GHSA-5847-RM3G-23MW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 00:38 – Updated: 2026-03-03 00:38
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has hook auth rate limiter bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 client key variants
Details

Vulnerability

The hook authentication throttle keyed failed attempts by raw socket remoteAddress text.

IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms of the same client (for example 1.2.3.4 and ::ffff:1.2.3.4) were treated as different clients, allowing separate rate-limit buckets.

Impact

An attacker could split failed hook-auth attempts across both address forms and effectively double the brute-force budget from 20 to 40 attempts per 60-second window.

Affected Components

  • src/gateway/server-http.ts
  • src/gateway/auth-rate-limit.ts

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Vulnerable versions: <= 2026.2.21-2
  • Patched version (planned next release): 2026.2.22

Remediation

Centralize and reuse canonical client-IP normalization for auth rate-limiting, and use that canonical key for hook auth throttling.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.22) so once npm release 2026.2.22 is published, this advisory can be published directly.

OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T00:38:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability\n\nThe hook authentication throttle keyed failed attempts by raw socket `remoteAddress` text.\n\nIPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms of the same client (for example `1.2.3.4` and `::ffff:1.2.3.4`) were treated as different clients, allowing separate rate-limit buckets.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could split failed hook-auth attempts across both address forms and effectively double the brute-force budget from 20 to 40 attempts per 60-second window.\n\n## Affected Components\n\n- `src/gateway/server-http.ts`\n- `src/gateway/auth-rate-limit.ts`\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Patched version (planned next release): `2026.2.22`\n\n## Remediation\n\nCentralize and reuse canonical client-IP normalization for auth rate-limiting, and use that canonical key for hook auth throttling.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.22`) so once npm release `2026.2.22` is published, this advisory can be published directly.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mw",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T00:38:48Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T00:38:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has hook auth rate limiter bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 client key variants"
}


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