{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "crawl4ai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-117",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-59",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T21:02:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThree backward-compatible hardening fixes in the Docker API server. The headline issue is an arbitrary file write via the screenshot/PDF `output_path`.\n\n### 1. Arbitrary file write via output_path symlink / TOCTOU (primary)\n\n`POST /screenshot` and `POST /pdf` accept an `output_path` constrained to `ALLOWED_OUTPUT_DIR` by `validate_output_path`. The 0.8.7 check was string-only: it did not resolve symlinks, so a symlinked path component inside the output directory could redirect the write outside the directory, and the final `open()` followed symlinks. On a deployment where the runtime user can write executable/cron locations this is an arbitrary-write to code-execution primitive. The API is unauthenticated by default.\n\nFix: `validate_output_path` now resolves the real path (symlinks) of the parent and re-checks containment, and the write uses `O_NOFOLLOW` (`write_output_file`). `output_path` remains supported.\n\n### 2. CRLF log injection (CWE-117)\n\nUser-controlled URLs/errors reflected into log lines could embed CR/LF and forge additional log entries. Fix: a logging filter strips CR/LF/control characters from all records.\n\n### 3. Webhook request-header injection (CWE-93/CWE-113)\n\nUser-supplied webhook headers were sent verbatim, allowing CRLF and hop-by-hop / sensitive header injection on the outbound webhook request. Fix: webhook headers are validated (name pattern, no control characters, deny `Host`/`Content-Length`/`Transfer-Encoding`/`Authorization`/`Cookie`/...), with early request-time rejection.\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file write (potential code execution) for #1; log forging for #2; request smuggling / header injection on outbound webhooks for #3.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to the patched version.\n- Enable authentication (`CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN`).\n- Run the container with a read-only root filesystem.\n\n### Credits\n\nInternal security audit (Crawl4AI maintainers).",
  "id": "GHSA-7cx2-g3h9-382p",
  "modified": "2026-06-16T21:02:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T21:02:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-7cx2-g3h9-382p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/issues/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/issues/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/pull/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Crawl4AI: Arbitrary file write (symlink/TOCTOU) plus log and webhook-header injection in Docker server"
}