CVE-2026-99485 (GCVE-0-2026-99485)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:43 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:43| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548 , < 35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473
(git)
Affected: d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548 , < 2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4 (git) |
guessed | |
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
7.0
Unaffected: 0 , < 7.0 (semver) Unaffected: 7.3.2 , ≤ 7.3.* (semver) Unaffected: 7.4-rc1 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix) |
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_message.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_message.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.3.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
"vulnerable": true
},
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "7.4-rc1",
"versionStartIncluding": "7.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails\n\naie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a\nfailed start frees it again:\n\n\thwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev-\u003embox);\n\t...\n\tret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann, ...);\n\tif (ret)\n\t\tgoto free_channel;\n\t...\nfree_channel:\n\txdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann);\n\nhwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That\npointer is the driver\u0027s own test for whether a hardware context has a\nusable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,\naie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message\nhelpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.\n\nIt matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls\naie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,\nafter aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context\nsurvives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return\nvalue entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is\nleft is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every\nlater user of it takes the non-NULL branch:\n\n - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed\n channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),\n - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -\u003e\n aie2_destroy_context(),\n - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -\u003e\n aie2_release_resource() -\u003e xrs_release_resource() -\u003e\n aie2_xrs_unload() -\u003e aie2_destroy_context(),\n\nand aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()\nfollowed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already\nfreed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.\n\nThe AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -\naie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev-\u003eaie.mgmt_chann right after freeing\nit. Do the same here.\n\nThe create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,\nxrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling\n-\u003eunload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx-\u003epriv, so the stale pointer\nnever outlives the structure holding it.\n\nStarting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer\nsizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and\nrequest_irq() can fail."
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:43:23.095Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4"
}
],
"title": "accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "bippy-1.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"assignerShortName": "Linux",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-99485",
"datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:43:23.095Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:25:14.418Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:43:23.095Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_message.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "d5b8b0347fa8470b751a506fb801797e271d7548",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_message.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.3.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3.2",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.4-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naccel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails\n\naie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a\nfailed start frees it again:\n\n\thwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev-\u003embox);\n\t...\n\tret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann, ...);\n\tif (ret)\n\t\tgoto free_channel;\n\t...\nfree_channel:\n\txdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann);\n\nhwctx-\u003epriv-\u003embox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That\npointer is the driver\u0027s own test for whether a hardware context has a\nusable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,\naie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message\nhelpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.\n\nIt matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls\naie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,\nafter aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context\nsurvives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return\nvalue entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is\nleft is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every\nlater user of it takes the non-NULL branch:\n\n - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed\n channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),\n - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -\u003e\n aie2_destroy_context(),\n - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -\u003e\n aie2_release_resource() -\u003e xrs_release_resource() -\u003e\n aie2_xrs_unload() -\u003e aie2_destroy_context(),\n\nand aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()\nfollowed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already\nfreed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.\n\nThe AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -\naie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev-\u003eaie.mgmt_chann right after freeing\nit. Do the same here.\n\nThe create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,\nxrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling\n-\u003eunload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx-\u003epriv, so the stale pointer\nnever outlives the structure holding it.\n\nStarting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer\nsizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and\nrequest_irq() can fail."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-99485",
"lastModified": "2026-11-19T15:18:03.267",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-11-19T15:18:03.267",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2117e3d96a4fd1ee13fa28b31494ff5f5db6ccf4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35003a3a2221207ded92ca4c60a54c2f83136473"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
},
"redhat_vex": {
"aggregate_severity": "Moderate",
"current_release_date": "2026-11-19T21:52:40+00:00",
"cve": "CVE-2026-99485",
"id": "CVE-2026-99485",
"initial_release_date": "2026-11-19T14:43:23.095000+00:00",
"product_status:known_affected": "1",
"product_status:known_not_affected": "203",
"source": "Red Hat CSAF VEX",
"status": "final",
"title": "kernel: kernel: Denial of Service via use-after-free in AMD XDNA driver",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-99485.json",
"version": "3"
}
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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