GHSA-725G-W329-G7QR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 14:50 – Updated: 2026-03-12 14:50
VLAI
Summary
kora-lib: Token-2022 Transfer Fee Not Deducted During Payment Verification
Details

Summary

When a user pays transaction fees using a Token-2022 token with a TransferFeeConfig extension, Kora's verify_token_payment() credits the full raw transfer amount as the payment value. However, the on-chain SPL Token-2022 program withholds a portion of that amount as a transfer fee, so the paymaster's destination account only receives amount - transfer_fee. This means the paymaster consistently credits more value than it actually receives, resulting in systematic financial loss.

Severity

High

Affected Component

  • File: crates/lib/src/token/token.rs
  • Function: verify_token_payment()
  • Lines: 529–654 (specifically 633–639)

Root Cause

In verify_token_payment(), the amount extracted from the parsed SPL transfer instruction is the pre-fee amount (what the sender specifies in the transfer_checked instruction). The function passes this raw amount to calculate_token_value_in_lamports() to determine how many lamports the payment is worth. It never subtracts the Token-2022 transfer fee.

The fee estimation path (fee.rs:analyze_payment_instructions) correctly accounts for transfer fees by calculating them and adding them to the total fee. But the verification path does not perform the inverse subtraction, creating an asymmetry.

Vulnerable Code

// crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654
pub async fn verify_token_payment(
    transaction_resolved: &mut VersionedTransactionResolved,
    rpc_client: &RpcClient,
    required_lamports: u64,
    expected_destination_owner: &Pubkey,
) -> Result<bool, KoraError> {
    let config = get_config()?;
    let mut total_lamport_value = 0u64;

    // ...

    for instruction in transaction_resolved
        .get_or_parse_spl_instructions()?
        .get(&ParsedSPLInstructionType::SplTokenTransfer)
        .unwrap_or(&vec![])
    {
        if let ParsedSPLInstructionData::SplTokenTransfer {
            source_address,
            destination_address,
            mint,
            amount,      // <-- This is the PRE-FEE amount from the instruction
            is_2022,
            ..
        } = instruction
        {
            // ... destination validation ...

            // LINE 633-639: Uses raw *amount without deducting transfer fee
            let lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports(
                *amount,        // <-- BUG: Should be (amount - transfer_fee)
                &token_mint,
                config.validation.price_source.clone(),
                rpc_client,
            )
            .await?;

            total_lamport_value = total_lamport_value
                .checked_add(lamport_value)
                .ok_or_else(|| {
                    KoraError::ValidationError("Payment accumulation overflow".to_string())
                })?;
        }
    }

    Ok(total_lamport_value >= required_lamports)
}

For comparison, the transfer fee calculation exists elsewhere in the codebase and is used during fee estimation:

// crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198
pub fn calculate_transfer_fee(
    &self,
    amount: u64,
    current_epoch: u64,
) -> Result<Option<u64>, KoraError> {
    if let Some(fee_config) = self.get_transfer_fee() {
        let transfer_fee = if current_epoch >= u64::from(fee_config.newer_transfer_fee.epoch) {
            &fee_config.newer_transfer_fee
        } else {
            &fee_config.older_transfer_fee
        };
        let basis_points = u16::from(transfer_fee.transfer_fee_basis_points);
        let maximum_fee = u64::from(transfer_fee.maximum_fee);
        let fee_amount = (amount as u128)
            .checked_mul(basis_points as u128)
            .and_then(|product| product.checked_div(10_000))
            // ...
        Ok(Some(std::cmp::min(fee_amount, maximum_fee)))
    } else {
        Ok(None)
    }
}

This function exists but is never called in verify_token_payment().

Proof of Concept

Arithmetic Demonstration

Given: - Token-2022 token with 5% transfer fee (500 basis points), whitelisted in allowed_spl_paid_tokens - Transaction fee cost: 5000 lamports equivalent - Token price: 1 token = 5 lamports

What should happen: - User needs to pay 5000 lamports worth → 1000 tokens - Transfer fee on 1000 tokens at 5% = 50 tokens - Paymaster destination receives: 1000 - 50 = 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports) - User should be required to pay MORE to cover the fee

What actually happens: - User sends transfer_checked for amount = 1000 tokens - verify_token_payment() calculates: 1000 tokens * 5 lamports/token = 5000 lamports - 5000 >= 5000 required → payment verified as sufficient - But paymaster only received 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports) - Paymaster lost 250 lamports on this transaction

Over 1000 transactions: Paymaster loses 250,000 lamports (0.25 SOL)

Runnable Test (using existing test infrastructure)

#[tokio::test]
async fn test_token2022_transfer_fee_not_deducted_in_verification() {
    // Setup: Token-2022 mint with 10% transfer fee (1000 bps)
    let transfer_fee_config = create_transfer_fee_config(
        1000,      // 10% basis points
        u64::MAX,  // no maximum fee cap
    );

    let mint_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();
    let mint_account = MintAccountMockBuilder::new()
        .with_decimals(6)
        .with_supply(1_000_000_000_000)
        .with_extension(ExtensionType::TransferFeeConfig)
        .build_token2022();

    // User sends transfer_checked for 1,000,000 tokens (1 token at 6 decimals)
    let transfer_amount: u64 = 1_000_000;

    // What verify_token_payment credits:
    let credited_amount = transfer_amount;  // = 1,000,000

    // What the paymaster actually receives (after 10% on-chain fee):
    let actual_received = transfer_amount - (transfer_amount * 1000 / 10000);  // = 900,000

    // BUG: credited_amount (1,000,000) > actual_received (900,000)
    // Paymaster is credited 11.1% MORE than it actually receives
    assert!(credited_amount > actual_received);
    assert_eq!(credited_amount - actual_received, 100_000); // 100,000 token units lost

    // The financial loss per transaction = 10% of the payment amount
    // This is NOT a rounding error — it is a full percentage-based loss
}

Impact

  • Systematic Financial Loss: The paymaster consistently credits more token value than it receives for every transaction paid with a transfer-fee-bearing Token-2022 token.
  • Loss Scale: Proportional to transfer_fee_basis_points / 10000 * payment_amount per transaction. For a token with 5% fee and 100 transactions/day at $1 each, that is $5/day or $1,825/year in losses.
  • Precondition: Requires a Token-2022 token with TransferFeeConfig extension to be whitelisted in allowed_spl_paid_tokens. The existing test infrastructure already creates such tokens (TestAccountSetup::create_usdc_mint_2022() with 100 bps / 1% fee).

Recommendation

Deduct the Token-2022 transfer fee before calculating the lamport value of the payment:

// In verify_token_payment(), after extracting amount:
let effective_amount = if *is_2022 {
    // Fetch the mint to check for TransferFeeConfig
    let mint_account = CacheUtil::get_account(
        rpc_client,
        &token_mint,
        false,
    ).await?;
    let mint_info = Token2022MintInfo::from_account_data(&mint_account.data)?;

    if let Ok(Some(fee)) = mint_info.calculate_transfer_fee(
        *amount,
        rpc_client.get_epoch_info().await?.epoch,
    ) {
        amount.saturating_sub(fee)
    } else {
        *amount
    }
} else {
    *amount
};

let lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports(
    effective_amount,  // Use post-fee amount
    &token_mint,
    config.validation.price_source.clone(),
    rpc_client,
)
.await?;

References

  • crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654verify_token_payment() using raw amount
  • crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198calculate_transfer_fee() (exists but not called in verification)
  • crates/lib/src/fee/fee.rs:174-204analyze_payment_instructions() (correctly accounts for transfer fee in estimation)
  • SPL Token-2022 specification: transfer fees are deducted from the transfer amount by the on-chain program
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "kora-lib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T14:50:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen a user pays transaction fees using a Token-2022 token with a `TransferFeeConfig` extension, Kora\u0027s `verify_token_payment()` credits the full raw transfer `amount` as the payment value. However, the on-chain SPL Token-2022 program withholds a portion of that amount as a transfer fee, so the paymaster\u0027s destination account only receives `amount - transfer_fee`. This means the paymaster consistently credits more value than it actually receives, resulting in systematic financial loss.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High**\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- **File:** `crates/lib/src/token/token.rs`\n- **Function:** `verify_token_payment()`\n- **Lines:** 529\u2013654 (specifically 633\u2013639)\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `verify_token_payment()`, the `amount` extracted from the parsed SPL transfer instruction is the **pre-fee** amount (what the sender specifies in the `transfer_checked` instruction). The function passes this raw amount to `calculate_token_value_in_lamports()` to determine how many lamports the payment is worth. It never subtracts the Token-2022 transfer fee.\n\nThe fee estimation path (`fee.rs:analyze_payment_instructions`) correctly accounts for transfer fees by calculating them and adding them to the total fee. But the verification path does not perform the inverse subtraction, creating an asymmetry.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n```rust\n// crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654\npub async fn verify_token_payment(\n    transaction_resolved: \u0026mut VersionedTransactionResolved,\n    rpc_client: \u0026RpcClient,\n    required_lamports: u64,\n    expected_destination_owner: \u0026Pubkey,\n) -\u003e Result\u003cbool, KoraError\u003e {\n    let config = get_config()?;\n    let mut total_lamport_value = 0u64;\n\n    // ...\n\n    for instruction in transaction_resolved\n        .get_or_parse_spl_instructions()?\n        .get(\u0026ParsedSPLInstructionType::SplTokenTransfer)\n        .unwrap_or(\u0026vec![])\n    {\n        if let ParsedSPLInstructionData::SplTokenTransfer {\n            source_address,\n            destination_address,\n            mint,\n            amount,      // \u003c-- This is the PRE-FEE amount from the instruction\n            is_2022,\n            ..\n        } = instruction\n        {\n            // ... destination validation ...\n\n            // LINE 633-639: Uses raw *amount without deducting transfer fee\n            let lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports(\n                *amount,        // \u003c-- BUG: Should be (amount - transfer_fee)\n                \u0026token_mint,\n                config.validation.price_source.clone(),\n                rpc_client,\n            )\n            .await?;\n\n            total_lamport_value = total_lamport_value\n                .checked_add(lamport_value)\n                .ok_or_else(|| {\n                    KoraError::ValidationError(\"Payment accumulation overflow\".to_string())\n                })?;\n        }\n    }\n\n    Ok(total_lamport_value \u003e= required_lamports)\n}\n```\n\nFor comparison, the transfer fee calculation exists elsewhere in the codebase and is used during fee estimation:\n\n```rust\n// crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198\npub fn calculate_transfer_fee(\n    \u0026self,\n    amount: u64,\n    current_epoch: u64,\n) -\u003e Result\u003cOption\u003cu64\u003e, KoraError\u003e {\n    if let Some(fee_config) = self.get_transfer_fee() {\n        let transfer_fee = if current_epoch \u003e= u64::from(fee_config.newer_transfer_fee.epoch) {\n            \u0026fee_config.newer_transfer_fee\n        } else {\n            \u0026fee_config.older_transfer_fee\n        };\n        let basis_points = u16::from(transfer_fee.transfer_fee_basis_points);\n        let maximum_fee = u64::from(transfer_fee.maximum_fee);\n        let fee_amount = (amount as u128)\n            .checked_mul(basis_points as u128)\n            .and_then(|product| product.checked_div(10_000))\n            // ...\n        Ok(Some(std::cmp::min(fee_amount, maximum_fee)))\n    } else {\n        Ok(None)\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis function exists but is **never called** in `verify_token_payment()`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Arithmetic Demonstration\n\nGiven:\n- Token-2022 token with 5% transfer fee (500 basis points), whitelisted in `allowed_spl_paid_tokens`\n- Transaction fee cost: 5000 lamports equivalent\n- Token price: 1 token = 5 lamports\n\n**What should happen:**\n- User needs to pay 5000 lamports worth \u2192 1000 tokens\n- Transfer fee on 1000 tokens at 5% = 50 tokens\n- Paymaster destination receives: 1000 - 50 = 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports)\n- User should be required to pay MORE to cover the fee\n\n**What actually happens:**\n- User sends `transfer_checked` for `amount = 1000` tokens\n- `verify_token_payment()` calculates: 1000 tokens * 5 lamports/token = 5000 lamports\n- 5000 \u003e= 5000 required \u2192 **payment verified as sufficient**\n- But paymaster only received 950 tokens (worth 4750 lamports)\n- **Paymaster lost 250 lamports on this transaction**\n\n**Over 1000 transactions:** Paymaster loses 250,000 lamports (0.25 SOL)\n\n### Runnable Test (using existing test infrastructure)\n\n```rust\n#[tokio::test]\nasync fn test_token2022_transfer_fee_not_deducted_in_verification() {\n    // Setup: Token-2022 mint with 10% transfer fee (1000 bps)\n    let transfer_fee_config = create_transfer_fee_config(\n        1000,      // 10% basis points\n        u64::MAX,  // no maximum fee cap\n    );\n\n    let mint_pubkey = Pubkey::new_unique();\n    let mint_account = MintAccountMockBuilder::new()\n        .with_decimals(6)\n        .with_supply(1_000_000_000_000)\n        .with_extension(ExtensionType::TransferFeeConfig)\n        .build_token2022();\n\n    // User sends transfer_checked for 1,000,000 tokens (1 token at 6 decimals)\n    let transfer_amount: u64 = 1_000_000;\n\n    // What verify_token_payment credits:\n    let credited_amount = transfer_amount;  // = 1,000,000\n\n    // What the paymaster actually receives (after 10% on-chain fee):\n    let actual_received = transfer_amount - (transfer_amount * 1000 / 10000);  // = 900,000\n\n    // BUG: credited_amount (1,000,000) \u003e actual_received (900,000)\n    // Paymaster is credited 11.1% MORE than it actually receives\n    assert!(credited_amount \u003e actual_received);\n    assert_eq!(credited_amount - actual_received, 100_000); // 100,000 token units lost\n\n    // The financial loss per transaction = 10% of the payment amount\n    // This is NOT a rounding error \u2014 it is a full percentage-based loss\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Systematic Financial Loss:** The paymaster consistently credits more token value than it receives for every transaction paid with a transfer-fee-bearing Token-2022 token.\n- **Loss Scale:** Proportional to `transfer_fee_basis_points / 10000 * payment_amount` per transaction. For a token with 5% fee and 100 transactions/day at $1 each, that is $5/day or $1,825/year in losses.\n- **Precondition:** Requires a Token-2022 token with `TransferFeeConfig` extension to be whitelisted in `allowed_spl_paid_tokens`. The existing test infrastructure already creates such tokens (`TestAccountSetup::create_usdc_mint_2022()` with 100 bps / 1% fee).\n\n## Recommendation\n\nDeduct the Token-2022 transfer fee before calculating the lamport value of the payment:\n\n```rust\n// In verify_token_payment(), after extracting amount:\nlet effective_amount = if *is_2022 {\n    // Fetch the mint to check for TransferFeeConfig\n    let mint_account = CacheUtil::get_account(\n        rpc_client,\n        \u0026token_mint,\n        false,\n    ).await?;\n    let mint_info = Token2022MintInfo::from_account_data(\u0026mint_account.data)?;\n\n    if let Ok(Some(fee)) = mint_info.calculate_transfer_fee(\n        *amount,\n        rpc_client.get_epoch_info().await?.epoch,\n    ) {\n        amount.saturating_sub(fee)\n    } else {\n        *amount\n    }\n} else {\n    *amount\n};\n\nlet lamport_value = TokenUtil::calculate_token_value_in_lamports(\n    effective_amount,  // Use post-fee amount\n    \u0026token_mint,\n    config.validation.price_source.clone(),\n    rpc_client,\n)\n.await?;\n```\n\n## References\n\n- `crates/lib/src/token/token.rs:529-654` \u2014 `verify_token_payment()` using raw amount\n- `crates/lib/src/token/spl_token_2022.rs:165-198` \u2014 `calculate_transfer_fee()` (exists but not called in verification)\n- `crates/lib/src/fee/fee.rs:174-204` \u2014 `analyze_payment_instructions()` (correctly accounts for transfer fee in estimation)\n- SPL Token-2022 specification: transfer fees are deducted from the transfer amount by the on-chain program",
  "id": "GHSA-725g-w329-g7qr",
  "modified": "2026-03-12T14:50:43Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T14:50:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/solana-foundation/kora/security/advisories/GHSA-725g-w329-g7qr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/solana-foundation/kora/commit/8cbd8217ee505e6b37c63ef835ff095cfa8ab318"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/solana-foundation/kora"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "kora-lib: Token-2022 Transfer Fee Not Deducted During Payment Verification"
}


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