 21:47 – Updated: 2026-09-16 21:47
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Nodemailer before 9.1.0 Email Domain Validation Bypass via RFC 5322 Comment
Summary
Nodemailer versions >= 6.9.16 and < 9.1.0 mis-parse RFC 5322 comments in email addresses: in lib/addressparser, a comment closed immediately before a non-break character causes the tokenizer to concatenate the atoms surrounding the comment instead of treating the comment as folding whitespace that terminates the domain. A recipient address such as user@good-corp.com(x)evil.com is therefore read by Nodemailer as the single domain good-corp.comevil.com (registrable domain comevil.com, which an attacker can register) and used for both the SMTP envelope (RCPT TO) and the emitted To:/From: headers, while a conformant RFC 5322 parser terminates the domain at the comment and reads good-corp.com. An application that validates the recipient domain with a strict RFC 5322 parser (without inspecting parse defects) or a naive prefix/substring allow-list and then hands the raw address to Nodemailer can be induced to deliver mail to a domain the attacker controls. Fixed in 9.1.0.
Severity
CWE
- CWE-436 - Interpretation Conflict
Assigner
References
3 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security… | vendor-advisory |
| https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/902b63e | patch |
| https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nodemailer-b… | third-party-advisory |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| nodemailer | nodemailer |
Affected:
6.9.16 , < 9.1.0
(semver)
Unaffected: 9.1.0 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:nodemailer:nodemailer:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
Date Public
2026-09-01 00:00
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}
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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