CVE-2026-99450 (GCVE-0-2026-99450)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:41 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:41| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
e5f19b619fa0b691ccb537d72240bd20eb72087c , < a2942b3abb5bddd1bac418abd61fb5f0616ab897
(git)
Affected: e5f19b619fa0b691ccb537d72240bd20eb72087c , < 9c48b994b66d7b585698f9aaee8ff559a7755c0a (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
7.0
Unaffected: 0 , < 7.0 (semver) Unaffected: 7.3.2 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.4-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/vfio/pci/nvgrace-gpu/main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a2942b3abb5bddd1bac418abd61fb5f0616ab897",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e5f19b619fa0b691ccb537d72240bd20eb72087c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9c48b994b66d7b585698f9aaee8ff559a7755c0a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e5f19b619fa0b691ccb537d72240bd20eb72087c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/vfio/pci/nvgrace-gpu/main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.4-rc1",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvfio/nvgrace-gpu: Use a core-only open_device in fallback mode\n\nWhen the ACPI memory properties are missing or the C2C link is down, the\ndevice is exposed through nvgrace_gpu_pci_core_ops. That table opens\nthrough nvgrace_gpu_open_device() but closes through\nvfio_pci_core_close_device(), so open and close are not symmetric.\n\nnvgrace_gpu_open_device() registers nvdev-\u003eusemem for poison handling\nunconditionally. In fallback mode usemem.memlength is zero, and\nregister_pfn_address_space() inserts a node covering [0, ULONG_MAX].\nNothing removes it: a second open fails with -EBUSY, and once the device\nis unbound the node outlives the nvdev that contains it. The next open\nafter a rebind reports:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800894aa30 by task nvgrace_repro/203\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80\n print_report+0x153/0x4c6\n kasan_report+0xe4/0x1a0\n interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310\n register_pfn_address_space+0x97/0x100\n nvgrace_gpu_open_device+0x21c/0x730\n vfio_df_open+0x213/0x520\n vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd+0x3e8/0x6e0\n vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x782/0x1570\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13c/0x1c0\n do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n Allocated by task 188:\n ...\n _vfio_alloc_device+0x3a/0x500\n nvgrace_gpu_probe+0xcb/0x660\n local_pci_probe+0xcf/0x170\n ...\n\n Freed by task 188:\n ...\n kfree+0x20d/0x600\n device_release+0xcf/0x250\n kobject_put+0x152/0x2f0\n pci_device_remove+0xb0/0x1c0\n device_release_driver_internal+0x38d/0x540\n unbind_store+0xde/0x100\n ...\n\nGive the fallback table its own open_device that only calls\nvfio_pci_core_enable() and vfio_pci_core_finish_enable(), the\ncounterpart of vfio_pci_core_close_device(). Fallback mode then never\ntouches the nvgrace memory regions, as Alex suggested.\n\nThis should be safe because the fallback table uses the vfio-pci core\nread, write and mmap handlers, so nothing there uses the state\nnvgrace_gpu_open_device() sets up. The one visible difference is that a\nfallback open no longer fails when BAR0 cannot be mapped, which matches\nvfio-pci."
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:41:46.677Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2942b3abb5bddd1bac418abd61fb5f0616ab897"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c48b994b66d7b585698f9aaee8ff559a7755c0a"
}
],
"title": "vfio/nvgrace-gpu: Use a core-only open_device in fallback mode",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99450",
"datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:41:46.677Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.416Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:41:46.677Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/vfio/pci/nvgrace-gpu/main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a2942b3abb5bddd1bac418abd61fb5f0616ab897",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e5f19b619fa0b691ccb537d72240bd20eb72087c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9c48b994b66d7b585698f9aaee8ff559a7755c0a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e5f19b619fa0b691ccb537d72240bd20eb72087c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/vfio/pci/nvgrace-gpu/main.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvfio/nvgrace-gpu: Use a core-only open_device in fallback mode\n\nWhen the ACPI memory properties are missing or the C2C link is down, the\ndevice is exposed through nvgrace_gpu_pci_core_ops. That table opens\nthrough nvgrace_gpu_open_device() but closes through\nvfio_pci_core_close_device(), so open and close are not symmetric.\n\nnvgrace_gpu_open_device() registers nvdev-\u003eusemem for poison handling\nunconditionally. In fallback mode usemem.memlength is zero, and\nregister_pfn_address_space() inserts a node covering [0, ULONG_MAX].\nNothing removes it: a second open fails with -EBUSY, and once the device\nis unbound the node outlives the nvdev that contains it. The next open\nafter a rebind reports:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800894aa30 by task nvgrace_repro/203\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80\n print_report+0x153/0x4c6\n kasan_report+0xe4/0x1a0\n interval_tree_iter_first+0x209/0x310\n register_pfn_address_space+0x97/0x100\n nvgrace_gpu_open_device+0x21c/0x730\n vfio_df_open+0x213/0x520\n vfio_df_ioctl_bind_iommufd+0x3e8/0x6e0\n vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0x782/0x1570\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x13c/0x1c0\n do_syscall_64+0x106/0x630\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n Allocated by task 188:\n ...\n _vfio_alloc_device+0x3a/0x500\n nvgrace_gpu_probe+0xcb/0x660\n local_pci_probe+0xcf/0x170\n ...\n\n Freed by task 188:\n ...\n kfree+0x20d/0x600\n device_release+0xcf/0x250\n kobject_put+0x152/0x2f0\n pci_device_remove+0xb0/0x1c0\n device_release_driver_internal+0x38d/0x540\n unbind_store+0xde/0x100\n ...\n\nGive the fallback table its own open_device that only calls\nvfio_pci_core_enable() and vfio_pci_core_finish_enable(), the\ncounterpart of vfio_pci_core_close_device(). Fallback mode then never\ntouches the nvgrace memory regions, as Alex suggested.\n\nThis should be safe because the fallback table uses the vfio-pci core\nread, write and mmap handlers, so nothing there uses the state\nnvgrace_gpu_open_device() sets up. The one visible difference is that a\nfallback open no longer fails when BAR0 cannot be mapped, which matches\nvfio-pci."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99450",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:17:58.833",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:17:58.833",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c48b994b66d7b585698f9aaee8ff559a7755c0a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2942b3abb5bddd1bac418abd61fb5f0616ab897"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-19T21:38:15+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-99450",
"id": "CVE-2026-99450",
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-19T14:41:46.677000+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "1",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "203",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in nvgrace-gpu VFIO driver",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-99450.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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